By Dr. Kalim Siddiqui 

As geopolitical tensions rise, Dr. Kalim Siddiqui examines the shifting power dynamics between the United States and Europe, particularly in the context of the Ukraine conflict. This article explores how the U.S. might be abandoning Europe in favor of a multipolar world order, with significant implications for global security and cooperation. 

I. Introduction 

This article explores the origins of recent conflicts, particularly Ukraine in the context of the declining dominance of the Western world, particularly the United States (US). It argues that contemporary geopolitical tensions arise from this power shift, driven by technological advancements and economic convergence. Advocating for a transition to multipolarity and multilateralism, this paper highlights the limitations of the US’s continued pursuit of hegemony and underscores the benefits of global cooperation (Siddiqui, 2020a). It contends that a future characterized by peace and shared development can only be achieved through international collaboration and respect for diversity. 

Donald Trump’s policy toward Ukraine is expected to differ from that of the Biden administration. This shift is not merely a reflection of Trump’s personal views but rather an acknowledgment by US policymakers that the US has manoeuvred itself into a precarious position. The US now faces a difficult choice: either escalate the war in Ukraine—potentially to the point of nuclear confrontation—or gradually retreat from its hegemonic ambitions. Efforts to force Russia into submission have largely failed. Ukraine has steadily lost territory to Russian forces, and the economic sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union (EU), which were intended to “reduce the rubble to rubble,” have not had their intended effect. The rubble has regained its value against the dollar, surpassing pre-sanction levels. 

More than three years have passed since Russian troops invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war has resulted in over 50,000 deaths, countless injuries, and the displacement of millions (Siddiqui, 2022a). However, the notion of a unified European foreign policy on Ukraine remains unrealistic. A sustainable resolution would require Ukraine to undergo de-Nazification, democratization, and the formation of a neutral government that is acceptable to the US, the EU, and Russia. Russia’s legitimate demands for the recognition of its sovereignty have been largely disregarded, while the US has shown little concern for Russia’s strategic interests. The roots of Russophobia can be attributed to two key factors: Russia’s vast natural resources, which position it as a potential rival to the West, and the US’s broader objective of maintaining a unipolar world order in which no dissent is tolerated. Notably, in 2007, President Vladimir Putin proposed a framework for a peaceful Europe at the Munich Security Conference, but Western leaders dismissed his initiative. 

II. NATO Expansion and the Geopolitical Consequences of US Influence in Europe 

NATO was established in 1949 as a military alliance against the Soviet Union, making it a Cold War institution. However, following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, NATO was not dismantled. Instead, it expanded eastward toward Russia’s borders, directly contradicting assurances given to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 7, 1990, when the US explicitly promised that NATO would not expand. In response to this commitment, the Soviet Union agreed to the reunification of Germany, and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. The Warsaw Treaty Organization, established on May 14, 1955, by the Soviet Union and seven other Eastern Bloc countries, was originally intended as a counterbalance to NATO. 

Despite its initial assurances, the US proceeded with NATO expansion, incorporating former Eastern Bloc countries into a US-dominated neoliberal order (Siddiqui, 2024a). It openly supported and financed colour revolutions, particularly in Ukraine, to weaken democratically elected governments that did not align with Western interests. Through these efforts, the US facilitated the rise of a Ukrainian government that was sympathetic to American geopolitical objectives in the region (Foy, 2024; Siddiqui, 2022a). 

On February 28, 2025, during a meeting in the Oval Office of the White House, US President Donald Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance humiliated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, refusing to provide any security guarantees. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, Europe remains divided, lacking a unified stance. Historically, European countries have managed to maintain cohesion under US leadership, but without American influence, sustaining unity on major international issues becomes significantly more challenging (Chotiner, 2025; Sabbagh, 2025).  

The current geopolitical situation in Central Europe presents risks even more severe than those of the Cold War, as the threat of nuclear confrontation could have catastrophic consequences (Siddiqui, 2023a). Furthermore, a potential US withdrawal from Europe could cause the continent to regress into a pre-1940 era of political rivalries and conflicts. Historical precedent suggests that, in the absence of US influence, European nations may once again descend into internal tensions, competition, and instability. For over 500 years, the rise of European powers has been marked by wars, slavery, indentured labour, colonialism, resource exploitation, and famines in the Global South (Siddiqui, 2020b). 

III. Brzezinski’s Geopolitical Strategy and the Implications of European Rearmament 

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s (1997) strategy for restoring and extending US dominance appears to align with the views presented in Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993). While Brzezinski addresses global geopolitical challenges, his analysis devotes relatively little attention to Africa and Latin America, instead focusing primarily on Europe and Asia. He strongly advocates for further European integration and the eastward expansion of NATO, emphasizing that maintaining US hegemony requires strategic control over the Eurasian landmass (Brzezinski, 1997). 

However, Brzezinski’s study (1997) overlooks several critical developments, particularly the rising economic power of emerging economies and their growing influence on global geopolitics. His perspective is primarily shaped by US strategic military considerations, particularly how the US can expand its dominance over Eurasia and the Global South. He supported NATO’s eastward expansion under the assumption that Russia would not respond militarily. However, this assumption proved flawed, as demonstrated by the 2014 US-backed overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the so-called Revolution of Dignity, which followed months of protests against his administration. 

The rearmament of Germany is likely to have significant consequences, including a rise in authoritarianism, a deepening economic crisis, and the growing influence of the far right. Increased military expenditures will necessitate drastic reductions in social spending, exacerbating inequality and fuelling domestic tensions. Furthermore, rearmament across Europe may weaken the European economy, as higher defence spending will lead to further budget cuts and austerity measures (Siddiqui, 2017). These policies will disproportionately affect the majority of the population, while benefiting a small elite through tax cuts and corporate subsidies (Siddiqui, 2024a). 

Historically, whenever capitalism encounters economic stagnation, centre-left political parties often shift toward the political centre in an attempt to preserve stability. However, such compromises frequently open the door to authoritarianism and the resurgence of far-right movements, resulting in heightened attacks on minorities and other marginalized groups. 

The current socio-economic crisis in Europe has already contributed to the rise of far-right parties such as the neo-Nazi Alternative for Germany (AFfD), alongside similar movements across the continent. Many of these groups express hostility not only toward refugees from outside Europe but also toward immigrants from within Eastern Europe. The emergence of neo-fascism in advanced capitalist countries has been marked by increased repression and a reallocation of public funds from welfare to military spending. At the same time, the United States has sought to reassert its control over the natural resources of the Global South under the neoliberal order. Notably, figures such as Donald Trump have made overt claims about acquiring territories like Greenland, exploiting Ukraine’s natural resources, and even developing Gaza for real estate and tourism purposes—highlighting the imperialist ambitions behind such rhetoric. 

Furthermore, the US and the UK played a significant role in undermining the Minsk Agreement, a diplomatic effort between Russia and Ukraine that could have averted the ongoing war. NATO’s broader strategy appears aimed at subordinating Russia and gaining access to its vast natural resources, reminiscent of the Western alignment with Russian President Boris Yeltsin during the post-Soviet 1990s. The Western narrative that Russia seeks to conquer Europe mirrors the propaganda of the Cold War era, when similar claims were made about the Soviet Union. These assertions lack a factual basis and serve to justify militarization and geopolitical confrontation rather than peaceful diplomacy (Siddiqui, 2022a). 

IV. The Decline of the Welfare State and the Burden of Military Spending in Europe 

In the post-war period, communist parties emerged as the second-largest political forces in many European countries. In response to the geopolitical landscape of the time, the US agreed to provide military protection for Europe, allowing European governments to focus their resources on social welfare spending rather than defence expenditures. This arrangement was part of a broader Keynesian economic strategy, in which increased US military spending functioned as a stimulus for economic growth (Siddiqui, 2022b). 

However, the current geopolitical landscape is shifting. European unity is weakening, and the US is facing financial constraints, unable to sustain the rising costs of military expenditures. As a result, the US has pressured European nations to increase their own defence budgets. The failure of the US and Europe to defeat Russia in Ukraine has led countries like the United Kingdom (UK) and France to assert that they can achieve this objective independently. To do so, they plan to significantly increase their military budgets (Siddiqui, 2024b). 

Currently, in the EU, higher education and healthcare remain freely accessible to citizens. However, expanding military budgets will require significant cuts to social spending, mirroring recent policies in the UK, where reductions in higher education funding, healthcare services, and workers’ benefits have been implemented to finance defence expenditures. This shift threatens to dismantle the welfare state, undermining workers’ rights that were won through decades of political and social struggle. 

Following World War II, much of Europe lay in ruins. However, rapid reconstruction was facilitated by free access to US markets and technology, along with Marshall Plan aid. Even former adversaries such as Germany and Japan benefited from this economic assistance. At the time, the US was keen to foster European prosperity, improving living standards while ensuring that European countries remained loyal junior partners to the US. Today, however, Europe allocates between 20% and 40% of its GDP to social spending, benefiting from relatively low defence expenditures—a model that is now under threat. 

John Mearsheimer, in his book (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, argues that the Ukraine conflict is the result of US provocations. His perspective, rooted in realist international relations theory, asserts that the best guarantee of a state’s survival is to achieve hegemony, as no rival power can then pose a serious threat. However, history has shown that when all major powers seek hegemonic dominance, it results in endless conflicts. According to Mearsheimer, true global hegemony is unattainable, meaning that the world is perpetually condemned to great power competition and recurrent wars (Mearsheimer, 2001). 

V. Global Economic Changes 

To understand the significance of economic factors in security considerations, it is essential to examine the evolving economic dynamics between the US and the European Union (EU). Since 2020, the US has experienced real economic growth of approximately 10%—three times the average growth rate of other G7 countries. In addition to prioritizing competition with China, the Trump administration has sought to reduce military spending on European security (Sabbagh, 2025). The relatively weak economic performance of European economies compared to the US appears to be another reason for Trump’s inclination to sideline European countries in negotiations with Russia over Ukraine. Among G20 nations, including BRICS countries, the US stands alone in exceeding pre-pandemic projections for both economic output and employment (Siddiqui, 2016). According to the most recent IMF Report (2025), US economic output per capita is now approximately 40% higher than that of the EU and Canada and 60% higher than that of Japan—roughly double the gaps observed in 1990. The US benefits from its vast natural resources, large consumer base, and deep capital markets, allowing businesses to scale efficiently and distribute products across the country. 

The EU, by contrast, faces structural economic limitations. Politically fragmented and lacking independent oil and gas resources, its economic potential remains constrained. Although the EU operates under a so-called single market, significant intra-EU trade barriers persist due to national differences in taxation, professional regulations, and legal frameworks. Additionally, the fragmentation of European capital markets limits investment opportunities. Furthermore, demographic challenges—including an aging population and increasingly restrictive immigration policies—exacerbate labour shortages. Europe’s heavy reliance on energy imports also leaves it vulnerable to fluctuations in oil and gas prices (Chotiner, 2025). 

The collapse of the Soviet Union briefly allowed the US to assert unparalleled global hegemony. However, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 profoundly altered the global economic landscape (Siddiqui, 2015). The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), a cornerstone of neoliberal economic policy, has had divergent effects on economies worldwide. While these policies disproportionately harmed weaker economies in the Global South, they also reshaped economic structures in the West. Measures such as wage suppression, industrial restructuring, reduced investment in domestic manufacturing, and the strategic offshoring of production—particularly to China—helped sustain profit rates in major capitalist economies (Siddiqui, 2019a). 

The global economy has undergone significant transformations in recent decades. Between 1990 and 2010, Brazil, India, and China doubled their share of global GDP, while the share of Western economies declined. The 2008 global financial crisis accelerated this shift (Siddiqui, 2023b). In response, China implemented a massive US$ 600 billion post-crisis stimulus package, solidifying its position as a key driver of global demand (Siddiqui, 2019b). The expansion of Chinese steel, cement, and aluminium production integrated raw material exporters into its regional economic orbit and fuelled the growth of South-South trade. Consequently, China surpassed the US as the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment, emerged as the leading source of merchandise trade, and contributed to over a third of global growth during the post-crisis period. By 2030, the World Bank projects that China and India will account for 38% of global investment and nearly half of total investment in manufacturing (Lavery, 2024). 

Figure 1 illustrates the real GDP growth of the world’s largest economies between 2013 and 2023, as well as projections by the IMF. The data clearly indicate that India and China have sustained growth rates more than double those of advanced capitalist economies. Within the advanced economies, the US has demonstrated significantly stronger GDP growth than its counterparts. In terms of nominal GDP at current US dollar prices, Figure 2 shows that the US economy has expanded at a faster rate than other advanced economies.  

Figure 1: Real GDP Growth of the World’s Largest Economies in Selected Years (in%).

Figure 2: The GDP Growth of Advanced Capitalist Economies from 1988 to 2023 (Trillion US$) (Current Prices US$).

In recent decades, an analysis of the world’s top six economies by their share of global GDP from 1985 to 2024 (IMF, 2025) reveals significant fluctuations, particularly in the case of the United States (see Figure 1). While the US has consistently remained the world’s largest economy, its share of global GDP has undergone notable shifts over time. 

The IMF’s projections for the world’s ten largest economies in 2025 highlight a clear trend: major developed capitalist economies are experiencing significantly lower real growth rates compared to emerging economies such as China and India (see Table 1). In the 1950s, the US alone accounted for over 50% of global GDP, but this share has declined sharply, falling below 25% by 2024. 

After reaching a low of 22.6% in 2010, the US economy rebounded, increasing its relative share by several percentage points. According to IMF estimates, the US will account for 26.3% of global GDP in 2024. In contrast, China and India have steadily expanded their share of global GDP over the past three decades, while the relative contributions of the US, the EU, and Japan have declined (see Table 2). 

Despite the EU’s expansion as new countries have joined over the past thirty years, its global output share has sharply declined, making it less economically significant than in the 1990s. In recent decades, the EU has become increasingly reliant on the US not only for security but also for economic stability. This dependency explains why former US President Donald Trump was less concerned about the EU’s reaction to the Ukraine issue. This broader trend also highlights the US’s relatively strong recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, as evidenced by its rising share of global GDP since 2020 (See Table 2). Meanwhile, the EU, and Japan have experienced relative declines during the same period. 

Table 1: Top 10 Largest Economies in the World in 2025. 

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2025. 

Table 2: Share of Global GDP of the World’s Top Five Economies from 1985 to 2024 at current prices (%). 

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2025. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-top-6-economies-by-share-of-global-gdp-1980-2024/ 

VI. Technological Convergence, Hegemony, and the Geopolitical Landscape 

Another significant study is by Professor Jeffrey Sachs in his 2020 book The Ages of Globalization: Geography, Technology, and Institutions. Sachs argues that technological and institutional changes have interacted to produce long-term global economic shifts. During the colonial period, technological divergence occurred, with more technologically advanced countries gaining decisive advantages over less advanced nations. This disparity led to wars, occupation, and exploitation. However, since the period of independence for many former colonies, technological convergence has emerged, with poorer countries progressively catching up to wealthier ones. As poorer nations narrow the technological gap, they pose a growing challenge to the hegemonic power of dominant states. This technological convergence has given rise to new and potentially tragic hegemonic conflicts (Sachs, 2020). 

This fear of being overtaken by rising powers is not a new phenomenon. Japan had similar concerns in 1941, and Germany shared the same anxiety in 1914. Today, China faces the same challenge, with the US explicitly seeking to contain China’s rise. This situation mirrors the concept of Thucydides’s Trap, an analogy drawn from fifth-century BCE Athens, where the rise of Athens as a dominant power led to a hegemonic contest with Sparta, the leading military power at the time. According to Thucydides, the fear of Athens’ rise led to inevitable conflict—a situation echoed in modern international relations as emerging powers challenge incumbent hegemonic states. 

In 2014, the US played a pivotal role in the overthrow of the Ukrainian government. Evidence suggests that much of the violence, including shooting into crowds, originated from protesters rather than the security forces under President Viktor Yanukovych. At the time, Yanukovych had pursued a neutral foreign policy and was opposed to NATO expansion. However, after his removal, the US supported the rise of a Russophobia, nationalist government, which quickly abandoned Ukraine’s neutrality and even passed laws banning the Russian language. In response, Russia annexed Crimea, and many pro-Russian factions within the Ukrainian military defected, initiating an insurrection in Eastern Ukraine (the Donbas region). 

In a shift in US foreign policy, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that the US planned to reduce its military presence in Europe. He emphasized that the US was no longer “primarily focused” on European security and that Europe would need to take the lead in defending Ukraine. Hegseth also acknowledged that restoring Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was unrealistic. He noted that the US was shifting its military priorities to focus on deterring China and called on European NATO members to increase their defence budgets to 5% of GDP to better defend the continent. 

VII. Conclusion 

Since around 2017, the world has transitioned from a unipolar order dominated by the US to a multipolar world, driven by global economic shifts. This shift has seen the emergence of three major global powers: the US, China, and Russia. Amid a deepening crisis in the US economy, the US is seeking to disengage from Europe and resolve the conflict in Ukraine, redirecting its resources towards reviving its domestic economy while focusing on the growing threat from China. The US has also pressured the EU to increase its defence spending, with a target of at least 5% of GDP, up from the current 2%. 

Economically, under Trump, despite some shifts in policy, there remain key continuities with previous administrations. The neoliberal economic framework is expected to persist. In response to inflationary pressures, central banks will likely follow the neoclassical model, raising interest rates to constrain wages and limit consumer spending, in the hope of slowing down price increases. The neoliberal policies—including deregulation and austerity—may be pursued to unleash entrepreneurial activity. Trump’s policies are expected to focus on reducing taxes, particularly corporate taxes, while imposing tariffs on imports. This approach could trigger inflationary pressures, prompting the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates again, potentially risking recession due to the economy’s reliance on cheap credit and the growing burden of US government debt. 

In contrast, an alternative European policy should prioritise ending the war in Ukraine and rejecting Trump’s predatory stance on Ukraine’s natural resources. This would involve removing sanctions, returning the $300 billion of Russian frozen assets, and restoring trade relations with Russia. Europe should pursue a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, China, India, and other emerging economies. Investment in green technology should be a priority, with a combined focus on de-growth to address the environmental challenges ahead. Fiscal policy should be revitalized, with increased public investment playing a central role in reducing inequality and driving long-term growth and prosperity. To restore peace and trust, demilitarising the 400 km border on both sides of Ukraine could be a crucial step. This model could draw inspiration from Austria’s post-war success, where the country emerged as a sovereign, democratic state and integrated with the rest of Europe. Ukraine could adopt similar policies to those Austria implemented during the Cold War, serving as a neutral buffer between the West and Soviet Union.

About the Author

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, Trade and Economic Policy. Since 1989, he has been teaching economics at various universities in Norway and the UK. Dr. Siddiqui’s research interests encompass a wide range of topics, including political economy, international trade, and economic history, South Asia, and emerging economies. He has presented papers at international conferences across numerous countries, reflecting his global engagement in the field. His scholarly pursuits span six broad domains: Political Economy, Development Economics, Economic History, Economic Policy, Globalization, and International Trade. Dr. Siddiqui has made significant contributions to research in areas such as trade policy, globalization, and political economy. His work has been published in chapters of edited books and articles published in peer-reviewed journals. For inquiries, Dr. Siddiqui can be reached at: [email protected]

References

1. Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books. 
2. Chotiner, I. (2025) “What Could Happen if the U.S. Abandons Europe” New Yorker, February 21.  
3. Foy, H. (2024) “The untold story of the most chaotic Nato summit ever” Financial Times, July 4, London.   
4. IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2025) World Economic Outlook – Growth on divergent paths amid elevated policy uncertainty, January, Washington DC: IMF. 
5. Lavery, S. (2024) “Rebuilding the fortress? Europe in a changing world economy” Review of International Political Economy 31(1): 330–353. 
6. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton.  
7. Sachs, J. (2020) The Ages of Globalisation: Geography, Technology, and Institutions, Columbia: Columbia University Press. 
8. Sabbagh, D. (2025) “US no longer “primarily focused” on Europe’s Security” The Guardian, February 12, London. 
9. Siddiqui, K. (2024a) “The Decline of the West and Global Political Economy” World Financial Review, December. 
10. Siddiqui, K. (2024b) “Political Economy of Globalisation and Issues of Global Governance” World Financial Review, September. 
11. Siddiqui, K. (2023a). “The New Cold War: Struggle for Global Domination” (Part I & Part 2) World Financial Review, June and August. 
12. Siddiqui, K. (2023b) “Marxian Analysis of Capitalism and Crises”, International Critical Thought, 13(4): 525-545. 
13. Siddiqui, K. (2022a) “Ukraine-Russia War and the Impact on the Global Economy” World Financial Review, November-December. 
14. Siddiqui, K. (2022b) “Capitalism, Imperialism, and Crisis”, European Financial Review, June-July. 
15. Siddiqui, K. (2020a) “Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies” World Financial Review, November-December. 
16. Siddiqui, K. (2020b). “The Political Economy of the Slave Trade, Capital Accumulation and the Rise of Britain” World Financial Review, January-February 
17. Siddiqui, K. (2019a). “The US Economy, Global Imbalances under Capitalism: A Critical Review” Istanbul Journal of Economics 69(2): 175 – 205, December. 
18. Siddiqui, K. (2019b). “Financialization, Neoliberalism and Economic Crises in the Advanced Economies” World Financial Review, May-June, pp.22 – 30. 
19. Siddiqui, K. (2017). “Austerity as a Tool of Fiscal Consolidation: Theoretical and Empirical Perspective” (Edi) S. Owsiak, Public Finance, and the New Economic Governance in the European Union, 116 – 166, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe. 
20. Siddiqui, K. (2016). “Will the Growth of the BRICs Cause a Shift in the Global Balance of Economic Power in the 21st Century?” International Journal of Political Economy 45(4): 315 – 338. 
21. Siddiqui, K. (2015). “Trade Liberalisation and Economic Development: A Critical Review” International Journal of Political Economy 44(3): 228 – 247.