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One Global Industry, Three Incompatible Tax Playbooks

Few industries illustrate the mess of global tax fragmentation as clearly as online gambling right now. Within the space of a few months, three major markets have moved in three different directions on how to tax the same basic activity – and an operator selling the same product across all three has to comply with all of them simultaneously.

One Global Industry, Three Incompatible Tax Playbooks

Brussels is currently weighing a coordinated approach. A proposed 1% EU-wide levy on gambling operators has reportedly gained momentum as part of the bloc’s next long-term budget, with backers arguing it could raise billions for education, youth and mental health funding, alongside strengthening the case against illegal operators. The proposal still needs unanimous approval from all 27 member states, and Malta – whose economy leans heavily on the gambling sector – has already signalled resistance, arguing fiscal sovereignty should stay with individual states.

The US shows what happens without that coordination

Contrast that with the country that never attempted harmonisation in the first place. State-by-state sports betting tax rates in the US currently range from 6.75% in Nevada to 51% in New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island, with wildly different rules on promotional deductions and loss-carryover that widen the gap further between headline and effective rates. Seven years after the Supreme Court cleared the way for state-level legalisation, there’s still no federal rate, and operators build entirely separate compliance and pricing models state by state.

This site’s own take on why globalisation makes this unavoidable

None of this is unique to gambling. This site’s own piece on cross-border tax management makes the broader point directly: any business operating in more than one market has to reckon with fluctuating currency exposure and a different tax and reporting regime in every jurisdiction it touches, and the more markets it’s in, the more that compliance burden compounds rather than averages out. Gambling is simply an unusually visible example of a pattern that applies to any genuinely multinational business, and one that’s only getting more pronounced as more sectors expand across borders at the same time regulators are trying to catch up.

What a genuinely global operator has to reconcile

An operator like Bet365, licensed and taxed in the UK, active in EU member states that could soon face a bloc-wide levy, and expanding into US states with a 45-point spread in effective tax rates, has to run three fundamentally different compliance calculations at once rather than one global playbook. Bet365’s current bonus code and offer terms on ToffeeWeb reflect one small piece of that discipline – eligibility, minimum deposit and wagering conditions disclosed as a standalone reference specific to the UK market, distinct from whatever a US state or an EU jurisdiction would separately require.

Why none of the three approaches is obviously right

Harmonisation reduces arbitrage but requires unanimous political buy-in that a bloc of 27 sovereign states may simply never deliver. Fragmentation lets each jurisdiction calibrate to local politics but invites exactly the offshore and cross-border migration effects that tend to erode the tax base it was designed to capture. Neither approach has yet produced a stable equilibrium anywhere it’s been tried at scale, which is worth remembering the next time a headline treats a new gambling tax announcement as a simple, one-off revenue story.

Why the underlying caution matters across every one of these markets

None of the tax architecture changes what the product actually is for the people using it. According to the Gambling Commission’s 2025 Gambling Survey for Great Britain, 2.4% of adults – roughly 1.3 million people – meet the threshold for problem gambling, with a further 3.1% classed as at-risk. The signs researchers flag are specific: chasing a loss with a bigger stake, needing to bet more for the same buzz, hiding how much time or money is going into it, or feeling anxious when unable to place a bet. Anyone recognising those signs, in themselves or someone close to them, can contact GamCare or use GAMSTOP to self-exclude from every UK-licensed gambling site at once.

The takeaway for anyone tracking cross-border tax policy

Gambling happens to be the industry making this visible right now, but the underlying tension – one product, many tax regimes, no consensus on the right model – will keep resurfacing in whichever sector globalises next. Watching how this particular fight resolves is as good a preview as any of what’s coming for digital services, crypto and carbon taxes too.

18+. Gambling can be addictive. Please play responsibly. Gambling is strictly prohibited for individuals under the age of 18. Need help? Visit GambleAware.org or call 0808 8020 133 (available 24/7). You can self-exclude from all UK-licensed gambling websites via GAMSTOP. Support is also available via GamCare. All promotions are subject to eligibility, wagering requirements, and full T&Cs. See operator site for details. Commercial content – contains an affiliate link.

Labuan IBFC: A Nexus for Regional Financial Connectivity

From Niche Innovation to Ubiquity

Buying coffee, paying for groceries, shopping online via embedded payment solutions and carrying out banking transactions on mobile banking apps through a few taps on the smartphone– these are all examples of how deeply embedded fintech has become in the life of an average consumer. The operations often run seamlessly in the background, underpinning routine financial transactions.

Small businesses also leverage on fintech to manage their daily operations, from e-invoicing systems to inventory tracking. Additionally, traditional non-bank financial institutions activities, such as sending remittances abroad, applying for loans or purchasing insurance have been significantly simplified and made more accessible by fintech solutions.

The widespread use and integration of fintech in our daily lives underscores how the segment has evolved from a niche offering to a core component underpinning the modern financial ecosystem.

Labuan IBFC: Where Fintech Innovation Thrives

The fintech boom in Asia has led to demand for an innovation-led landscape underpinned by strong fundamentals. This is where Labuan International Business and Financial Centre (Labuan IBFC) comes in, providing a sophisticated framework where avant-garde solutions are frameworked by robust governance which allow for sustained expansion and credibility with quick turnaround times.

Labuan IBFC is currently home to more than 90* digital services providers, which spotlights the jurisdiction’s position as a digital hub. These service providers encompass digital banks, financial exchanges and fintech intermediaries, which thrive within an operating environment that promotes connectivity, innovation capability and partnership. The result is more than a hub—it is a living ecosystem driving the future of digital finance. *Source: Labuan IBFC Market Report 2025

The jurisdiction was placed 37th in the Global Financial Centres Index 39 (GFCI 39) fintech ranking as of March 2026. The GFCI 39 evaluation considers innovation, infrastructure, talent, and regulatory environment. This recognition highlights a preference for jurisdictions that balance forward-looking capability with regulatory robustness.

Combining Digital Innovation with Regulatory Integrity

Key to Labuan IBFC’s success as a digital hub is its legacy licensing approach, which supports a wide range of fintech solutions and activities. Licenses in this segment include the digital banking license, which is key for digital banking operations; alongside the payment system operator, digital financial exchange, digital financial broker and digital investment management licences, which support regulated digital payments, trading, brokerage, and investment activities. It also provides framework-based approvals for tokenisation and digital asset-related platforms under the oversight of Labuan Financial Services Authority (Labuan FSA).

This is complemented by the dedicated Shariah-compliant legislation within its established Islamic finance ecosystem, which enables the jurisdiction to leverage on the meaningful opportunities arising from the intersection of fintech-Islamic finance.

Another key factor is the jurisdiction’s adherence to global transparency and taxation standards, in compliance with OECD regulations inclusive of the BEPS initiative. Oversight by a single regulator – Labuan FSA – and enforcement of a substance requirement policy both contribute to a thriving digital hub that operates on the parallel tracks of governance and measurable economic presence. 

From Financial Centre to Strategic Gateway

Over Labuan IBFC’s 35 years of existence, a key evolution has taken place, whereby the jurisdiction’s role has evolved from a financial centre to a gateway between global capital markets and high-growth regional ecosystems. This is evident especially in fintech, which sees Labuan entities connecting global infrastructure with demand from Asia in a legal and expansionary manner.

An example of this gateway proposition is reflected in regulated digital finance structures established within the jurisdiction, such as the tokenisation of Shariah-compliant securities via the Islamic Digital Assets Centre (IDAC) approach. In one such case study, the tokenisation of IILM sukuk was conducted via a Labuan-regulated platform without compromising Shariah integrity, credit quality, or regulatory compliance. Lower investment thresholds and quicker settlement allow expanded access to institutional-grade Islamic instruments without sacrificing stringent protection for investors. 

The case study above illustrates a key point: the competitive advantage for an ecosystem is not about providing and utilising the most advanced technology; instead, the sustainability and success of an ecosystem will be contingent upon a compliant and flexible framework. In this context, Labuan IBFC’s strength is not merely enabling innovation, but in facilitation — positioning itself as the trusted gateway through which capital can move efficiently, securely, and at scale across different financial systems.

Powering Asia Pacific’s Digital Financial Infrastructure

The explosive growth of fintech, digital payments and platform economies across the Asia Pacific is fuelling the need for scalable financial infrastructure, as the surge in real-time payments, e-wallet adoption and cross-border transactions influences how consumers and SMEs access financial services. Parallelly, the rise of SMEs and digital platforms has made embedded finance solutions a necessity; with payments, lending and treasury functions seamlessly integrated into business ecosystems.

In this landscape, Labuan IBFC plays a collaborative role, enabling efficient cross-border licensing, financial intermediation, and regulatory conformity. The jurisdiction provides globally-compliant infrastructure within a robust regulatory framework and cross-border connectivity—thereby positioning itself as a neutral and trusted nexus seamlessly connecting capital, service providers, and markets across the region’s diverse regulatory environment.

Media Contact

About Labuan IBFC

Labuan IBFC, Asia’s premier international financial hub, offers global investors and businesses the benefits of being in a well-regulated and supervised jurisdiction, which adheres to international standards of compliance in tax transparency. We also provide fiscal neutrality and certainty in a currency-neutral operating environment.

Building Resilient Cross-Border Supply Chains in an Era of Trade Uncertainty

By Jesse Mitchell

Trade volatility is reshaping global logistics, making resilient cross-border supply chains a strategic advantage for companies seeking continuity, compliance, and long-term growth.

Global trade has entered a period where shifting tariffs, geopolitical tensions, regulatory changes, and transportation disruptions have become recurring business realities rather than isolated events. Organizations that are adapting most effectively are investing in resilient cross-border supply chains that prioritize flexibility, visibility, and strategic planning alongside cost efficiency.

Why Has Trade Uncertainty Become a Permanent Supply Chain Challenge?

Trade volatility is now driven by overlapping factors rather than isolated events, making disruption a recurring business risk. Many companies with international supply chains are navigating overlapping changes in tariffs, geopolitical conditions, regulatory requirements, transportation capacity and customs enforcement priorities.

Supply chain planning increasingly requires flexibility because changes in trade policy, customs administration and market conditions may take effect before businesses can adjust established sourcing arrangements. The World Trade Organization reported that the value of global goods imports affected by new tariffs and other import measures more than quadrupled between mid-October 2024 and mid-October 2025 compared to the previous 12-month period.

Frequent tariff changes, retaliatory trade measures, and evolving customs requirements have made landed costs less predictable. Businesses should not assume that tariff rates, trade remedy measures, transportation conditions, and other import requirements will remain unchanged throughout an annual sourcing cycle. For North American importers and exporters, customs planning and compliance are increasingly important complements to logistics efficiency. 

What Makes a Cross-Border Supply Chain Resilient? 

Resilient supply chains balance cost efficiency with the ability to adapt quickly to changing trade conditions. Although resilience measures may add near-term costs, they can be treated as long-term risk-management investments that reduce exposure to certain operational and financial disruptions.

Depending on the organization’s products, markets, and risk exposure, a resilient supply chain may draw on capabilities such as:

  • End-to-end supply chain visibility 
  • Strong customs compliance processes 
  • Supplier diversification 
  • Inventory and transportation contingency planning 
  • Data sharing and forecasting capabilities 

Resilience does not come from a single initiative. It comes from combining compliance, visibility, sourcing, inventory and transportation practices that help an organization prepare for disruption and respond when conditions change.

Traditional Supply Chain 

Resilient Supply Chain 

  • Cost-focused 
  • Sourcing decisions led primarily by unit cost 
  • High dependence on a limited number of suppliers 
  • Customs reviewed primarily when shipments are prepared 
  • Shipment information distributed across systems or partners 
  • Contingency plans developed after a disruption 
  • Sourcing decisions consider cost, continuity, lead time and trade exposure 
  • Supplier concentration is assessed, and alternatives are developed where practical 
  • Customs requirements are considered during sourcing and product planning 
  • Relevant shipment and customs information is shared across responsible teams 
  • Key disruption scenarios and response options are documented in advance 

How Can Companies Reduce Cross-Border Risk Without Sacrificing Efficiency? 

Companies can reduce their exposure by involving customs and logistics specialists earlier, reviewing supplier concentration, assessing potential tariff preferences and improving communication among procurement, logistics, compliance and finance teams. These measures cannot prevent every disruption, but they can help businesses identify avoidable risks before goods are shipped.

Engage customs brokers and logistics providers as strategic partners rather than relying on them solely for transactional support. Their expertise can help identify risks in classification, origin, valuation, and documentation before shipments reach the border.

Integrating customs considerations into broader supply chain planning can help reduce avoidable costs and clearance issues. Relevant customs requirements should be considered during sourcing, product and procurement decisions rather than only when a shipment is being prepared for entry. Regular reviews of tariff classification, country of origin, and customs valuation help reduce the risk of delays, reassessments, and unexpected duty costs.

Cross-functional communication is another critical component. Collaboration between procurement, logistics, customs compliance, and finance helps align operational and commercial decision-making. Ensure relevant information on tariff changes, supplier risks, inventory levels, and regulatory developments is shared across departments. Clear ownership of customs compliance and trade risk management helps organizations respond more consistently as regulations evolve.

6 Key Resilience Practices 

While every supply chain has unique risks, the most resilient organizations consistently prioritize the following practices: 

  1. Diversify suppliers strategically 
  2. Invest in customs compliance 
  3. Improve shipment visibility 
  4. Conduct scenario planning 
  5. Regularly review trade policy exposure 
  6. Strengthen relationships across logistics partners 

These practices help organizations respond more effectively to disruptions while maintaining operational continuity and long-term competitiveness.

What Should Leaders Prioritize as Global Trade Continues to Evolve? 

Make resilience your competitive advantage. Resilience is a long-term business capability. Organizations that can adapt quickly are better positioned to maintain customer commitments and protect profitability during periods of uncertainty.

Trade uncertainty has become an enduring feature of today’s global business environment. Organizations that invest in diversified sourcing, strong customs compliance, supply chain visibility, and proactive risk management are better equipped to navigate disruptions while maintaining efficient cross-border operations.

Resilient supply chains are designed to adapt as conditions change, reduce exposure to identifiable risks and support long-term business objectives. Making resilience a business priority can help organizations respond more consistently to trade changes while continuing to serve customers across borders.

About the Author

Jesse Mitchell

Jesse Mitchell is the Director of Business Development at Strader-Ferris International, a Canadian & U.S. customs brokerage, cross-border logistics, and warehousing company. Founded in 1953 by Raymond Strader, SFI was built around his beliefs of an honest and straightforward approach to helping clients succeed. Strader-Ferris has been in business for 70 years and successfully handled millions of cross-border shipments. 

Rising Fuel Prices Add Pressure on U.S. Economy

The conflict involving Iran is starting to affect the U.S. economy as fuel prices continue to rise. Gas prices have moved above $4 per gallon nationwide, while diesel prices have increased even faster. Analysts say higher diesel costs are a bigger concern because they make transporting goods more expensive, which can eventually lead to higher prices for consumers.

Experts say fuel prices may stay high even if oil prices begin to fall. U.S. refineries are already operating near their limits, and fuel supplies remain tight after months of heavy demand and global disruptions. Ongoing attacks affecting energy infrastructure have also made it harder for the market to recover.

Many economists expect higher fuel costs to put more pressure on household budgets in the coming months. While the government has taken steps to support energy supplies, analysts say there are no quick fixes. Until production catches up with demand, Americans could continue paying more at the pump and for everyday goods.

Related Readings:

Dow Surges as Trump Signals Iran Deal Progress

Oil Prices Fall

Power Plants at Risk

The Best Car Shipping Companies of 2026

Shipping a car involves real money, a real asset, and a handoff to strangers you’ve never met. The industry is crowded with brokers that quote low, adjust at pickup, and go quiet during transit. The companies on this list were evaluated for the things that actually determine whether a shipment goes well: pricing transparency, carrier vetting, communication during transport, and what happens when something doesn’t go according to plan.

Six companies made the cut. The list is not a directory of every option on the market; it’s a short list of companies worth trusting with a vehicle.

1. RoadRunner Auto Transport — Best Overall

RoadRunner Auto Transport has been in the car shipping business for 30 years, longer than most of its competitors have existed. The company works with more than 14,000 vetted, FMCSA and DOT-compliant carriers across a nationwide network and manages shipments through its own in-house dispatch team rather than relying entirely on external load boards. An AI-powered proprietary load board handles carrier matching internally, which cuts down on the delays and miscommunications that show up when multiple middlemen are involved.

Pricing is all-inclusive from the start: the quote covers door-to-door pickup and delivery, carrier insurance, and applicable fees. There’s no deposit at booking; payment happens once a carrier is confirmed and pickup is scheduled. That structure removes a common friction point and protects customers in cases where plans change before a carrier is assigned.

The service area covers all 50 states, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, with Caribbean destinations also available. RoadRunner Auto Transport handles standard vehicles, trucks, SUVs, motorcycles, classics, exotics, lifted trucks, dually trucks, oversized vehicles, and inoperable vehicles. Both open and enclosed transport are available. During transit, customers have access to a 24/7 online tracking portal with text and email updates at key milestones.

The company has more than 20,000 five-star Google ratings and is veteran-owned, with military discounts for active-duty service members, veterans, and their families. It operates under USDOT #3124544 out of Bethpage, New York, and holds an accident-free FMCSA safety record for the trailing two years.

For anyone who wants a straightforward quote, no deposit games, and a company with the infrastructure to back up what it promises, RoadRunner Auto Transport is the first call to make. Get a quote at their car shipping calculator.

2. Mercury Auto Transport

Mercury Auto Transport is a Florida-based broker with a solid reputation for fast carrier matching, particularly on high-demand routes like the Florida-to-Northeast corridor. The company offers open and enclosed transport, a price-matching feature for competing quotes, and an online tracking tool. Mercury doesn’t require a deposit upfront and works with a large carrier network. Customer reviews skew positive on communication and pickup timing; the company is a reasonable choice for straightforward moves on well-trafficked routes.

3. SGT Auto Transport

SGT Auto Transport positions itself around price transparency and a price-lock guarantee, meaning the quoted rate is the delivered rate. The company is a broker that focuses on standard residential shipments across the continental US. It offers open and enclosed options, publishes customer reviews prominently, and has a strong record on BBB. SGT is worth considering for budget-conscious shippers on common interstate routes who want a fixed price in writing before committing.

4. Safeeds Auto Transport

Safeeds Auto Transport is a Columbus, Ohio-based broker with a growing national footprint. The company offers open and enclosed transport, door-to-door service, and a 7-day price lock with no upfront payment required. Safeeds has shipped over 10,000 cars and is BBB accredited. The company handles standard vehicles, motorcycles, and specialty vehicles including those purchased at auction. Safeeds is a practical option for customers who want transparent pricing, no deposit, and responsive support throughout the process.

5. AmeriFreight

AmeriFreight is one of the more established brokers in the car shipping space, with a history of competitive pricing and a supplemental insurance add-on that provides additional coverage beyond what carriers’ base cargo insurance covers. The company works with a large carrier network across all 48 contiguous states, with Alaska and Hawaii available through specialist partners. AmeriFreight is frequently cited for its discount structure, including reductions for military, students, and early bookers. A solid mid-range choice for customers who want extra insurance options baked into the process.

6. Montway Auto Transport

Montway is one of the largest auto transport brokers by volume in the United States, handling hundreds of thousands of shipments annually. The company offers real-time tracking, open and enclosed transport, and service to all 50 states. Its scale gives it access to a deep carrier pool, which tends to keep pickup windows tighter than smaller operations can manage. Montway is a reliable choice for standard shipments, particularly for customers who prioritize a well-documented track record and broad availability over a more hands-on customer experience.

What to Look for When Choosing a Car Shipping Company

  • Deposit structure. Companies that require a large deposit before assigning a carrier have less incentive to perform. Look for no-deposit or pay-on-pickup structures.
  • All-in quotes vs. teaser rates. Some companies quote a base rate that excludes carrier insurance and fees, then adjust at pickup. A quote should cover everything.
  • Carrier vetting. A broker is only as good as the carriers it dispatches. Ask how carriers are screened; FMCSA and DOT compliance should be the floor.
  • Communication during transit. Knowing where your vehicle is during a multi-day shipment matters. Tracking portals and proactive updates are worth prioritizing over companies that go quiet once the truck leaves.
  • FMCSA registration. Any broker or carrier moving vehicles across state lines must be registered with the FMCSA. Verify it before booking.

Frequently Asked Questions

How much does it cost to ship a car?

Most domestic shipments run between $500 and $1,500 for open transport. Coast-to-coast moves land at the top of that range or above it. Enclosed transport runs roughly 30 to 50% higher. Distance, vehicle size, route demand, and season all affect the final price; get an all-inclusive quote that covers insurance and fees before comparing numbers across companies.

How long does car shipping take?

Short regional hauls can deliver in one to three days after pickup. Cross-country shipments typically take seven to ten days. Build in a pickup window of two to five days on the front end; carriers consolidate loads along a route before heading out.

Is my car insured during transport?

Licensed carriers are required to carry cargo insurance, and that coverage travels with your vehicle during transport. Coverage levels vary by carrier. Some brokers, including AmeriFreight, offer supplemental insurance for additional protection. Review what’s included before assuming coverage is comprehensive.

Do I need to be present at pickup and delivery?

You or a designated representative needs to be available at both ends to sign the Bill of Lading, which documents the vehicle’s condition before and after transport. This paperwork is important if any damage needs to be claimed.

What’s the difference between open and enclosed transport?

Open transport is the standard option; vehicles ride on an exposed multi-car carrier and the vast majority of shipments use it without incident. Enclosed transport puts the vehicle inside a covered trailer, protecting against weather and road debris. The price difference is real; enclosed typically costs 30 to 50% more. The upgrade makes sense for classics, exotics, or any vehicle whose condition justifies the extra cost.

Trump’s Iran War US Oil Shortage Deception

By Dr. Jack Rasmus

Last June 17, 2026 Trump announced the US and Iran had agreed to a Memorandum of Agreement (MOU) and a ceasefire in the war. The global price of crude oil fell almost immediately—from the $100 per barrel range at which it hovered throughout April and May to $67 for West Texas Crude (WTI) and $70 for Brent crude.

The retail price of gasoline in the US—which had surged from $2.92/gallon nationwide for regular grade gas before the war to the $4.50/gallon range at its peak—cost the American consumer $69 billion in additional out of pocket expense for the four months, March through June.

The MOU did not last long. Within days it began collapsing and in early July both sides declared it was dead. Military attacks by both sides thereafter re-commenced and have escalated steadily ever since. So too has the price of gas at the pump again, as crude oil now exceeds $90/barrel and rising.

When the US government releases crude oil supply from the SPR it doesn’t charge the oil companies anything for the oil. They get the oil for free. No cost.

As the media story goes in the New York Times and Washington Post legacy media in America, Trump responded and agreed to an MOU as result of the pressure from US oil company CEOs who, in early June 2026, went public and warned Trump US oil stockpiles and reserves were running critically low and would disappear in another 3-4 weeks. That would send the spot price of crude well above $150/barrel and gas at the pump to $8/gallon or more! So Trump proposed the MOU to Iran mid-June. The tentative deal on June 17 immediately drove the price of crude down to $67/barrel and shaved 50 cents or more a gallon off the price of gasoline at the pump.

But is this narrative correct?

Was the Iran war really leading to US oil reserves collapsing, causing a severe shortage that was about to drive retail gasoline prices through the roof? Or was the MOU a deception and a tactic to set up a larger military conflict with Iran that is now unfolding?

Let’s look at some facts of the past five months about US crude oil stockpile reserves, US crude production, US crude oil exports and imports, as well as US refinery capacity and gasoline and distillate fuel inventories since February 28, 2026.

Official Data on Oil Reserves, Production & Exports

According to the sources US Energy Information Administration and the private economic research firm, tradingeconomics.com, US commercial oil stock reserves on February 27, 2026 amounted to 439 million barrels. In the first six weeks of military conflict from that date through April 17, US commercial stockpiles of crude rose to 465 million barrels. Thereafter a mild drawdown occurred and by July 17, 2026 the commercial reserves were still 411 million barrels. That latter number represented a mere 6% below the preceding five year average of commercial reserves. Hardly seems like a major commercial stockpile shortage. Or, for that matter, a shortage justifying a $1.50/gallon rise in the price at the pump and $69 billion cost to consumers!

Maybe the commercial reserves were not at crisis levels but the Trump administration’s authorization of a release from the US Strategic Petroleum (SPR) reserve reflected a shortage offset by government oil supplies from the big SPR storage facilities in Big Hill and Bryan Mound, Louisiana.

At the start of the war, the SPR held 415 million barrels. That was already down from its 714 million barrel capacity due to the Biden administration’s release of 300 million barrels after its disastrous inflation and war policies. But that 300 million was all before the Iran war.

By April 17, 2026 the SPR had been drawn down by only 10 million barrels, to 405 million. The drawn down of the SPR didn’t begin until May. By June 26 the SPR reserve was 325 million barrels. Note this fact: the SPR draw down was in May to early June. That’s when the price of crude per barrel was hovering around $100 per barrel—bouncing around a few days lower as Trump falsely announced an end to the conflict no less than 14 times by various accounts—in order to prevent the price surging to more than $100. As Trump manipulated the markets with his announcements, the crude oil price fell $10 to $20 barrel each time, only to rise quickly again after a few days every time he manipulated the markets.

Since June 26 the SPR reserve has continued at around 320 million barrels. On July 17 it was 314 million, down from 325 nearly a month before. In other words, there was little further draw down of the SPR the past month, mid-June to mid-July. Just as there was little draw down from February 28 through April 17. The actual drawn down—about 100 million barrels—occurred between April 17 and June 17. As we’ll see the timing of that drawn down to the period between April 17 and June 17 is important.

The draw down coincided when the price of crude oil hovered consistently around $100 per barrel!

The SPR Oil Company Profit Scam

When the US government releases crude oil supply from the SPR it doesn’t charge the oil companies anything for the oil. They get the oil for free. No cost. They then can sell it for export at the then prevailing market price—i.e. $100 per barrel or more if April to June 17. Or, they can refine it and sell it in the US domestic market—again at the $4.50/gallon price instead of prior $2.92/gallon. In both cases there’s no costs of production for the drilling and other pre-refinery production. And if for export, no costs of production at all. Lower or no cost mean windfall profits.

In the first quarter of 2026 the 27 major US oil companies reported windfall profits of $40 billion. That was before the Iran war and the price escalation. Soon they’ll report second quarter 2026 profits. Analysts except that to be $60 to $80 billion additional profit windfall.

So the US big oil companies in just the first half will realize more than $100 billion further profit from the Iran war. While the US consumer puts out $69 billion and cuts other spending and/or his savings by that amount.

Who says war is not profitable! And who wants it to continue? And this is not to mention the Weapons companies of the Military Industrial Complex. Or the financial speculators who got pre-notice of Trump’s market price manipulation announcements—which include his friends and family businesses who placed speculative bets on oil price swings since February 2026!

The SPR oil company profits scam—where they wait to take SPR free oil at $0 dollar cost until it reaches $100 per barrel and more and then sell it at 100% profit—is just one of many ways that capitalists of various ilk have been exploiting the war.

Defenders of the SPR scam will argue the oil companies don’t realize 100% profit. They have to return the free oil from the SPR at a higher rate that they received. Typically they are required to return 1.2 barrels for every 1 barrel they take. True. But they can wait up to two years to replace the 1.2 barrels. So they wait until the price per barrel falls more than 20% in order to pump their own oil to send to the SPR.

This is not unlike ‘short selling’ stock market shares by speculators. In a short sale, the financial speculator capitalist takes possession of a share of stock and technically ‘sells’ it. When the price of the stock then collapses he ‘buys’ the stock at the much lower price. So he buys it low and (pre) sells it high. The difference is the speculative profit. He doesn’t actually take possession of anything. It’s all an accounting manipulation, except for the profit at the end which he gets to bank in his account. That’s real.

In similar fashion, the Oil company waits until the price per gallon is high, only then ‘takes’ the oil from the SPR. Sells it at the peak market price. Then waits until the price collapses and replaces the oil at the low market price. Even if the replacement is 1.2 to 1, the profit difference is when the lower replacement price is less than 20%. US oil companies took and sold SPR oil at $100 or more per barrel. They have two years to replace it at less than $80. The difference is pure profit. Should a recession occur within two years, the price per crude will certainly fall to $50 or less.

Other Evidence of No Oil Shortage

The oil companies in the meantime gouge the US consumer at the retail level for gasoline, home heating oil, and diesel.

If there was a true supply shortage, why has US crude oil production not changed at all during 2026 and the war?

From our same sources, on February 27, daily US crude oil production in the US was 13.7 million barrels. On April 17 13.6. On June 26, it was 13.8. Since June it has been steady at 13.8 million barrels. So the shortage is not due to US crude oil production. And, as we saw, not due to oil company commercial crude oil reserves.

So where has the SPR oil supply (100 million barrel draw down April-June) gone? Try US oil companies’ US oil exports. The dollar value of those exports rose from $7.8 billion for the month of February 2026 before the Iran war to $17.1 billion in April 2026 to $19.1 billion in May. (June is not yet available but almost certainly will exceed $22 billion).

An argument can thus be made the SPR release plus the US companies’ crude output increase has gone to exports. While some of the dollar value increase is no doubt due to the rising price of US crude exports, some of that is also due to the increase volume of crude exports.

And not just crude oil exports. Refined oil product exports have risen in quantity and price as well. US Refinery capacity rose from 89% in February 2026 to 96% in July.  That increase in refinery output should have increased the supply of gasoline, distillates, etc. and thus reduced the price for consumers at the pump but didn’t. (More supply means lower price).

Gasoline and distillate inventories fell slightly despite the US refinery production rise from 89% to 96% capacity.

While some of the dollar value increase is no doubt due to the rising price of US crude exports, some of that is also due to the increase volume of crude exports.

According to the Wall St Journal of July 9, 2026, US gasoline inventories fell from 253 million barrels on February 27 to 212 million on July 9. And distillate inventories from 120 to 103 million barrels. In both cases, not much a decline or shortage from prior five year average levels, but certainly not enough of a supply shock to justify a 50% increase or more in the cost per gallon for gasoline and diesel fuel!

Conclusions

The data for both US crude oil production and reserves (commercial or SPR) simply don’t indicate there’s been a crisis in oil supply shortage in the US.

US crude production and commercial reserves don’t support that view.

The US SPR release is actually a profits scam to enrich the oil companies, who will have realized windfall profits of more than $100 billion in just the first six months of 2026.

In contrast, US households have paid out of pocket $69 billion. US businesses more.

Much of the SPR free oil was likely re-exported by the US oil companies at significant profit.

US oil companies’ refinery output should have increased the supply of gasoline and distillates but didn’t. That moderate refined oil output increase was also likely mostly re-exported.

There is not now, nor has there been a supply shortage of either crude oil or refined oil products in the US. It’s all a Trump-Media-MIC misrepresentation of facts to justify a grand scale rip-off and exploitation—as all wars are.

Now that the Iran war has resumed as a hot war in July, the process of exploitation of consumers, oil price manipulation and speculation, and oil company profits windfalls will repeat in the second half of 2026.

About the Author

jack_rasmusDr. Jack Rasmus is author of the recently published book, ‘The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy from Reagan to Trump’, Clarity Press, 2020. He publishes at Predicting the Global Economic Crisis. 

The Collapse of the Bipartisan Consensus Over US-Israel Ties

By Dan Steinbock

After the Gaza genocide, bipartisan consensus over US-Israel ties is crumbling. As legal debate is expanding, the political foundation of unconditional U.S. military support for Israel has entered its most serious crisis in decades.

For decades, U.S. support for Israel rested on one of Washington’s strongest bipartisan assumptions: that military assistance was strategically necessary and politically untouchable. But Gaza has weakened that consensus.

Critics now see Israeli military aid as a misguided strategy and political target. The most visible shift has occurred inside the Democratic Party.

A collapsing bipartisan consensus on Israel

Driven by voter and demographic shifts, humanitarian concerns in Gaza, and the unwarranted conflict with Iran, more than 100 House Democrats recently supported an amendment seeking to block billions of dollars in Israel-related assistance, an extraordinary departure from previous voting patterns.

House Democratic leadership (including Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries) has officially called for a “major reset” in U.S.-Israel relations.

Senate efforts to restrict weapons transfers have also attracted substantial Democratic support, reflecting growing concern about civilian casualties, international law, and U.S. responsibility.

Accountability after mass atrocities has increasingly examined not only battlefield actors but also the widening web of political leaders.

The Republican coalition is also less unified than before. While most Republican lawmakers remain strongly supportive of Israel, MAGA-aligned figures influenced by anti-interventionism, “America First” priorities, and skepticism toward foreign aid have increasingly questioned open-ended commitments.

Growing opposition within the MAGA movement to U.S. arms transfers centers on a deep ideological rift over foreign interventionism. Former Georgia Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene left office in January 2026 after a bitter falling out with President Trump.

While much of the base supports President Trump’s foreign policy, a growing, vocal faction—backed by prominent voices like Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, and Representative Thomas Massie—challenges continued, unconditional weapons shipments.

The result is a new political landscape: traditional pro-Israel Democrats, evangelical conservatives, progressive Democrats, libertarian Republicans, and anti-interventionist conservatives now approach the issue from fundamentally different premises.

The debate is therefore no longer simply “pro-Israel versus anti-Israel.” It concerns whether U.S. strategic interests, domestic law, international obligations, and humanitarian concerns can continue to be reconciled under existing policy.

From political controversy to legal challenges

At the same time, legal initiatives accusing U.S. officials of complicity or failure to prevent alleged Israeli violations have moved the debate from politics into courts, international institutions, and questions of historical accountability.

The legal debate has developed along several tracks. The most significant U.S. case was Defense for Children International–Palestine v. Biden, brought by Palestinian organizations, Gaza residents, and Palestinian-Americans against President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, for their alleged “failure to prevent and complicity in the unfolding genocide against Gaza.”

Along with the human rights organizations, the lawsuit was promoted by Josh Paul who had resigned from the U.S. State Department over arms shipments to Israel; Jewish Voice for Peace; and genocide and Holocaust scholars spearheaded by international lawyer William Schabas.

The plaintiffs proposed that a genocide, or serious risk of genocide, of Palestinians in Gaza was occurring. They also argued the U.S. is violating its duties under international law to prevent and not be complicit in the genocide. Those U.S. failures were seen to contribute to the erosion of “long and widely held norms of international law,” including the Genocide Convention and Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Palestine et al. v. Biden et al. case was dismissed by the U.S. Court with a ruling that “while it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide,” U.S. foreign policy was a political question over which courts lacked jurisdiction. In a written decision, U.S. District Judge Jeffrey White quoted approvingly from a prior preliminary ruling (by the ICJ in the case brought against Israel by South Africa). It found Israel’s conduct in Gaza may amount to genocide and ordered it to stop killing and wounding Palestinians.

Other initiatives include advocacy and legal campaigns by groups such as Democracy for the Arab World Now (DAWN), which warned U.S. officials that continued assistance after awareness of alleged violations could raise questions of aiding and abetting.

DAWN wanted the ICC to investigate Biden, Blinken, and Austin for violating Articles 25(3)(c) and (d) of the Rome Statute. These crimes featured those identified in the ICC arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Intriguingly, the DAWN submission widened the net of “accessorial liability” to include several other U.S. officials as well.

More recently, DAWN and allied organizations have also challenged Trump administration’s measures targeting ICC-related advocacy.

Genocide scholar William Schabas and other international-law experts have supported arguments that third-party states may face responsibility if they knowingly facilitate atrocities. In the mainstream corporate media, these remain contested (though increasingly popular) legal interpretations. Yet, the latter have expanded the debate beyond Israel itself to states providing weapons, diplomatic protection, or political cover.

Biden cabinet’s accessorial liability

Critics of the Biden administration argue that responsibility cannot be limited to the president alone. They point to a broader decision-making network involving arms transfers, diplomatic protection, intelligence coordination, and political messaging.

During her failed presidential campaign, Vice President Kamala Harris touted her readiness for executive responsibility by supporting continued military aid to Israel. Although she acknowledged that Gaza was a “humanitarian catastrophe,” she said that she would not shift policy from Biden. Nor would she end arms sales to Israel.

The role of Secretary of State Antony Blinken was most critical because he served as Biden’s right-hand in the Middle East and led the administration’s (largely futile) diplomacy in the region. The State Department oversees diplomatic relations, arms approvals, and implementation of human-rights-related foreign assistance standards.

U.S. military support relied on his subordinates who failed to raise the alarm on the use of arms transfers to Israel in disregard of U.S. foreign policy, domestic legal standards, and international obligations, including Bonnie Jenkins, the Under Secretary of Arms Control and International Security, and Stanley L. Brown, acting as Assistant Secretary Political-Military Affairs, which coordinates between the State and Defense Departments on arms transfers and oversees the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

Along with Blinken, Pentagon had the vital role. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and senior officials were involved because the Department manages military assistance and security cooperation. Israel’s military support relied on senior officials like Amanda Dory, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who provided strategic direction for international arms sales, and Mike Miller, as Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Other officials identified by critics include National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan who advised the President on the strategic implications of arms transfers and ensured the coordination between defense, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies. In turn UN Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield had a high-profile role in the UN Security Council. She vetoed seven resolutions calling for immediate ceasefire, humanitarian assistance and limits to Israeli attacks against civilians. She was the public face of a cabinet that was more willing to finance arms for genocide than to end the atrocities.

As Secretary of Treasury, Janet Yellen may look like a gentle grandmother, but she also pledged the U.S. could afford to offer huge amounts of military aid to Ukraine and Israel at the same time, enabling the ceaseless flow of arms in both wars. She warned Iran that nothing was “off the table” for sanctions if Tehran were to be linked to the Hamas-led attack on Israel.

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo oversaw dual-use technology exports. CIA Director William J. Burner and the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines were intimately linked with the Biden cabinet’s actions regarding Gaza.

So, in addition to the big three and the supportive six members of the Biden cabinet, the widening net of accessorial liability includes at least half a dozen other heads of executive departments and some ten cabinet-level officials.

The legal question is not whether every official who supported policy decisions shares identical responsibility. The narrower issue is whether individuals who knowingly continued, facilitated, or defended policies that allegedly contributed to unlawful acts and mass atrocities could or should face political, reputational, or legal consequences.

Historically, accountability after mass atrocities has increasingly examined not only battlefield actors but also the widening web of political leaders, administrators, financiers, and institutions that enable military campaigns.

Are mass atrocities crimes without punishment

In Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov thought he was above ordinary morality. Since some are destined to rise beyond good and evil for a higher purpose, he commits a murder but discovers that he will gain no salvation without atonement. Raskolnikov’s unraveling reveals a deeper truth. No mind, no matter how brilliant, can erase its own humanity.

But perhaps things have changed since Dostoyevsky.

After leaving office, many senior Biden officials moved into academia, consulting, publishing, advisory boards, and policy institutions. Today they pontificate on their great achievements in the Biden cabinet.

After leaving office on January 20, 2025, former President Joe Biden has been writing his White House memoir. Thanks to a deal with Creative Artists Agency (CAA), a Hollywood giant, he hopes to cash on future opportunities. He has made only selective public appearances, due to ongoing treatment for prostate cancer.

Having served as Biden’s echo chamber on Gaza, Vice-President Kamala Harris moved to Los Angeles with her family. Like Biden, she, too, signed with CAA to focus on speaking and publishing. 

Former State Secretary Blinken entered the policy and academic circuit. He has a book deal with Crown Publishing. The memoir promises to provide a “candid” and “rare glimpse” of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza. Blinken is likely hoping a new post in a post-Trump Democratic administration or a return to lucrative private sector consulting.

Former Defense Secretary Austin has also returned to defense-policy and advisory circles. Prior to the Biden White House, he earned seven figures from defense companies, while working alongside Blinken at Pine Island Capital Partners, a private equity firm investing in defense companies. In summer 2025, he rejoined the Carnegie Corp., while launching a consulting firm, Clarion Strategies, with former NATO officials. As CEO and co-founder, he now stood to benefit from the global defense industry.

Jake Sullivan, the former National Security Advisor joined Harvard Kennedy School as the inaugural Kissinger Professor of the Practice of Statecraft and World Order. After the Gaza genocide, he teaches international affairs and global strategy.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the public face of the Biden cabinet in the UN, works as a senior advisor at the global advisory and advocacy firm APCO Worldwide. Over the years, APCO’s multiple controversies include corporate campaigns for the tobacco industry, lobbying for foreign governments with poor human rights records, ties to Israeli defense contractors, and investigations into spying on journalists.

Gina Raimondo, former Secretary of Commerce, joined the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) as a distinguished fellow, co-chairing a task force on economic security.

After her role in arms transfers to Israel and the Gaza genocide, Bonnie Jenkins serves as a visiting professor of international affairs at George Washington University. Specializing in security assistance, weapons destruction, and international security operations, Stanley Brown continues to do what he did during the Gaza genocide.

Janet Yellen, William Burns, and other former officials transitioned into advisory, institutional, or private-sector roles.

Supporters argue these transitions reflect normal democratic circulation between government, academia, and policy institutions. Critics say they demonstrate a structural problem. Officials involved in controversial foreign-policy decisions often face limited consequences and can continue operating within elite networks. Revolving doors between the White House and the private sector compound the problem.

The broader issue is institutional rather than personal. If officials who design or defend disputed policies face no meaningful review, future administrations are likely to conclude that reputational costs are manageable and legal risks minimal.

The Trump escalation: Gaza, Iran, the ICC, and complicity allegations

The second Trump administration has transformed the Gaza debate from a question of U.S. military support into a broader confrontation over the limits of executive power, international law, and American responsibility for allied conduct.

Critics argue that President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Mike Waltz, ex-Security Adviser and current US Ambassador to the UN, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have moved beyond Biden-era policies by rejecting many external constraints on U.S. and Israeli actions.

On Gaza, the Trump administration has supported positions that critics describe as facilitating potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, or forced displacement.

The most controversial proposal was Trump’s suggestion that the U.S. could take control of Gaza and relocate its Palestinian population — a plan critics argued raised serious questions under international humanitarian law, while supporters presented it as a reconstruction and security initiative.

As the Trump administration pursued policies hostile to international accountability mechanisms, the confrontation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) became a defining issue. Trump issued Executive Order 14203 imposing sanctions and other restrictions on ICC officials involved in investigations affecting U.S. personnel or Israeli officials, arguing that the Court had acted illegitimately against American sovereignty and its allies.

Critics argue that attacking the ICC while shielding Israeli officials facing allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity severely risks weakening global accountability mechanisms.

In Iran and the wider Middle East, the administration adopted a “maximum-pressure” strategy, restoring sanctions and intensifying efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, regional networks, and military capabilities. Critics warn that escalation policies — including support for Israeli military actions against Iran and threats of overwhelming retaliation — risk expanding regional warfare, generating new civilian harm and participating in war crimes and mass atrocities.

The central legal argument against the administration is not that every official personally committed crimes, but that senior policymakers may incur political or legal exposure if they knowingly authorize, facilitate, or shield actions that violate international humanitarian law.

The historical question is whether these policies will be remembered as necessary exercises of state power — or as a precedent where a great power increasingly exempts itself and its partners from the rules they claim to defend.

Collapse of credibility

The central question is whether controversial wartime policies become temporary exceptions or permanent precedents. If extensive civilian harm, unrestricted weapons transfers, collective punishment allegations, or attacks on the accountability of institutions become politically acceptable, the consequences will extend beyond Gaza.

The central question is whether controversial wartime policies become temporary exceptions or permanent precedents.

The United States has historically promoted international legal norms with strategic exceptions. The Gaza debate exposes that contradiction more sharply than many previous conflicts because Washington is simultaneously a military supplier, presumed diplomatic protector, and global advocate of a “rules-based order.”

The ultimate issue is therefore the collapse of the U.S. institutional credibility, due to the fatal gap between Washington’s stated values and observable events.

There is no return to status quo ante Gaza.

The original version was published by the Informed Comment (US) on July 21, 2026.

About the Author

Dr Dan SteinbockDr Dan Steinbock, an expert of the multipolar world, is the founder of Difference Group and has served at the India, China and America Institute (US), Shanghai Institute for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). He is also the author of two new books on the Middle East crises: The Obliteration Doctrine (Sept. 2025) and The Fall of Israel (Oct. 2024). For more, see https://www.differencegroup.net/ 

Fixed-Rate Bonds and Notes from Phoenix Energy: Common Questions About This Alternative Investment

Potential investors researching alternative investments are often searching for clarity. One name popping up online in 2026 is Phoenix Energy. Online, potential investors want to know more about the company: Is Phoenix Energy legit? Is Phoenix Energy a “good” investment? What do Phoenix Energy fixed-rate bonds and notes offer and what risks should potential investors consider before committing their money?

Phoenix Energy is a U.S.-based oil and gas company that issues fixed-rate corporate bonds and notes to investors under SEC regulations

Like many investments, alternative investments carry risk, and potential investors should conduct their own due diligence before investing. The goal of this article is to give potential investors a clear, practical guide to conducting due diligence before deciding if Phoenix Energy corporate bonds and notes may be appropriate for one’s portfolio.

Frequently Asked Questions About Phoenix Energy

Who is Phoenix Energy?

Phoenix Energy (Phoenix Energy One, LLC) was founded in 2019 and is headquartered in Irvine, California, with offices across the U.S. Phoenix Energy (NYSE American: PHXE.PR) is a publicly traded oil and gas company focused on acquiring and developing energy assets across the United States and is actively drilling in the Williston Basin of North Dakota and Montana. Phoenix Energy states that it finances a significant portion of its operations and growth through corporate bond and note offerings — including Regulation D Rule 506(c) offerings and a registered offering, which, according to the offering materials, have stated annual interest rates ranging from 6% to 13%.

Phoenix develops and manages energy assets using a vertically integrated model. This includes acquiring mineral rights, participating in joint development projects, and drilling and operating its own wells.

How Does Phoenix Energy Pay Interest on Its Corporate Bonds and Notes?

A common question potential investors ask is how Phoenix Energy is able to offer fixed annual interest rates ranging from 6% to 13% on its corporate bond offerings.

Phoenix Energy is an oil and gas company whose primary business is the exploration, development, and production of crude oil. It’s worth noting that global oil demand has averaged approximately 100 million barrels per day in recent years, providing the commercial market in which the company sells its production. The company generates revenue through the sale of oil production, as well as from other energy-related operations. Like other companies that issue corporate debt, Phoenix Energy uses cash generated from its business operations to meet its financial obligations, including interest payments on its outstanding debt securities.

Oil and gas producers operate in a cyclical industry where commodity prices, production levels, and operating costs fluctuate over time. According to the company, Phoenix Energy seeks to manage these risks by focusing its operations in established producing regions, hedging a portion of its anticipated production to help reduce exposure to short-term commodity price volatility, and managing its operations with the objective of remaining effective across a range of oil price environments. These strategies are intended to support the company’s cash flow, although no strategy can eliminate business or market risk.

According to Phoenix Energy’s publicly filed financial statements, the company’s gross revenue has grown in recent fiscal years:

  • 2023: $118.1 million
  • 2024: $281.2 million
  • 2025: $687.2 million

Historical financial results should not be viewed as predictive of future performance. Potential investors should review the company’s SEC filings, offering documents, and applicable risk factors before making any investment decision.

What are fixed-rate corporate bonds and notes?

Fixed-rate corporate bonds and notes are a type of corporate debt where an investor lends money to a company and earns interest at a rate that is set upfront and does not change over the life of the investment. The interest is calculated at the fixed rate and paid in accordance with the bond’s stated terms, such as monthly payments or compounding. Because the rate is known from day one, fixed-rate bonds and notes are often easier for investors to understand than products with fluctuating returns, though they still involve risk and depend on the company’s ability to meet its obligations.

How can potential investors evaluate whether Phoenix Energy’s offering is legitimate?

Phoenix Energy is an operating oil and gas company whose public filings are available through the SEC. Phoenix Energy raises capital through corporate bond offerings that are either (i) sold under Regulation D, Rule 506(c), or (ii) offered pursuant to an SEC-registered offering. In July 2026, the company also announced its Phoenix Flex Junior Secured Notes™ offering, a registered offering with an effective SEC registration statement.

Information about the company’s offerings may be available through SEC filings, including registration statements (for registered offerings) and notices (for Regulation D offerings), accessible via the SEC’s EDGAR database.

What corporate bonds and notes does Phoenix Energy offer?

As of July 2026, Phoenix Energy offers corporate bonds and notes with stated annual interest rates ranging from 6% to 13%.[1] These debt securities are available through:

Minimum investment amounts are $25,000 for the Regulation D bonds, $5,000 for the Registered Offering, and $1,000 for the Phoenix Flex Notes. Bond terms vary by offering and investor eligibility.

These investments do not represent direct ownership in oil and gas assets. Instead, investors lend capital to the company and, according to the company, investors have historically received monthly interest payments or compounding interest, depending on the selected option.[3]

Can I buy Phoenix Energy corporate bonds and notes through Robinhood, Fidelity, Charles Schwab or a financial brokerage account?

Phoenix Energy corporate bonds and notes are not currently available for purchase through traditional brokerage platforms because these offerings are sold directly to the public. Phoenix Energy bond offerings are detailed on their website.

Where can I read Phoenix Energy investor reviews?

Third-party review sites like Trustpilot and BBB provide reviews from posters who often identify themselves as investors.

Phoenix Energy Trustpilot Reviews

As of July 2026, on Trustpilot, Phoenix Energy One, LLC holds a rating of approximately 4.7 out of 5 stars, based on over 300 separate reviews. According to Trustpilot, these reviews are submitted by users describing their individual experiences interacting with the company in one way or another.

Phoenix Energy BBB Reviews

Phoenix Energy also maintains an A+ rating with the Better Business Bureau, where it is listed as an accredited business on the platform. To obtain BBB accreditation, a business must meet eligibility requirements and undergo a review process that considers factors such as complaint history, business practices, and adherence to BBB standards. In regard to rating, according to the BBB, “The BBB rating is based on information BBB is able to obtain about the business, including complaints received from the public.” BBB seeks and uses information directly from businesses and from public data sources. The BBB platform also provides a structured process for submitting complaints by individuals and for companies to respond to such complaints. 

Reviews can offer helpful insight into investor experiences, but they are inherently subjective and may not reflect every individual outcome. For that reason, potential investors should review official SEC filings, offering materials, and guidance from a qualified financial professional when conducting due diligence.

Does Phoenix Energy pay monthly?

The company indicates that investors can choose monthly interest payments or monthly compounding interest. Historically, Phoenix Energy has made monthly interest payments in accordance with the applicable bond terms.[4] Future payments would depend on the company’s ability to satisfy its obligations and are not guaranteed. The company states that it intends to continue building a business capable of supporting investor obligations.

How can I attend a Phoenix Energy webinar?

Phoenix Energy states that it hosts daily free webinars where prospective investors can hear directly from executives, learn about the business model, and ask questions in real time.

To learn more, visit the official Phoenix Energy website or register for an upcoming Phoenix Energy webinar.

What risks should I consider before investing in Phoenix Energy?

Investing in alternative investments involves risks, including but not limited to:

  • Private corporate bond and note risks – Phoenix Energy’s Regulation D Rule 506(c) Offering and Registered Offering consist of corporate bonds. Phoenix Flex Notes are junior secured notes. The terms, rights, and risk characteristics of each offering are described in the applicable offering materials. Depending on the offering, these securities may be unsecured or junior secured, may have limited liquidity, and involve credit risk, meaning investors rely on the Company’s ability to meet its obligations.
  • Limited liquidity – Investors should be prepared to hold Phoenix Energy securities for the applicable investment term. Redemption, transfer, and liquidity rights vary by offering and are described in the applicable offering materials.

Investment involves risk, including possible loss of principal.

What is due diligence?

Due diligence is the process of doing your homework before making an investment decision. That includes reading the fine print, asking questions, and making sure you understand how the company operates and how your money would be used.

For investors considering Phoenix Energy’s corporate bonds and notes, due diligence means going beyond headlines and reviews. It means looking at the full picture, including the company’s business model, track record, official filings, and its engagement with the public.

What should I look at when evaluating a company like Phoenix Energy?

Here are a few practical ways to perform due diligence:

  • Review the offering documents. These outline key terms, risks, and eligibility requirements. You can access these through Phoenix Energy’s website or at gov.
  • Attend a webinar. Phoenix Energy hosts daily webinars where investors can hear directly from executives and ask live questions.
  • Review the company’s quarterly and annual reports and other filings made with the SEC.
  • Reach out with questions. The company’s Investor Relations team is available by phone or email to walk you through the offering or answer anything you’re unsure about.
  • Talk to a financial advisor. A licensed advisor can help you determine if this type of fixed-income investment makes sense for your financial goals.

What are the Final Considerations on Investing with Phoenix Energy?

No single source—including online reviews, company materials, or third-party commentary—should be the sole basis for an investment decision. Reviewing offering documents, SEC filings, asking questions directly to the company, and consulting a qualified financial advisor can help potential investors make a more informed decision about whether Phoenix Energy’s corporate bonds and notes are appropriate for their financial objectives and risk tolerance. 

Disclaimer: Not an offer to sell, nor a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities. Securities offered through Crescent Securities Group, Inc., member FINRA/SIPC, pursuant to a registration statement and prospectus or private placement memorandum, as applicable, and only where lawful. Investors must meet suitability requirements. For a complete discussion of risks, you should carefully review the registration statement and prospectus or private placement memorandum for the applicable offering prior to making any decision to invest. These documents may be obtained at phxoffering.com. An investment involves risk, including possible loss of principal and may be illiquid or unsecured. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

The third-party review platforms referenced in this article are operated independently of Phoenix Energy. Testimonials reflect the experiences of individual reviewers and may not be representative of the experiences of other investors. Phoenix Energy did not provide cash or non-cash compensation in exchange for the testimonials referenced herein.

This article contains forward-looking statements, including statements regarding Phoenix Energy’s business strategy, operations, and future intentions. These statements are based on current expectations and are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. Investors should review the company’s SEC filings and offering documents, including the applicable risk factors, for additional information. Forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance.

[1] Interest rates and payment options vary by offering, term, investor eligibility, and applicable offering documents. See the applicable prospectus or private placement memorandum for current rates, terms, risks, and eligibility requirements.
[2] Registered offerings will be subject to certain criteria, including objective financial suitability standards specific to each offerings and amount invested (see prospectus). Private placement offerings open to “accredited investors” only. Accredited investors as defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D includes individuals with a net worth over $1 million (excluding primary residence) or income over $200,000 (individual) or $300,000 (household) in each of the prior two years, with a reasonable expectation of the same in the current year. Learn more about accreditation requirements.
[3] Stated annual interest rates and payment options are offered only under applicable offering documents and are subject to the terms, conditions, eligibility requirements, and risks described in the applicable prospectus or private placement memorandum. Not all offerings are available to all investors.
[4] According to Phoenix Energy, since first issuing its corporate bonds in 2021, it has made scheduled interest payments and returned principal at maturity or redemption in accordance with the applicable bond terms. Past performance is not indicative of future results.

America Needs A Smarter Work From Home Policy

By Dr. Gleb Tsipursky

America needs a smarter work from home policy, and Britain’s House of Lords has offered the right starting point: stop treating remote work as either a perk to protect or a problem to eliminate. The real question is what arrangement helps public servants do the work well, serve the public effectively, and stay in jobs that government increasingly struggles to fill.

A serious state telework policy should be transparent, auditable, and tied to public-service results.

The UK report’s strongest lesson is its refusal to embrace a universal rule. Home-based and hybrid work can improve recruitment, retention, disability inclusion, caregiving support, and regional opportunity. It can also weaken mentoring, collaboration, onboarding, and workplace culture when managers fail to design it carefully. That balanced view is exactly what U.S. federal and state governments need now.

Washington has moved toward broad return-to-office requirements. President Trump’s 2025 return to in-person work memorandum directed federal agencies to end many remote-work arrangements and bring employees back to their duty stations full time, with exceptions. Several states have followed the same path. Ohio ordered many state employees back to offices through an executive order on state employees, while California set a default expectation of four in-office days per week for many state workers through its return to office order.

Some in-person work is essential. Government needs secure collaboration, public-facing services, emergency response, mentoring, and institutional culture. But government office mandates should not pretend that physical presence automatically equals accountability. The better standard is performance: case backlogs, response times, service quality, staff retention, recruitment speed, employee engagement, office utilization, and citizen satisfaction.

The UK report also makes clear that remote work is not just a convenience issue. It is a labor-force issue. A National Bureau of Economic Research paper on disability employment found that increased working from home explained a substantial share of the post-pandemic rise in full-time employment among people with physical disabilities. That should matter to every governor and agency head trying to fill public-sector vacancies. Remote and hybrid options can help government compete for talent, retain experienced workers, and expand access for people who face commuting, health, caregiving, or geographic barriers.

The United States should not simply copy Britain’s approach. It should improve on it. Federal agencies and state governments should classify roles by function: site-required, hybrid-eligible, or remote-eligible. They should require managers to justify why location matters for specific tasks, not rely on blanket assumptions. They should train supervisors to manage hybrid teams, onboard new hires, coordinate anchor days, protect boundaries, and measure outcomes. A serious state telework policy should be transparent, auditable, and tied to public-service results.

The governments that learn to tell the difference will serve citizens better than those that confuse office attendance with productivity.

The U.S. also needs better remote work data. Agencies should track what hybrid work does to productivity, equity, disability accommodations, real estate costs, cybersecurity, turnover, and service delivery. States must also address complications Britain does not face in the same way, especially interstate taxation, payroll, workers’ compensation, and licensing. The National Conference of State Legislatures has warned that remote work can create complex state and local tax issues when employees work across borders.

The lesson from Britain is not that everyone should work from home. It is that serious governments should stop governing by slogan. The next stage of remote work reform should be evidence-based, role-specific, and focused on public value. Presence matters when the work demands it. Flexibility matters when it improves hiring, retention, inclusion, and performance. The governments that learn to tell the difference will serve citizens better than those that confuse office attendance with productivity.

About the Author

Dr. Gleb TsipurskyDr. Gleb Tsipursky was named “Office Whisperer” by The New York Times for helping leaders overcome frustrations with Generative AI. He serves as the CEO of the future-of-work consultancy Disaster Avoidance Experts. Dr. Gleb wrote seven best-selling books, and his two most recent ones are Returning to the Office and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams and ChatGPT for Leaders and Content Creators: Unlocking the Potential of Generative AI. His cutting-edge thought leadership was featured in over 650 articles and 550 interviews in Harvard Business Review, Inc. Magazine, USA Today, CBS News, Fox News, Time, Business Insider, Fortune, The New York Times, and elsewhere. His writing was translated into Chinese, Spanish, Russian, Polish, Korean, French, Vietnamese, German, and other languages. His expertise comes from over 20 years of consulting, coaching, and speaking and training for Fortune 500 companies from Aflac to Xerox. It also comes from over 15 years in academia as a behavioral scientist, with 8 years as a lecturer at UNC-Chapel Hill and 7 years as a professor at Ohio State. A proud Ukrainian American, Dr. Gleb lives in Columbus, Ohio.

 

U.S. and China to Hold First AI Talks Under Trump Administration

The United States and China are expected to hold official talks on artificial intelligence in September, according to Reuters sources, marking the first AI dialogue between the two countries under President Donald Trump. The discussions, which are still being finalized, are expected to take place before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s planned visit to the U.S. later that month. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is expected to lead the U.S. delegation.

The talks will focus on the growing risks and challenges surrounding advanced AI, including military applications, cybersecurity, and the development of powerful frontier models. The U.S. has already tightened export restrictions on advanced AI chips to China, while both countries are considering measures to regulate the use and distribution of increasingly capable AI systems.

Analysts say China is seeking practical, technical discussions rather than political negotiations. While no major agreements are expected from the first meeting, both sides are likely to establish common definitions and discuss basic AI governance as they navigate an increasingly competitive global AI race.

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