By Ahmad Dahlan
The issue of political Islam and the state in Indonesia apparently continues to roll ahead of the 2019 presidential election as President Joko Widodo from the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDIP) took Professor Ma’ruf Amin as a vice presidential candidate. Ma’ruf Amin is an ulema, scholar, and an expert in Islamic economics.
The declaration of cleric Ma’ruf Amin as President Jokowi’s running mate in next year’s presidential election has surprised many as the announcement occurred just hours after former Consitutional Court chief justice Professor Mahfud MD appeared to confirm he was the vice presidential choice of Widodo.
What also made the decision astonishing is the fact that Jokowi was nominated as a presidential candidate by the Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP), the ruling party which had been perceived as a nationalist-red party and not too open to Islamic policies, although in the past presidential election, PDIP was supported by a mass Islamic-based party, particularly the United Development Party (PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and several NU cadres.
Is the election of Amin as Jokowi’s Vice President candidate aimed at alleviating tensions over political Islam within the country or Jokowi is purely seeking victory?
Issues Exacerbating Political Islam in Indonesia
There are three recent major issues related to the exacerbation of political Islam in Indonesia. First, the left-wing issue relating to the rise of communism. Of course, prejudice about the rise of communism is inseparable from the parties involved in the September 30 movement. “According to historians, in 1965 – 1966 Islamic youth and paramilitary groups with military backing massacred between 500,000 and one million suspected communists across the country.”¹
Second, the right-Islam issue is terrorism and Daulah Islamiyah. Indonesia is panicked by the extreme ideology of right Islam which had given birth to many militant-jihad attacks. Unfortunately, many Muslims are trapped in a circle of terrorism which is allegedly affiliated with the IS (Islamic State) movement in Iraq and Syria, and are willing to commit suicide terrorism. Even the latest Indonesia church attacks in Surabaya is very ironic, because the attacks were committed by a family of suicide bombers.2
Third, bilateral trade and development relations between Indonesia and China continue to be passionate. Xiao Qian (Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia) said in 2017 that the value of Indonesian exports to China reached U.S. $ 28.5 billion (up 35%), and Indonesian imports from China reached U.S. $ 34.8 billion (up 8.3%).3 This bilateral trade relationship is often politicised and linked to communism.
These three issues directly or indirectly create tension against the socio-political-economic conditions of Muslims in Indonesia. Can Amin address these problems? Also, what is the role of Islamic economics in neutralising Indonesia’s economic development going forward?
Ma’ruf Amin As Expert in Islamic Economics
In the socio-political aspect, the appointment of Amin could be correct to alleviate the issue of SARA (ethnicity, religion, race and between groups) or identity politics.
According to the Chairman of the Central Leadership Board of PDIP, Andreas Pareira, the Ma’ruf Amin election could reduce the identity politics attacks aimed at Jokowi. To recall, in the 2014 presidential election, there were groups who spread the issue about Jokowi being a non-Muslim and his affiliation with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).4
In my opinion, PDIP seemed to be more interested in Ma’ruf’s position as an expert in the field of economics (Islam) and Chair of the National Sharia Council, which oversees and gives fatwas on the Islamic economic system in Indonesia – roles that are rarely known by the Indonesian people. With his breadth of knowledge and expertise in economics, his victory in the upcoming 2019 presidential election and tenure could help advance macroeconomic policies (national economic development) based on Islamic economics, and encourage the growth of sharia financial and banking institutions in Indonesia.
Relation of Political Islam and Islamic Economics in Indonesia
If you look at the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, it was considerably late compared to other Muslim-majority countries. Some findings suggest that this can be attributed to President Soeharto’s regime (New Order) and his policies towards Islam.
Interestingly, it was Soeharto who provided political-economic support for the establishment of the first Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat) at the time when the Islamic trend is giving a stronger sociological effect.
In an interview with Perwaatmadja (founder of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia and had served in the Islamic Development Bank), he explained one thing that Moerdiono (at that time the minister of state secretary) emphasised is the idea of Islamic bank establishment is not in line with the Indonesian Islamic State (NII).5 In fact, the idea of establishing an Islamic bank is far from the mission of establishing an Islamic state.
Soeharto immediately carried out political and regulatory policies by issuing a Government Regulation (PP) concerning banks with the profit sharing principle,6 and he drive to pool the core capital so the Islamic bank could be realised in Indonesia. It is rare that President Soeharto quickly agrees with the Islamic policies/issues, especially if driven by political parties (pure politics).
This reflects that the use of Islamic economic system and banking as a way to change authorities’ views on political Islam is very effective and does not cause much Islamic tension with the state or Islamic phobia.
Meanwhile, it was suspected that Suharto’s support for the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) was an opportunist strategy, because of his political stance that saw positive changes about “Islamisation” especially among the middle class.7
Also, Effendy’s research found that the relationship of the Islam and state was not easy. It had an impact on the political role of Islam to participate fully in Indonesian political development, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Then the deadlock found common ground in 1992 when both accommodated interests.8
That conflict can be seen today in Jokowi-Ma’ruf tandem (a Nationalist-Religious tandem). Perhaps, PDIP wants to have a memorable victory in the upcoming 2019 presidential election the same way as the victory of Ganjar-Taj Yajin, in the Central Java Governor election (2018). If you look at the surveys, Jokowi has better electability than Prabowo.
Again, in the context of Islamic political economy, basically the Islamic economic system or the personification of Islamic economics like the election of Ma’ruf – which is perceived to be a synthesis and a way to reduce the political Islam tensions in Indonesia did not come suddenly, but has been in a very long process.
Referring to Hefner in the late 1980s, new modernists (young Muslim thinkers) began to emerge. They campaign not to conquer the country, but to renew education and culture with new (global) discourse on democratisation and human rights. They stated, the ultimate goal of Muslim politics is not to create a centralised state with monopoly rights to politics and culture, but the building of Muslim civil society that is able to balance the state power, and promote public culture about pluralism, public participation and social justice.9 Political structure which is the focus of Islamic economic thought and movement has been in motion since the 1980s and were discussed in various books and literatures. Again, at that time, the political Islam relationship and state was known as antagonistic (not mutually agreed).10 Hefner explained that between 1983 and 1985, the Indonesian government required all mass organisations to be founded on the Pancasila ideology. The New Order regime often interfered in Muslim organisations.11
Today, Islamisation is already in the public space, which was pioneered by the rise of the Islamic economy in Indonesia since 1990s. The political space before that barely allowed the formalisation of Islam/sharia now acknowledges many regulations such as sharia banking laws and sukuk.
Also, there has been various civil Islamic political economic organisations such as the Islamic Economic Community (MES), the Association of Islamic Economics Experts (IAEI), Indonesian Islamic Bank Association (Asbisindo) among others which carry out activities and encouragement for the government to support policies on development of Islamic economics system and Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia.
The positive impact that the Islamic economic system/sharia has is that it can ease tensions in political Islam, and the integration of the word “Islam/sharia” in the financial and business economic systems in Indonesia has created internal inclusiveness (among Muslims) because Islamic economics does not contain sensitive differences (khilafiyah).
The Islamic economics also creates external inclusiveness where Islamic financial institutions do not only belong to Muslims but can be owned and accessed by all people regardless of religion, race, ethnicity and class, even from the Chinese group. To note, some Islamic banks are only business units of conventional banks whose majority shares are owned by Chinese people. This model is difficult to be realised in other Islamic institutions.
These are the best conditions and moments about Islamic economics and its personification
Featured Image: The battle lines for Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election were drawn when Mr Widodo (left) chose Mr Amin (right) as his running mate. (AP: Tatan Syuflana)
About the Author
Ahmad Dahlan is a doctor in Islamic Economics and Finance, and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics and Islamic Business, IAIN Purwokerto, Indonesia. He wrote many books, articles, competitive researchers; was active in the Sharia Economic Community Expert Council (MES); and served as a Deputy Chair of the Indonesian Economists Association (IAEI), Banyumas Regency. His article, “Political Economy of Islamic Banking in Indonesia,” was recently published in the American International Journal of Social Science (June 2018).
1. Lamb, Kate., “Beware the red peril: Indonesia still fighting ghosts of communism.” The Guardian. October 1, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/beware-the-red-peril-indonesia-still-fighting-ghosts-of-communism.
2. Horten, Alex. “Family of suicide bombers kills at least 7 in Indonesia church attacks.” The Washington Post. May 13, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/13/family-of-suicide-bombers-kills-at-least-7-in-indonesia-church-attacks/?utm_term=.3ea39b4b9fb9.
3.“Dubes: Nilai perdagangan Indonesia-China meningkat.” Antaranews.com. January 30, 2018. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/681839/dubes-nilai-perdagangan-china-indonesia-meningkat.
4. “Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin: Politik Identitas VS Isu Ekonomi,” Tempo.co. August 20, 2018. https://fokus.tempo.co/read/1118744/jokowi-maruf-amin-politik-identitas-vs-isu-ekonomi.
5. Karnanen Anwar Perwaatmadja, interview, Tuesday, July 12, 2016 at Jakarta. The sentence were processed by the author.
6. At that time invited PP No. 70, 71 and 72 concerning banking based on profit sharing principle.
7. Hefner, Robert W. “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesia Middle Class.” paper. Mujani Saiful. “Kultur Kelas Menengah Muslim dan Kelahiran ICMI: Tanggapan Terhadap Robert W. Hefner dan Mitsuo Nakamura.” on the Nasrullah Ali Fauzi (ed.), ICMI Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi, (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), p. 76-77.
8. Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the state: the transformation of Islamic political ideas and practices in Indonesia, thesis (doctoral), (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1994), p. 214.
9. Hefner, Robert W. “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization”, Sociology of Religion, Oxfort Journal, Published by: Oxford University Press, Vol 62, No 4, 2001, p. 504.
10. Hadiz Vedi R., “Indonesian Political Islam: Capitalist Development and the Legacies of the Cold War.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 30, 1, 3-38.
11. Hefner. Public Islam, p. 505.







































































The Political Personality of Donald Trump
By Winston Nagan and Samantha Manausa
What kind of a personality is Donald Trump? In this article, the authors share their insights on what type of leader Trump is by looking at various perspectives, and whether his traits are compatible with what the democracy requires as well as what his recent conducts as president indicate about the political history of America.
Donald Trump, in poetic terms, resembles the Green Knight in the poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. The Green Knight storms into the aristocratic and sophisticated castle of King Arthur. He represents the unruliness and unkemptness of crude, untethered nature. Donald Trump’s personality is a complex combination of natural forces, many of which have a psychopathological edge to them. From the point of political psychology, he is the quintessential illustration of the power-oriented and directed personality. There is nothing necessarily bad about a leader seeking power. However, the methods he uses to get power may reveal complex personality traits, some of which are infused with latent psychopathologies. Since he has achieved power, these pathologies have even begun to express themselves in the form of a lethal leadership behaviour. The idea of a political personality that is oriented to power is expressed in scholarly terms as the “private motives of the actor displaced on public objects and rationalised in the public interest.” Clearly, Trump displaces something on public objects and provides garrulous justifications such as “Make America Great Again”, “Beware of Outsiders”, and “We are Under Threat and I have a Solution”. Trump was able to wedge himself into the political process by appealing to a minority of white voters who were still wallowing in shock and awe over the election of a black president.
We have probably underestimated the psychological effect of this change in American politics. Not only was President Obama black, but he was also intellectually skilled and politically competent, matters which severely affected the collective eco-structure of the lower class, the economically deprived white electorate. Regardless of its depressed socio-economic status, this minority had always comforted itself by assuming superiority over blacks in the social status hierarchy. That last refuge of security and whiteness is now threatened by a change in national leadership to a black president. Trump, who, notwithstanding his economic status, has a perspective that is largely lower class and laced with crude vulgarity, probably felt his own whiteness threatened. Thus was born the idea that the president, elected by the American people, did not carry a real mantle of authority. This idea went mainstream in the form of birtherism and the assumption that President Obama could be humiliated by being forced to produce his birth certificate. That this lie endured for so long is a matter of concern which certainly requires further investigation. The explanation probably lies with the administration of President George W. Bush, whose advisors suggested that political truths are largely contingent and can actually be minimised if not obliterated by the repetition of a lie, provided one has the resources to flood the media with the lie. The lie will come to be regarded alongside the truth, compromising truth itself and undermining the veracity of the principle of public life. Trump used birtherism with relentless tenacity to tarnish or obscure the truth. He did this intentionally, which indicates that his intention of exploiting lower class racism may be grounded in a deep pathology in which he gets personal gratification from it.
Trump has appropriated these ideas – namely, the purposeful repetition of a lie and the management of the airwaves – as central features of his administration. Lie after lie so overwhelms the media that there is virtually no discussion of the central issues in his policies. It would be tedious to attempt to recount all the lies relevant to the body politic; the very tediousness of it implies that Trump has utilised lies with great success. The lies he proclaims are shameless, and often come into conflict with previous lies that he has espoused. It is clear that the lies he spews about his opponents are motivated only by a desire for political advantage. There exists no fundamental model of ethics or morality in his utterances.
So, what kind of a personality is Donald Trump? The technical literature offers us a multitude of perspectives through which his personality can be understood. First, although a person’s principle traits may be indicative of personality development, that person may have elements of narcissism in his personality. In a more exåtreme form, narcissism may be a psychopathic disorder. In general, however, it straddles the line between egregious behaviour and tempered behaviour. Trump’s administration is saturated with narcissism; both his campaign and presidential platforms all tend to focus more on Trump than on his ideas or plans. Another framework of personality is more concerned with symptoms of obsession and compulsion. This could be reflected in Trump’s obsession with denigrating others who are deemed “outsiders”, such as Muslims and Latin American immigrants. This can also indicate a psychopathic disorder. Other pathological perspectives would consider the Machiavellian outlook, and would find Trump to be a radically manipulative personality. It is true that leaders need some measures of this to be successful. However, in extreme forms, manipulation is done only for the sake of manipulation, representing yet another form of psychopathological behaviour. Similarly, the normal personality may also have a streak of paranoia. In a sense, Trump’s impatience with criticisms or challenging questions from the media are indications that there is a small level of paranoia in his political style. Finally, two compelling perspectives are those of the authoritarian personality and totalitarian personality. Trump has shown a tendency toward authoritarianism, though they were somewhat subdued during his campaign. It is difficult to see him in totalitarian mode, but this is possibly a latent feature of his outlook. What is clear is that Trump’s personality has a number of traits that are pathological in some degree and would appear to be incompatible with what a real democracy requires. His recent conduct as president, which includes threats to withdraw security clearances of intelligence officials, banning a White House reporter from a correspondence reception, indicating that the new Russian assault on American democracy will target Democrats and not Republicans, dismissal of national security advisors and the Secretary of State, and more, indicate that we may be in for a rough time in the political history of our nation.
About The Authors