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The “Secret Code” of Success

Sucess businessman climbing on stair against conrete wall with key hole door ,sunrise scene city skyline outdoor view .

By Ben Laker, Mark Ridley and Ian Mills

What is the greatest formula for high-level success? In this article, the authors highlight the significance of fulfilment, control, resilience, influence and communication in making performance at its best. Armed with this insight, when recruiting in the future, leaders will be far better equipped to investigate the deeper motivations and beliefs that drive the best-of-the-best.

Based on 20,000 hours of comparative analyses across the spectrum of performance and interviews with the world’s most iconic leaders from organisations including Adidas, Cisco, GSK, JP Morgan, Microsoft, Oracle, Steinway & Co. and Vodafone, a recent study from Transform Performance International (LID Publishing, 2017), presents the most rigorous global evaluation of how leaders behave and are driven, which in doing so reveals the “secret code” behind consistent and high-level success.

Insights from this study are fascinating and suggest that five core beliefs are held by all leaders, referred to as Destination Beliefs because many of those interviewed regard their professional (and personal) life as an ever-expanding journey. Whilst they acknowledge the importance of the belief in shaping their mind-sets and behaviours, they point out repeatedly that these core beliefs are aspirational, evolving continuously, and certainly not finite.

But this was not the whole story. It was clear that the Destination Beliefs are necessary components of a leaders’ belief system, but what really separated the top performers from the lower performers was how those beliefs were interpreted and synthesised internally. Put simply, for each Destination Belief the interviewees described attitudes towards the belief which spanned a spectrum.  These were the 10 sub-beliefs, referred to as Journey Beliefs because they demonstrate how we respond to what happens to us on the journey.

High performers are constantly evaluating themselves against a personal progress goal to be the most professional, productive person they can be.

What is most interesting is that the interviewees experience and even wrestle internally with journey beliefs from either and/or both ends of the spectrum. The most successful leaders respond to certain journey beliefs with greater intensity than they do to others. And it is their response to the intensity of the journey belief which then drives a behaviour. Journey Beliefs lay out in front of leaders the path that they will walk through. And whilst much may have been said and written about having the “right kind of attitude”, now, for the first time, it can be measured in a specific population. Here, finally, is a causal chain of five components, a formula for success – The Secret Code.

Fulfilment is the first component. It’s a state of satisfaction that comes from knowing you’ve either achieved, or are on track to shift performance from good, to better, to best. High performers are constantly evaluating themselves against a personal progress goal to be the most professional, productive person they can be. They know the extent to which a potential customer (internal or external) engages with them is a reflection of their personal style of Communication (more on this later), credibility and persuasiveness.

 

They understand the concept of Control, the second element. They believe in having a plan, and regularly evaluate where they want to be, where they are, and what the gap is. They show a sense of personal accountability for their success or failure. When failure comes (it does even for top performers), they don’t blame the economy, their company, or the marketing department. They embrace it as something they own, because when you own a problem, you can do something to change it. Failure is therefore seen as a temporary setback on the road to inevitable success, where every mile of asphalt, every pothole, every bridge, tollgate, and detour is seen as something you can control.

 

Resilience comes next. It is connected to Control as it represents your ability to bounce back from setbacks and get back on track. Like Control, Resilience is revealed through taking action. Like a muscle that grows after exercise, or a chunk of coal that gains value after being squeesed under pressure, resilient leaders face whatever the world throws at them, convert the stress to positive energy, and get busy shaping their own destiny. Resilience means being adaptable to change, and showing a “can do” approach when the pressure is on to meet deadlines, advance the sale, win the deal and hit quota. Resilience is a fundamental building block for achieving Influence as a leader.

 

Influence is the fourth piece in this jigsaw. As a leader, you need to gain influence with others to open doors, get on the calendar, gain stakeholder support, and win business. You also need influence with people in your own company to secure resources, support or the pricing needed to win specific deals. You need influence to plug in to the internal grapevine and know about changes, risks or opportunities before they’re general knowledge. Some people see this type of behaviour as being political – and they’re right. You will always encounter politics on the job. People will always be jockeying to be noticed, gain allies, build a power base, or exert influence over their work environment. It requires extra effort to navigate this, which is why resilience is needed as a foundation. Influence is gained by networking, talking to a lot of people, and using the wisdom of crowds to your advantage so you’re never caught by surprise. When you know in advance what changes are coming, how people feel about them, what they most want, and whose opinion matters most, you can take action faster and more precisely than others. You build a track record of success. You gain partisans and friends in all the right places. This gives you Influence. A key building block to do all this is your ability to communicate.

 

Communication is the fifth piece of the puzzle. You can never over-communicate with your colleagues or with a customer. Speed and clarity are the keys. Speed is important because today people ingest and send information in person, or by phone, video, email, blog and tweet. If you can’t say it in 200 characters or less, some people switch off. So instead of long meetings, letters or emails every few weeks, try having shorter exchanges every few days. The important thing is to stay front of mind. Clarity is important because there’s so much noise competing for people’s attention, your message needs to be precise and stand out from the static. Try thinking of every communication as a three-part story: you need an attention-grabbing headline, a reason it matters and a call to action. This applies to what you write and what you say. The lesson we took from the interview analysis was clear. High performers think about how they communicate. They recognise that communication is never about one-size-fits-all. In short, they are flexible, chameleon-like. And they are like this because they come from a place where they believe that they have a duty to help others understand, to enable the asking of questions; in short, to generate dialogue.

 

Let’s summarise:

• The better your communication, the more conversations and ideas you explore with people, and the more opportunities you can uncover to pursue your personal goals for fulfilment.

• The more fulfilled and confident you become, the more gravitas you project, and the more control you exert over your environment.

• The more in-control you are, the easier you evade obstacles. But even when you can’t, you deal with challenges in a way that builds your emotional, mental, or spiritual muscles; your resilience.

• The more resilient you are, the more you choose to act rather than be acted upon; the more people and events you will influence.

• The more influence you gain, the more doors open to connect you with other influencers. You become better informed, hear of opportunities before others, and greatly improve the quality of your communication with others.

• The better your communication, the more conversations and ideas you explore with people, and the more opportunities you can uncover to pursue your personal goals for fulfilment . . . and so on.

How did these Journey Beliefs manifest themselves? In summary, top-performers believe in giving themselves permission to be better than they ever dreamed possible. Low-performers believe that success comes from avoiding failure. Top-performers hold themselves accountable for their success: low-performers are happier to attribute lack of success to factors which they perceive to be outside of their control.  The highest-performing group look for ways to work smarter when facing tough times; the lower-performers talk about working even harder. High achievers know that having influence comes through demonstrating flexibility, not brute force due to position or power. And finally, the top-performing leaders regard communication as an ever-deepening dialogue, whereas lower performers tend to view communication as more transactional and transmission-centric.

The highest-performing group look for ways to work smarter when facing tough times; the lower-performers talk about working even harder.

As you can see, the Secret Code is a self-actualising, self-supporting cycle of behaviour and beliefs. The implications for leaders are huge. Let’s liken their performance to the body of a racing car. We see the shape, the style and color, assembled and ready to hit the road. A person’s education and skills might be likened to fuel in the tank; the more they have, the further they’ll go. Their needs, ambition and hunger might be likened to spark plugs that ignite the fuel to create combustion to drive the wheels. Within this analogy, where do  belief systems fit in? They’re at the driver’s feet: the accelerator and brake. It doesn’t matter how suited to any role a psychometric assessment says a person is, if deeply-held beliefs make them drive with the brakes on.  

About the Authors

Dr Ben Laker (@drbenlaker) is Professor of Leadership and Director of Impact and Global Engagement at Henley Business School, University of Reading and Visiting Fellow at Birkbeck, University of London. He is often asked to attend United States House Select Committee hearings that supply public policy recommendations to the United States Congress and the Biden-Harris administration. In his next public address, at the British Embassy in Helsinki, Benjamin will explore Europe’s energy crisis and examine the implications of windfall taxes on energy companies with lawmakers from around the world.

Mark Ridley is Founding Partner at Transform Performance International. Mark is a driving force behind this highly successful UK-based firm. An inspirational coach and co-author of 100 Big Ideas to Help You Succeed (LID, 2013), he has worked as a strategist, chair and facilitator with global brands, investment houses and academic institutions for over 25 years, in 60 countries, inspiring leadership and coaching talent, growing sales and transforming the way people communicate. He facilitates regularly at major conferences and events worldwide and is an acknowledged expert in sales leadership, emotional intelligence and collaborative excellence.

Ian Mills is Managing Partner at Transform Performance International, Ian is a co-author of 100 Big Ideas to Help You Succeed (LID, 2013) and numerous white papers. He has been a salesperson and led sales organisations in the fast-moving consumer goods, financial and technology sectors. Since 1999 Ian has been a leading light in the building of a globally successful performance improvement consultancy that has delivered solutions in over 60 countries. From Lima in the west to Beijing in the east, he has led behaviour change and transformation projects with corporations such as Hewlett-Packard and Maersk.

Going Beyond the Boundaries: Renta 4 on Discovering the Growth Potential of the MILA Market

A conversation with Mr. Tristán González del Valle Chavarri, Institutional Business Director at Renta 4 Banco and Chairman at Renta 4 Luxembourg

As the dividing line between technology and finance continues to blur, players in the finance industry are challenged to adapt to new realities. In this interview with Mr. Tristán González del Valle Chavarri, Institutional Business Director at Renta 4 Banco and Chairman at Renta 4 Luxembourg, we tackle the challenges facing the finance industry, the investment climate in the MILA Market and Renta 4’s innovative investment strategies and services which are greatly tailored to the needs and requirements of their customers. 

 

In today’s fast-paced business environment, what do successful directors like you have in mind every single day?
In my opinion today the important thing is to understand the customers better each day and to identify what their needs and expectations are. It is essential that clients feel confident, secure and see that there is transparency. Our job is to provide added value and confidence in the management of the client’s assets.
Specifically in the MILA market, our proposal is to transfer our successful Spanish business model to these countries, adapting it to the social and economic idiosyncrasy that each of them lives.

 

Specifically in the MILA market, our proposal is to transfer our successful Spanish business model to these countries, adapting it to the social and economic idiosyncrasy that each of them lives.

With your professional career mainly developed in the finance industry, you’re a witness of the drastic changes within this sector. What do you think are those developments that have the greatest impact on the present and future landscape of this industry?
After the 2008 financial crisis, it has become clear that the market has shifted towards greater transparency and risk control. The accessibility of information by clients has to be one of the basic pillars of the industry and all these changes have led to a general decline (which has not yet ended) of the costs for the final customer.

 

What you stated above proves that the finance industry has indeed evolved. Being the Institutional Business Director at Renta4 Banco, how do you and your team approach the aforementioned developments?
Renta 4 is always very active in terms of training and we have been making a very significant effort in the last six months – training directors and sales representatives about the implications of MFID2 (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II) and the consequences and effects for the clients.
From the institutional department we have adapted all the documentation material, presentations, etc. so that the investors have maximum access to the information with complete transparency.

 

Renta 4 Banco is one of the top financial institutions that offer investment products and services. What makes your investment strategies and services unique and first-rate?
When someone gets inside a Renta 4 branch he’s talking only about financial services and products and never about other banking commercial products. Also one of our main goals is to educate our clients and prospects on the financial industry, regulations and other relevant issues.

 

In relation to your products and services, can you give us a succinct idea about Renta 4 Banco’s investment platforms?
Renta 4 Banco stands out among its competitors for its high in-house technological development in the late 90s. One example of our continuous development is our Fondotop platform, considered one of the best distribution platforms in the market, in which the client can search, analyse, choose, buy and manage the funds that he wants among more than 4,100 funds. In Fondotop the client can find a qualitative and quantitative analysis to build up his portfolio. On the web the client can also find online seminars on funds to be trained, because we believe that customer education is fundamental.

 

How efficient are your platforms in addressing the investment needs of your retail, institutional and international clients? How do you make sure they have comprehensive investment portfolio/profile?
In our platform clients (retail and HNWI) find updated information on regulations, investor profile, products and analysis. Seventy percent of the income on intermediation from private clients comes from the platform. Institutional clients don’t use the platform.

 

We launched MILA Fund convinced of the high growth potential of the MILA region for the coming years and the attractiveness for European and South American investors to invest in countries that are showing stability in economic terms and political maturity.

Let’s talk about the MILA Market. In 2016, you launched the MILA Fund. What’s significant about the investment climate of the countries of the Pacific Alliance that you pioneered an investment fund therein?
In Renta 4 Luxembourg we launched this vehicle convinced of the high growth potential of the MILA region for the coming years and the attractiveness for European and also South American investors to invest in countries that are showing stability in economic terms and political maturity. In this way, making our MILA fund available to all investors is a clear sign of our confidence in the region’s integration project. For example, Chile, Colombia, Perú and México have better investment grades by the qualifying agencies than many Eurozone countries.

 

Since then, what are the significant developments/events that transpired both for your company and the market itself?
Supported by the research local Renta 4 teams in Chile, Peru and Colombia, during these two years we have focussed on positioning the fund in undervalued companies and those with the best future prospects and visibility. We maintain our investment style of investment process (own analysis) and fundamental value.
It has been two complex years for the region due to the involution that has brought about the return of trade protectionism on the part of the United States, and that has impacted the confidence of investors, especially in Mexico. In our experience, this type of setback is only circumstantial and becomes a great opportunity when viewed with more perspective towards the future.
The continuous growth of these markets in the last 10 years is creating an emerging middle class that is consolidating consumption in these countries.

 

What’s the difference between investing in the MILA market and in the Eurozone?
Markets are increasingly global and the differences tend to be reduced more and more, however, there is still a clear divergence between the perception that investors have of what represent developed and emerging markets. Despite this greater convergence, the view remains that markets like MILA enjoy higher expected returns in exchange for being more exposed to the oscillations of the cycle. The stability of the middle classes and the huge potential of their private consumption represent a big opportunity for companies.
However, we must not forget that the average age of these countries is much lower than that of the countries of the Eurozone and the labour market shows increasing employment rates.

 

With the increasing complexity of the playing field, how do you make your company resilient? What helps you counterbalance the degree of risk?
Renta 4 is an independent bank, offering exclusively financial services, without risk to the Spanish market and is formed by a network of 61 domestic offices and four international branches in which there are teams of experienced professionals listening to the client and that leads the client to feel safe.
Our investment team (research and fund managers) is highly qualified and experienced – a result of this is the significant number of awards obtained.

 

To achieve resilience, how do you make sure that your approach toward your customer relations and innovation is holistic?
Without excesses we try to have an as wide and complete range of products as possible. In our Luxembourger range of funds we have classes available for different types of clients (retail or institutional) and in the two main world currencies (euro and dollar). Specifically customers of MILA countries still prefer to have their investments in USD.
We are constantly listening to the needs of our customers in order to tailor made our offer to their requirements.

 

Do you think there will still be major shifts within the industry in the coming years? In what aspects?
Yes, clearly there would be continuous change. The industry is always subject to move – shifts that may come from regulators, technology or customers. It is clear that these changes should always be based on good understanding but what will be the next one I don’t know, unfortunately I don’t have the crystal ball.
Many believe that at this moment there is an excess of changes due to regulators but I believe that if it is for the benefit of all parties, the industry will always be open to changes for the better.

 

As Renta 4 already has exposure in various markets, what are your future undertakings/projects?
Our goal is to consolidate the international expansion that started in 2012 and finished last year with the launch of the “Fiduciaria” in Colombia. Our main objective is to integrate the business models of those three countries to become a Regional structure for South America.
Luxembourg has a significant role in the consolidation of these projects. Today we’re a UCITS Man Co1 with different strategies and we plan to develop the Man Co to a “Super Man Co” (UCITS + AIFMD2) to be agile and dynamic in developing alternative strategies for our Institutional South American client.

 

To those who aspire to succeed in this industry I recommend maximum honesty and transparency, have a strong spirit of flexibility, be curious to try to have total information.

Within the span of your professional career, what are the most significant things you have discovered/learned? What would be your advice for those aspiring to succeed in this industry?
What I have learned in these years is that one cannot remain seated in his achievements, as the world in which we live and work changes more and more quickly. For the one that does not change, does not evolve, quickly the market drop him off.
So first of all my advice to those who aspire to succeed in this industry is that I recommend maximum honesty and transparency, have a strong spirit of flexibility, be curious to try to have total information. It’s “much more important to sleep well than to eat well”.

 

There could be people out there who are wondering about the status quo of the investment industry, what message do you want to get across to them?
The client has entrusted us to manage their savings. As such my only responsibility to them is to manage risk and not to buy risk.

 

Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez del Valle Chavarri.

About the Interviewee

Mr. Tristán González del Valle Chavarri is currently the Director of the Institutional Business Development of Renta 4 Banco Group in Spain, Latin America (Chile, Colombia, Perú) and Luxembourg. In the past he has been Partner in Belgravia Capital and had other important experience in Latin America and in Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal). Mr. Gonzalez del Valle speaks fluently English and Italian.

When Technology Meets Finance: An Interview with CFO, Rabobank Asia Niels Boudeling

Finance leaders are aware of the tremendous impact of technological advancements and of the need to improve their business strategies to keep their competitive advantage. In our conversation with Niels Boudeling, CFO at Rabobank Asia, we explored the changing landscape of the finance industry and the impact of digitisation to the roles of CFOs. We also talked about his career journey as well as his pieces of advice for people who aspire to become successful CFOs in the future.

Presently, you are the Chief Financial Officer at Rabobank Asia. Before joining Rabobank Asia, what are the roles you fulfilled in the early stages of your career? 

I started my career as an auditor in Rotterdam, The Netherlands and since then I have always worked in financial roles. Compared to current careers in Finance, I know that my career is more traditional with an increasing level of responsibility over time, leading to a variety of management, senior finance and CFO roles in The Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, U.K. and now in Hong Kong.

In today’s business climate, the role of CFO is fundamentally changing. At Rabobank Asia, what are the duties/responsibilities you primarily deal with? How has your role changed over the years?

“Due to the more challenging competitive landscape, my role in initiating strategic decision-making has become more important.”

Indeed, today’s business climate is much more challenging than when I started in Hong Kong in 2014. I believe I just experienced the tail end of the golden years for banks in Hong Kong. We are now dealing with a changing competitive environment. This change has also affected my role as CFO. For example, the discussions about business performance have become more intense, managing expectations versus reality. Due to the  more challenging competitive landscape, my role in initiating strategic decision-making has become more important. What type of bank do we want to be? How are we going to make a difference for our Clients? Cost awareness and cost reduction have become even more important than before. At the same time, my task to promote long-term value creation, by stimulating the business to find new opportunities to grow the top line, has not changed.

Could you tell us the present demands of the finance functions that you prioritise and your approach to be effective in it?

I currently prioritise the creation of a truly efficient data flow in our Hong Kong hub. Eventually, this development will be introduced to all of our locations in Asia.  It starts upstream (at the input stage) with a strong emphasis on data quality. Rather than manual adjustments during the reporting process we focus on first-time-right data input. This requires acceptance by colleagues in commercial, operational and risk departments of their role in getting data right and their understanding of the consequences of data errors. An interesting transition!

Straight-through-processing of data, from front office to mid office to back office systems, and ultimately, into a Single Point of Truth (SPOT) is the second important development I am spending a lot of time on. The SPOT contains hundreds of data fields, or attributes as we call them, and contains risk data, customer data and, of course, financial data.

At the downstream end of the data flow, a large variety of reports is currently being automated. We do this by using advanced mapping tables which connect the SPOT with the reporting applications.

The combination of these three steps should enable my team to free up time from low value add activities, like error correction, and use this time for high value add activities such as scenario planning, forecasting and the identification of business opportunities. A clear example that technology is making our jobs in Finance much more exciting!

What are the internal and external challenges you closely monitor to assure the attainment of your financial objectives?

CFOs are nowadays facing a high number of challenges and must have the courage to take unpopular standpoints. Internal conflicts that come to mind are decisions about outsourcing versus automation of activities. Or, should the firm engage in new activities or new products? The right position in every decision within the triangle of risk, returnand efficiency should be meaningfully discussed by the decision-makers. In my view, the CFO has an important role in that discussion.

External challenges lie in the ever-evolving regulatory landscape. With solvency and liquidity requirements increasing, the costs associated with carrying liquid assets are increasing too. This needs fine tuning through the use of optimisation models and continuous maintenance. New regulation on access to current accounts and payments (PSD2) may bring new competitors. And new accounting standards, such as IFRS 9, affect the bottom line.

These new regulations put pressure on our returns and operating model. They also make data availability more important: regulators are considering to get constant access to near real-time data, signalling a shift in monitoring from a more traditional principle-based approach to a rule-based approach.

To address the implications of the convergence of technology and finance, what are the strategic policies, procedures or standard that you think should be put in place?

“Finance and IT cannot operate in silos any longer…This is a prerequisite for optimising our business value and process efficiency. It’s not a stretch to understand the logic of common objectives and KPIs for CFOs and CTOs.”

Finance and technology go hand-in-hand and with the increased interest in good data, the reliance by the finance function on the IT team is more noticeable than ever before. Finance needs the support from IT to ensure that all required data fields are captured in systems and that these systems are set-up in such a way that they enable data quality controls throughout the data flow. Therefore, Finance and IT cannot operate in silos any longer. I see that finance and IT professionals work more and more often in cross functional teams (XFTs). A big advantage of this is that it broadens everybody’s skillset and it stimulates finance professionals to embrace new technologies. This is a prerequisite for optimising our business value and process efficiency. It’s not a stretch to understand the logic of common objectives and KPIs for CFOs and CTOs.

Today’s business environment is indeed increasingly becoming complex due to technological innovations. To add, CFOs are challenged by economic uncertainties and issues on cyberspace, with all these in mind, what is your view on the future of the finance industry?

It is difficult to talk about the future of the finance industry without distinguishing time frames. In the short term, the abundance of liquidity, low interest rates, low commodity prices and increased global competition require banks to continue soul searching: what are we going to do where? Tough choices have already been made, are currently being made and will continue to be made in this time frame. Which attributes constitute a competitive advantage that allows banks to escape the arena of commoditised products where margin pressure requires large volumes to compensate set-up costs?

In the medium term, most commoditised products, like payments, transfers and simple loans will be processed by companies outside the traditional banking industry, some of them Fintech companies, but perhaps the more important competitors for retail banks will be large online retailers which will integrate banking services in their retail value chain.

In the long term the distinguishing factor for banks will be the quality of their advice and the ease of doing business with them (location, network, channel integration). Most products and services will be automated or operated outside the traditional finance industry. In my view banks will become smaller in terms of balance sheet and number of employees, more specialised and more event driven.

Evidently, the industry today is surrounded with risks and a plethora of opportunities, what do you think are the things that present and future CFOs need to explore?

Present and future CFOs have more data available to them than previously. Not only data collected within their own businesses, but also data from competitors, potential clients or best practices from completely different industries. There is a wealth of data to explore. The combination of advanced data analytics and machine learning (A.I.) could give insight in business opportunities. Machine learning could help CFOs to only analyse data pairs for which the correlation actually makes sense. Because at the same time there is a risk that CFOs drown in this sea of data.

For those aspiring to become CFOs, what are the fundamentals associated with such role as well as pieces of advice and realisations that you can share with them?

“Aspiring CFOs should understand that their role will become much more human resources oriented as they will manage a more diverse finance team in the future.”

Aspiring CFOs should have the independence and courage to say no to a business proposition but at the same time aspiring CFOs should have a certain level of entrepreneurship in their DNA that encourages them to take calculated risks and be a critical best friend for their business stakeholders. Aspiring CFOs should also understand that their role will become much more human resources oriented as they will manage a more diverse finance team in the future. The CFO will most likely not be the best accountant and a CPA qualification alone is no guarantee to become CFO. This means that there will be more competition from disciplines outside the Finance domain for the CFO role. In terms of skills, aspiring CFOs should hone their influencing skills. If no action is taken on an otherwise good financial analysis, the finance function has still not accomplished its mission.

There can be a lot of pressure when leading your company towards the attainment of your financial objectives, how do you make sure that you maintain a healthy lifestyle, both in your professional and personal life? What’s your daily grind?

I notice that going to the gym in the morning makes a positive difference for me during the day. I feel more energised and return home with energy left. It only takes me one hour, so I try to do this on Monday, Wednesday and Friday. During the weekend we often explore Hong Kong’s great hiking routes.

Sports help to be fit and at the same time it is important to sharpen the mind to be future-proof. Frequently ask yourself the question: “What have I learned today?”

We all have our own motivations, who/what is the particular person, thing or words of wisdom that keep you going?

What keeps me going is teamwork. I get a lot of energy from a strong team spirit. If there is so much trust within the team that disappointments are overcome without playing the blame game and successes are shared, I am at my best. Therefore team building and team member selection are important for me.

In reference to your career journey, what’s the secret to one’s success in this industry?

“I believe that future CFOs will have experience outside the finance domain. Operations, Risk Management or Treasury are interesting areas for any future CFO.”

There is no golden bullet for success in this industry and eventually you need some luck to be at the right time at the right place with the right background and skills. Nevertheless, I believe that there are several factors that will most likely contribute. First of all I believe it is useful to have experience in different industries, like manufacturing, retail and auditing. It’s interesting to see how the best practices from one industry are very useable in another industry.

Secondly, I would recommend to everybody who has the ambition to become a CFO in a MNC to experience living abroad for a while. It’s a great exercise in flexibility and a good test for your assumptions and prejudices.

Thirdly, I believe that future CFOs will have experience outside the finance domain. Operations, Risk Management or Treasury are interesting areas for any future CFO. I also believe that a good business school will broaden your view and enable you to engage in meaningful discussions about business and strategy.

Finally, what I would recommend to any aspiring CFO is to never stop learning, to have an open mind and the courage to ask the “WHY?” question frequently. Why are we doing this?

 Thank you very much Niels for sharing with us your invaluable insights.

About the Interviewee

Niels Boudeling is CFO Asia for Rabobank, a large cooperative bank with its roots in The Netherlands. Responsible for finance, control and taxation in Hong Kong, Singapore, Mumbai, Shanghai and Jakarta Niels is constantly searching for the right balance between commercial opportunities, risks and efficiency.

Before joining Rabobank, Niels worked at Cartier, MontBlanc, FootLocker and Paxar in the UK, Switzerland and Germany in variety of CFO and Senior Finance Managers roles. He started his career in 1981 as an Auditor for KPMG in the Netherlands.

Niels holds a Master of Science in Accountancy from Nyenrode University, an executive Master in Finance and Control from Maastricht University, an MBA from RSM/Erasmus University and is a Registered Controller.

The QFC, a Platform for Growth in Qatar and Beyond

By Haitham Al-Salama

Looking for top business and investment destinations in the Arab world? Dr. Haitham Al-Salama, Chief Economic Advisor at Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) and Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance, highlights in this article the favourable investment climate of Qatar and how QFC’s platform can help companies in their business expansion endeavours in the region.

 

Having continually been ranked as one of the top economies globally in competitiveness, communications and innovation, Qatar boasts one of the strongest and fastest growing economies in the region and continues to attract international investors and businesses to its shores.

The well-developed, competitive local market and highly developed value chain supports the needs of investors. Its market strength makes it the ideal location for businesses looking to expand to Qatar, the wider region and other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia.

Backed by a coordinated government strategy and strong investments in key economic enablers such as its infrastructure, Qatar’s GDP continues to grow at substantial rates. This growth was well under way before Qatar won the rights to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

The Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV 2030), a long-term blueprint released in 2008 that envisions a “diversified economy in which the private sector plays a prominent role”, includes a project pipeline worth some $200bn that both local and international companies in various economic sectors can benefit from.

In addition, as a market that is not saturated, but instead continuously growing with abundant opportunities in a number of areas, Qatar’s growing market strength makes it an ideal location for businesses and investors.  

How the QFC can help propel businesses 

The QFC platform is exclusive, offering its own legal, regulatory, tax and business infrastructure, allowing 100% foreign ownership and 100% repatriation of profits and allowing businesses to trade in any currency.

The QFC platform is exclusive, offering its own legal, regulatory, tax and business infrastructure, allowing 100% foreign ownership and 100% repatriation of profits and allowing businesses to trade in any currency.

Our competitive tax regime of 10% corporate tax on locally-sourced profits is unmatched and unlike other financial centres in the region, the QFC does not impose an “end date” on this guarantee. We boast a robust and transparent tax regime, and companies set up under the QFC also benefit from Qatar’s extensive Double Taxation Agreements with over 60 countries.

Our firms also benefit from a regulatory environment that conforms to international best practices and features an independent court with judgments enforced in the State of Qatar, regulatory tribunal and dispute-resolution centre.

We offer businesses the right platform to expand locally, regionally and international and we take care of all logistics so that they can focus on growing their business.

 

The QFC offers many additional benefits, including:

• 100% foreign ownership

• 100% repatriation of profits

• Trading in any currency

• Quick and easy set up

• Firms can conduct business with any business in Qatar in any currency

• We offer a one-stop-shop for businesses including help with set up, immigration, visas and other

• We also offer access to an independent and transparent legal environment based on English common law and an independent Employment Standards Office

• Access to Qatar’s business community, especially now with our expected move to Msheireb Downtown Doha which will serve as a new financial and business capital for Qatar

• Exemption of taxes when applicable or a competitive 10% tax on locally sourced profits

 

Utilising the QFC platform

The QFC is preparing for the Qatar 2022 FIFA World Cup™ and beyond by providing the necessary legal, regulatory and financial support to local and international firms that are essential to Qatar’s journey towards economic maturity, diversity and sustainability.

The QFC platform can be utilised to support a variety of services that relate to Qatar hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup™ including all types of consulting services, legal services, IT services, marketing and brand management services, PR firms, advertising agencies, recruitment firms, accounting/audit firms to name a few.

The best thing about being a global financial and business centre is that we can welcome a wide array of businesses from various sectors to join our platform. It has also allowed us to put Qatar on the map and reiterate the growing business opportunities available.  

 

How the QFC is adding to Qatar’s diversification goals

Through our offerings we attract a growing volume of businesses from Qatar and across the world; currently the QFC hosts 461 businesses from a diverse range of sectors.

At the QFC, our mission is, and has always been, to drive economic development and diversification. We continue to focus on attracting firms that will serve Qatar’s purpose to diversify its economy, in-line with the Qatar National Vision 2030.

Through our offerings and unique platform, we attract a growing volume of businesses from Qatar and across the world; currently the QFC hosts 461 businesses from a diverse range of sectors. We also successfully enable local companies to expand beyond Qatar and tap into new markets.

We are playing a key part in the QNV 2030 roadmap by helping promote Qatar as a whole, and the vast opportunities there are in this thriving nation. Last year we conducted roadshows across Asia, Europe and the UK and we are seeing a lot of interest from these markets. We are planning more roadshows to continue to show international businesses how they can benefit from Qatar’s multi-billion investment portfolio.

About the Author

Dr. Haitham Al-Salama is Chief Economic Advisor at Qatar Financial Centre and Special Advisor to the Minister of Finance. He has over 15 years experience spanning the fields of healthcare, policy and management within governmental and non-profit organisations. He is a recipient of a number of awards including Oxford University’s Honorary Senior Research Fellowship and the League of Arab States’ 25th Anniversary Distinguished Student Award.

Are Smaller Firms More Export Competitive? A Study of Brazilian Firms

Interior Of Busy Modern Open Plan Office With Staff

By Roque Zin, Paulo Barcellos and Syed Akhter

This article analyses the export performance of Brazilian firms from 2002 to 2010, when the Brazilian currency became stronger.  Firms were classified according to their size (micro, small, midsize and large) and to exports volume in American dollars (USD). The Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (Balassa, 1965) was used to analyse the effects of currency fluctuations on export performance.1 Results indicate that despite unfavourable conditions caused by currency appreciation, smaller firms increased exports volume and improved competitiveness more than large firms.

 

1. Brazilian exports and exchange rate fluctuations

From 2002 to 2010, Brazilian products became more expensive in foreign markets due to the Real (Brazilian currency) appreciation from approximately USD 0.28 to 0.60.  This was due to global economic developments, changes in Brazilian economic policy, and an increase in the inflow of foreign direct investments.

In 2002, 2,639 export companies were located in RS state representing 13.64% of the total of Brazilian export companies. In 2010, the number of RS export firms dropped to 2,531 or 11.54% of the total. Over the same period, RS state exports increased 139.46%, but that growth was well below the national increase of 234.51%. 

Smaller companies are subject to greater financial restrictions and, therefore, have limited access to capital markets to seek protection mechanisms to mitigate exchange rate effects.

Considering that the number of export companies declined in RS and exports increased at a lower rate than the national average, it could be argued that RS firms lost export competitiveness.  Based on these preliminary data, the question that guided this study was whether competitiveness loss was due to the exchange rate.  Also, has it affected firms of all sizes equally or have smaller (micro, small, midsize) firms experienced greater adverse effects compared to large ones?

Smaller companies are subject to greater financial restrictions and, therefore, have limited access to capital markets to seek protection mechanisms to mitigate exchange rate effects.  Another issue to be considered is the exported product. In general, smaller firms do not export commodities whose quotation is established by the international market, and the price increase may offset the loss of exported volume due to an adverse exchange rate. Having in mind the territorial dimension of Brazil and the large variety of firms, the study was concentrated in RS state, which is not a big commodities producer and even so has representativeness in the country exports volume.

2. Competitiveness, exchange rate and the RCAI

Competitiveness may be defined as the capability of a country, a particular industry sector, or a firm to profitably operate in the global market.  Many conceptual models have been developed to identify factors that are associated with competitive advantages of a firm.  External to the firm, systemic factors can change the competitive environment that alters the competitive advantages of a firm. 

A relation between long-range growth and devalued exchange rates in developing countries was found, reaching to the conclusion that price change due to exchange rate devaluation is of fundamental importance for economic growth.

In examining the role of different external factors, many authors have emphasised the significance of exchange rate fluctuations in influencing companies’ international performance. The exchange rate is the main variable for exports growth due to its favourable impact on competitiveness. One author states that after thirty years he “remains convinced that the exchange rate is one of the chief obstacles to many countries’ growth”.2 A more competitive exchange rate increases demand for exports.3 Favourable exchange rate is a strategic variable for the growth of countries. A relation between long-range growth and devalued exchange rates in developing countries was found, reaching to the conclusion that price change due to exchange rate devaluation is of fundamental importance for economic growth.4

The Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (RCAI) is one of the indicators more commonly used to evaluate the competitiveness of a country’s product in relation to international trade. Based on Ricardo’s law of Comparative Advantages created in 1817, the RCAI is used to evaluate product competitiveness in world markets, regional markets or a specific national market. Comparative advantage is a basic idea for explaining trade relations among countries that are not easily understood. As such, some researchers state that the theory might have been valid two centuries ago but it is irrelevant today.  However, it is concluded that the advantages theory is important to explain international trade, but the concept alone can hardly explain something so broad and complex.5

A study in Italy has shown that comparative advantage may be altered over time. Changes in industrial sectors and in various regions involving the performance of the Italian economy over 30 years were observed. The conclusion was that the comparative advantage of traditional sectors remained, while the performance of sectors which were not competitive some decades ago improved. Some regions also improved their competitiveness indicators.6 Comparative advantage regarding production fragmentation among countries was also analysed. The study concluded that the comparative advantage concept, when used in its original way, loses its explicative power for international trade. However, it is still useful when the global trade flow is considered as disaggregated into a production chain.7

 

3. Research method

This study refers to the period from 2002 to 2010 when a strong appreciation of the Brazilian currency occurred, followed by a remarkable devaluation. As a matter of fact, the exchange rate increased from USD/R$ 0.2831, in 2002, to 0.6005, in 2010. This change has altered the price relation (USD/Real) of products and affected companies’ competitiveness in the global market. In this study, the RCAI was used to analyse RS firms’ performance vis-à-vis that one of similar Brazilian companies. Based on data supplied by the Foreign Trade Office of the Brazilian Government (SECEX), a database of Brazilian and RS firms’ exports according to company size was created. In accordance with SECEX criteria, the size of a firm is determined by the number of employees and the amount of exports. In instances where a firm can fit into different size categories, it is classified under the greater criterion.8

RCAI uses variables generated a posteriori to measure the participation of the exports of a product in relation to a reference zone of this same product; then, that quotient is compared to total exports of that economy with total exports of the reference zone. RCAI determines the relative competitiveness of a sector in relation to others. RCAI is calculated for RS companies classified by size resulting in their performance vis-à-vis the performance of similar size Brazilian ones.

Most Brazilian firms determine costs in Reals, converted to USD when goods are exported. If the product export price in USD is maintained, the firm will receive a lower amount in Reals for the unit sold. This would mean a competitiveness loss for Brazilian companies and, thereby, a reduction of the exported amount, or a price increase in dollars that would result in a reduction of the exported volume. After exports go down, product profit margins for sold goods may deteriorate, what is observed from 2002 to 2010. However, exports present an increase during that period. From 2002 to 2010, according to Table 1, Large size firms experienced an increase of 150.84%. In general, these firms sell agricultural or mineral commodities, which experienced a price increase in world markets. The price increase offsets the exchange rate disadvantage Brazilian firms then faced.

A fact that deserves attention is the increase of smaller (micro, small, and midsize) firms’ exports. All of them increased sales in world markets despite the expectation that the currency appreciation would result in a loss of competitiveness and, thereby, a decrease in sales. Given the characteristics of RS state, which does not have large mineral reserves and is a grain producer, the question that must be investigated is its performance in relation to the Brazilian one. Having in mind the firms’ size, how was the sales evolution in the international market? 

 

4. Main findings and questionings

Data analysis shows that smaller (micro, small, and midsize) firms improved their RCAI from 2002 to 2010, while large firms did not, and, still worse, their RCAI kept falling in the period.

From 2002 to 2010, RS large export firms lost competitiveness compared to firms in other size categories. The RCAI for micro firms increased from 1.423, in 2002, to 1.985, in 2010, representing a growth of 39.49%. Small firms presented a growth rate of 75.25%, from a RCAI of 1.062 to 1.748, over the same period. Midsize companies, however, have grown only 19.00% (RCAI from 1.205 to 1.434), while large companies have lost competitiveness in the same period of time. Competitiveness reduction was not significant once the RCAI has shown just a slight decrease of 0.59%, from 0.980 to 0.974.

Data analysis shows that smaller (micro, small, and midsize) firms improved their RCAI from 2002 to 2010, while large firms did not, and, still worse, their RCAI kept falling in the period.    

One of the outcomes of this study is to leave some questions open for future investigations that could shed light on the following research questions: (1) are there structural issues in RS state that influence the growth of smaller firms’ exports notwithstanding the number of smaller export companies’ decrease? or (2) do internal management issues explain their performance? Future studies may investigate smaller firms that have increased their exports to find out whether their performance is due to price changes, new markets, higher productivity, competitive strategies or other factors. 

This study is important for economic and foreign trade policies because smaller firms do not sell commodities and their performance signals that they may be developing some competitive advantages which need to be investigated.  A more detailed study may help these firms to expand their participation in world markets. 

About the Authors

Roque A. Zin is a Faculty member at the Graduate Program in Production Engineering at the University of Caxias do Sul, in Brazil. He also acts as a finance advisor for business firms. 

 

Paulo F. P. Barcellos is a full Professor at the University of Caxias do Sul Graduate Program in Business Administration. He is the author of the book Coal/Natural Gas: an energy strategy for Mercosur in the 21st century, published in Portuguese. 

Syed H. Akhter is a full Professor and former Department of Marketing Chair at Marquette University, in the USA. He is a Fulbright scholar and is the author of two books: Global Marketing and Strategic Marketing.

 

References

1. Balassa, B. (1965).Trade and Revealed Comparative Advantage. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

2. Thirlwall, A. P. (2011). Balance of Payments Constrained Growth Models: History and Overview, PSL Quarterly Review,64 (259), 307-351.

3. Williamson, J. (2005). The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: The Relevance of International Experience to China´s Decision, China & World Economy, 13 (3), 17-33.

4. Rodrik, D. (2008). The real exchange rate and economic growth: theory and evidence. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity.In: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2008_fall_bpea_papers/2008b_bpea_rodrik.pdf.

5. Deardorff, A. (2005). How Robust is Comparative Advantage? Review of International Economics, 13 (5), 1004–1016.

6. Benedictis, L. (2005). Three Decades of Italian Comparative Advantages. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

7. Baldone, S.; Sdogati, F.; Tajoli, L. (2007). On Some Effects of International Fragmentation of Production on Comparative Advantages Trade Flows and the Income of Countries, The World Economy 2007, Oxford, UK.

8. SECEX (2012), Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, Brazilian Government. In:

• http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5HYPERLINK

• “http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=3287&refr=608″&HYPERLINK

• “http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=3287&refr=608″menu=3287HYPERLINK

• “http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=3287&refr=608″&HYPERLINK

• “http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=3287&refr=608″refr=608

Cryptocurrency: Advancing Kazakhstan’s Economy and Investment?

Kazakhstan’s Economy and Investment

By Samantha Brletich

Aimed at developing markets, cryptocurrency, and attracting investment, Kazakhstan created the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC). Such move, however, is not a panacea for Kazakhstan’s feeble investment climate as it has to take institutional and legislative steps – if it is to build greater economic partnerships and diversify its investments.

Kazakhstan has been implementing measures to increase investment including marketing campaigns, reforming laws, market reforms, and engaging with Europe. Oil & gas production and export, mineral deposits and mining, and transportation form the backbone of its economy. Kazakhstan, despite being run by an authoritarian, is fairly open-minded concerning economic agreements and finance. Kazakhstan has managed to operate its mixed economy – characterised by private sector freedoms and state planning – to become the largest economy in Central Asia. Integrating cryptocurrencies further advances Kazakhstan’s efforts to become an innovation hub and top-tier investment partner in the region.

As Kazakhstan continues to promote itself as the land of innovation and as the bridge between Europe and Asia, the adoption of cryptocurrencies, or creation of a state cryptocurrency, has been considered an alternative to attract investment.

As Kazakhstan continues to promote itself as the land of innovation and as the bridge between Europe and Asia, the adoption of cryptocurrencies, or creation of a state cryptocurrency, has been considered an alternative to attract investment.  The government announced in July 2017 for Kazakhstan to become the “the most [favourable] business climate” for cryptocurrency and financial technology (fintech) companies.1  The Astana Times reported on 23 November 2017, that Kazakhstan established a Kazakhstan Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Association (KABC).2 The Association was created to regulate the lucrative cryptocurrency markets and work with the country’s national bank regarding cryptocurrencies.1

Kazakhstan may issue the state- sponsored CryptoTenge, to regulate and integrate into its financial framework and to explore non-extractive industries. The currency would be a fiat currency, recognised as legal tender which is state-controlled. The issuance of the CryptoTenge would make Kazakhstan the first country in Central Asia with its own cryptocurrency and mark significant progress in Kazakhstan’s digital economy, diversifying Kazakhstan’s economy and the use of alternative financial instruments. Kyrgyzstan in June 2014 planned to issue its own cryptocurrency called GoldenRock,3 however as the status of this cryptocurrency is unknown, Kyrgyzstan declared the use of cryptocurrency as a form of payment illegal.4

Kazakhstan created the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC), an innovation hub aimed at developing markets, cryptocurrency, and attracting investment; the AIFC will have its own courts based on Common Law and the language will be English.5 Deloitte highlights that “the Fintech regulatory Sandbox, a special regime for innovative projects within the [AIFC provides] unique advantages for attracting capital to different projects from around the world.”6 Furthermore, deregulation of blockchain technology “enables financial services to be performed not just by established banks but also by specialised start-up companies.”7 

The AIFC signed an innovation pact with Maltese investment firm EXANTE. The working group led by the AIFC and established in July 2017, will regulate the cryptocurrency, establish the ecosystem, and “and [improve] the investment climate in Kazakhstan for development and support of innovative technologies.”8 Kazakhstan will receive EXANTE’s blockchain platform, Stasis, “the platform provides governments with an efficient platform to tokenise fiat currencies and transform them into digital versions on a block chain securely.”9 Stasis, which enables virtual instant payments with no risk of de-evaluation or hyperinflation of digital assets and the mobile application, selling blockchain-based bonds, will bring in investors.10

Cryptocurrency markets present Kazakhstan with the opportunity to become a regional leader in fintech. Cryptocurrencies would allow Kazakhstan to tap into unexplored markets in Asia and build economic relationships with cryptocurrency-friendly countries such as Singapore and Japan. Also the establishment of a cryptocurrency will modernise and make Kazakhstan’s economy more competitive and if successful, lessen the dependence on its extractive industries or make business easier in these industries.

The use of cryptocurrency would promote small and medium business entrepreneurship, because of its low cost and instant transactions, which remains a driver in Kazakhstan’s economic growth. Kazakhstan’s e-commerce sector remains underdeveloped and was projected to reach $5 billion by the end of 2017.11 Online shopping only accounted for 10-12% of all Internet services. 9 Kazakhstan can generate more investment by creating user-friendly cryptocurrency platforms and encourage businesses/merchants to accept cryptocurrency allowing for more cash payments and investment. The tourism, hospitality, and online merchant sectors would benefit from this move because of Western businesses and high-profile global events including the recent EXPO 2017 Astana. Therefore, cryptocurrency may boost non-extractive industries strengthening other sectors of the economy.

Also, cryptocurrency is part of the larger effort of the Kazakhstan Government to create digital economy. The “Digital Kazakhstan Program” was submitted for state approval in early December 2017,12 and focuses on four key initiatives – (1) creating digital silk road to secure infrastructure; (2) developing a creative society and skills to support the digital economy; (3) digital transformation of the economy; (4) and  creating a proactive digital economy which aims to improve electronic and mobile government systems.13 The program is to be implemented in two phases: the first phase was scheduled for 2016-2019 and the second phase is schedule for 2020-2025.14

Cryptocurrency advances Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy goal of economic development with foreign countries. Kazakhstan is party to the Eurasia Economic Union (EaEU) (also referred to as the EEU), and other multi-national political and economic organisations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The EaEU has a free trade policy and allows  for workers and goods to move within the common economic space – two areas that Kazakhstan  can improve for investment. Once Kazakhstan’s digital economy is developed, Kazakhstan can influence the economic policies of its powerful neighbors, Russia and China. Once other EaEU countries establish their cryptocurrencies, the EaEU can become a regional cryptocurrency market. In late December 2017, Vladimir Putin was considering creating a common cryptocurrency for the EaEU and the BRICS economic organisations. If Russia proposes a common cryptocurrency, Russia would dominate the EEU and the FSU states in cryptocurrency limiting the regional influence of Kazakhstan.15

By not utilising cryptocurrencies, Kazakhstan would miss multiple opportunities to advance their own digital economy, exploration of blockchain technology, and regional leadership role.

And it is not unrealistic that Kazakhstan would propose a regional cryptocurrency for Central Asia and the Customs Union to create a multi-cryptocurrency common economic market. Kazakhstan’s current regional cooperation with Europe and Asia indicates Kazakhstan seeks a higher position in the international system. Kazakhstan’s and South Korea’s blockchain regulatory bodies, KABC and the Korea Blockchain Industry Promotion Association (KBIPA) respectively, that agreed on cooperation “with Korean companies, known for their innovativeness, provides unique opportunities for Kazakhstan’s business.”16 By not utilising cryptocurrencies, Kazakhstan would miss multiple opportunities to advance their own digital economy, exploration of blockchain technology, and regional leadership role.

KZ Cash is the first regional cryptocurrency in Kazakhstan that was launched by a citizen of Kazakhstan and not by the government.17 KZ Cash became active on 21 October 2017 according to the social media feed.14 The cryptocurrency’s website, lists KZ Cash will be accepted by hotels, restaurants and other companies in the tourism industry to promote growth.18 The payment platform, Smart Pay, also created by a Kazakh citizen, provides merchants, hotels and retailers to offer the option of paying with bitcoin.19 The website cites Kazakhstan’s geographic location along the “Great Silk Road” guaranteeing its success.15 Kazakhstan’s geographic location would also ensure the success of its Crypto Valley, located in Astana, for the country.20 Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s improved investment climate and its developing digital economy would attract technology companies. The Crypto Valley would supplement the already operating Technopark and the Business Incubator, and the Science Park Astana Business Campus at Nazarbayev University opening in 2018.21

Cryptocurrency and the AIFC is not a panacea for the country’s investment woes. Institutional reforms must be undertaken to improve investment. In July 2015, President Nazarbayev declared five presidential reforms to improve investment as part of the “Kazakhstan 100 Steps” modernisation program, supported by the Ministry of Investments and Development: (1) creation of a modern government apparatus, (2) rule of law, (3) industrialisation and economic growth, (4) one shared future, (5) and a transparent and accountable state.22 The Government signed the 2015 New Entrepreneurial Code and new Labour Code to improve investment creating “single windows” for companies and offices where businesses obtain government services.23 Kazakhstan in November 2015, amended legislation on migration and employment to increase worker access; the rules were to take effect in January 2017.24 Kazakhstan also developed a new national investment strategy, supported by the Kazakh Invest National Company, and created a special export strategy embodied by the Kazakh Export National Company.

Foreign ownership and foreign business access to agricultural land, bureaucracy and unevenly applied laws, corruption, fickle legislation without exemptions and grandfather clauses, and government interference contribute to a less-than-ideal investment climate. Improving human rights (including freedom of speech and press) and labour conditions would attract more investment from foreign governments and businesses. It would also improve Kazakhstan’s overall reputation. In March 2015, Kazakhstan implemented constitutional reforms reducing presidential powers and allowing for a possible political transition; however, reforms did not impact Nazarbayev’s powers. Kazakhstan is still considered “not free” by human rights watchdog, Freedom House.25 An improved human rights record would expand Kazakhstan’s role in the UN and other intergovernmental organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which it is seeking membership from.

Kazakhstan’s development of fintech can support new economic partnerships on cryptocurrency and strengthen relations with its Eurasian and Asian partners who are also developing their own digital economies.

With an improved investment climate and a probable cryptocurrency, Kazakhstan can become a modern investment partner. Kazakhstan’s development of fintech can support new economic partnerships on cryptocurrency and strengthen relations with its Eurasian and Asian partners who are also developing their own digital economies. Kazakhstan must balance innovation and democratic reforms with economic state control and regulation. With support of state programs, Kazakhstan strives to maintain their position as the most investor-friendly country in the region. Only after the creation of the CryptoTenge or the introduction of another cryptocurrency in the country, will investors be able to determine if cryptocurrencies’ impact on Kazakhstan’s economy.

About the Author

Samantha Brletich is a freelance writer and researcher on the region of Central Asia and the Former Soviet Union. She focuses on extremism and terrorism, governance, economics, and multi-lateral policy in the region. She has a Master’s in Peace Operations Policy from George Mason University in the United States.

References

1.Haig, Samuel. Kazakhstan Seeks to Become Regional Hub for Cryptocurrency Industry. News, BitCoin.com. https://news.bitcoin.com/kazakhstan – seeks – to – become – regional – hub – for – cryptocurrency – industry/

2.Dyussembekova, Zhazira. Kazakh organisations form Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Association. The Astana Times. https://astanatimes.com/2017/11/kazakh – organisations – form – blockchain – and – cryptocurrency – association/

3. Lyon, Nina. First Country of the Eurasian Economic Union to Issues Its Own Cryptocurrency. CoinIdol.com https://coinidol.com/kyrgyzstan – to – issue – cryptocurrency/

4. Rizzo, Pete. Kyrgyzstan: Bitcoin Payments Violate State Law. CoinDesk. Kyrgyzstan: https://www.coindesk.com/kyrgyzstan – bitcoin – payments – violate – state – law/

5. Astana International Financial Centre. Homepage. http://www.aifc.kz/

6. Deloitte (13 July 2017). Kazakhstan becomes the second government to embrace the cryptocurrency market system. https://www2.deloitte.com/ru/en/pages/about – deloitte/press-releases/2017/kazakhstan-becomes-the-second-government-cryptocurrency-market-system.html, accessed 4 December 2017.

7. Rysaliev, Aktan. Kazakhstan: Making a Tentative Foray into Digital Money. EurasiaNet.org. http://www.eurasianet.org/node/80266

8. Deloitte. Kazakhstan becomes the second government to embrace the cryptocurrency market system. Deloitte. https://www2.deloitte.com/ru/en/pages/about-deloitte/press-releases/2017/kazakhstan-becomes-the-second-government-cryptocurrency-market-system.html

9. Statis. Homepage. www.stasis.net

10. Bitcoin Exchange Guide. Kazakhstan Cryptocurrency – Nation’s Exante Stasis Blockchain? https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/kazakhstan – cryptocurrency/

11. Export.gov. Kazakhstan – E-Commerce. https://www.export.gov/article?id= Kazakhstan – ECommerce

12. Kazinform.com. Digital Kazakhstan programme to be submitted to Head of State for approval. Kazinform.com. http://www.inform.kz/en/digital – kazakhstan – program – to – be – submitted – to – head – of – state – for – approval_a3092695

13. Zerde, National Infocommunication Holding JSC. “Digital Kazakhstan” state program. https://zerde.gov.kz/en/activity/program – control/digital – kazakhstan/

14. Digital Kazakhstan. Homepage. www.digitalkz.kz

15. RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty. Russia’s Central Bank Considering Cryptocurrency Within EEU, and BRICS. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia – central – bank – consider – cryptocurrency – eeu – brics/28943879.html

16. Tengrin News. Cryptocurrency exchange. Kazakhstan and South Korea agreed on cooperation https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/kriptovalyutnaya – birja – kazahstan – yujnaya – koreya – dogovorilis – 333534/

17. Cash_KZ. Tweet. https://twitter.com/cash_kz/status/ 9 2 1 7 8 9 1 4 1 3 2 6 7 1 2 8 3 2

18. KZ Cash. Introduction. https:// kzcash.kz / index. php ? option = com _ sppage -builder&view= page&id = 17&lang=en

19. Votilov, Alexandr. Kazakhstanis can pay with bitcoins of purchases in stores. Forbes Kazakhstan. https://forbes.kz/finances/finance/kazahstantsyi _ mogut _ oplachivat _ bitkoinami _ pokupki _ v_ magazinah

20. EFE. Expo 2017 Astana complex to become Crypto Valley. https://www.efe.com/efe/english/business/expo-2017-astana – complex – to – become- crypto – valley/50000265 – 3385089

21. Mayor’s Office of Astana. Astana Business Campus Will Open Its Doors in 2018. http://astana.gov.kz/en/modules/material/8519

22. Ministry for Investments and Development, Republic of Kazakhstan. 100 Concrete Steps. http://mid.gov.kz/en/kategorii/100-konkretnyh-shagov-0

23. United States Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Kazakhstan. https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2017/sca/270019.htm

24. Export.gov. Kazakhstan – 9.2-Labor. https://www.export.gov/article?id = Kazakhstan – Labor

25. Freedom House. Kazakhstan: Authorities Arrest Editor of Last Independent Newspaper. https://freedomhouse.org/article/kazakhstan – authorities – arrest – editor – last – independent – newspaper

Earn Billions in North Korea: Here’s How

Business, commerce and finance in North Korea concept, 3D rendering

By Shepherd Iverson

This is not a parody for THE ONION, but a pragmatic proposal to reunify Korea with your money, in exchange for resource ownership, construction contracts, licensing agreements and temporary business sector and market monopolies in northern Korea worth billions.

North Korea ranks 10th among nations in mineral reserves, with large deposits of magnesite, ore, coal, gold, zinc, copper, silver, rare earths, and other minerals worth an estimated $6-10 trillion.

What makes this proposal possible is the abundance of profitable resources and prospective enterprises in the Hermit Kingdom that would come under South Korean (or your) control after unification. North Korea ranks 10th among nations in mineral reserves, with large deposits of magnesite, ore, coal, gold, zinc, copper, silver, rare earths, and other minerals worth an estimated $6-10 trillion. Everything is up for grabs in northern Korea, including temporary monopolistic control over entire economic sectors in finance, energy, public utilities, telecommunications, manufacturing, healthcare, tourism, transportation, automotive products, construction materials and contracts for public infrastructure; ownership or licensing agreements for control over mines, seaports, airports, ski resorts, tourist attractions, and construction contracts for railroads, tar roads, a gas pipeline, energy generation, and a multitude of necessary projects. If you get in now, after unification these safe government-authorised investment vehicles will result in enormously profitable ventures, many with secure long-term revenue streams.

There are only a few people in the world with the enterprise and ability to consider this proposal. If I were to write a promotional it would read: SEEKING PROMISES FROM BILLIONAIRES, CORPORATIONS, PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS, AND INTERNATIONAL BANKS TO INVEST IN A NO-RISK FUND THAT WILL PRODUCE ENORMOUS PROFITS AND INCREASE THE STABILITY OF OUR WORLD.

Impossible? What if the Kim regime can be disarmed and Korea unified by promising personal rewards to its elites? Imagine you control a multi-billion dollar fund and North Korea is an underperforming corporation run by an incompetent board of directors – the Kim family and a few ultra-elites – who will not negotiate a deal. In this regressive situation, it is logical to offer its shareholders – political and military elites – a higher price for their shares to persuade them to overrule their board of directors – a friendly corporate buyout.

Pyongyang elites must be assured of an uptown future. To reassure those who depend on their positions in power for their means of survival that they will continue to prosper under new political leadership in a free-market economy, I propose the institution of a Reunification Investment Fund to provide elites with a golden parachute after they bring about unification. In this Triangular Benefit Unification Model, the South Korean government guarantees large profits to private enterprises that in turn, promise money to Pyongyang elites for unifying Korea and transferring political power to Seoul.

I estimate this buyout will cost $30 billion – $4.3 billion dispersed per year for 7 years. The top 1,000 North Korean elite families are promised $5 to 30 million; 11,000 upper elites – including all generals – would become millionaires; 51,200 lower level political and military elites receive $100,000 to $500,000. In total, 112,200 elites receive on average one-quarter-million-dollars each and may now live in the free world as affluent citizens of a democratically united Korea. The apparent audacity of this proposal is assuaged by the fact this is a no risk investment, since money is not released until after unification and the formal transfer of political and military power. Details may be discussed, but surely some amount of incentive will motivate elites to make Kim an offer he cannot refuse.¹

On the surface it may seem counterintuitive, unethical, and even immoral to pay an enemy after decades of human rights abuse. However, upon closer analysis, almost everyone in the North Korean pyramid of power has been replaced in recent years, and this new generation of elites may be viewed less as perpetrators and more as victims of an ignoble history. Most who will benefit are merely innocent inheritors of their fathers’ ill-begotten estate (position and power) and were not complicit in its acquisition or in the malevolence that followed. We do not punish the descendants of slaveholders or the children of thieves and murderers. This payment would amount to a bailout for the sins of their ancestors – without moral hazard.

For practical reasons, promising personal and financial security to the House of Kim may ease the deal and prevent bloodshed.

For practical reasons, promising personal and financial security to the House of Kim may ease the deal and prevent bloodshed. Denial of complicity in palace purges and other atrocities may preserve Kim’s public image; his father and the relic henchmen he has already dispatched from positions of power may be scapegoats for decades of malfeasance and unconscionable human rights abuse. If Kim does not acquiesce, with $20-30 million promised to each of the 200 most prominent families, they might take matters into their own hands. Or a coup d’état may be sponsored by well-compensated military elites. Since safety is more precious than power, young Kim would have little choice but to accept this offer.

North Koreans are ready for change. Digital visions of personal freedom and material prosperity have saturated cultural impressions, creating modern aspirations and a new social context for political change that has not existed before.

North Koreans are ready for change. Digital visions of personal freedom and material prosperity have saturated cultural impressions, creating modern aspirations and a new social context for political change that has not existed before. After decades of silent transformation the mere existence of a $30 billion fund sitting in escrow ready to pay elites vast sums upon unification may be a game changer. This fund will provide a stable platform for peacefully managing the political transition, while international development banks and the South Korean government will provide the larger capital foundation for successful economic reintegration. The alternatives would cost trillions and might result in catastrophic loss of life.

For decades, cloistered foreign policy professionals in Washington have failed to make a deal. Although the grim trajectory of geopolitics may seem unstoppable, we need not continue down this road leading into the abyss. Instead, we may think outside the box and create novel solutions to unique contemporary geopolitical problems. We need private and public leaders who can bring out the best in us; those who perceive the big picture and understand the ideas that move humanity forward are often initially considered crazy, disruptive, or impossible; luminaries who can show us what we should want, while smartly employing incentives to get us there. Indeed, from time immemorial practical reason and creativity has helped us overcome nature, now in a digital nuclear age we must be smarter and more innovative in order to save us from ourselves.

Business entrepreneurs understand opportunity costs, and to counter threatening entropic global forces should be willing to invest large and long in a more secure world order. If they neglect their fiduciary responsibility in such matters, they do so at their own peril – and ours. Although this particular plan for enlightened self-interest is an impossible proposition for all but a few WORLD FINANCIAL REVIEW readers, for those in position, this idea might be worth billions and create an opportunity to stand for a moment on the world stage in Oslo Norway.

About the Author

Dr. Shepherd Iverson taught in the Institute for Korean Studies at Inha University in South Korea from 2009-2017. His academic papers, articles, and op-eds on disarming North Korea have appeared in international journals, Asian newspapers, and Forbes Magazine. Professor Iverson’s ideas are presented in detail in his new volume: Stop North Korea! A Radical New Approach to Solving the North Korea Standoff (2017).

Reference

1. Details of this plan and the payout are in my book, Stop North Korea! A Radical New Approach to Solving the North Korean Standoff (North Clarendon, Vermont: Tuttle Publishing, 2017).

2018: A Foreign Policy Wild Ride in Trump’s America

Foreign policy in america

By Markos Kounalakis

Surprise is an element that Trump relishes both in deal-making and in policy. America and the world need to get ready for a wild ride in 2018. Guessing what the world will look like in the Trump era is a risky game. President Donald Trump came to office with no governing track record and his time in the Oval Office has been full of contradicting policies and statements that make only one thing certain: Unpredictability.

The last line of defense in checking President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy power is the old guard of the Republican Party, and those watchmen are about to go quietly into the night.

A 2018 Republican sweep would cripple two key Senate committees, moving them from painfully ineffective to plainly inconsequential. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee are supposed to oversee the foreign-policy and the national-security apparatus. Trump has brought them to heel.

He has belittled the outspoken Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee, who became a lame duck by giving up a 2018 re-election bid (Disclosure: Corker held my presidential appointment from Senate confirmation in 2016). Sitting out alongside him is another committee member, Trump-critic Sen. Jeff Flake of Arizona, leaving a handful of cowed Republicans and the minority Democrats to try to counter Trump policy tweets and fight for a systematically well-formulated foreign agenda.

Chairing the Armed Services Committee is Sen. John McCain of Arizona. A hale McCain is a formidable leader, whether in military conflict or D.C. turf wars, but he is publicly disrespected and humiliated by Trump, who once said the former P.O.W. was “not a war hero.” The once powerful McCain is suffering a grave illness that may take him off the policy battlefield sooner than he deserves.

Without the present and vibrant check Corker and McCain provide on Trump’s instincts and inclinations, the man is granted full reign over global affairs. Indeed, there are almost no judicial checks on a president’s foreign policy, and the checks within the administration are minimal. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is all but sidelined and his State Department is going through a convulsing re-organisation that makes diplomats cogs, not wheels, of diplomacy.  Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has been given both full authority and responsibility for military matters, but the decision to militarily deploy remains with the Commander-in-Chief.

That leaves legislative instruments available to congressional committees – the power of subpoena, confirmation, and budget. But a 2018 rout by Republicans riding Trump coattails and parroting his messaging would further diminish the majority party’s resistance and dwindle the number of critical senators keeping the administration from usurping all power to decide matters of war and peace. 

The odds of retuning a full Republican-led Senate and House of Representatives is diminishing by the day following the Senate-hopeful Roy Moore’s loss in Alabama and the increasing number of Republican congressmen who are dropping out of their difficult reelection bids.  November elections are not decided this early in the 2018 political cycle and what may appear as growing Democratic momentum in the early part of a still peaceful year can quickly shift into a bandwagon of rallying round the flag patriotic fervor should the United States be attacked or threatened or if President Trump initiates a military engagement abroad.  Congress would have little say and less power in the outbreak of hostilities.

The Constitution says only Congress can “declare war.” The reality, however, is that every American military engagement fought since World War II was an undeclared war.

Already, Congress’ check on presidential power in foreign affairs and security is weak. The Constitution says only Congress can “declare war.” The reality, however, is that every American military engagement fought since World War II was an undeclared war. It’s been a police action, a response, a kinetic military action, an extended military engagement, but never a war. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and likely any fight picked by the current administration will find its legal justification in the 2001 Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which is in desperate need of an overhaul.

Presidents end run Congress on war powers, but what about legislation? Congress recently tried to tie the president’s hands on Russia and force him to up the sanctions regime and punishment for Moscow’s multiple sins. He signed the bill, but undermined the legislative maneuver by sitting on his hands.

Few Republicans today have the fortitude or ability to debate, criticise or resist Trump’s foreign policy.  The House has a foreign affairs committee, chaired by Ed Royce (R-CA) who has so far voted with Donald Trump 96.1%. In Royce, Trump has a reliable ally and rubber stamp.  This Trump loyalty has come at a significant political cost to the congressman, with Royce deciding he would be defeated in a reelection bid in his increasingly Trump-policy resistant home state of California. 

Presidential power is not absolute, however. A president needs to sell his policies to the people and maintain democratic support for those policies every two years so that elected representatives can return the citizens’ electoral verdict to Washington. Recent results favoring Democrats in Virginia and elsewhere could indicate a brewing midterm backlash against Trump. 2018 will determine whether Americans have faith in Trump’s conduct and character. If that faith translates into Republican majorities, those representatives are likely to grant the president the unbridled foreign policy power he sought when he declared, “I alone can fix it.”

Trump could deservedly achieve more power before next year’s election with a positive North Korea outcome, whether negotiated or otherwise. A North Korean success would prove to lawmakers and the American people that his tough talk and confrontational style works. That would reinforce and strengthen the time-tested notion of executive privilege in foreign affairs. 

Ironically, failure in North Korea could also favor Trump politically as an America threatened or under attack would likely rally citizens behind its president.  As the world prepared for the 2018 Winter Olympics, a slight thaw warmed otherwise chilly relations between North and South Korea, with Pyongyang making overtures towards talks and participation in the quadrennial sporting event. A consequent nuclear freeze or agreement to control North Korea’s ballistic threat could give Trump a huge political boost and the world a sigh of relief.  It would also make a 2018 Republican electoral victory more likely with the inevitable and unstoppable presidential tweets and speech rightly boasting and bragging of a difficult deadlock solved.  In the meantime, the world must take a wait-and-see approach.

A 2018 Republican House and Senate would allow Trump to test Mel Brooks’ theory that “it’s good to be the king.” Then again, if recent electoral victories and a stronger anti-Trump field portend a Democratic sweep next year, Congress will make sure administration bad actors are investigated, foreign follies go unfunded, military actions are constrained, and partisan appointments languish.

Foreign Policy Players in Trump Administration

Waiting in the West Wing, however, and impatiently anticipating wholesale global disruption are two high-visibility politicians, promoting and positioning themselves to be the next wave of foreign affairs leaders. The Iran protests at the beginning of 2018 have provided them a more prominent platform, Trump aligned policy, and clear boost to their power, even though they both hail from the economically and politically marginally important state of South Carolina. 

Senator Lindsey Graham’s and Ambassador Nikki Haley’s loud anti-mullah voices are heard both at the White House and on the world stage. Graham and Haley are actively making the case for Iranian regime change, a strategy partly developed at a Heritage Foundation that was until recently led by South Carolina’s former Senator Jim DeMint. The Carolinas have not had this much influence on American foreign affairs since North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the turn of the millennium.

The Southern Haley-Graham Iran strategy supports multiple proxy wars against Tehran-allied and underwritten bad guys. The Islamic Republic of Iran subsidises and supports Yemen’s Houthi rebels, Assad’s murderous Syrian forces, Lebanon’s Hezbollah terrorists, and the turncoat Iraqis trained and equipped by Iranians to kill Americans. The list is long and Haley-Graham encourages the fights on all of Iran’s foreign fronts.

Now the battlefront has suddenly turned to Iran’s homeland. Street protests have flared-up and anything can happen. Demonstrator body counts are rising throughout the country. In this unpredictable environment, Trump-whisperers, golf buddies, and prominent politicians with a global platform have inordinate power over policy while reinforcing the president’s political instincts, belligerent rhetoric, and assertive policies. Haley-Graham tops the list of those foreign policy influencers.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, the former South Carolina governor, came to office almost a year ago and soon let it be known that “there’s a new sheriff in town” and that Israel-bashing and Iran-coddling was over. Haley is the highest profile woman in an administration where only Ivanka Trump seems to have total access and influence. Haley is presumed to have presidential ambitions and is stirring up conservative political support by attacking the U.N., everyone’s favorite whipping boy. Picking on a fully-deserving Iran is a winning issue and a no-brainer.

The U.N. platform allows Haley to pursue institutional reform in a target-rich environment. Attacking perceived anti-American states at the United Nations gives her positive press and builds her foreign policy cred. In the process, Haley gets to reward foreign friends while busily “taking names” of egregious global offenders and Trump antagonists.

The United Nations provides a grand stage for grandstanding and Haley took the floor last month to accuse Iran of providing rockets to Saudi-attacking Yemeni rebels and violating the Obama-signed nuclear deal. In her relentless effort to undermine Iran’s despicable regime and build an international coalition, she put on display missile parts as “concrete evidence” against Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s bad behavior – “we are not going to sit back and watch this,” she warned.

Less assertively, former-Trump-critic-turned-Trump-friend Lindsey Graham is augmenting his Trump access. Senator Graham is a Vietnam veteran who was relentlessly critical of President Obama’s foreign policy, an exceedingly positive attribute in Trump’s White House. Mild-mannered, tough-talking Graham is now a tee time buddy and clubhouse chum of the nation’s latest golfer-in-chief. In the process, he has become a significant player in the administration’s foreign policy-making. His Iran position is unequivocal: “We’ve got a chance to deliver some fatal blows to really bad actors in 2018.”

If Haley has dreams of occupying the Oval Office, Graham is said to be eyeing the Secretary of State job that Trump is working to make vacant. Wall Streeters say that incumbent Rex Tillerson needs to stay in office a full year before a Bush 41-era tax loophole allows him to fully defer a $71 million tax bill. The countdown to Tillerson’s 366th day in office is well underway and Iran-hawk and former presidential candidate Graham has ingratiated himself as a Trump convert and improbable defender, perfectly positioned to step into a State Department leadership vacancy.

South Carolina’s favorite son and daughter are bolstering President Trump’s support for Iran’s street protesters The Iranian situation is fluid and volatile.

Democracies around the world are harboring the hope that this is a Persian-version of Tunisia’s Arab Spring, but also fear a Libyan-style revolution that devolves into more bloodshed and chaos. The Haley-Graham combo has proven politically effective at home, but the question is whether it will be as diplomatically successful in Iran.

The Post-Impeachment, Post-Indictment, Post-Trump Scenario

Michael Wolff’s “Fire and Fury” bestseller paints a picture of a dysfunctional Trump White House on the verge of collapse and on the edge of internal overthrow.

Figuring the odds for a 25th Amendment action is best left to bookmakers, however, not book authors. Whatever the odds, foreign leaders always need to hedge their bets. On their minds, if not their tongues, is what life would be like under a President Pence.

Traditional foreign allies look to Vice President Mike Pence and his visits for American reassurance and resolve, continuity and commitment. The veep’s outwardly quiet demeanor and unfailing Trump loyalty has earned him the right to travel the world on the president’s behalf, carrying with him the credibility of presidential access and influence. Pence’s absence from the pages of Wolff’s book will certainly endear him further to President Trump, who perceives a White House otherwise under siege by internal enemies.

NATO looked to Pence for love early in this administration, when POTUS was flirting with Russia and tired of buying European gifts and taking them on military theater dates on his dime. Trump avoided talking about “commitment” and changed the subject when it came to the sacred mutual defense vows of Article V. But Pence never wavered, never failed. Europe’s affection for Pence is returned and, if Germany’s Angela Merkel survives her latest leadership challenge, the love can blossom anew.

Australia, too, had a rough patch with America. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had an early spat with Trump, punctuated by phone hang-ups and hurt feelings. Pence made peace by successfully going on what Australian media called a “charm offensive” to repair any damage and rebuild the relationship.

Around the world, Pence is a practiced and predictable politician in the American conservative presidential mold, unlikely to stray from the mainstream of post-World War II orthodoxy that sees America’s role as the world’s policeman. When he was in Congress, he was staunchly pro-Iraq War. His intensely Christian social conservatism could influence his privileging foreign policies and partners who align with traditional Judeo-Christian values.

Pence’s Middle East trip, his first visit there as vice president, gave the world strong clues as to how he will deal with prime ministers and potentates in the ever-contested region. From Syria to Egypt, Russian presence and influence is growing by the day. Iran and Saudi Arabia are militarily engaged in proxy wars against each other. Pence’s speech in the Israeli Knesset gave insight to his approach toward Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The Middle East is but one part of an evolving America First strategy that pits foreign nations into one of two clear categories – friend or enemy.

The Middle East is but one part of an evolving America First strategy that pits foreign nations into one of two clear categories – friend or enemy.  Friends are not necessarily traditional allies, as the Trump policies excoriate many of those countries as defense and security free-riders who are seen as financial parasites, exploiting economic and trade policies that give them access to American consumer and financial markets while relying on American security guarantees to give them the wherewithal to expend their national resources on aggressive industrial policies and underwritten export strategies. 

Enemies are no longer traditional ideological adversaries, as some countries have managed to endear themselves to the Trump administration by providing investment, jobs, and capital to American markets while alleviating America’s security burden in the Middle East and elsewhere. This “transactional” evolution of America First leaves few regions and nations outside of the binary friend-enemy framework, with both a marginal strategic understanding of these nations within the Trump Administration and a traditional lack of focus on their significance and relative growth, power, and importance in the 21st century. 

A peaceful presidential transition, whether before or on Jan. 20, 2021 – or even if Trump leaves office in 2025 after a second term – creates an opportunity for a policy reset. Trump’s disruptor-in-chief tweets and feats have crushed compacts, rejiggered alliances, starved institutions, and destroyed foreign policy assumptions.

As for Pence, every vice president is always a heartbeat away from assuming power. Health is the main concern, as the 71-year-old President Trump has been as transparent about his medical history as he has been with his tax returns. Health aside, President Trump is facing potentially fatal political challenges from a toxic “Moscow Mueller” cocktail made up of one part Putin spirits, a squeeze of lip-puckering palace intrigue, and slightly sweetened with Russia-related investigations of friends and family.

Not every political sector may see a President Pence as a refreshing change of pace as some global leaders do. The prospect of a Pence administration has American progressives scared witless.

Not every political sector may see a President Pence as a refreshing change of pace as some global leaders do, however  the prospect of a Pence administration has American progressives scared witless. They worry the fiercely devout former Indiana congressman and governor would actively pursue his long-embraced and deeply-felt conservative agenda. Pro-choice activists are particularly concerned about his anti-abortion stance and already troll him by donating in his name to Planned Parenthood. As one Huffington Post headline put it, “Trump might blow up the world, but Pence would set the clock back to 1954.”

Broader political uncertainties loom, too. On domestic policy issues, it’s unclear if middle America would choose President Trump – a former Democrat with a free-spinning moral compass – over the clear-cut, clean-cut Pence. In foreign policy, however, the U.S. foreign policy establishment (called “The Blob” during the Obama years) weighs-in heavily in Pence’s favor, with Europeans all but counting the days to a potential ascension.

The next president may inherit a dirty mess but will start with a relatively clean slate on foreign policy. Whoever becomes the next president will be handed an incredible amount of latitude to develop a new foreign policy agenda entirely free of previous commitment or policy inertia.

If that next president is Mike Pence, his foreign policy decisions are easy to anticipate, if not entirely predict. Crises faced by Oval Office occupants have a way of testing presidential character, instincts and reactions. Just ask George W. Bush, who ran for president with the promise of pursuing a “humble” foreign policy.

The fear of most political analysts today, however, is that Trump’s perspective on power and his unyieldingly America First assertive stance in the world could easily invite or devolve into a violent conflict with an adversary nation.  A compliant and continuing 2018 reelected Republican Congress would be all but assured in the case of a war-tense or terror-filled Autumn.

Regardless of how 2018 shapes up, the last year has caused foreign policy analysts to experience whiplash, political observers to eat their hats, and a global populace sitting on the edge of their seats, watching a dramatic, unpredictable, and existentially relevant performance unfold. 

About the Author

Markos Kounalakis, Ph.D. is a senior fellow at Central European University and visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is a nationally syndicated foreign affairs columnist for McClatchy newspapers. Dr. Kounalakis’s new book, “Spin Wars & Spy Games” on the geopolitics of global news networks is scheduled for release in May 2018 by Hoover Press.  Markos can be reached at [email protected] or on Twitter @KounalakisM.

Yellen’s Twin Legacies – Powell’s Dilemma

By Jack Rasmus

As Yellen leaves the Powell Fed with two contradictory legacies, the question of the day is which will the Powell Fed now follow? Does it continue Yellen’s policy of relatively slow and occasional rate hike? Or does it raise rates faster, and in increments more than 0.25%? More important, what might be the effects of more rapid rate hikes on financial markets? Will it be 2006-07 all over again?

This past February 2018 Janet Yellen, chair of the US Federal Reserve bank since 2014, was replaced by the Trump administration with the new Fed chair, Jerome Powell. Yellen leaves the Powell Fed with two contradictory legacies. The question of the day is which will the Powell Fed now follow? What role will the Trump administration’s tax cuts and spending programs play in influencing the choice? And is the Powell Fed now in a ‘no win’ situation, regardless which policy direction it takes?

Yellen’s Fed represents a continuation of the policies of her predecessor, Ben Bernanke – just as Bernanke’s policies continued Alan Greenspan’s, his predecessor. All three Fed regimes are defined by their shared policy of decades-long, massive liquidity injections – beginning with Greenspan’s assumption of the Fed chair in 1987 and continuing through the third of Yellen’s four year term in 2016.

The legacy of their thirty years of unremitting liquidity injection has been excessively leveraged, debt-fueled investment in financial markets that generated asset demand driving financial asset prices into unsustainable bubble territory. With Greenspan it was the savings & loan industry bust in the late 1980s, the US contribution to the Asian currency bubble of the late 1990s, then the US tech stock bubble of 1999-2000, and, together with Bernanke at his side, thereafter the subprime mortgage bond and derivatives twin bubbles of 2004-07.

Yellen’s First Legacy

Like her predecessors, in her first three years at the Fed helm Yellen chose to continue the Greenspan-Bernanke policy of excess liquidity. As the following Table 1 shows, Yellen continued the Bernanke QE program of Fed dirvect bond buying in her first year as chair.

In 2015-16 thereafter, she continued to ‘rollover’ prior debt that was maturing, thereby keeping the Fed balance sheet at $4.5 trillion instead of allowing it to decline. The net liquidity injected into the economy by the Yellen Fed during its first three years, composed of new and rolled over debt, was thus likely in excess of $500 billion.2

A comparison of Yellen vs. Bernanke money supply growth further illustrates the Yellen continuation of the Greenspan-Bernanke excess liquidity policy and its effect on the US money supply. The virtual free money from the Fed clearly continued during the first three years of her term, as Table 2 indicates. The Fed benchmark rate remained in the 0.25%-0.5% range through 2016.

When measured in terms of the M2 money supply, more of the Fed’s liquidity actually entered the US economy on an annual basis during Yellen’s first three years than had even under her predecessor, Bernanke. Vast amounts of that liquidity flowed into financial markets, both in the US and abroad.

In 2017 the Yellen Fed began seriously raising its benchmark rates – albeit gradually. That policy shift of ‘rate hike gradualism’ is also a legacy – the second – of the Yellen Fed.  Excess liquidity initially, the first legacy, followed by gradualism in rate hikes constitute the Yellen Fed’s ‘twin legacies’.

The policy shift to gradually higher rates actually began under Bernanke, announced in 2013 but never implemented.

The policy shift to gradually higher rates actually began under Bernanke, announced in 2013 but never implemented. Bernanke in 2013 no doubt remembered the consequences of his prior shift and rate hikes in 2006-07 – a shift which contributed toward precipitating the 2007-08 housing-derivatives bubbles implosions. Bernanke announced his intention to raise rates in mid-2013 but then ‘blinked’ amidst widespread market negative reactions, in the US and across emerging markets.  He likely did not want to leave a legacy that on his watch the Fed’s policy shifts precipitated two – not one – market crashes. The 2007-09 was enough. Let someone else preside over the second. 

Bernanke’s legacy was threefold:  continuing his mentor, Greenspan’s policy, excess liquidity, followed by too high and too rapid rate hikes in 2006-07, thereafter by still even more excess liquidity post-2008.  If excess liquidity was the fundamental source of the bubbles and crisis, in some perverse logic then still more liquidity was envisioned as the solution short term.

Yellen’s legacies would be continuing the three decade long ‘Great Liquidity Put’ set in motion by Greenspan and Bernanke, and then to actually implement the Bernanke ‘rate gradualism’ policy shift in 2017, announced by Bernanke in 2013 but quickly shelved for the rest of his term. The differences between the Bernanke and Yellen legacies were thus minimal: both contributed to the GLP and, whereas Bernanke announced his intention to raise rates gradually in 2013 but didn’t, Yellen began doing so in her last year. The Yellen Fed was thus but an addendum to the Bernanke–except for the latter’s disastrous accelerate rate hikes in 2006-07 that helped precipitate the crash. That experience now looms large on the horizon for the Powell Fed.

The Bernanke Put: Greenspan’s on Steroids

Assuming the Fed chair in 2006, Bernanke attempted to reverse the prior two decade long policy of excess liquidity. By 2007, he had quickly raised the benchmark federal funds rate to 5.25%. However, after years of artificially low 1% rates under Greenspan’s Fed, raising rates too high and too quickly, to 5.25%, played a central role in precipitating the housing and derivatives bubble busts – the first commencing in 2007 and the latter in 2008.

The lesson of 2006-07 was clearly: after years of artificially low rates around 1% fueling debt-driven financial asset bubbles, rates could not rise to 5% or more, and certainly not that quickly in 2006-07. Today rates have been low, at 0.25% for almost eight years. And it’s unlikely that rates will have to rise anywhere near 5.25% to precipitate a similar markets’ response.

In the six years that followed the 2008 crash Bernanke would absorb the lesson of decades of excess liquidity, followed by too rapid rate hikes in 2006-07 only partially. To contain the 2008 crisis (fundamentally caused by excess liquidity enabled debt driven financial bubbles) he would resort to injecting even more liquidity in 2008-09. The ‘Bernanke Put’ would succeed the Greenspan’s Put by magnitudes.4  As a consequence, the Fed’s benchmark rate came down from a high of 5.25% to 0.25% in just months, and would remain there for eight more years. 

The Fed rate collapse of 2008-09 was enabled by means of quantitative easing (QE) injections of $4.5 trillion (and more if refinancing debt maturity rollovers are counted), special Fed auctions, central bank currency swaps, and traditional bond buying open market operations. Per some estimates, perhaps as much as $8 to $10 trillion in liquidity was added by collective means to the global banking system by Bernanke during his tenure at the Fed.

If Bernanke failed to heed the dangers of excess liquidity and debt driving financial bubbles, by 2013, he apparently did absorb the lessons of 2006-07– i.e. not to raise rates too high, too fast in an effort to try to retrieve excess liquidity.  In 2013, instead of raising rates too rapidly once again, he carefully suggested publicly that the Fed might begin raising rates once again in the near future–albeit very gradually and slowly. He also announced the Fed might even consider selling off some of its bloated $4.5 trillion debt.

Just the talk of rising US interest rates in the US precipitated a near panic in emerging market economies. EME currencies quickly depreciated, in turn accelerating capital flight from EME markets.

However, just the talk of rising US interest rates in the US precipitated a near panic in emerging market economies (EMEs).  EME currencies quickly depreciated, in turn accelerating capital flight from EME markets.  Bernanke backtracked quickly in the face of what was called then the ‘taper tantrum’. But as he reversed his announcement, he made it clear in late summer 2013, up until leaving office in February 2014, that it still was the Fed’s intention to eventually raise rates – as well as begin selling off the Fed’s bloated balance sheet (which would further raise rates) – at some yet undefined future date and at a slow rate. His Fed thereafter ‘marked time’ until his departure in February 2014 and replacement by Yellen. However, in the interim he had laid the groundwork for the Yellen Fed to implement his policy of rate hike gradualism.

Yellen’s Second Legacy

The Yellen Fed began clearly as a virtual extension of the Bernanke Fed: in the early years it continued to provide excess liquidity, like the Greenspan and Bernanke Feds before. Moreover, the Yellen Fed continued to do so for three more years, and only in the last year of her term cautiously began to seriously implement the Bernanke policy of gradual rate hikes.

It took the Yellen Fed two years before it would make even a token increase in rates, and then only a tepid 0.25% hike at the end of 2015. It took another full year before another token hike occurred, in December 2016.  Neither together was sufficient to discourage the financial asset bubbles that were growing, still being fueled by the prior eight year policy of continued liquidity provided by the central bank. 

It was only in 2017 that the Yellen Fed started to rise noticeably, in hikes of 0.25% well spread out over the year. From 2014 through 2016, the excess liquidity policy continued to feed financial asset markets expansion. The 2017 rate gradualism policy was modest and slow and clearly intended not to discourage financial markets from their steady run up that was set in motion back in 2010. The 2017 rate increases, which raised Fed rates to a level of 1.5%, were thus a cautionary hike in anticipation of potential aggressive Trump fiscal policy on the horizon, as well as a response by the Fed to the emergence of what was called the ‘Trump Trade’–i.e. rising financial markets, especially equities, in anticipation of business-investor tax cuts coming and the release of ‘animal spirits’ boosting business investment.

However, clearly the Bernanke-Yellen policy of rate hike gradualism was becoming less gradual by 2017. Gradualism was being slowly redefined. It was not 2014-16 token gradualism, but nor was it yet 2006-07 of rapid rate hikes! However, signs began to appear in 2017 that perhaps a repeat of 2006-07 (and perhaps its consequences) was not too far away.

Trump promises of accelerating fiscal policies – tax cuts and spending alike – were being taken seriously by financial markets in 2017.

Trump promises of accelerating fiscal policies – tax cuts and spending alike – were being taken seriously by financial markets in 2017. The so-called ‘Trump trade’ was boosting financial asset markets. In the face of that, the additional 1% hike in the Fed benchmark rate in 2017 did little to dampen financial asset market speculation and inflation. Stock markets in particular were now being driven by the new ‘animal spirits’ based on little but expectations of a great windfall in profits and capital gains from the Trump tax cuts.

By year end 2017, the thirty year, 1987 through 2016, ‘Grand Liquidity Put’ of Greenspan-Bernanke-Yellen clearly had come to an end. Fiscal policy would now drive monetary. Unlike the preceding period when monetary policy by central banks was the lead and fiscal austerity followed in its wake.  By early 2018 it now appears the gradualist Fed rate hikes policy–announced and aborted by Bernanke in 2013 and begun to be implemented 2016-17 by Yellen – will soon be replaced with more accelerated rate hikes 2018-19. That raises the new scenario that future Fed policy may consequently look more like 2006-07 – with all its consequences – overlaid with a new taper tantrum in emerging markets that will dwarf the aborted reaction of 2013.

Yellen’s Legacies; Powell’s Dilemma

The Powell Fed now faces a dilemma:  Does it continue Yellen’s policy of relatively slow and occasional rate hikes, allowing financial markets to escalate still further into bubble territory, driven now by new forces of fiscal stimulus and the release of global investor ‘animal spirits’?  Or does it raise rates faster, and in increments more than 0.25% as in the past, to confront the new fiscal stimulus and investor expectations? More important, what might be the effects of more rapid rate hikes on financial markets? Will it be 2006-07 all over again? How high must rates go until it does? The Fed says it doesn’t care about financial markets. But it is expected to say that. In truth, its past track record shows it clearly does care.

The Powell dilemma may be answered not by the Fed. Not by central bank monetary policy. In 2018 monetary policy may be relegated to a secondary role and forced to follow fiscal once again – something that has not been the case for decades. The Powell Fed may have its direction chosen for it – i.e. by the Trump-Congress fiscal policy already set in motion. By the Trump tax cuts, the accelerating US war spending, possible infrastructure spending, etc.

Yellen’s legacy of ‘rate gradualism’ will likely be abandoned – as trillion dollar annual US budget deficits loom now for years to come as a result of Trump tax cuts and spending plans. That fiscal policy shift already means the Fed will now have to borrow significantly more – in the next two years alone at least $600 billion more to fund the $300 billion in Trump tax cuts and $300 billion in additional budget deficit spending (and perhaps more if defense spending continues to rise as projected next year or Congress itself funds more than Trump has requested).

Beyond the next two years, in the longer run, perhaps $10 trillion more in US deficits over the coming decade, should certain assumptions by Trump and Republicans prove erroneous: i.e. should US GDP not exceed the projected 3% plus annual growth rates; should a recession occur sometime in the next decade which is highly likely; should foreign buyers of US Treasury debt slow their purchases, should US defense spending continue to accelerate; and should the Trump tax cuts cost more than initially reported.

Estimates of next year’s US budget deficit by JP Chase Bank research is already $1.2 trillion, and other sources project even higher. Most independent sources estimate average annual deficits of $1 trillion or more for a decade to come. That’s more than the $10 trillion, to be added to the current US national debt of $20 trillion. And that’s a mountain of Treasury bonds to be sold by the Fed, which will no doubt require more rapid, significant, and sustained Fed rate hikes to finance. The 30 year ‘Grand Liquidity Put’ is over. Central bank Fed monetary policy is henceforth the tail on the fiscal dog.

The question now being asked by ‘Fed watchers’, bankers, and business press pundits is whether Powell will continue Yellen policy of gradually raising Fed rates (not likely) or will he raise Fed short term benchmark rates even faster, perhaps four times or more in 2018, as has been signaled–and even further thereafter in 2019? And will the Fed under Powell accelerate the sell off of its balance sheet – announced by Yellen, but not yet really begun, thus driving rates higher even faster?

A next set of questions is whether a flattening yield curve now underway, and a slowing real US economy by late 2018-early 2019, bring the new rate hike and tightening Fed policy to a halt? Could it even mean, in the medium term, a return to a policy of rate reduction and cheaper money once again? How soon before rising rates precipitate another financial instability event?

Put alternatively: how high (and fast) will Fed rates rise in the short run, 2018-19, before the prior liquidity fueled financial asset bubbles of 2009-18 created by Greenspan, Bernanke, and Yellen begin to burst?  The 10% February 2018 stock market corrections may be but a harbinger of things yet to come – a dress rehearsal correction that often occurs before the more sustained corrections that follow weeks, sometimes months, later.

Three to four rate hikes in 2018 may lead to history repeating itself. The Fed’s rate hiking in 2007-08 – from a 1% Fed funds rate to more than 5%–precipitated the crash of the bubble in subprime mortgages that spread via derivatives contagion to the rest of the credit system. A similar experience in 2018-19 may be in the making, albeit with new causal transmission mechanisms and other financial asset markets. It won’t be mortgages and credit default swaps next time. Fed rate hikes may burst the current bubbles in stocks and junk bonds–this time transmitted by derivatives in the form of exchange traded notes & products linked to passive investing and quant hedge fund algorithm-induced automated selling. Or it may come from emerging markets, now overloaded with dollar denominated corporate debt, that collapse with massive capital flight and recessions provoked by rising domestic rates that shut down their own economies. It may even originate in China where, even if contained there, will send unknown psychological contagion effects across the rest of the global economy.

When rising rates driven by fiscal policy inevitably meet the financial fragility that exists in key sectors of the US economy, it may bring about the abrupt termination of the Fed rate hike policy about to accelerate at the Fed.5

The last time the Fed reversed course and raised rates in 2006-08, rates rose beyond 5% before the bubbles imploded. Given the fundamentally more fragile US economy today, it may take far less a hike to precipitate the same!

The last time the Fed reversed course and raised rates in 2006-08, rates rose beyond 5% before the bubbles imploded. Given the fundamentally more fragile US economy today, it may take far less a hike to precipitate the same! 

As this writer has been arguing elsewhere recently, what’s different today from 2006-07 is that it will almost certainly not take a 5% Fed funds rate to precipitate another crisis. A Fed funds rate of 2%-2.5% may prove sufficient. A 10 year Treasury bond rate of 3.5% could provoke the same.  Either could set in motion a serious contraction of bond or stock Exchange Trade Funds’ prices, accelerated by Quant hedge fund algorithmic trading, and amplified by the mass influx of passive index investing in recent years.

While that may not be the immediate short term scenario, it may not be far from the midterm truth, circa 2019-20!

About the Author

Dr. Jack Rasmus is the author of the recently published book, ‘Central Bankers at the End of Their Ropes: Monetary Policy and the Coming Depression, Clarity Press, August 2017, which has been previously reviewed on this magazine. He blogs at drjackrasmus and his twitter handle is @drjackrasmus.

References

1. See Jack Rasmus, ‘Yellen’s Fed: From Taper Tantrum to Trump Trade’, in Central Bankers at the End of Their Ropes, Clarity Press, August 2017, Chapter 14, p. 260.

2. Some argue that the ‘rollover’ of debt does not matter because an equal amount of debt was retired compared to the issue of the rollover. But this ignores the effect of the money multiplier as the liquidity enters the economy. The principal may be retired, but the ‘multiple’ of the liquidity is not and it contributes as well to the financial asset bubble expansion.

3. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/32329?tg=gen.

4. See Jack Rasmus, ‘Bernanke’s Bank: Greenspan’s ‘Put’ on Steroids’, Chapter 5 in Central Bankers at the End of Their Ropes: Monetary Policy and the Coming Depression’, Clarity Press, August 2017, pp. 106-41.

5. For tis writer’s analysis of how the US economy has become more ‘fragile’ in recent years–based upon variables of debt, income, and terms of debt servicing, see Jack Rasmus, Systemic Fragility in the Global Economy, Clarity Press, 2016.

AIIB: Experiments in Scaling-up Development Finance

By Daniel Poon

Since its launch in January 2016, what are the significant developments on the operations of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)? In this article, the author discusses the operational features of AIIB and provides insights into the bank’s lending operations by adopting an institutional perspective on China’s experience with its own national development banks, such as the China Development Bank.

The middle of last month marked the second anniversary of AIIB, but many are still debating: will it be any different from existing multilateral development banks (MDBs) like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB)?

Unlike most major MDBs, the Bank is majority owned by developing countries with China as its largest shareholder. This could make the AIIB more attuned to the interests of developing countries, but not necessarily so.

In fairness, two years is too short a time span for a definitive verdict on the nature of the Bank’s operations. Thus far, it has expanded its initial membership of 57 to 84. The Bank has extended loans to 24 infrastructure projects (in which three are fund of funds investments) in 12 countries. Total loans amount to $4.2bn, which has mobilised an additional $17bn from other public and private investors.

For now, India is the top borrowing country in terms of number and value of AIIB investments. India has received five investments worth $4.07bn, of which $1.07 bn was contributed by the AIIB.

For now, India is the top borrowing country in terms of number and value of AIIB investments. India has received five investments worth $4.07bn, of which $1.07 bn was contributed by the AIIB.

Overall, this is a good start, but does not suggest anything especially innovative about the Bank’s way of doing business.

The debate about the AIIB stems in part from an oversimplification of the challenges of setting up a new MDB, essentially from scratch. The World Bank has been in operation for over 70 years; in 2017 it disbursed $43.9bn and had a total full-time staff of under 12,000. By comparison, at the AIIB’s first annual Board of Governors meeting in June 2016, it had a total staff of 39, and anticipated a total staff of 100 by the end of that year.

The AIIB regards 2016 – 2020 as its “start-up phase”, and 2021 – 2027 as its “growth phase”. This gradual approach is also consistent with China’s overall style of pragmatic economic reform and opening-up.

So it will take some time before AIIB can match the lending scale of those with a longer history. And rightly so, solid multilateral institutional foundations and practices do not simply fall from the sky. Indeed, the AIIB regards 2016 – 2020 as its “start-up phase”, and 2021 – 2027 as its “growth phase”. This gradual approach is also consistent with China’s overall style of pragmatic economic reform and opening-up.

But as the AIIB ramps up, certain features that allow for institutional experimentation seem to be moving into place. In a recent interview, Jin mentioned that, “We must have creative spirit, and neither clone the World Bank nor copy the ADB. Instead, we should review and absorb good experiences and strive to build a multilateral financial institution with advanced 21st century governance concepts.”

Some of this “creative spirit” is already apparent: to reduce administrative costs and loan approval times, the AIIB board of directors is unpaid and non-resident; also, bidding for AIIB projects is not confined to member countries. On environmental and social safeguards, some have expressed concerns over the Bank’s reliance on corporate and country reporting systems, but others believe this could promote greater borrowing capacity in recipient countries.

A more contentious issue, however, is that of AIIB’s loan capacity and loan conditions: can the Bank strike a balance between high-standards and safeguards on project loans, while improving the speed and size of loan dispersion without resorting to strict policy conditionalities?

It is still too early to assess these aspects, although China is clearly far less willing to impose wide-ranging policy conditionalities. Existing studies have generally focussed on estimating AIIB’s scale of lending by super-imposing the operational features of existing MDBs.

From an institutional perspective, however, China’s experimental approach to its own national development banks – such as the China Development Bank – could also suggest an inclination for experimentation with the AIIB.

For starters, the AIIB has secured a triple-A rating from the three major international credit ratings agencies. This rating is contingent on the Bank respecting its (maximum) statutory loan-to-equity ratio of 2.5, which allows the Bank to tap international capital markets at low-cost. (The Bank plans its first international bond issuance in the second quarter of this year.)

This conservative statutory ratio is consistent with those of existing MDBs. But the Bank’s articles of agreement also includes little-noticed provisions for a “special funds” mechanism that is managed by the AIIB and that can channel finance to AIIB infrastructure projects, but whose resources are held separately from the Bank’s shareholder equity.

The idea is that outside public and private investors can contribute resources to these special funds, and it just so happens that China has also created several stand-alone investment vehicles that have a combined target fund size of almost $100bn – such as the $40bn Silk Road Fund, the $10bn China-Africa Development Fund, and the $15bn China-Russia Regional Development Investment Fund, among others (see table 1)

Most of these vehicles have received their capital from China’s national development banks (and other Chinese institutions), which, in turn, leverage the equity capital received from the country’s foreign exchange reserves to raise cheap financing from domestic capital markets.

It is not inconceivable that at some point some of these various vehicles could selectively finance AIIB infrastructure projects through the special funds mechanism, especially as the Bank garners further expertise managing projects in different regional settings.

AIIB’s institutional design appears to maintain a de jure loan-to-equity ratio aimed at safeguarding access to international capital markets, while also creating a conduit that allows for de facto infrastructure financing to be scaled-up above the statutory limit.

In sum, the AIIB’s institutional design appears to maintain a de jure loan-to-equity ratio aimed at safeguarding access to international capital markets, while also creating a conduit that – in indirectly tapping China’s domestic capital markets (and foreign exchange reserves) – allows for de facto infrastructure financing to be scaled-up above the statutory limit.

Keeping AIIB’s institutional context in mind, some Chinese scholars have suggested that China’s overseas development finance will come less in the form of official development assistance, and more in the form of “other official flows” (OOF), OOF-like loans and OOF-like investments from national development banks and other state-backed entities, due to the nature of large infrastructure projects.

In this vein, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, positioned the role of development finance as in-between that of concessional and commercial finance, but “slightly tilted” toward the latter.

It is this apparent inclination to experiment with innovative financial arrangements that could allow the AIIB to improve upon existing MDB practices, at least in terms of extending large and rapid infrastructure project loan dispersions. To be sure, the only special fund that currently exists provides grants to low income member countries for project preparation.

But AIIB’s articles of agreement appears to leave room for wider experimentation with scaling-up via the special funds mechanism, and it is this broader backing of China’s financial institutions that may, in due course, reveal AIIB’s distinctive operational features.

This commentary is based on a background paper co-authored with Ricardo Gottschalk, prepared for the first session of UNCTAD’s Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Financing for Development, 8-10 November 2017.

About the Author

Daniel Poon is an economist with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Division on Globalization and Development Strategies. He previously worked for the International Labour Organization and the North-South Institute (Canada). His main research interests and publications involve China’s industrial strategy, development finance and South-South economic relations.

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