By Dr. Kalim Siddiqui

Asia’s economic rise has reshaped global power dynamics, with profound implications for trade, development, and geopolitics. Dr Kalim Siddiqui analyses the region’s transformation, highlighting how strategic state intervention, industrialisation, and public investment have propelled growth. His study underscores Asia’s central role in shaping a more multipolar and economically diverse world. 

I. Introduction 

This article examines the rapid economic growth experienced in Asia in recent decades. While development has been uneven across the region, Asia as a whole has become increasingly prosperous, with its share of global output and trade rising sharply. This transformative shift warrants careful analysis due to its profound implications for global development and policy. 

Within Asia, East Asia has demonstrated the most remarkable economic success. This achievement can be attributed to a combination of historical, institutional, and strategic factors. Notably, several East Asian countries experienced relatively short periods of Japanese colonial rule which, although often harsh, had different long-term consequences compared to European colonization. Despite national variations, several commonalities underpinned the region’s development: comprehensive land reforms, significant public investment in education and healthcare, a strong emphasis on industrialization, and a commitment to export-oriented economic strategies (Siddiqui, 2022; Glawe and Wagner, 2021). 

Geopolitical dynamics also played a critical role. During the Cold War, particularly in the aftermath of the Korean and Vietnam wars, the US was determined to promote economic stability and development in East Asia as a bulwark against communism. This strategic interest led to preferential access to Western markets, inflows capital, and technologies. East Asian governments had built institutions and implemented policies that balanced market incentives with state-led planning. Over the past seven decades, this hybrid approach has resulted in industrialization, rising productivity, improved living standards, and higher income levels across the region (Asian Development Bank, 2020). 

Meanwhile, other regions in Asia—particularly South Asia and Central Asia—are also showing signs of economic growth. Over the past decades, these regions have experienced steady growth in income, industrial output, and integration into global markets. In South Asia, India has emerged as a key driver of regional growth, supported by a large domestic market, a thriving service sector, and expanding technological capabilities. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have also achieved notable progress, particularly in textiles and manufacturing (Bhattacharjee and Haldar, 2015). 

In Central Asia, countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have benefited from resource wealth—particularly oil, gas, and minerals—as well as increasing economic diversification and regional connectivity initiatives like China’s Belt and Road Initiative. These efforts have begun to reduce their historical dependence on commodity exports. Southeast Asia, too, deserves mention as a dynamic region contributing to Asia’s economic ascent. Countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines have seen rising foreign direct investment, exports, improving infrastructure, and growing manufacturing sectors, particularly in electronics, and consumer goods. 

From antiquity until around 1820, China and India were the world’s two largest economies, measured by their share of global GDP. The dominance of the West—first Europe, then the United States (US) – emerged only in the past three centuries. In this historical perspective, the economic dominance of the West can be seen as a temporary divergence, or even an aberration, from a long-standing global norm. Like all historical aberrations, it is now coming to an end (Mahbubani, 2022). 

The Western share of global output is gradually shrinking, while Asian countries have been catching up through rising productivity, industrialization, innovation, and investment. This shift coincides with stagnating real wages and rising income and wealth inequalities in many Western countries—particularly for the bottom 50% of the population—over the past four decades (Siddiqui, 2019). 

The rise of Asian economies also coincides with the collapse of European colonial empires. Despite winning the Second World War, European powers emerged from the war economically and militarily weakened. They were increasingly unable to maintain control over their colonies and became heavily reliant on US financial assistance, particularly through the Marshall Plan. 

However, this US led global order is rapidly declining and the resurgence of Asia is taking place, especially China and India (Siddiqui, 2025a). Technological advances and the growing interdependence of the global economy are accelerating this transition, making the influence of Asian economies increasingly central to the global order (Mahbubani, 2022). 

The contemporary global order, though still largely shaped by Western institutions, has its roots in centuries of European and American dominance—established through colonial expansion, the transatlantic slave trade, and geopolitical control. The US, in many ways, represents a continuation of European influence, both politically and economically, as a settler-colonial society built by European migrants. Over the past five centuries, this Euro-Atlantic axis has held a dominant role in shaping global systems of power. That epoch, however, may now be giving way to a more multipolar world, with Asia at its core (Siddiqui, 2020). 

The establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—further entrenched this asymmetrical global power structure. Although created with the stated goal of fostering global economic stability and development, these institutions have often reinforced patterns of dependency and underdevelopment, especially in the Global South. Financial assistance and development loans extended through the IMF and World Bank typically come with stringent conditionalities. These conditions frequently limit recipient countries’ economic sovereignty, compel the adoption of neoliberal reforms, prioritize debt repayment over social investment. 

II. Industrialization: Lessons from the Experiences of Developed Economies  

A historical comparison between the industrialization of the US and Germany in the 19th centuries reveals important policy measures undertaken such as state-led initiatives and public investment played a pivotal role in driving economic transformation. Significant investments were made in infrastructure, education systems, urban housing, and banks played important role in financing industrialisation – measures that not only modernized national economies but also helped to dismantle various forms of economic rent, particularly land rents and transport monopolies, which otherwise could have obstructed industrial expansion. 

In Germany, for example, banks functioned less as instruments of speculative finance and more as facilitators of industrial development. Financial institutions were closely aligned with national economic goals, providing long-term capital for manufacturing and infrastructure projects. Similarly, in the US, federal and state governments took deliberate steps to make infrastructure widely accessible and affordable. Housing markets were also regulated to suppress excessive land speculation and ensure broad access to urban development opportunities. These interventions reduced overall economic overheads, thereby lowering production costs and enhancing global competitiveness. As a result of these developmental strategies, both Germany and the US were able to accumulate financial surpluses over time, positioning themselves as creditor nations and industrial leaders on the global stage.  

III. China’s Path to Industrialization: State and Economic Transformation 

China’s rapid industrialization and economic modernization over the past four decades has drawn widespread global attention. In less than two generations, the country transformed from a predominantly agrarian society into the world’s second-largest economy. This extraordinary transition was not the product of unregulated market liberalization, but rather the outcome of a strategically managed mixed economic model in which state and private sectors played mutually reinforcing roles. Crucially, the Chinese government retained control over key sectors—including banking, education, infrastructure, and communications—ensuring that essential services remained both accessible to the public and aligned with national development priorities (Siddiqui, 2025b). 

A central pillar of China’s development strategy was the state’s decision to preserve sovereign control over money creation and the banking system. By keeping financial institutions largely within the public domain, the Chinese government curtailed the growth of a speculative, profit-driven domestic financial sector. Instead, credit and investment were channelled into productive areas such as housing, transportation, energy, and industrial infrastructure—projects that were delivered at low cost and often supported by public subsidies. This approach minimized production overheads and allowed Chinese industries to maintain competitive pricing in international markets (Siddiqui, 2025b). 

China’s experience thus illustrates the effectiveness of a coordinated developmental state in achieving industrial modernization while avoiding some of the destabilizing effects associated with financial liberalization and speculative capital flows. It presents a compelling alternative to neoliberal economic orthodoxy and raises important questions about the role of state intervention in late-industrializing economies. In addition, sustained public investment in education and infrastructure has played a critical role in China’s economic transformation by fostering a skilled labour force and developing an efficient logistical network (Siddiqui, 2024a).  

These developments underscore the broader importance of financial sovereignty and strategic public investment in driving industrial development. For many developing countries, capital outflows and the extraction of financial surpluses by advanced economies—often through mechanisms such as external debt servicing, capital flight, or profit repatriation—pose significant obstacles to sustainable growth. To mitigate these challenges, governments in the Global South must adopt policies that prioritize the retention, mobilization, and reinvestment of financial surpluses within their domestic economies. Redirecting financial resources toward domestic investment—particularly in education, research and development, and infrastructure—can substantially enhance productivity, and reduce production costs. 

IV. Industrialization and Economic Growth 

Rapid industrialization has played a pivotal role in enabling the export of higher-value commodities to global markets. The opportunities created by globalization, increased access to Western markets, and substantial inflows of foreign capital have collectively transformed many developing economies. Between 1970 and 2024, measured in current prices at market exchange rates, the share of industrialized countries in global GDP declined significantly—from 70% to 36%—while the share of developing countries rose sharply from 10% to 48%. Asia’s share alone increased from 4% to 44%, accounting for nearly the entire growth in the developing countries’ portion; by contrast, the combined shares of Latin America and Africa increased by less than two percentage points over the same period. 

By 2024, Asian countries accounted for 35% of global income, 44% of world manufacturing output, and over one-third of global trade, with income per capita converging towards the global average. Asia now represents half of the world’s twenty fastest-growing economies, generates two-thirds of global economic growth, and contributes 44% of global GDP (IMF, 2025). 

Table 1 presents the world’s largest economies and their shares of global GDP in 1995. At that time, the US held the top position, with a GDP of $7.6 trillion, accounting for 25.4% of global output. Of the ten largest economies, eight were developed nations. Only two—Brazil and China—were classified as developing countries, ranking sixth and eighth, respectively. 

Nearly thirty years later, as shown in Table 2, the global economic landscape has shifted significantly. China surged from eighth to second place, and India entered the ranks of the world’s top ten economies (Siddiqui, 2018). The US remains a dominant economic power, contributing 24.1% of global GDP despite comprising just over 4.5% of the world’s population. Meanwhile, China’s economic rise has been striking: its GDP has grown to $17.78 trillion, representing 18.6% of global GDP—a substantial increase over the past three decades (see Table 2). 

Over this period, Asia experienced a dramatic rise in industrial production and exports. The region underwent significant structural transformation, with a growing share of its workforce employed in industry and services. And proportion of manufactured goods in exports have also risen sharply. However, the growth in manufactured exports has not been evenly distributed across Asia’s sub-regions. From 1995 to 2024, Asia’s share of global exports increased by more than 22 percentage points. Of this growth, East Asia accounted for over three-quarters, while Southeast Asia, South Asia, and West Asia together contributed less than one-quarter. 

Table 1:  The World’s Largest Economies, Sized by GDP (1995) 

Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/the-worlds-largest-economies-1970-2020/ 

Table 2:  The Top 10 Largest Economies in the World, Sized by GDP (2023) 

Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/the-worlds-largest-economies-1970-2020/ 

From a relatively modest share of global GDP in the early 2000s, Asian economies have surged ahead, accounting for more than half of global output (measured in PPP) by 2023. This dramatic rise marks a pivotal shift in the global economic landscape. The rapid economic ascent of Asia is unprecedented in modern history. In 2000, Asia’s contribution to global gross domestic product was relatively minor. However, driven by the economic dynamism of countries such as China, India, (Siddiqui, 2016) and the ASEAN nations, the region’s share of global output has grown significantly. By 2023, Asia accounted for over 50% of global GDP in PPP terms, outperforming other regions in both growth rates and aggregate output (Figure 1).  

Projections to 2050 indicate that Asia will continue to expand its global economic presence. According to long-term forecasts by international institutions, Asia is expected to not only maintain but also strengthen its leadership in global output, innovation, and trade. This shift is often interpreted as a restoration of historical balance—a “return to normalcy” after a relatively brief period of Western dominance (IMF, 2025; Mahbubani, 2022). 

A historical perspective on Asia’s share of global gross domestic product (GDP) from 1700 to 2050 reveals that, prior to colonization, Asian economies—particularly those of China and India—dominated global output. Projections indicate that by 2050, Asia is poised to regain this leading position in the world economy, marking a restoration of its historical economic prominence (see Figure 2) 

Figure 1: Share of World Gross Domestic Product (PPP, US$) from 2000 to 2023. 

Figure 2: Asia’s Share of Global Gross Domestic Product, 1700-2050. 

Figure 3: Share of Asian Exports of Goods to the Global Markets, 1953-2023.  

Between 1970 and 2023, Asia’s share of global GDP, measured in constant 2010 US dollars, rose dramatically—from less than one-twelfth to over one-fourth, marking an increase of nearly 20 percentage points. However, growth in GDP per capita, relative to that of industrialized countries, increased at a much slower pace. This divergence highlights the uneven nature of Asia’s economic catch-up, both across and within countries. Nevertheless, the region experienced significant structural transformation: the share of the primary sector in Asia’s GDP declined from 27% to just 8%, reflecting a shift toward industry and services. 

The recent rapid growth of South Asia is due to several factors including greater integration into the global economy, driven by trade liberalization, globalization, and accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since the 1990s, countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka have pursued a range economic reforms aimed at attracting foreign capital, and encouraging exports. India’s accession to the WTO in 1995 marked a pivotal moment in its economic trajectory. The liberalization of trade and investment regimes enabled Indian firms to participate more actively in global value chains, particularly in high-growth sectors such as information technology (IT), pharmaceuticals, and automotive manufacturing. The rapid expansion of the IT and services sectors has since emerged as a major engine of GDP growth and urban employment, especially in cities such as Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and Chennai. 

Similarly, Bangladesh has emerged as one of the world’s leading exporters of ready-made garments (RMG), leveraging its competitive labour costs, preferential trade access to Western markets, and targeted government support. The RMG sector has not only driven substantial export earnings but has also generated millions of jobs—particularly for women—thereby contributing to broader socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Additionally, remittances from overseas workers have played a crucial role in strengthening foreign exchange reserves and raising household incomes across South Asia (Sachs, 2009). 

Moreover, South Asian economies have increasingly diversified their export portfolios to include higher-value goods and services. Investments in infrastructure, skills development, and digital connectivity have further enhanced their industrial capacities. These structural transformations have underpinned sustained economic growth, reductions in poverty, and gradual improvements in living standards throughout the region. While significant challenges remain—including income inequality, poor infrastructures, and environmental sustainability. 

Historically, Asia’s socio-economic achievements have been remarkable. According to Maddison’s PPP statistics, Asia’s share of world GDP reached its lowest point of 14.9% in 1962, while its GDP per capita as a proportion of that in Western Europe and North America also hit a nadir of 9.2% in the same year. It is important to note that these proportions cannot be directly compared with income shares and levels expressed in current prices at market exchange rates, due to differences in valuation methods (Maddison, 2007). 

The Maddison database, recently extended through 2016, estimates that Asia’s share of world GDP, measured in 1990 international (Geary–Khamis) dollars, stood at 43.1% in 2016—up from 36.1% in 1870 and 56.5% in 1820. Furthermore, GDP per capita in Asia as a proportion of that in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania was estimated at 26.4% in 2016, closely resembling the 26.6% recorded in 1870. These figures suggest that Asia’s share of global output has returned to levels last seen around the mid-19th century, while per capita income relative to industrialized countries has reverted to its 1870 benchmark (Maddison, 2007). 

During the 1980s, the export-led growth model was widely promoted as the ideal development strategy for developing countries, inspired by the extraordinary economic performance of the Four East Asian Tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. These economies demonstrated rapid growth rates significantly exceeding those of countries like India, which pursued more dirigiste, or state-led, development strategies. Consequently, international institutions such as the World Bank advocated for abandoning ‘inward-looking’ policies in favour of export orientation (Glawe and Wagner, 2021). 

This neoliberal prescription gained further momentum in the aftermath of the foreign debt crisis of the 1990s, when many developing countries were compelled to adopt export-led growth strategies. However, the apparent success of export-led growth, particularly in China and Southeast Asia, is more nuanced than often portrayed. Much of this growth was facilitated by easy access to foreign capital, especially from the US, Japan, and multinational corporations that relocated labour-intensive industries to low-wage Asian countries to produce goods for Western markets (Siddiqui, 2012). 

V. Asian Economic Transformation 

Asia has emerged as a global economic powerhouse, with a rapidly increasing share of global output, manufacturing, and trade. Over the past several decades, many Asian economies have undergone significant structural transformations. Improvements in demographic, social, and economic indicators reflect this progress, and several countries in the region have successfully transitioned to high-income or industrialized status.  

A key factor behind this transformation has been sustained public investment in education and healthcare, coupled with strategies focused on employment creation and export-oriented growth. While openness to trade, foreign investment, and technology transfer has been crucial, successful industrialization has often required the guidance of deliberate and adaptive industrial policies. 

The region’s economic growth has been accompanied by a dramatic structural shift. In the 1960s, over two-thirds of Asia’s labour force was employed in subsistence agriculture. By 2024, more than 65% of workers were employed in the industrial and services sectors and Asia accounted for 30.7% of global merchandise exports, 29.3% of global imports, and attracted 35.9% of global inward foreign direct investment.  

In the early postcolonial period, particularly in the 1960s, Asian exports were largely composed of agricultural and primary commodities, along with light manufacturing goods such as textiles and garments. Today, the region is widely recognized as production of high-tech goods, including automobiles, computers, smartphones, machine tools, and robotics. The region now boasts an electrification rate of over 90% and operates approximately 75% of the world’s high-speed rail network. 

Exports of goods from Asia have risen sharply over the past several decades, reflecting the region’s deepening integration into the global economy. In 1953, Asia accounted for approximately 12% of global merchandise exports. By 2023, this share had increased to 36.3%, as shown in Figure 3. A major inflection point occurred around 2003, when many Asian economies—benefiting from WTO membership and greater access to global markets—accelerated their export-led growth strategies.  

By 2023, Asia’s share of global exports slightly exceeded that of Europe, reaching 37% compared to Europe’s 36.9%. China, in particular, has played a pivotal role in this transformation. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has emerged as the world’s leading manufacturing hub, with its share of global trade reaching nearly 16% by 2023. Intra-regional trade has also grown significantly (Siddiqui, 2023a). By 2023, approximately 58% of Asia’s trade occurred within the region, making it the second-most integrated trade bloc globally, after the European Union (Siddiqui, 2023b). 

In terms of overall economic output, Asia’s share of global GDP (measured in PPP) reached approximately 55% in 2023—surpassing the combined share of Europe and North America. This growth has been driven primarily by the rapid expansion of China and India, but also supported by the performance of other emerging Asian economies. In 2023, Asia’s GDP was estimated at $41.36 trillion, making it the world’s largest economic region. China alone accounted for 19.2% of global GDP in 2024.  

VI. Demographic Changes in Asia 

The demographic transformation of Asia over the past seven decades has been profound. By 2023, Asia’s population had nearly tripled compared to its 1965 level, reflecting one of the most significant demographic expansions in modern history. This growth occurred alongside far-reaching social and economic transformations. Most notably, the region underwent a major demographic transition characterized by sharply declining birth and fertility rates, rising life expectancy, and improved education and health outcomes (Siddiqui, 2024b). 

Fertility rates in Asia declined to roughly one-third of their 1965 levels, while birth rates fell by more than half. Life expectancy at birth rose dramatically, from 49 years in 1965 to 79 years in 2023. Infant mortality saw a striking decline—from 160 deaths per 1,000 live births to just 23. At the same time, literacy rates increased from 43% to 94%, underscoring major improvements in public education and healthcare systems. These gains were largely the result of sustained public investment in human capital, effective population policies, and broader economic modernization (Siddiqui, 2024c). 

As of May 2025, Asia remains the most populous continent, home to approximately 4.8 billion people—or 58.8% of the world’s total population (see Figure 4). Over the past half-century, the region has experienced rapid population growth (see Figure 5), but this trajectory is expected to shift in the coming decades. By 2050, Asia’s population is projected to peak at around 5.3 billion, followed by a gradual decline in the second half of the century. 

In contrast, Africa’s share of the global population is set to rise significantly. In 2024, Africa accounted for about 18% of the world’s population; by 2100, this figure is projected to reach 38%. Meanwhile, Asia’s relative share is expected to fall from nearly 60% today to approximately 45% by the end of the century. These shifts in global population distribution will have far-reaching implications for labour markets, economic development, migration patterns, and geopolitical dynamics. 

Figure 4: Distribution of the Global Population by Continent, 2024.

Figure 5: Population by World Region, 1800-2100.

VII. Concluding Remarks 

Over the past seven decades, Asia has undergone a remarkable economic transformation. From widespread poverty and post-colonial stagnation in the mid-20th century, the region has emerged as a global engine of growth, investment, trade, and innovation. Many Asian countries have successfully transitioned from agrarian economies to dynamic industrial and service-based systems, lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, and significantly improved human development indicators (IMF, 2025). 

This unprecedented success has been underpinned by strategic state intervention, investment in human capital, industrialization, and the pragmatic use of global integration to serve national development goals. The Asian experience demonstrates that rapid development in the Global South is possible—if supported by effective state institutions, active public investment, and inclusive economic strategies. 

Looking ahead, building a resilient and equitable economy in the Global South requires reclaiming economic sovereignty from the constraints of neoliberal orthodoxy. This involves a more assertive role for the state—not only in regulating markets but also in driving public investment, expanding domestic demand, and addressing inequality. Key policy measures include increasing rural incomes through agricultural development, public investments in education, health, and infrastructure. Asia’s development trajectory offers not a singular model, but vital lessons: long-term planning, key role of the state, industrialisation and social inclusion are essential to achieving broad-based and sustainable growth.

About the Author

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, Trade and Economic Policy. Since 1989, he has been teaching economics at various universities in Norway and the UK. Dr. Siddiqui’s research interests encompass a wide range of topics, including political economy, international trade, and economic history, South Asia, and emerging economies. He has presented papers at international conferences across numerous countries, reflecting his global engagement in the field. His scholarly pursuits span six broad domains: Political Economy, Development Economics, Economic History, Economic Policy, Globalization, and International Trade. Dr. Siddiqui has made significant contributions to research in areas such as trade policy, globalization, and political economy. His work has been published in chapters of edited books and articles published in peer-reviewed journals. For inquiries, Dr. Siddiqui can be reached at: [email protected]

References 

1. Asian Development Bank (2020) 50 Years of Asian Development, Manila, Philippines.  
2. Bhattacharjee, J. and Haldar, S. (2015) “Economic Growth in South Asia: Binding Constraints for the Future” Journal of South Asian Development, 10(2). 
3. Glawe, L. and Wagner, H. (2021) The Economic Rise of East Asia – Development Paths of Japan, South Korea, and China, London: Springer. 
4. IMF (2025) World Economic Outlook, Washington DC: IMF. 
5. Maddison, A. (2007) Contours of the World Economy 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History. New York: Oxford University Press. 
6. Mahbubani, K. (2022) The Asian 21st Century, Springer: Singapore. 
7. Sachs J. (2009) South Asia story of development: Opportunities and risks. In Ghani E., Ahmed S. (Eds), Accelerating growth and job creation in South Asia (pp. 42–49). New Delhi: Oxford University Press 
8. Siddiqui, K., (2025a) “Indian Economy at 75: Transformation and Challenges”, American Review of Political Economy 19(1). 
9. Siddiqui, K. (2025b) “Understanding the Rise of High Technology in China” World Financial Review, April. 
10. Siddiqui, K. (2024a) “China’s Growth Miracle and Development Strategy Since the 1980s”, World Financial Review, December. 
11. Siddiqui, K. (2024b) “Impact of Population Changes and Economic Growth in China and India” World Financial Review, November. 
12. Siddiqui, K. (2024c) “The BRICS Expansion and the End of Western Economic and Geopolitical Dominance” World Financial Review, November. 
13. Siddiqui, K. (2023a) “Developmental Challenges: Export vs Import-Substitution in Industrialisation in Developing Countries” World Financial Review, October-November.  
14. Siddiqui, K. (2023b) “The Political Economy of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Growing Regional Multilateral Ties” World Financial Review, February-March. 
15. Siddiqui, K. (2022) “Comparing the Economic Performance of East Asian and Latin American Countries: The Role of Agricultural Reforms in the Economic Transformation” World Financial Review, July-August.  
16. Siddiqui, K. (2020) “Prospects of a Multipolar World and the Role of Emerging Economies” World Financial Review, November-December. 
17. Siddiqui, K. (2019) “The Political Economy of Global Inequality: An Economic Historical Perspective” Argumenta Oeconomica Cracoviensia 21(2):11 – 42.  
18. Siddiqui, K. (2018). “The Political Economy of India’s Economic Changes since the last Century” Argumenta Oeconomica Cracoviensia 19: 103 – 132.  
19. Siddiqui, K. (2016) “Will the Growth of the BRICs Cause a Shift in the Global Balance of Economic Power in the 21st Century?” International Journal of Political Economy 45(4): 315 – 338. 
20. Siddiqui, K. (2012) “Malaysia’s Socio-Economic Transformation in Historical Perspective”, International Journal of Business and General Management 1(2):1-50. 

By Dr. Kalim Siddiqui 

The Bandung Conference marked a turning point in the postcolonial world’s pursuit of political and economic independence. Dr Kalim Siddiqui explores how this historic gathering laid the foundation for South-South cooperation and economic sovereignty, examining its enduring relevance to today’s Global South amid shifting geopolitical and economic power structures. 

I. Introduction 

In April 1955, representatives from 29 newly independent Asian and African countries convened in Bandung, Indonesia, for the landmark Asian-African Conference—widely known as the Bandung Conference. This historic gathering marked a watershed moment in the political awakening of former colonies in what is now commonly referred to as the Global South. 

Seventy years later, the legacy of the Bandung Conference endures as a powerful symbol of the shared aspirations of postcolonial states to forge a world order based on solidarity, mutual respect, and economic cooperation. The struggle for independence not only dismantled colonial rule (Siddiqui, 2019a) but also paved the way for envisioning alternative models of economic development. Bandung Conference thus signalled the beginning of a transformative era aimed at reshaping global power dynamics and advancing South-South economic cooperation (Siddiqui, 1985). 

One of the conference’s most enduring contributions was its resolution on economic collaboration, which emphasized the importance of mutual support among developing countries. This initiative sought to promote regional integration and strengthen intra-South economic ties as a pathway toward greater autonomy and equity within the global economic system. 

The economic ascent of the Global South—a term broadly encompassing developing countries—has been one of the most significant global transformations since the end of World War II. This evolution can be traced through five interrelated phases: decolonisation, non-aligned movement, Third World’s debt crisis, globalisation, and the emergence of new economic powers. 

Globalisation, initiated by the United States and other developed capitalist countries in the 1980s, was once heralded as a pathway to shared prosperity. The globalisation model rests on policies such as market liberalisation, trade and capital deregulation, and the reduction of state intervention in the economy. Rather than promoting a more equitable global order, globalisation has exacerbated socio-economic disparities, particularly in the Global South—and has undermined the traditional role of the state as a mediator of economic and social tensions (Siddiqui, 2019a). 

The Global South—typically referring to developing countries, often characterized by lower GDP per capita—accounted for approximately 44% of global GDP in 2024. Despite this already substantial share of the world economy, these countries contributed an even more striking 80% to global economic growth, underscoring their increasing influence in shaping the trajectory of global development. 

However, regions formerly subjected to imperial rule continue to face significant setbacks and challenges. A striking example is Israel, which has functioned as an outpost of imperialism and has played a destabilizing role in the broader Middle East. The creation of Israel can be traced back to imperial agreements such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) between Britain and France and the Balfour Declaration (1917). Israel was officially established in 1948 as part of a settler-colonial project facilitated by British support. Its founding involved the violent displacement of approximately 760,000 Palestinians and the destruction of hundreds of towns and villages in ethnic cleansing (Kaplan, 2025). 

Since its inception, Israel has pursued policies aimed at the appropriation of Palestinian land and water resources while systematically displacing the indigenous Palestinian population to enable the expansion of Jewish settlements. Over time, this process has developed into a system of institutionalized segregation and discrimination. In the occupied territories, Israel has enforced policies that physically and legally separate Palestinians from Israeli settlers, maintaining parallel legal systems that significantly disadvantage Palestinians in terms of rights, freedom of movement, and access to essential resources (Siddiqui, 2024a). 

II. Colonialism and Marx’s Critique of Imperial Power 

From the late 15th century onward, European imperial powers established colonies that came to dominate nearly all of Asia, Africa, and the Americas (Siddiqui, 2020a). These colonial powers systematically stripped regions of the Global South of their sovereignty, plundered their natural resources, disrupted indigenous cultures, destroyed self-sufficient economies, and dismantled longstanding social and political institutions (Siddiqui, 2020b). 

Although Karl Marx’s primary analytical focus was on Europe and the development of capitalism in 19th-century Britain, he also engaged with colonialism, particularly in the contexts of Ireland, India, and China (Siddiqui, 1990; also see 1996). In a New York Daily Tribune article dated June 5, 1857, Marx asserted: “One thing is certain, that the death-hour of Old China is rapidly drawing nigh… before many years pass away, we shall have to witness the death struggles of the oldest empire in the world, and the opening day of a new era for all Asia.” (Marx and Engels, 1968) 

Marx’s reflections on India were notably ambivalent. While he acknowledged the devastating consequences of British colonial rule, he also viewed it as a possible—albeit violent—catalyst for historical transformation (Siddiqui, 2018). He lamented the “terrible havoc” inflicted on Indian society but argued that colonialism might inadvertently undermine stagnant social structures and facilitate progress (Siddiqui, 2024b). Karl Marx in his article, The British Rule in India (1853) which was published in the New-York Daily Tribune on June 25, 1853. Here in particular, Marx identified the Indian village community—often idealised by others—as a fundamental pillar of what he termed “Oriental despotism.” Further in The British Rule in India (1853), he wrote: “[Village communities], inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism… restraining the human mind within the smallest possible compass… enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.” (Marx and Engels, 1968) 

Karl Marx argued that Britain’s transformation of India into a “reproductive country” for British industry—supplying raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods—necessitated the development of modern infrastructure, including railways, roads, and irrigation systems. This process of economic integration, he believed, would also undermine hereditary divisions of labour and, by extension, weaken the caste system, which he regarded as a central impediment to India’s social and political progress (Marx and Engels, 1968). 

Nevertheless, Marx never depicted Britain’s colonial ambitions as intentionally progressive. He was unequivocal in his denunciation of British motives, writing in the New York Daily Tribune on June 25, 1853: “England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them… The question is: can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?” In this interpretation, Britain does not function as a conscious agent of enlightenment, but rather as what Marx described as an “unconscious tool” of history—simultaneously facilitating structural transformation while engaging in violent expropriation, cultural destruction, and political repression. 

By 1857—particularly in response to the Indian Rebellion, Marx’s critique of imperialism became markedly sharper. He expressed support for the anti-colonial uprising, aligning himself with revolutionary movements seeking national liberation. In his analysis, British rule operated on “the principle of destroying nationality,” pursued through violent repression and systematic cultural erasure (Siddiqui, 2024c). 

Moreover, in Capital, Volume I, Marx directly linked colonial expansion to the origins of capitalist accumulation. In the chapter titled “The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist,” he wrote: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population… the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of black skins… are the chief moments of primitive accumulation” (Marx, 1976: 915). Here, colonial violence appears not as an anomaly but as a foundational mechanism in the emergence of capitalism (Siddiqui, 2020c). 

From this point onward, Marx increasingly regarded colonialism not as a contradictory element within the dialectical process of historical development, but as a regressive and coercive system of domination. This shift in perspective laid the theoretical groundwork for later anti-imperialist and postcolonial thinkers, who would go on to emphasize the enduring structural inequalities and widespread poverty generated and sustained by colonial rule (Siddiqui, 1989). 

III. Neo-Colonialism and the Enduring Grip of Empire in West Africa 

West Africa offers a striking example of how decolonisation was often incomplete. In the aftermath of formal independence, France retained substantial influence over its former colonies, particularly under the guise of protecting French assets and nationals. As part of this arrangement, French military forces were stationed in several countries, granting France significant leverage over domestic political affairs (Siddiqui, 2024d). 

A key mechanism of this continued dominance has been monetary control. Many former French colonies were compelled to adopt the CFA franc, a currency pegged to the French franc (and later the euro), with monetary policy governed by the French Treasury and the Banque de France. Given the intrinsic link between monetary and broader economic policy, this effectively placed substantial aspects of economic sovereignty under French oversight. 

Attempts to remove neo-colonial structures have frequently been met with violent repression. A notable example is Burkina Faso, where President Thomas Sankara—widely hailed as a visionary revolutionary and staunch advocate for African self-determination and sovereignty—implemented sweeping reforms aimed at reducing foreign dependency. His policies included the expulsion of French military forces, land redistribution, nationalization of key industries, and the promotion of women’s rights and environmental sustainability. Sankara sought to chart a path of truly independent development, free from the influence of former colonial powers. However, his radical agenda challenged entrenched interests both domestically and internationally. In 1987, he was assassinated during a military coup that received support from France, underscoring the extent to which efforts to dismantle neo-colonial systems have been systematically undermined (Siddiqui, 2024d). 

The anti-imperialist struggle, however, has persisted. In 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power in Burkina Faso and soon expelled French military forces from its country. He also formed the ‘Alliance of Sahel States’ alongside Mali and Niger—countries similarly rich in natural resources and burdened by foreign military presence. French and US troops have since been forced to withdraw from parts of the region, including the closure of a US drone base there, marking a significant shift in West Africa’s foreign policy. 

Among the many natural resources in the Sahel region, gold occupies a particularly significant position. Burkina Faso, in particular, is one of Africa’s leading gold producers, extracting approximately 57 tonnes in 2024. Yet, despite this abundance, the vast majority of profits from gold production benefit foreign corporations that own and operate most of the country’s mines. The local population sees minimal returns from this wealth, reflecting a familiar pattern of extractive neo-colonial economic structures. 

Burkina Faso is a predominantly agrarian society, where more than 80% of the population relies on agriculture for their livelihoods. In this context, land is not merely a productive resource—it is the foundation of survival, cultural identity, and socio-political stability. However, the country’s colonial legacy, neoliberal economic restructuring, and ongoing political volatility have entrenched significant inequities in land access, undermining the nation’s capacity to pursue autonomous and sustainable development. 

In response to these structural challenges, President Ibrahim Traoré has initiated land reform efforts aimed at dismantling land monopolies and addressing rural inequalities. Central to his government’s policy aimed at achieving food sovereignty and economic sovereignty, which demand a more equitable distribution of land and the empowerment of local communities. 

Burkina Faso’s longstanding dependency on food imports has left the country vulnerable to global market shocks, price volatility, and geopolitical pressures (Siddiqui, 2024e). Achieving true economic sovereignty—the ability of the state and its people to define and implement their own economic priorities—requires a fundamental reversal of this dependency. Land access to the rural poor is essential, not only to boost domestic food production but also to create employment opportunities in rural areas and strengthen local food systems. 

Thus, in Burkina Faso, land reform is not merely a technical exercise involving redistribution of land. It is a profoundly political act that determines who controls resources and who benefits from agricultural production. A genuinely transformative approach to land governance is therefore indispensable for building sustainable food systems and reclaiming economic sovereignty in the postcolonial era. 

In response, Captain Ibrahim Traoré has taken decisive steps to reverse this dynamic. His government has nationalised several gold mining operations previously under foreign companies’ ownership, aiming to redirect revenues toward industrialisation, public education, and healthcare. Additionally, he has implemented agricultural reforms to support small farmers and promote food grain self-sufficiency—an essential component of economic independence (Siddiqui, 2024e). 

Multiple coup attempts have reportedly sought to remove Ibrahim Traoré, a reaction that reflects a longstanding imperialist pattern of destabilising reformist governments in Africa. Compounding these challenges is an ongoing insurgency by Islamist militants, who currently control up to 40 percent of Burkina Faso’s territory. The dual threats of internal instability and external subversion underscore the immense difficulties faced by postcolonial states striving for genuine sovereignty and economic justice. 

Despite the formidable challenges faced by governments resisting neo-colonial influence, the renewed drive for decolonisation in West Africa has garnered widespread and enthusiastic support across the African continent. Demonstrations in solidarity with Ibrahim Traoré have taken place in multiple countries, with thousands calling for an end to foreign interference in Burkina Faso. The popular resonance of his leadership reflects a broader historical memory: the same imperialist forces that seek to destabilise reformist regimes today were responsible for the assassination or removal of leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara, and Muammar Gaddafi. 

Today, Africa stands at a critical juncture. The continent’s geopolitical relevance has never been greater. By 2050, it is projected that one in every four people on Earth will live in Africa, which will be a big demographic, economic, and political transformation. As such, the continent has become a renewed arena for contestation between imperial powers seeking to control its vast natural resources and African countries striving to reclaim sovereignty and redirect those resources toward national development and social welfare. 

What we are witnessing is not merely a political realignment, but the opening of a new chapter in Africa’s long-standing struggle for political and economic sovereignty and dignity. 

IV. China and the Global South: Cooperation Rooted in the Bandung Spirit 

China has played a prominent role in shaping contemporary global development, both through its rapid economic growth and initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative (GDI). Rooted in the Bandung Spirit of cooperation among developing countries, the GDI embodies collective aspirations for equitable development. Chinese President Xi Jinping articulated this vision at the 70th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in June 2024, stating, “Of all the forces in the world, the Global South stands out with a strong momentum.” 

Key Bandung-inspired institutions—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-founded New Development Bank (NDB)—have expanded access to financing for emerging economies. Meanwhile, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has enhanced connectivity, creating new opportunities for partner countries (Siddiqui, 2019b). 

A decade ago, the US and the EU were the dominant trading partners of regions such as Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. However, by 2024, China has emerged as the largest trading partner for 63 Global South countries—including Iran, Brazil, Chile, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya—compared to just 36 in 2013. 

Currently, annual trade among Global South countries exceeds $14 trillion. A growing share of this trade is intra-South, with South-South trade projected to grow at 3.8% annually through 2033, outpacing the 2.2% growth expected for North-North trade. Trade between China and the Global South is forecasted to increase at an even faster rate of 5.9% annually over the next decade (IMF, 2025). 

V. The Emerging Economic Centre of Gravity: Trade and Investment in the Global South 

Trade within the Global South has expanded for a variety of reasons, including the establishment of free trade arrangements and regional integration initiatives. These include intra-regional frameworks such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the 54-nation African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), South America’s Mercosur, and the Pacific Alliance in Latin America. Regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have also demonstrated increasing levels of cooperation. Meanwhile, the expansion of BRICS and the implementation of AfCFTA signal a broader trend toward greater economic integration and cooperation within the Global South. 

By 2030, India is projected to become the world’s third-largest economy, with an estimated GDP of US$6.3 trillion. To support this trajectory, India is making significant investments in education, skills development, and infrastructure, aiming to enhance its export industries and integrate more deeply into global supply chains, particularly as multinational corporations seek cost-effective alternatives to China. 

In addition, India is modernizing its industries, with a strong focus on the digital sector. The digital economy already contributes approximately 11% to the country’s GDP and is expanding rapidly. As a major global provider of information technology services, India is capitalizing on its large pool of technical talent and aims to become a leading player in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and advanced computing (Siddiqui, 2024f). 

On average, the developing countries invest only about one-quarter of what developed countries spend on R&D as a percentage of GDP, according to the World Bank. Despite this gap, many Global South nations are advancing rapidly in technological capability. To accelerate this momentum, governments need to adopt strategies that foster a conducive environment for early-stage risk capital and innovation. This includes supporting innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), strengthening the broader business ecosystem, and investing in education, research and skills development. 

Importantly, the Global South is transitioning from cost-driven to value-driven exports. Rather than primarily supplying raw materials to the Global North, many developing countries are increasingly focusing on value addition, developing domestic industries and integrating into global value chains. 

The Global South’s share of global GDP has grown markedly since the 1990s, rising from 19% in 1990 to nearly 44% in 2024. This expansion is particularly evident in East Asia—most notably in China, where rapid industrialization and economic reforms have led to deep integration into global markets. Other regions, such as South Asia, have also experienced robust economic growth, with India playing a leading role (Siddiqui, 2018). 

The Global South is deepening trade and investment relationships—particularly within the region itself. For example, trade between China and other Global South countries is projected to grow at a faster rate than trade between the Global South and the Global North. This reflects a broader structural shift in the global economy, with the economic centre of gravity increasingly moving toward the Global South. Developing countries such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa are playing progressively more prominent roles in shaping global economic trends. 

While the Global South is experiencing overall higher economic growth, there are important regional variations. East Asia, for instance, has achieved rapid development through industrialization and deep integration into global value chains. In contrast, many countries in Africa and Latin America continue to rely heavily on natural resource exports. 

Sustainable development has also emerged as a central concern, and some Global South countries are positioning themselves as leaders in this area. Brazil, for example, not only boasts one of the world’s cleanest energy mixes but is also the second-largest global supplier of biofuels. The country plans to invest an additional US$40 billion in biofuels by 2037. Chile, similarly, is aiming to become one of the world’s leading producers of green hydrogen by 2040. 

According to the World Bank, the addition of six new member states to BRICS has only moderately increased the bloc’s combined GDP, both in nominal terms and when adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). However, based on PPP-adjusted GDP, the BRICS grouping is now significantly ahead of the G7—a milestone it achieved in 2020 (see Figure 1). The inclusion of major economies such as India and China contributes substantially to BRICS’ overall economic size (Siddiqui, 2024f). In terms of population, the bloc far surpasses the G7, which reflects both its demographic weight and its growing geopolitical influence. Nevertheless, the average GDP per capita in BRICS countries remains considerably lower than that of the G7, particularly when compared to economies in the European Union and North America. 

Over the past quarter-century, the global economic and geopolitical landscape has undergone a significant transformation, marked by the rise of the BRICS countries as a growing counterbalance to the traditional dominance of the G7. This shift has been particularly evident in the expanding share of global GDP held by the BRICS, especially when measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), as illustrated in Figure 2. 

Figure 1: Comparison of G7 and BRICS Economies, 2023. 

Figure 2: G7 and BRICS Countries’ Share of Global GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 

According to the World Economic Outlook report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2025), the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the eleven BRICS member countries is projected to surpass the global average growth rate in 2025. The BRICS bloc is expected to grow by 3.4%, compared to the global average of 2.7% (IMF, 2025). 

The countries leading this projected growth within BRICS include Ethiopia (6.6%), India (6.2%), Indonesia (4.7%), the United Arab Emirates (4.0%), and China (4.4%). In terms of international market share for 2025, China is anticipated to hold the largest share among BRICS members, accounting for 19.6% of global GDP. Following China are India (8.5%), Russia (3.4%), Indonesia (2.4%), and Brazil (2.3%) (IMF, 2025). 

The IMF data also indicates that the eleven BRICS member countries are becoming increasingly central to the global economy, surpassing the influence of the G7, which includes the advanced economies of the EU, Canada, and the US. In terms of global economic share, the G7 accounted for approximately 28% in 2025 projection, while the BRICS countries represent a significantly larger share—approximately 44%. The BRICS countries are projected to account for nearly half of global economic output by 2025 when measured by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2025), global economic growth is forecasted at 3.2%, with the BRICS bloc expected to contribute a substantial portion of this growth.  

According to the IMF (2025) forecasts, the global economy is expected to rely more on the BRICS countries for growth than on the developed countries. The BRICS’ projected influence on global economic growth over the next five years is driven by: their combined economic growth and rising share of global GDP. China is expected to play a particularly significant role, contributing approximately 22% to global economic growth over the next five years, surpassing the combined contribution of the G7. India is anticipated to be the second-largest driver, projected to contribute nearly 15% of global growth by 2029. 

Overall, the IMF projects that BRICS economies will be the principal engines of global growth in the near future (see Figure 3). The ten BRICS member states now account for more than a quarter of global GDP and nearly half of the world’s population. This underscores the group’s increasing economic clout and its growing role in shaping global development. 

Figure 3: GDP Growth Contributions from the US, EU, and BRICS Economies.

A remarkable progress has been made in reducing absolute poverty levels in China. This success can be attributed to the combined effects of rapid GDP growth and large-scale, targeted development interventions. Today, developing countries collectively hold over US$5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves—nearly double the amount held by developed countries. 

Structurally, there has been a notable shift in global manufacturing capacity toward Asia, which has emerged as a major engine of global growth since the early 21st century. Many developing countries are gradually moving up the global value chain. According to some estimates, Asia is now home to approximately 40% of the world’s researchers. 

Trade between China and the Global South is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 5.9% over the next decade. Notably, the Global South has also surpassed developed economies as a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), attracting approximately US$525 billion in 2023 compared to US$464 billion for developed countries. 

The Global South is emerging as a formidable force in international trade. By 2033, annual trade among Global South nations is projected to approach US$14 trillion. A growing proportion of this trade is intra-regional: South-South trade is expected to increase at an annual rate of 3.8%, outpacing the 2.2% growth projected for trade among developed economies (North-North trade). Trade between China and the broader Global South is anticipated to grow even more rapidly, maintaining a 5.9% annual growth rate over the coming decade. 

Consequently, more Global South countries are ascending to the ranks of the world’s largest economies. By 2029, India is expected to become the third-largest economy globally, with a projected GDP of US$6.3 trillion. Brazil is forecast to occupy the eighth position, while Indonesia is anticipated to rank sixteenth (see Figure 4). 

Figure 4: Global South Economies are Projected to Become Some of the World’s Largest Economies by 2029.

VI. Conclusion

The Bandung Conference of 1955 stands as a pivotal moment in the history of international relations, marking the emergence of a collective voice from newly independent nations in Asia and Africa. By rejecting both colonial domination and Cold War bipolarity, the conference laid the ideological and political groundwork for the Non-Aligned Movement and offered an alternative vision of global cooperation rooted in mutual respect, sovereignty, and solidarity. Reassessing Bandung’s legacy not only highlights the enduring struggles for global equity and justice but also underscores the continuing importance of South-South cooperation in confronting contemporary global challenges. 

The historic gathering at Bandung marked a pivotal moment in the political awakening of what is now known as the Global South. Seven decades later, the conference’s legacy endures as a powerful symbol of the shared aspirations of postcolonial states to establish a world order grounded in mutual respect, non-alignment, sovereignty, and economic cooperation.  

However, the path toward economic transformations and prosperity in developing countries remains complex and uneven. Persistent challenges such as structural inequalities, external pressures, and global market volatility underscore the urgency for strategic and context-specific policies that promote inclusive growth, economic diversification, and sustainable development. Yet, the momentum generated by transformative regional initiatives continues to offer a hopeful vision—one in which the Global South, and Africa in particular, and shapes a future defined by autonomy, resilience, and shared prosperity. 

In conclusion, the rise of Global South economies signals a major shift in the global economic and political order. Fuelled by reforms, demographic growth, industrialisation, and South-South cooperation, these nations are gaining influence and the deepening of regional cooperation and the expanding scope of South-South alliances signal a movement toward greater sovereignty, and sustainable progress.

About the Author

Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specializing in International Political Economy, Development Economics, Trade and Economic Policy. Since 1989, he has been teaching economics at various universities in Norway and the UK. Dr. Siddiqui’s research interests encompass a wide range of topics, including political economy, international trade, and economic history, South Asia, and emerging economies. He has presented papers at international conferences across numerous countries, reflecting his global engagement in the field. His scholarly pursuits span six broad domains: Political Economy, Development Economics, Economic History, Economic Policy, Globalization, and International Trade. Dr. Siddiqui has made significant contributions to research in areas such as trade policy, globalization, and political economy. His work has been published in chapters of edited books and articles published in peer-reviewed journals. For inquiries, Dr. Siddiqui can be reached at: [email protected]

References 

1. IMF (2025). World Economic Outlook: A Critical Juncture amid Policy Shifts, Washington DC: IMF. 
2. Kaplan, Amy (2025) Our American Israel: The Story of an Entangled Alliance, Harvard University Press.  
3. Marx, Karl (1976). Capital, vol. 1, London: Penguin, P. 915 
4. Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick (1968) The First Indian War of Independence, 1857–1859, Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
5. Siddiqui, K. (2024a) “Palestine, Imperialism and the Settler Colonial Project”, World Financial Review, February-March. 
6. Siddiqui, K. (2024b). “Economic Drain from India during the British Rule” World Financial Review, December. 
7. Siddiqui, K. (2024c). “The Multinational Corporations, Capitalism, and Imperialism: The Case Study of East India Company” World Financial Review, July. 
8. Siddiqui, K. (2024d). “Neo-colonialism: An analysis of international factors on the development of the Global South” World Financial Review, December-January. 
9. Siddiqui, K. (2024e). “Food Dumping, Rising Food Insecurity, and Hunger in the Developing Countries”. World Financial Review, July.  
10. Siddiqui, K. (2024f). “The BRICS Expansion and the End of Western Economic and Geopolitical Dominance”, World Financial Review, November. 
11. Siddiqui, K. (2020a). “Britain’s Trade with China in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century: A Review of the Opium Wars” Asian Profile, 48(3):206 – 221, September.  
12. Siddiqui, K. (2020b). “The Study of Economic History and the Importance of Understanding the Past” World Financial Review, November-December. 
13. Siddiqui, K. (2020c). “The Political Economy of the Slave Trade, Capital Accumulation and the Rise of Britain” World Financial Review, January-February. 
14. Siddiqui, K. (2019a). “The Political Economy of Global Inequality: An Economic Historical Perspective” Argumenta Oeconomica Cracoviensia, 21(2):11-42.  
15. Siddiqui, K. (2019b). “One Belt and One Road, China’s Massive Infrastructure Project to Boost Trade and Economy: An Overview” International Critical Thought. 9(2):214 – 235.  
16. Siddiqui, K. (2018). “The Political Economy of India’s Economic Changes since the last Century” Argumenta Oeconomica Cracoviensia, 19:103-132.  
17. Siddiqui, K. (2016). “Will the Growth of the BRICs Cause a Shift in the Global Balance of Economic Power in the 21st Century?” International Journal of Political Economy 45(4): 315-338. 
18. Siddiqui, K. (1996). “Growth of Modern Industries under Colonial Regime: Industrial Development in British India between 1900 and 1946” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 17(1):11-59, January. 
19. Siddiqui, K. (1990). “Historical Roots of Mass Poverty in India” (Eds.) C.A. Thayer, J. Camilleri, and K. Siddiqui, Trends and Strains, p.59-76, New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House. 
20. Siddiqui, K. (1989). “Colonialism, Hunger and Backwardness in the Developing Countries” Materialisten, (in Norwegian) no.3-4:111-135, Oslo. 
21. Siddiqui, K. (1985). “South-South Economic Co-operation and its Future Prospects”, Bergens Tidende, October 4, Norway. 
22. World Bank (2025). Emerging and Developing Economies in the 21st Century, Washington DC: World Bank.