By Dan Steinbock
President Duterte’s recalibration of Philippine foreign policy has the potential for greater stability in the region. But it has unleashed the wrath of media pundits and economic hitmen.
During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Manila, some 30 bilateral agreements were signed. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) on cooperation on oil and gas development in the South China Sea topped the list of deals in trade and investment, infrastructure, and cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative.
Duterte’s recalibration seeks to couple longstanding relations with the U.S. with Sino-Philippine economic cooperation. It is a balancing act, not an act of exclusion. In contrast, there was an element of exclusion in the foreign policy in the Aquino era when good relations with Washington were seen to require distance from China.
Today, some critics of the Duterte policies push similar exclusionary ideas seeking to misrepresent or undermine the Sino-Philippine rapprochement. Ostensibly, this occurs in the name of Philippine national interest, yet these pundits and hitmen are affiliated by external economic and geopolitical interests.
Let’s take a closer look at just two such examples. Neither is an isolated case. More recent examples abound. And still more are likely to occur in the future.
Media pundits and geopolitical interests
A year ago, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), a U.S. think-tank, published a release about “A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building.” What made the long report intriguing were the many satellite photos and aerial imagery. Yet, the pre-Christmas release did not generate much chatter.
A month later, Richard Heydarian, portrayed as an independent academic and policy adviser, released an AMTI update, “ASEAN Under Duterte: Lost Opportunities on the South China Sea” (Jan 12, 2018). Heydarian complained that “under Duterte’s watch, ASEAN has lost a crucial opportunity to hold China to account.” Thereafter, GMA News headlined his “take on PHL allowing China to do maritime research in Benham Rise” (January 23, 2018). He was portrayed as “GMA News resident analyst.” No mention was made about his author affiliation with AMTI.
To foster debate, the Inquirer’s Frances Mangosing released another “exclusive” entitled “New photos show China done with its militarization of South China Sea” (Feb 4, 2018). The “source” of aerial photos was not identified, but the photos were reminiscent of those published previously by the AMTI. That led to a new – this time anonymous – AMTI release based on Inquirer’s story, which noted that most images “were taken in late 2017 by an unspecified patrol aircraft from an altitude of 1,500 meters” (Feb 16, 2018). It was followed by Mangosing’s new piece, “Kagitingan Reef may be China’s ‘intelligence hub’ in Spratlys – US think-tank” (Feb 18, 2018), based on the AMTI release.
Richard Heydarian, portrayed as an independent academic and policy adviser, released an AMTI update, “ASEAN Under Duterte: Lost Opportunities on the South China Sea” (Jan 12, 2018). Heydarian complained that “under Duterte’s watch, ASEAN has lost a crucial opportunity to hold China to account.”
In reality, AMTI is a subsidiary of the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a multimillion-dollar U.S. think-tank led by members of U.S. government, State Department, Congress and Pentagon. Heydarian is a member contributor of the AMTI, the CSIS, and Council for Foreign Relations. His Twitter account is visualized by the UK-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which is pushing an “Indo-Pacific Age” in Asia – which just happens to be the name of Heydarian’s forthcoming book.
That leaves the mystery of the source of the satellite photos. In addition to CSIS/AMTI, they belong to DigitalGlobe, which is a U.S. multibillion-dollar vendor of space imagery and geospatial content. In 2016, DigitalGlobe teamed up with Amazon, which has a $600 million 10-year cloud deal with the CIA, and CIA’s venture arm In-Q-Tel which has been active in Silicon Valley since 1999.
There is nothing illegitimate about such affiliations or the content they produce. But they are beholden mainly to U.S. geopolitical interests. Truthful journalism should acknowledge such linkages, not suppress them.
Hitmen and economic interests
Since 2016, President Duterte has pushed an infrastructure investment program which relies on sustained growth at close to 7% per year. The strategy is to become an upper middle-income economy by early 2020s. Yet, the effort has been almost systemically misreported internationally.
In May 2017, Philippine Department of Budget and Management (DBM) estimated that $167 billion would be spent on infrastructure during Duterte’s six-year term. A day later, Forbes released a widely-distributed commentary, which alleged that this debt “Could Balloon to $452 Billion: China Will Benefit.” The author, Anders Corr, expected the Philippine government debt of $123 billion to soar to $290 billion. Assuming that most monies would come from China and with excessive mafia-type interest rates, Corr argued that with accrued interest Philippines would end up in debt bondage as debt-to-GDP ratio would balloon to a world-record of 296%.
Like Heydarian, Corr was framed as an independent observer. Yet, according to his own testimony and that of U.S. Naval Institute, he has done “field research” in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. He has had “deals” with Pentagon on Russia and Ukraine. In Afghanistan he has served US Pacific Command and U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific for U.S. national security in Asia.
In May 2017, Philippine Department of Budget and Management (DBM) estimated that $167 billion would be spent on infrastructure during Duterte’s six-year term. A day later, Forbes released a widely-distributed commentary, which alleged that this debt “Could Balloon to $452 Billion: China Will Benefit.”
After the 2017 Forbes debacle, Corr seemed to disappear from public debates. Now he’s back, particularly in Australia. He has urged Trump to get tougher in South China Sea, bullied Pakistan with sanctions, advocated US nuclear weapons against North Korea and blamed China for being the ringleader of global terrorism. Despite grossly failed projections, he continues to be used an “expert” by major media.
Corr also has his media trolls. In August 2017, Singaporean-based ASEAN Today, which has many references to Corr’s pieces, published his Forbes piece with the new title: “Is the Philippines heading into a debt crisis?” Maybe the idea was to divide the ASEAN Summit, which Duterte would host weeks later. Yet, the piece was signed by ASEAN Today’s editor Oliver Ward. Interestingly, Ward does not reside in Singapore, but in Boston, U.S. where he also contributes to The Hill Reporter and OpenDemocracy sites, which are funded by Soros foundations and National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Around the same time, the NED also hosted the launch of Heydarian’s critical book on Duterte in the U.S.
So what’s the truth about the alleged “debt bondage”? Let’s compare these forecasts with IMF projections. Between 2017 and 2022, the DBM estimated the debt would mildly decline. My estimate was slightly more conservative because I expect trade wars to have some adverse impact toward 2019-2020. In contrast, Corr claimed Philippine debt-to-GDP ratio would soar to 300% of GDP by 2022. In reality, IMF’s forecast is closely aligned with my projection and that of DBM. In contrast, Corr’s “projections” have nothing to do with reality (Figure).

The lessons
The moral of the story is that, in the Philippines debate about China and the U.S., independent analysts may sometimes be not that independent. Transparent initiatives may at times prove very opaque. Democracy organizations may promote anti-democratic goals. And even reputable reporters, observers and economic analysts may occasionally serve as assets for external interests – knowingly or not.
In such circumstances, mainstream news may be less about actual news than about carefully choreographed exercises of soft power.
Featured image by Sunstar Philippines
About the Author
Dan Steinbock is the founder of Difference Group and internationally recognized expert of the multipolar world economy. He has served at the India, China and America Institute (US), Shanghai Institute for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see http://www.differencegroup.net/
The original commentary was released by The Manila Times on December 11, 2018.
Global Economic Outlook after Trump-Xi Timeout
By Dan Steinbock
As many hoped, the highly anticipated Trump-Xi meeting in the Buenos Aires G20 Summit resulted in a truce. The devil is in the details.
As the G20 Summit ended in Buenos Aires, the G20 official summit statement acknowledged flaws in global commerce, called for reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) and deleted the word “protectionism” after U.S. resistance.
The statement was completed only after hours of diplomatic bargaining over the night. As far as the European Union (EU) was concerned, the U.S. was the lone holdout on almost every issue in Buenos Aires, particularly in climate change.
The G20 economies preferred a diluted final statement to further G20 division.
Tango in Buenos Aires
Following the summit’s close, Presidents Trump and Xi and their top aides met in a highly-anticipated dinner, which lasted longer than expected. Either there was magic dust in their grilled sirloin steaks paired with a malbec from the Argentine winery Catena Zapata. Or perhaps, just perhaps, reason finally prevailed.
Before Buenos Aires, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on an additional $267 billion in Chinese goods. He also indicated he would raise the existing tariff rate on $250 billion in Chinese imports from 10% to 25% on January 1.
According to early reports, U.S. and China agreed to put on hold new tariff increases. Following Buenos Aires, the White House said that, after a “highly successful meeting”, Trump had agreed to leave tariffs on U.S. products at a 10% rate after January 1, while China agreed to buy a substantial amount of products from the U.S.
The White House also said that China has agreed to start purchasing substantial U.S. agricultural, energy, industrial and other products from the U.S. to reduce the trade imbalance; and that the US and China agreed to try to reach an agreement on several trade issues “within the next 90 days.”
The first impression is that the Trump-Xi Summit may have achieved a critical truce, de-escalation of tensions, and possibly a path toward a long-term compromise.
The timeout came at the 11th hour.
Three trade-war scenarios
Last October, Roberto Azevêdo, Director of the World Trade Organization (WTO), said that the trade war between the U.S. and China was far from over. The speech preceded the release of the WTO Indicator, which suggested that trade growth is likely to slow further into the fourth quarter of 2018 and below-trend trade growth in the coming months.
After a sharp upswing in 2017, both exports and imports in Asia had held up very well year-to-date, with continued double-digit growth in many economies. But since the onset of Trump’s tariff wars in spring, elevated uncertainty has haunted the global economy.
According to WTO, merchandise trade volume growth was expected to reach 4.4% in 2018, which is still below the 2017 level. But as Trump’s tariffs have escalated tensions, a fall in business confidence and revised investment decisions may soften the outlook. Moreover, a full trade war could derail trade recovery for years.
According to the UN, global investment flows were projected to resume growth in 2017 and surpass $1.8 trillion in 2018. Thanks to U.S. neo-protectionism, they fell to $1.5 trillion last year. The current status quo looks even gloomier; especially with the trade tensions and central banks’ planned normalization.
Three scenarios illustrate the rising economic stakes of Trump’s tariff wars that have rapidly expanded from a bilateral trade conflict to a potential global trade war.
Last July, U.S. and China imposed 25% tariffs on $34 billion of the other’s imports and levies on another $16 billion. In this $50 billion Muddling Through Scenario, the tariff’s economic impact would have been limited to 0.1% of Chinese GDP and 0.2% of U.S. GDP, respectively.
Recently, Trump has threatened with further tariff escalation. In the ‘America First’ Scenario, the stakes will quadruple to $200 billion, with soaring collateral damage. In China, it could shave off 0.4% of GDP; in the U.S., 0.8% of GDP.
If the stakes of the White House’s tariff war would escalate to $500 billion – Trump’s pre-Buenos Aires goal – the potential collateral damage would increase tenfold from the first scenario. In this Global Trade War Scenario, China’s GDP could take a hit of 1%, but the U.S. GDP would suffer a 2% impact.
How will these trade war scenarios impact global growth prospects?
Three global scenarios
As the global economy has passed its peak, thanks to rising interest rates and global trade tensions, each trade war scenario implies different growth prospects (Figure).
Sources: Difference Group (WEO/IMF growth data)
In the Muddling Through Scenario, both full trade war and ‘America First’ prospects are avoided. A good start would be a bilateral tariff truce starting in early 2019. But it is predicated on successful bilateral diplomacy that will lead to positive prospects in the second half of 2019. In this case, global growth prospects would remain close to the OECD/IMF baselines at around 3.5%-3.9% – possibly even higher.
In the ‘America First’ Scenario, neither truce nor diplomacy would prevail. After spring 2019, continued friction would result in progressive escalation and spillovers in global economy. As a result, global prospects would dampen as world GDP growth in 2019 would sink to 3% or worse.
In the Global Trade War Scenario, diplomacy would fail, while ‘America First’ escalation would spread across the world economy. Risks to global outlook would overshadow world GDP growth, which would plunge to 2%-2.5% for several years to come – which would translate to plunging world trade and investment, and new geopolitical conflicts.
High stakes
After Buenos Aires, the Global Trade War scenario has been temporarily suspended. Yet, the ‘America First’ scenario has not been fully reversed.
We’ve been there before. After the Trump-Xi Florida summit in April 2017, U.S. and China announced a 100-day action plan to improve strained trade ties. Yet, only two weeks later, Trump issued a memorandum, which directed Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross to investigate the effects of steel imports on national security – and that became the first shot in the bilateral trade war last spring.
With the truce, the Muddling Through scenario prevails momentarily but it can easily reverse back toward escalation, even global trade war.
If the White House and the Congress fail to achieve a decent compromise in the Trump trade wars, the complications would degrade global economic outlook for years to come.
The stakes are historical. Failure should not be an option.
Based on Dr. Steinbock’s briefing on the Trump-Xi meeting and its impact on global growth prospects on December 2, 2018.
About the Author
Dan Steinbock is the founder of Difference Group and has served as research director of international business at the India, China and America Institute (US) and a visiting fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (China) and the EU Center (Singapore). For more, see http://www.differencegroup.net/