The Trump administration’s initiative to mandate a full-time return to the office for federal employees has ignited heated debate over its practicality and implications for government efficiency. Spearheaded by entrepreneur and former presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, who has been tapped to lead the newly proposed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), the plan seeks to reduce the federal workforce through a strategy designed to prompt mass resignations. In an interview with Tucker Carlson, Ramaswamy described the policy as a means of “streamlining bureaucracy” by making federal jobs less appealing to those who value flexible work arrangements. However, critics argue that this approach would squander taxpayer money, disrupt essential government functions, and undermine the quality of public service delivery, as highlighted in a recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report.
Ramaswamy’s vision hinges on eliminating telework options and enforcing strict in-office attendance as a mechanism to drive attrition. He estimated that roughly a quarter of federal employees would voluntarily leave their positions if such measures were imposed, reducing payroll costs without direct layoffs. This “radical idea,” as Ramaswamy called it, was pitched as a way to shrink a federal workforce that he characterized as bloated and overreaching. However, Carlson raised concerns about the plan’s feasibility, pointing to the robust job protections afforded to federal employees, which make involuntary terminations notoriously difficult. Ramaswamy brushed off these concerns, maintaining that revoking remote work privileges would naturally compel resignations.
Proponents of the plan argue that cutting the federal payroll, which stands at $110 billion annually, would lead to a leaner and more efficient government. They contend that reducing headcount will eliminate inefficiencies and curb excessive regulation. Ramaswamy portrayed the move as a necessary step to dismantle bureaucratic inertia, asserting that many unelected federal employees create regulatory burdens that undermine legislative authority. “If you simply require them to show up at the office Monday through Friday,” Ramaswamy stated, “a significant portion would choose to leave, simplifying government processes and reducing overhead.”
Despite these claims, the proposal appears economically shortsighted and operationally hazardous. The federal workforce of 2.2 million employees oversees a $6.1 trillion budget, meaning salaries account for just 1.8% of expenditures—a remarkably low overhead for such a vast operation. These employees perform critical functions across agencies like Homeland Security, the Department of Education, and the Federal Reserve. Forcing resignations at scale would create a talent vacuum in roles requiring specialized knowledge and skills. The resulting need for recruitment, onboarding, and training of replacements would not only delay a return to full operational capacity but also generate significant costs that could eclipse any perceived savings. Furthermore, the abrupt loss of experienced personnel would disrupt ongoing projects, diminishing the efficiency and quality of public services.
This approach also disregards the proven success of remote work in the federal sector. During the COVID-19 pandemic, telework enabled government agencies to sustain productivity while reducing operational expenses tied to physical office spaces. OMB findings indicate that flexible work arrangements enhanced efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Reversing these gains would necessitate substantial reinvestments in office infrastructure, including utilities, maintenance, and security, potentially nullifying anticipated payroll savings. Taxpayers would ultimately bear the burden of these avoidable expenses.
Ramaswamy has framed the initiative as part of a broader agenda to overhaul federal regulations. He suggested that cutting workforce numbers could invalidate up to 50% of existing rules, many of which he claims are crafted by unelected officials. While this rhetoric may appeal to critics of federal bureaucracy, it overlooks the intricacies of governance and the essential role of institutional expertise. Federal employees do more than draft regulations; they implement policies enacted by Congress, ensuring the smooth delivery of programs and services that millions of Americans depend on, from Social Security to disaster relief.
The human and economic costs of this policy extend beyond the immediate federal workforce. Morale among remaining employees would likely deteriorate under increased workloads and eroded institutional knowledge, leading to further attrition and a self-perpetuating cycle of inefficiency. Industries reliant on federal oversight would face delays and disruptions, imposing costs on businesses and state governments alike. These cascading effects would exacerbate waste and inefficiency rather than alleviate them.
Rather than resorting to a blunt-force approach aimed at workforce reduction, the government should pursue nuanced reforms that balance efficiency with service quality. Modernizing outdated systems, embracing digital transformation, and leveraging the proven benefits of remote work are far more effective strategies for achieving cost savings and operational excellence. Ramaswamy’s presumption that fewer employees automatically equate to better governance oversimplifies the complexity of federal operations and risks undermining critical public programs.
In forcing federal employees back to the office under the guise of driving resignations, this policy sacrifices functionality for optics. Instead of creating a streamlined government, it threatens to dismantle the institutions that underpin national stability and public trust. Clinging to outdated workplace paradigms in an era of demonstrated telework success is not just inefficient—it is economically reckless and a disservice to taxpayers.
By the end of the Second World War, the limitations of free-market and non-interventionist economic policies had become apparent. In response, a Keynesian interventionist approach was adopted by major capitalist countries, ushering in a period of economic prosperity. Over the following quarter-century (i.e. 1945-1972), these policies spurred growth in employment and incomes across leading economies. However, international developments—including the Cold War, decolonization, and rising inflation—introduced new challenges for global capitalism (Siddiqui, 2023a). And by the mid-1970s, the Keynesian model was struggling to address the deeper structural crises of monopoly capitalism. In its place, neoliberal “free market” policies began to emerge across major economies and were later imposed on developing nations in the 1980s as they grappled with debt crises and external repayment pressures.
Colonial capitalism, in its earlier forms, tolerated some level of dissent within its colonies. Leaders of independence movements—such as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Sardar Patel, Sukarno, Mossadegh, Ben Bella, Nkrumah, and Nelson Mandela-advocated for social equality, freedom, and independence. Despite facing oppression and undemocratic policies, they were not eliminated by colonial authorities. However, contemporary instances, such as Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, reflect a harsher approach toward occupied populations and their leaders.
Since 1948, Israel has implemented policies that have systematically undermined Palestinian rights, with actions including ethnic cleansing and land expropriation. This settler-colonial project, initially supported by Britain and later by the United States (US), has allowed Israel to pursue expansionist policies—displacing populations and controlling land and water resources. For years, Israel has imposed a blockade on Gaza, tightly controlling its contact with the outside world through military means. The recent conflict in Gaza has highlighted the extent of Israel’s actions, with reports of targeted destruction of hospitals, schools, playgrounds, mosques, and refugee shelters. The humanitarian situation in occupied Palestine underscores the global community’s failure to address the ongoing violence and the continued displacement of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank (Siddiqui, 2024a).
II. Capitalism, Imperialism, and Hegemony
Capitalism is a system in which private owners control production and resource distribution, with economic activities driven by market competition. At its core, capitalism is founded on private property rights, encouraging efficiency as resource owners seek to maximize the value of their assets. Profit serves as the primary motivation for individuals to engage in economic exchanges, with the expectation of mutual benefit.
Imperialism marks a phase in capitalism characterized by monopolistic control and dominance of financial capital. In this stage, European powers divided the world among themselves, extending their influence over other countries and territories to benefit their own economies. This imperialist expansion led to significant global economic inequalities and the restructuring of colonized economies to serve metropolitan capital. (Siddiqui, 2023b)
The concept of hegemony, explored by Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), has been central to discussions of global power dynamics. Hegemony describes periods in which one power exerts dominance over others, shaping international policies. Following World War II, this idea gained prominence in the context of the decline of European colonial empires and the rise of a postwar liberal international economy under US leadership. Economic historians and theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Charles Kindleberger expanded on the concept, with Kindleberger’s analysis of the Great Depression of 1930s sparking the “hegemonic stability theory” debate among neorealist and liberal scholars.
While Britain and other European powers pursued direct military control over overseas territories, the United States adopted a model of informal empire after World War II. Although the US did not engage in traditional colonialism, it exerted considerable influence over other countries through economic and military means. Countries, particularly in Latin America, gained political independence but remained economically subordinated to foreign powers. The neocolonial approach enabled metropolitan powers to maintain economic dominance, fostering global inequalities and regional tensions even after the formal end of empire.
The US hegemony has been sustained through its economic, political, and military leadership, along with the cooperation of allies and economic rivals. The 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement exemplified the US vision for a postwar economic order, establishing frameworks that would enable it to lead the global economy.
More recently, Fukuyama (2021) observed that the peak of American hegemony spanned less than two decades—from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. During this period, the United States held significant power across military, economic, political, and cultural domains. The height of this influence was marked by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in which the US aimed not only to reshape Iraq and Afghanistan but also to remake the broader Middle East (Fukuyama, 2021).
The European Union could have countered US hegemony by opposing NATO’s eastward expansion, potentially mitigating tensions with Russia and averting the Ukraine conflict. However, collective EU action failed to align with its long-term interests. The Ukraine war has subsequently drawn the EU closer to the US, both economically and in terms of defence. As a result, the EU’s reduced trade and cooperation with Russia has led to energy crises, inflation, and economic instability within Europe (Siddiqui, 2022a).
III. Decline of the West as an Economic Power
The decline of Western economic dominance and the waning of US hegemony is a subject of ongoing debate. Some scholars argue that emerging economies in the Global South, particularly China, will succeed the US in leading the world economy, potentially dominating future cycles of capitalist accumulation. Others suggest that this shift will be fraught with challenges and may not unfold peacefully (Siddiqui, 2022b).
The decline of manufacturing in the US and UK began in the 1980s due to economic factors, and globalization and trade liberalization since the 1990s accelerated this shift, moving manufacturing bases from the US and EU to East Asia, China and India. East Asian economies, by contrast, achieved remarkable growth starting in the 1980s, with substantial increases in per capita incomes, exports, and living standards driven by expanded trade and the influx of foreign capital and technology. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the global spread of neoliberal policies, a new cycle of economic growth and prosperity was anticipated. Instead, inequality and economic crises deepened in advanced capitalist economies. The prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the 2008 global financial crisis, further exposed the signs of US decline, reflected in slowed productivity, stagnant wages, growing trade deficits, and mounting foreign debt. (Siddiqui, 2019)
Historically, the West’s economic dominance has shifted. From 1814 to 1914, British hegemony, or Pax Britannica, relied on superior naval power and technology to control colonies and exploit their resources, often through force. This era was marked by significant violence, two World Wars, and the Great Depression. After World War II, the US emerged as the new global hegemon, with its rivalry with the Soviet Union resulting in the Cold War (1947–1990). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US stood as the sole superpower, ushering in a unipolar world order.
IV. Major Theories of International Geopolitics
Various influential theories address the dynamics of international geopolitics. The first, Hegemonic Competition Theory, often referred to as the “Thucydides Trap,” draws on the work of classical political theorist Thucydides (c. 460–400 B.C.E.), who examined the moral questions surrounding the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.E.) between Athens and Sparta. According to proponents of this theory, China’s rise is likely to lead to a confrontation with the US, echoing Athens’ challenge to the dominant power of Sparta. Currently, the US is seen as weakened both economically and militarily, diminishing its role in global affairs and creating instability. This situation mirrors the decline of Britain after World War I, when it shifted from being the world’s top creditor and capital exporter to becoming one of the largest debtor nations (Siddiqui, 2019).
The second, Realist Theory posits that geopolitics is shaped by power politics, with emerging economies like China, Russia, and India expected to play increasingly significant roles. Realists view states as the main actors on the international stage, prioritizing national security, self-interest, and power. Realism also tends to be sceptical about the influence of ethical norms in international relations. Growing superpower tensions have revitalized the realist-idealist debate, sparking renewed interest in the realist approach. Realists consider maintaining a balance of power essential during shifts in global economic and military capability. For instance, in 1908, Germany’s GDP surpassed Britain’s, while Russia’s rapidly growing economy reached a GDP on par with Germany’s by 1880, leading Britain to view these rising powers as potential threats to its dominance.
The third theory, Marxist Theory, offers a distinct critique of geopolitics, examining it through the lens of global financial capital. Academics such as Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein, with his core-periphery model, contribute to this perspective. Marxist theory approaches geopolitical economy through historical-materialist analysis, examining the trajectory of capitalism from its origins to the current era of global financial capitalism and imperialism (Siddiqui, 2023b). Marx’s critique of political economy emphasizes production over exchange, value over prices, and classes over individuals. In contrast, mainstream economic theories often depict the economy as isolated from broader social realities, adopting an ahistorical and abstract approach.
Following the Second World War, the US emerged as the dominant economic power. Economist Angus Maddison estimated that in 1950, the US produced 27.3% of global output despite comprising only 6% of the world’s population. In comparison, the Soviet Union, the second-largest economy, produced only a third of the US output, with China producing around one-sixth. However, US economic supremacy began to wane in the 1950s as Western European and Japanese economies gained ground in terms of productivity, skills, and growth.
V. The Rise of China in the Global Economy
Neoliberalism emerged in the late 1970s in the UK and US as a new framework of contemporary capitalism, arising from the perceived failures of post-war Keynesian policies. Under neoliberalism, the state’s role in resource allocation, particularly between consumption and investment, diminished, while capitalists gained greater control over production and finance across national borders. This control has been systematically bolstered by globalized financial corporations, operating with minimal state oversight.
Since the early 1990s, financialization has further solidified US economic dominance. Neoliberalism imposed strict social and fiscal disciplines, such as adherence to austerity policies, reduced welfare spending, and deregulation of the financial sector (Siddiqui, 2017). These policies have led to increased job insecurity, declining real wages, a reduced share of wages in national income, and growing inequality within many countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent global expansion of markets, known as globalization, was seen as solidifying a US-led world order underpinned by free markets and finance.
Over the past three decades, China’s rise has fundamentally reshaped global politics. Economic reforms initiated in 1987 led to a gradual opening of China’s economy to investment and trade, culminating in its accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. Since then, China has transformed from a low-cost manufacturing hub into a global leader in advanced technologies. This shift has restructured global supply chains and altered international diplomacy, establishing China as a key trade and development partner for emerging economies across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (Siddiqui, 2024d)
In 1978, China began opening its economy to market forces, initiating a period of unprecedented growth that defied expectations. Between 1990 and 2022, China’s GDP (in constant US dollars) expanded by 14.2 times. By 2022, the IMF estimated that China’s GDP (in constant 2017 US dollars) was 18% larger than that of the US Additionally, China’s GDP per capita rose from 3.8% of the US level in 1990 to nearly 28% by 2022. Over this period, China has made significant advancements in high technology, skill development, innovation, and quality education, challenging both the US and the EU in these areas.
Today, China represents 20% of the global population and produces one-sixth of global GDP. In comparison, the US, with 6% of the world’s population, generates one-fifth of total global output. When measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China’s share of global output stands at 19%, compared to 16% for the US and 15% for the EU, marking a substantial shift towards Asia in a single generation. Thirty years ago, China’s share of the global economy was a modest 5%, while the US and EU each represented 20% (IMF, 2024)
China’s rapid economic rise and the relative decline of US and Western dominance have reshaped the global economic landscape. The shift of manufacturing to East Asia has boosted economic growth but also widened global inequalities. The legacy of colonialism and the ongoing disparities between the Global North and South highlight the complexities of today’s global economy. As emerging economies continue to grow and challenge traditional powers, the future of global economic leadership is uncertain, likely marked by challenges and potential conflicts.
Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration’s decision to invade Afghanistan and Iraq marked a significant shift in US foreign policy. These military interventions, combined with domestic and global economic challenges, contributed to a gradual erosion of US economic dominance. The global financial crisis of 2008 further exacerbated these issues, resulting in lower investments and slower growth. The mainstream economists believed that a free-market system led by the US would ensure long-term prosperity.
In 2024, the global economic landscape is defined by the following top five economies: The US remains the largest economy with a GDP of approximately $26 trillion (as shown in Table 1). Its economic growth rate was 2% in 2023. The US economy is diverse, with strong sectors in finance, manufacturing, technology, and services. The US dollar’s role as a global reserve currency enhances its international economic influence (Siddiqui, 2024b). The statistics underscores the significant shift in global economic power over recent decades (See Figure 1a and Figure 1b), particularly the rise of Asia as a dominant economic force and the evolving roles of established and emerging economies (IMF, 2024).
China is the second-largest economy, with a GDP approaching $18.53 trillion in 2023 and an annual growth rate of 4.6%. China’s economic success is driven by its manufacturing sector, technological advancements, and a growing consumer market. China’s rise has significantly impacted global supply chains and international diplomacy (Siddiqui, 2024d).
Germany, as the third-largest economy, excels in export-oriented industries such as engineering, automotive, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Known for its precision and quality, Germany leads in exporting automobiles, machinery, and chemicals, playing a crucial role in global trade. Japan, the fourth-largest economy, is characterized by its innovations and high technology. With a strong emphasis on research and development, Japan excels in high-tech industries including automotive, electronics, and robotics. Its annual GDP growth rate is 0.9% (Siddiqui, 2024c).
India has emerged as the fifth-largest economy with a GDP exceeding $3.94 trillion in 2024. The country’s rapid economic advancement is driven by key sectors such as information technology, services, agriculture, and manufacturing. India benefits from a large domestic market, a skilled labour force, and a growing middle class.
Figure 1b: Shift of World Output Towards Asia, 1990-2024.
Rank
Country
GDP (trillion US$)
Annual Growth Rate (2023)
1
US
$26.00
2%
2
China
$18.53
4.6%
3
Germany
$5.84
1.8%
4
Japan
$5.19
0.9%
5
India
$3.94
6.1%
6
UK
$3.07
1.4%
7
France
$3.32
1.6%
8
Brazil
$2.28
2.3%
9
Italy
$2.13
1.2%
10
Canada
$2.10
2.0%
Source: IMF data, July 1, 2024.
Table 1: The Top Ten Largest Economies in the World in 2024
It is estimated that world top economies will change. According to IMF (2024) study in 2050 Chinese economy will emerge as the top in terms of PPPs, followed by India, US, Indonesia, Brazil, Russia and so on (See Figure 2) This would mean these emerging economies share contribution to the world economy will greatly change (See Figure 3). All these economic changes will lead to change in their participation in international trade and their spending in R & D. Indeed, their struggle for greater power share in the world body and making rules to favour their economies and enhancing their position and influence on global sphere.
Source: IMF, 2024.
Figure 2: World’s Top 10 Economies in 2050 as estimated by IMF, GDP at PPPs.
Source: IMF, 2024.
Figure 3: Share of World’s GDP (PPPs) Changes from 2016 to 2050, as estimated by IMF.
Those developing countries that have proved most adept at learning, absorbing, using and enhancing such knowledge are in East Asia, China and South Asia. Asia including China has half of the world’s population. Moreover, Asia continues to be the world’s fastest-growing region. Region ability to learn and increase productivity is outstanding. It is clear from the past decades experience of economic expansion, the centre of gravity of the world economy is continuing to shift in the direction of these regions. As a result, it is expected that economic rise of the region will inevitably create political shifts. Indeed, it is already happening. For instance, China’s rapid economic rise is the big geopolitical fact of our era. In recent decades, China has become the worlds’ manufacturing hub and the largest investor in Africa. China has been recently involved in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia in peace negotiations and reducing conflicts in Middle East.
It is predicted that China, India, Indonesia and Turkey will account for the majority of the region’s expected GDP in 2050. The fastest growing economies in Asia during the 2050s will be India (more than 3.1 annual growth), and Bangladesh (3% annually). These countries are expected to thrive thanks to their high population growth rates and would be able to take advantage of larger workforce. Latin America will account for a relatively small 7% of global GDP in 2050.
However, growth always does not mean expansion of employment. For example, we need to draw a distinction between “a mere increase in production” and “a large remuneration of labour”. A high GDP growth, it is argued, would raise the rate of growth of employment, which would reduce the relative size of the labour reserves, create tightness in the labour market, and raise the real wage rate. But, under neoliberal policy and free market regime, agriculture and petty producers are squeezed on the name of global competition. Therefore, the agricultural growth depends on the international market and to the consumption demands of the consumers in the rich countries. The employment in agriculture is getting reduced thanks to increased automatization and innovations. Even high rates of GDP growth under neo-liberal globalisation generate very little employment growth which is often referred to as “jobless growth”.
With a worsening distribution of income, that is, a rise in the share of economic surplus, an ex- ante slowing down of the growth of aggregate demand relative to income growth becomes inevitable. The economist Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky had contested this proposition by highlighting the possibility of a rise in investment growth to compensate for the decline in consumption growth. However, this is possible, but there is no reason to believe that investment under capitalism would change, since capitalists invest only when there are prospects of finding a market and expecting higher profits. The government can intervene to undermine the adverse impact of neoliberal policy, but the global finance opposes any move towards government control and to a larger fiscal deficit or higher taxes on the rich, which are the only means of financing larger government expenditure that would increase aggregate demand.
VI. Conclusion
From early colonialism to modern capitalism, economic growth among colonizers has often occurred at the expense of other nations. Colonizers violently occupied foreign lands, creating an artificially cheap supply of resources from their colonies and semi-colonies. While these processes generated significant wealth and economic development in Europe and the United States, but they exacerbated poverty, hunger and economic inequality in the colonized regions, fostering tension and potential conflict (Siddiqui, 2022b).
The structural inequalities in production, reproduction, and global finance continue to perpetuate the divide between the Global North and South. This stratification, deeply rooted in colonialism and slavery, has left lasting imprints. For instance, the average annual income in the Congo is $785 per capita, whereas in Belgium—the Congo’s former colonizer—it stands at $47,400 in 2023, according to World Bank data (World Bank, 2024).
The study concludes that a significant economic and power shift is gradually taking place, with the Western economy facing steep decline. Many emerging countries are assuming larger roles in the global economy, warranting closer scrutiny of their rise. Notably, China’s re-emergence as a great power is unprecedented in both scale and speed, contributing significantly to the relative decline of US economic power.
Dr Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK.
References
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Siddiqui, K. (2024c) “Revisiting the Japan’s Economic Stagnation”. World Financial Review, Feb-March.
Siddiqui, K. (2024d) “The BRICS Expansion and the End of Western Economic and Geopolitical Dominance”, World Financial Review, November. pp.3-14.
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Over the past four decades, China has undergone a remarkable economic transformation, often called a “Growth Miracle.” In less than two generations, it has evolved from a low-income, agrarian society into a productive, manufacturing-driven, middle-income nation. During this period, improvements in income, education, and healthcare have been substantial. Since 1978, economic reforms have lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens out of poverty, leading to a rapid enhancement in living standards—an achievement unparalleled in human history. The World Bank study (2013) estimates that these changes have moved over 800 million people out of poverty.
This article provides an overview of China’s economic development since 1978, examining the political economy of its growth, its global implications, and the extent of its economic progress. Understanding China’s unique developmental path is especially critical for international business, given its rapid ascent as an industrial powerhouse and one of the world’s largest consumer markets, with significant impacts on the global economy. China’s modernization was orchestrated and supported by the Communist Party of China, distinguished by two notable aspects: First, unlike other developing economies, including Russia, China managed its transition from a planned to a mixed-market economy without substantial economic disruption, while maintaining high growth rates. Second, China’s gradual approach to deregulation has avoided the entrenched interest-group politics that have often hindered similar efforts elsewhere. (He and Wang, 2024)
China’s pro-market reforms, initiated in 1978, included significant changes to agriculture and rural sectors, notably the de-collectivization of agriculture. The country opened to foreign investment, allowed individuals to start businesses, and lifted price controls in 1985. While these reforms were gradual, and privatization was limited to some state-owned industries, the government retained control over key strategic sectors. As regulations eased, market forces of supply and demand played a larger role in shaping the economy. (Siddiqui, 2015)
These reforms attracted foreign investment and promoted international trade. The primary drivers of growth were large-scale capital investments—stemming from both foreign capital and domestic savings—and rapid productivity gains. These factors worked in tandem, as economic reforms enhanced efficiency, boosted output, and created resources for reinvestment. (Siddiqui, 2024)
Mainstream economists highlight productivity gains (i.e., increased efficiency) as another major factor in China’s economic expansion. Productivity improvements were achieved largely through reallocating resources to more productive uses, especially in sectors previously under strict government control, such as agriculture and trade. Rural reforms increased agricultural output, enabling many farmers to migrate to cities, where they found better opportunities in manufacturing. Decentralization encouraged private enterprises and individuals to pursue new opportunities outside the state sector. Additionally, exposure to competitive forces in the export sector and foreign investment introduced new technologies and management practices, significantly enhancing efficiency.
II. Modernization and Global Capitalism
Modernization, in recent history, often refers to the transformation of a society from an agrarian base to a technologically advanced, industrialized economy with high productivity. Under capitalism, this process began with Britain’s Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century, when capitalists hired wage labour to produce goods and services. Over time, these industries evolved into large-scale mechanized enterprises, producing goods for broader markets. Driven by the capitalist imperative to control resources and expand markets, improvements in transportation and communication helped broaden trade networks and stimulate global trade. However, the worldwide expansion of capitalism has not always yielded positive outcomes for all communities. (Siddiqui, 2020a)
Britain’s path to industrialization, for instance, relied heavily on exploiting its colonies, from which it accumulated “surplus” wealth to reinvest in its own industries. While capitalism has undeniably led to the development of modern infrastructure and expanded markets, it has also been linked to widespread poverty, crime, and even slavery. The bourgeoisie, or capitalist class, has historically exploited workers while amassing considerable profits. Beyond the core capitalist countries, the pursuit of raw materials and markets for surplus goods often turned many regions into colonies or semi-colonies, frequently through coercion, reducing these areas to targets of exploitation and control.
Historically, China, too, endured foreign military interventions that led to significant political and social upheaval during the late Qing dynasty. European powers, along with Russia and Japan, seized Chinese territories, subjecting the country to what is now known as the “Century of Humiliation” (1839–1949). This period began with Britain’s invasion of China in 1839 to open Chinese ports for the opium trade, marking the start of the First Opium War (1839–1842). This conflict stemmed from the illegal opium trade, which had escalated sharply since the 1820s. The Second Opium War (1856–1860) saw British and French forces invade China again, culminating in the plundering and burning of Beijing’s Summer Palace in 1860. Japan also attacked China in the 1910s and again in the 1930s, occupying large portions of Chinese territory. These interventions triggered widespread civil strife and suffering within China throughout the 19th century, resulting in the deaths of tens of millions of Chinese people. (Siddiqui, 2020b)
III. Opening of China’s Market to Foreign Investors
In the mid-1970s, Western economies faced stagflation, partly due to declining profit rates as former colonies gained independence, driving up raw material prices and reducing profit margins. The opening of China’s market offered Western economies an opportunity to export capital and technology to a low-wage economy, with hopes of restoring profitability. Additionally, during the 1980s, the United States grappled with a balance of payments crisis, exacerbated by Japan’s high productivity growth and export boom. In response, the U.S. pressured Japan to sign the Plaza Accord in 1985, which led to a significant appreciation of the yen. This shift incentivized Japanese companies to invest and produce overseas, particularly in China. (Siddiqui, 2009a)
When the Communist Party came to power in 1949, China was one of the world’s poorest nations, plagued by widespread illiteracy, poverty, and malnutrition. Soon after, the government enacted radical land reforms, dismantling land monopolies and fostering rural equality, which led to an increase in agricultural output. Compulsory primary education and rural healthcare initiatives were also introduced, laying the groundwork for China’s modernization. In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China began gradually opening its economy to foreign investment, marking the start of a new era of economic transformation. (He and Wang, 2024)
IV. Industrialization in China
In its early stages of industrialization, China imposed high tariffs on imports, recognizing this as a necessary step to foster its nascent industries. However, these high tariffs were kept in place only temporarily—not to protect weak or uncompetitive companies but to attract foreign industries and technology to China. The aim was to create favourable conditions for technology transfer and modernization. (He and Wang, 2024) This policy of encouraging domestic industries to modernize and become internationally competitive, even after tariffs were removed, has been one of China’s most effective industrial strategies in recent times. (Jian and Nie, 2024)
During the height of the Cold War, as the United States sought to counterbalance the Soviet Union, Henry Kissinger made a secret visit to Beijing in 1971, paving the way for President Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. These groundbreaking diplomatic efforts encouraged China to gradually open its markets to foreign capital and trade. In doing so, China negotiated favourable terms with foreign corporations, gaining access to advanced technology and business expertise. The United States further solidified this economic opening by granting China most-favoured-nation status in 1980, spurring a significant surge in capital inflows and exports (See Figures 1 and 2). (Siddiqui, 2019a)
The influx of foreign capital enabled China to rapidly accumulate capital, which allowed the country to establish a modern industrial base in a relatively short period. (UNCTAD, 2023) The Chinese government actively promoted foreign investment in manufacturing. As Yu (2024:42) notes, “The Chinese government has implemented policies to support domestic capital, welcome foreign investment, and commit to restoring intellectual property rights in international trade negotiations, despite their monopolistic nature. At the same time, the government has not reinstated private land ownership or permitted landlords to reclaim authority. Public ownership remains central to the economy, with the state-owned sector playing a leading role in policy implementation, thereby providing stability and regulatory oversight in domestic economic development.”
Figure 1: Foreign Capital Inflows into China between 1990 and 2022.
Source: World Bank, national accounts data, 2023; OECD, 2023.
Figure 2: China’s Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP), 1960-2023.
V. China’s Economic Resilience and High Savings Rate
When the 1997 financial crisis struck East Asian economies, China remained largely insulated, thanks to its relatively closed financial sector. This insulation helped China maintain economic stability, enabling both domestic and foreign businesses to expand their global market share, while other East Asian countries faced economic setbacks and scaled back from international markets. (Siddiqui, 2009b)
Historically, China has maintained a high savings rate. When economic reforms began in 1978, domestic savings represented 32% of GDP, much of which stemmed from the profits of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). These savings were directed by the central government into domestic investments. Subsequent reforms, including the decentralization of production, boosted household and corporate savings, sustaining China’s high domestic investment levels.
Between 1980 and 2010, China’s domestic savings rose steadily, supporting an exceptionally high savings rate (see Figure 3), which the government channelled into investments—particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis. As global demand declined and exports faltered, China pivoted inward, focusing on domestic investments to stimulate employment. (Siddiqui, 2009c) It is projected that China’s average investment growth will remain around 10%, with private consumption growth at 9%, government expenditure growth at 12%, and net exports growth at -1%. By 2023, following gradual structural changes, China’s GDP composition was expected to be approximately 40% investment, 42% private consumption, 15% government expenditure, and 3% net exports. (Wolf, 2023)
Figure 4: Gross Saving Rate of the World’s Major Economies as a % of GDP in 2023.
In 2023, China’s share stood at about 18.75%. China also maintains the world’s highest gross savings rate (see Figure 4), which peaked at 52% of GDP in 2008. Even in 2019, when COVID-19 struck, China’s gross savings rate remained robust at 44%, with nearly a fifth of these substantial savings contributing to the current account surplus.
VI. China’s Remarkable Economic Transformation and Future Challenges
According to World Bank data, the percentage of Chinese people living below the poverty line dropped from 80% in 1978 to just 9% by 2013. While China’s per capita GDP was comparable to India’s in 1978, it had risen to more than five times higher than India’s by 2022. Over the last 44 years, an unprecedented number of Chinese citizens have witnessed substantial improvements in living conditions. To eradicate poverty by 2021, the Chinese government launched targeted initiatives in 2014, identifying 100 million people below the poverty line and implementing programs to improve their incomes. (World Bank, 2024)
China’s average life expectancy in 1978 was 64 years—remarkable compared to India’s 51 years, although still lower than the U.S. at 73 years. By 2023, life expectancy had risen to 77 years in both China and the U.S. China’s infant mortality rate also dropped significantly, from 37 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1978 to just 5.4 per 1,000 in 2023, surpassing the U.S. rate of 5.7 per 1,000. China experienced an unprecedented period of steady growth over four decades, culminating in substantial gains in per capita income (See Figure 5). (Wolf, 2023)
However, sustaining rapid economic growth is becoming increasingly challenging. China currently accounts for 15% of global exports, and, as noted in a World Bank report, its dominance in various sectors may face resistance from trading partners. To mitigate a potential medium-term growth slowdown, China will need to focus on economic diversification and expanding its domestic market. (World Bank, 2024)
Figure 7. Comparison of Economic Aggregates of China and the United States in the 21st Century, 2000–2023.
Table 1: The GDP Growth of the Chinese and US (in trillions of US$) between 2014 and 2023.
China’s economic growth has been remarkable, reaching a peak of 14.2% in 2007. Although the global economy was later disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s growth rate remained consistently faster than that of the United States, as illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. Today, China plays a pivotal role in the global economy, contributing over 10% of international trade, approximately 18% of global GDP (at market exchange rates), around 16% of world oil demand, and more than a quarter of the world’s broad money supply.
Despite both the U.S. and China experiencing GDP growth, China’s rate has been significantly higher (see Table 1). The Figure 7 indicates China’s share in global GDP, adjusted for purchasing-power-parity, up to 2023, with projections through 2029. (World Bank, 2024) This rapid expansion has substantially increased China’s share of global output, propelling the country to middle-income status. Alongside economic growth, China has made significant strides in education, healthcare, social welfare, housing, and overall living standards.
VII. Conclusion
China’s economic transformation began in 1978 with reforms in the agricultural sector, incentivizing rural households to boost agricultural output. These reforms later expanded to the urban industrial sector, introducing policies like the dual-price system, which reduced supply shortages, and opening select sectors to private businesses in a competitive, market-led environment. The Communist Party initiated these pro-market reforms, gradually expanding foreign investment opportunities across sectors. By liberalizing trade in the 1980s and welcoming foreign capital, technology, and access to Western markets, China leveraged its vast labour resources for rapid economic growth. This shift to an open-door policy marked the beginning of China’s era of high growth.
A crucial aspect of China’s rise has been its impressive trade expansion. Since 1980, China’s exports and imports have grown at an annual rate of 15%, outpacing the global average of 7%. For instance, trade with the U.S. surged from $5 billion in 1980 to $670 billion in 2022, making China the U.S.’s largest merchandise trading partner and its largest source of imports. (World Bank, 2024) Many U.S. companies have operations in China, benefiting from its competitive labour costs and access to its booming market. China’s remarkable growth from 1978 to 2010, averaging around 10% annually, has indeed justified the “Chinese economic miracle.” As a key driver of global growth, China has contributed nearly a third of worldwide growth over the past four decades. Policies of “reform and opening up” have gradually integrated China into the global economy, with the country’s competitive wages, infrastructure, and government support policy playing a crucial role. Additionally, China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 facilitated global market access and accelerated technology transfer.
China’s rise from a developing nation to a global economic power in just four decades is remarkable. From 1980 to 2018, its GDP grew at an average annual rate of over 10%. The World Bank study (2024) highlights China’s “fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history,” which has lifted over 800 million people out of poverty. Today, China is the world’s top economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and leads in value-added manufacturing, merchandise trade, and foreign exchange reserves.
Since the 1990s, China’s growth, averaging over 9% annually, has garnered extensive interest from economists. By 2010, China became the world’s second-largest economy by nominal GDP, and by 2016, it surpassed the U.S. in GDP (PPP). Over this period, nearly 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty, with significant improvements in healthcare, education, and social services.
Yet, China’s rise has raised concerns in the U.S., with accusations of unfair trade practices, currency undervaluation, subsidies to Chinese producers, and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) that allegedly impact American jobs and competitiveness in IP-intensive industries. In response, the U.S. has recently implemented high-tech restrictions to curb China’s economic rise. (Siddiqui, 2018)
China has become a prominent global player, especially in infrastructure and economic policy. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious project financing infrastructure across Asia, Europe, Africa, and beyond. If successful, the BRI could significantly expand China’s influence, especially in the Global South, and create new markets for Chinese exports and investments. (Siddiqui, 2019b)
Looking forward, China faces several challenges that could hinder its future growth, including its heavy reliance on fixed investment and exports, a weak banking sector, widening income disparities, and significant environmental concerns. Expanding social safety nets, promoting cleaner industries, and curbing official corruption are critical reforms that could sustain China’s growth trajectory. The success of these reforms will likely determine whether China can maintain its rapid growth or face a gradual slowdown.
Dr Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK.
References
He, Z. and Wang, C. (2024) “Understanding the Unique Characteristics and Essential Requirements of Chinese Modernization” International Critical Thought, 14(1):1-17.
Jian, X. and Nie, C. (2024) “Clarifying Several Misjudgements regarding China’s Economic Trends” World Review of Political Economy, 15(2):166-184.
Siddiqui, K. (2024) “China’s Trade and Growing Economic Influence with East Asia” World Financial Review, April-May, pp.2-14.
Siddiqui, K. (2020a). “A Comparative Political Economy of China and India: A Critical Review” (edi.) Young-Chan Kim. China-India Relations: Geo-Political Competition, and Economic Cooperation, pp.31-58, Switzerland: Springer.
Siddiqui, K. (2020b) “Britain’s Trade with China in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century: A Review of the Opium Wars” Asian Profile, 48(3):206-221, September.
Siddiqui, K. (2019a). “The US Economy, Global Imbalances under Capitalism: A Critical Review” Istanbul Journal of Economics 69(2): 175 – 205, December.
Siddiqui, K. (2019b) “One Belt and One Road, China’s Massive Infrastructure Project to Boost Trade and Economy: An Overview” International Critical Thought. 9(2):214 – 235.
Siddiqui, K. (2018) “U.S. – China Trade War: The Reasons Behind and its Impact on the Global Economy” World Financial Review, November-December, p.62 – 68.
Siddiqui, K. (2015). “Perils and Challenges of Chinese Economic Development” International Journal of Social and Economic Research, 5 (1):1-56.
Siddiqui, K. (2009a). “Japan’s Economic Crisis” Research in Applied Economics, 1(1):1-25.
Siddiqui, K. (2009b) “The Current Financial Crisis and its Impact on the Emerging Economies: China and India” Research in Applied Economics, 1(2):1-28.
Siddiqui, K. (2009c) “The Political Economy of Growth in China and India” Journal of Asian Public Policy 1(2):17-35.
President-elect Donald Trump on Sunday named Lebanese American businessman Massad Boulos as his senior adviser on Arab and Middle Eastern affairs. Boulos, father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, played a key role in securing Arab and Muslim American support during the campaign, particularly in Michigan, where Trump won a narrow victory.
Boulos’ deep ties to Lebanon’s political factions, including Hezbollah allies and opponents, as well as his outreach to Arab American leaders, position him to influence Trump’s Middle East policies. Analysts note his ability to navigate Lebanon’s political complexities, but his connections could spark controversy.
The announcement follows Trump’s decision to appoint Charles Kushner, father of his son-in-law Jared, as U.S. ambassador to France.
Lebanese observers expressed cautious optimism, hoping Boulos might advocate for policies benefiting Lebanon’s fragile economy and politics. “We’re optimistic,” said Hamdi Hawallah, a retiree. “It’s a rare opportunity.”
Once a haven for oil and defense investing, Dubai has since shaken off the shackles of its old reputation and emerged as a leading location for green investment opportunities.
In the US and throughout Europe, green investors are walking on shaky ground. The future of ESG in the US is more uncertain than ever, with Donald Trump set to return to the White House. In Europe, aspirations seem to outweigh capability, with EU Member States lagging behind international competitors when it comes to sustainable innovation and green technologies (European Commission).
It’s a different story in Dubai. From sustainable construction practices to the development of green technology, responsible and sustainable opportunities are thriving.
But too many European investors are stuck on the idea that Dubai has nothing to offer the eco-driven investor. And in the fast-paced, competitive world of private investment, their continued hesitancy is putting them at risk of missing out on key responsible investment opportunities in the Emirati city.
It’s time European investors set aside their outdated conceptions about Dubai, and double their investments in the city’s exciting sustainable opportunities.
It’s no secret that Dubai is a haven for international investors. With an economy that’s going from strength to strength, Dubai has earned itself a reputation as a hotbed for innovative, future-proof investment opportunities – many promising strong prospective returns. The real estate industry in particular is white hot, with a frenzy of international investors all clamoring to cash in.
Dubai’s investor-friendly atmosphere makes the prospects of investing in the city that bit sweeter. From zero taxes on capital gains and rental income, to the investor-friendly FDI regulations, Dubai is committed to adapting and evolving into an international hub for foreign investment. It’s a stark contrast to the high tax rates and sense of stifled innovation that courses through Europe (Sifted).
With Dubai’s ongoing property boom (Economy Middle East), and government-led initiatives designed to stimulate and encourage growth, the UAE economy is forecasted to grow by 4.8% in 2025 (ZAWYA). It’s time European investors double their current investments in Dubai and cash in on its glimmering future – or risk being beaten to the chase by competitive, opportunity-hungry investors from around the globe.
Investment opportunities in Dubai’s leading industries aren’t merely profitable – they’re governed by sustainability targets and environmentally responsible regulations.
One of Dubai’s most promising, future-focused sectors is its green tech industry. As the United Arab Emirates has made the transition away from oil dependence, Dubai has chiseled itself out a nice spot in the global renewable energy sector.
Its status has been boosted in part by the city’s clean energy strategy, which aims to convert Dubai into a global clean energy hub by 2050. In the process, Dubai has visions to construct a state-of-the-art innovation center, where all clean energy R&D efforts will be housed (Invest in Dubai). With over $12 billion already invested in renewable energy nationwide (Fast Company), the UAE’s market is expected to register a compound annual growth of around 8% between 2024 and 2029 (Mordor Intelligence).
Dubai’s mission to find viable alternatives to oil and fossil fuels has seen the city transform into a hotbed for exciting ‘cleantech’ startups, opening up a realm of opportunities for foreign investors.
It’s a striking contrast to the current climate in Europe, where aspirations for a world-leading green tech sector are being put to rest by an ongoing decline in manufacturing capacity. With high production costs driving out firms, cleantech companies are relocating elsewhere (European Commission), and for many of these firms, Dubai has proven an especially inviting location (Sifted). And that’s without mentioning president-elect Donald Trump’s proposed tariffs for European imports (LSE), which is adding fuel to the fire of corporate Europe’s fears.
Alongside the pivot to clean energy and its work on tech-driven climate solutions, the city has begun to place an emphasis on sustainable infrastructure. Through the Dubai 2040 Urban Master Plan, responsible investment opportunities have opened up throughout Dubai’s construction and real estate sectors.
Foreign investment opportunities in Dubai meld responsible principles with real, tangential benefits. Dubai has a lot to offer investors. It promises profitable and future-focused investment opportunities, governed by sustainable practices; but it equally promises an investor-friendly environment, with regulations that both enable and encourage investment and entrepreneurship.
With a promising future of growth and innovation as wind in their sails, it’s time European investors move on from the beaten ground of Europe and the US and look towards the promising shores of Dubai. With its economy-defining industries and innovative, sustainability-driven sectors, the city packed full of opportunities that are waiting to be explored by European investors.
Dr. David von Rosenis an international investor and entrepreneur. Through the VONROSEN family office, he invests in businesses across the world with a particular focus on renewable energy, gaming, nutrition and technology. He has also founded and scaled several businesses, including lottery platform Lottoland, super-prime property developer 25 Degrees and fashion label VONROSEN.
He was born and raised in Germany and currently splits his time between Dubai and Switzerland. He studied economics and business at the European Business School and later gained a PhD in Economics from the University of Economics in Prague in 2007.
In today’s fast-paced digital workplace, the success of any organization hinges on more than just advanced technology and streamlined operations. As Bob Grazioli, CIO of Ivanti, reveals in an interview with me, the concept of Digital Employee Experience (DEX) is reshaping the role of CIOs and influencing productivity, cybersecurity, retention, and organizational culture. DEX is how employees interact with their organization’s digital environment. This encompasses the hardware and software they use to perform their daily tasks, as well as the level of access and support they receive. From understanding employee frustrations with tech tools to using AI to elevate digital experiences, Grazioli shares insights from Ivanti’s latest research on DEX, highlighting the imperative for CIOs to manage DEX effectively and strategically.
The Challenges and Importance of Managing DEX
For CIOs, managing DEX is both a necessity and a formidable challenge. DEX isn’t simply about having functioning technology; it’s about creating a seamless, frustration-free digital environment that supports productivity and satisfaction. Grazioli notes that the stakes are high: “Our research shows that 55% of office workers report that poor digital experiences impact their overall mood and morale,” he says. This correlation between overall employee experience and DEX means that poor technology experiences can erode not only productivity but also retention and overall job satisfaction.
By establishing a clear, data-backed connection between DEX improvements and business outcomes, CIOs can demonstrate that DEX is not just an operational concern but a driver of business performance.
However, creating a cohesive understanding of DEX data is difficult. Organizations frequently lack the metrics to quantify and improve DEX, which hinders CIOs from advocating for necessary investments. “CIOs need to track DEX metrics effectively to prove the value of investments in this area,” Grazioli explains. By establishing a clear, data-backed connection between DEX improvements and business outcomes, CIOs can demonstrate that DEX is not just an operational concern but a driver of business performance.
DEX and Cybersecurity: A Strategic Connection
One of the lesser-discussed benefits of improving DEX lies in its ability to strengthen cybersecurity. Frustrated employees often resort to risky workarounds to bypass cumbersome security practices or inefficient tools. According to Ivanti’s research, 61% of employees have used unsafe shortcuts at work due to dissatisfaction with their tech tools. Grazioli notes that this behavior introduces critical security risks, as employees bypass secure protocols in favor of ease of access.
To combat this, 93% of security professionals surveyed by Ivanti agree that prioritizing DEX positively impacts an organization’s cybersecurity posture. By addressing the underlying causes of frustration, CIOs can help reduce risky behavior, thereby fortifying cybersecurity defenses. “DEX isn’t just a productivity tool; it’s a security measure,” Grazioli emphasizes, pointing out that by providing tools that are user-friendly and efficient, CIOs can help mitigate these risks and protect sensitive data.
Overcoming Skepticism Within IT Teams
While leadership may recognize the importance of DEX, Grazioli points out that IT teams are often skeptical of its benefits. “Our research shows that 60% of IT workers view DEX as just a buzzword,” he explains. This skepticism stems from a combination of high workloads, the demands of hybrid work, and a perception that DEX doesn’t translate into practical improvements for the IT department itself.
To counter this, CIOs can take concrete steps to ensure IT workers have the tools they need to succeed, especially in remote settings. Currently, 23% of remote IT workers report that their tools are less effective when working outside the office. By improving DEX for IT professionals, CIOs can create a more supportive environment, reducing burnout and helping IT staff see the practical benefits of DEX. Grazioli highlights the potential of AI to support this shift, explaining, “Integrating DEX with AI allows employees to proactively address minor tech issues on their own, freeing up IT’s time for high-value work.”
Elevating the Role of CIOs Through DEX
For CIOs, managing DEX can be a career-defining responsibility that positions them as strategic leaders within their organizations. Ivanti’s research reveals that 75% of executives believe that strong DEX management can elevate the CIO role, as DEX impacts key performance indicators such as retention, productivity, and employee satisfaction. Grazioli explains that by automating processes, anticipating potential issues, and proactively resolving tech obstacles, CIOs can play a visible role in enhancing the employee experience and driving productivity.
High-quality DEX isn’t just an operational efficiency; it’s a contributor to talent retention and job satisfaction. Ivanti’s data shows that 90% of leadership-level executives recognize the role of DEX in improving employee retention, while 97% see its positive impact on productivity. For CIOs, this means that effectively managing DEX can help secure their position as a central figure in strategic business discussions, demonstrating how technology investments directly impact organizational goals.
Addressing Budget and Resource Barriers to DEX
Although DEX is highly valued, Ivanti’s report identifies cost and budget as major barriers. Despite 65% of executives indicating that DEX budgets are increasing, only 49% of IT teams currently use DEX management tools. Grazioli explains that many organizations struggle with aligning their budget priorities to include comprehensive DEX solutions. Without the right tools in place to measure and track DEX performance, CIOs face significant challenges in justifying these investments to other organizational leaders. “The lack of access to key metrics, such as DEX scores and device analytics, makes it difficult for CIOs to demonstrate the value of DEX and secure the necessary resources,” Grazioli notes. He suggests that organizations can overcome these challenges by investing in DEX management tools that provide actionable insights into employee technology experiences. By tracking the right metrics and understanding the data, CIOs can make a stronger case for continued investment in DEX and its impact on business outcomes.
How DEX Drives Productivity, Security, and Retention
The connection between DEX and productivity is undeniable. Grazioli highlights the fact that 60% of office workers report frustration with their tech tools, which can significantly impact their work efficiency. Slowdowns, technical glitches, and inefficient tools not only reduce productivity but also decrease morale. Ivanti’s research shows that nearly 100% of leadership executives agree that improving DEX enhances productivity and job satisfaction. By providing employees with the right tools and ensuring that their technology is functioning optimally, CIOs can help mitigate these frustrations and increase overall workplace efficiency.
DEX also plays a key role in reducing security risks. When employees are dissatisfied with their tech tools, they may bypass security protocols in favor of quicker, more convenient solutions. Ivanti’s research reveals that 61% of employees admit to using unsafe shortcuts in their workflows. By improving DEX, organizations can reduce these security risks by ensuring that employees have tools that work well and meet security standards. A seamless digital experience can help minimize the temptation to take shortcuts, ultimately improving cybersecurity posture across the organization.
In addition to enhancing productivity and reducing security risks, DEX is also critical for attracting and retaining top talent. Grazioli emphasizes the importance of addressing the technology needs of IT teams, as they are responsible for implementing and managing DEX initiatives across the organization. IT workers are often overwhelmed with the demands of hybrid work and may experience burnout due to inefficient tools. By prioritizing DEX for IT teams, CIOs can help improve employee satisfaction and reduce turnover, ultimately supporting the organization’s long-term success.
The Future of DEX: AI and Consolidation
Looking ahead, Grazioli envisions a future where DEX and AI converge to revolutionize IT workflows and reduce burnout. “AI-powered DEX solutions will transform how organizations manage employee experiences,” he predicts. By leveraging AI, organizations can proactively address tech issues before they affect employees, freeing up IT teams to focus on more strategic tasks. Additionally, AI can provide valuable insights into employee technology experiences, helping organizations make data-driven decisions to improve digital workflows.
As organizations continue to implement DEX strategies, Grazioli also sees a growing need for consolidating fragmented IT tech stacks. Without a streamlined, unified tech environment, organizations will struggle to gain meaningful insights into how employees interact with their digital tools. By consolidating their tech stacks and ensuring that DEX tools work seamlessly together, organizations can gain a clearer view of employee experiences and make more informed decisions.
Furthermore, Grazioli suggests that Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) will play an increasingly important role in DEX strategy moving forward. “CISOs will need to be closely involved in DEX initiatives, ensuring that security considerations are embedded within digital experiences,” he explains. By working together, CIOs and CISOs can create a more secure and efficient digital workplace, where technology works for employees rather than against them.
The Impact of Cognitive Biases on DEX Strategy
In developing and implementing a Digital Employee Experience (DEX) strategy, CIOs must navigate several cognitive biases that can cloud judgment and lead to ineffective decision-making. Two cognitive biases particularly relevant in this context are status quo bias and optimism bias, each of which can subtly undermine DEX initiatives and impede meaningful change.
Status Quo Bias—the tendency to prefer current states and resist change—can significantly hinder the adoption of new DEX solutions. This bias is often seen within IT teams and among leadership, who may prefer existing systems and processes, even if these are not optimal for the organization. Given the already high demands of hybrid work, many IT professionals may feel hesitant to embrace new DEX tools, viewing them as yet another addition to an already complex tech landscape. Status quo bias can lead to a reluctance to invest in new DEX technologies that could ultimately reduce employee frustrations, boost productivity, and ease IT workloads. To counteract this bias, CIOs should present compelling, data-backed evidence that illustrates how specific DEX improvements address current pain points, making it clear that the potential benefits outweigh the comfort of the familiar.
Optimism Bias—the tendency to overestimate positive outcomes and overlook potential risks—can also play a role in shaping DEX strategies, especially in terms of cybersecurity. Leaders with optimism bias might underestimate the consequences of employee frustration with technology or believe that employees will naturally adhere to security protocols. However, research shows that 61% of employees have taken unsafe shortcuts to circumvent inefficient tools, which poses a significant security risk. Optimism bias may also lead leaders to assume that employees are generally content with existing technology, missing early signs of dissatisfaction or disengagement that could impact retention. CIOs who are aware of this bias can adopt a more realistic, data-driven approach to DEX, using employee feedback and technology usage data to gauge true satisfaction and identify areas for improvement.
Managing Digital Employee Experience is no longer a luxury or a “nice-to-have” for CIOs—it is a mission-critical component of business success.
By acknowledging these cognitive biases, CIOs can foster a more objective, flexible approach to DEX. Addressing status quo and optimism biases not only paves the way for better technology adoption and security practices but also enables CIOs to implement DEX strategies that more accurately reflect the needs of their employees, boosting both satisfaction and productivity.
Conclusion: DEX as a Strategic Imperative for CIOs
Managing Digital Employee Experience is no longer a luxury or a “nice-to-have” for CIOs—it is a mission-critical component of business success.
As Bob Grazioli highlights, a seamless and effective DEX strategy can have far-reaching implications for productivity, employee satisfaction, cybersecurity, and retention. CIOs who prioritize DEX not only enhance the work experience for their employees but also elevate their role within the organization as strategic leaders.
However, the journey to successful DEX management is not without its challenges. Overcoming skepticism from IT teams, navigating budgetary constraints, and addressing the complexities of managing multiple tech tools require a thoughtful and proactive approach. As AI and other innovative technologies continue to shape the future of work, CIOs must remain agile and committed to enhancing the employee experience through the right combination of technology, data, and strategic leadership.
In the years to come, the organizations that effectively manage DEX will not only improve their internal operations but will also set themselves apart in a competitive talent market. By focusing on the digital experiences that shape employees’ day-to-day work lives, CIOs can drive long-term success and position their organizations for continued growth and innovation.
As cloud adoption accelerates, it is reshaping how businesses operate, innovate, and compete. The potential value unlocked by cloud technologies is immense, with McKinsey estimating it could drive $3 trillion in business impact by 2030. However, achieving these benefits is often hindered by cost inefficiencies.
Despite widespread adoption of cloud services like AWS and Google Cloud Platform (GCP), businesses face mounting challenges in controlling expenses. Many organizations report cloud costs as a top concern, driven by a lack of visibility and control over sprawling cloud environments. Traditional cost management strategies, often spearheaded by FinOps teams, focus on budget control rather than the underlying causes of inefficiency. As a result, engineers are left to manually address complex infrastructure issues without the necessary tools or insights.
This fragmented approach leads to wasted resources, missed opportunities for optimization, and frustration for technical teams. Businesses are left seeking a solution that not only manages costs but also enhances the performance and efficiency of their cloud infrastructure.
PointFive’s Engineer-First Approach
PointFive offers a transformative solution by reframing cloud cost management as an engineering challenge rather than a financial problem. At the heart of its strategy is the DeepWaste™ Detection Engine, a powerful tool that identifies inefficiencies embedded in cloud architecture.
Unlike traditional FinOps platforms that focus on financial reporting and anomaly detection, PointFive empowers engineers to address waste at its root. The platform provides actionable insights, tailored remediation scripts, and seamless integrations with popular tools like Jira and Slack, enabling teams to resolve issues within their existing workflows.
PointFive’s focus on actionable analytics gives engineers a clear understanding of their cloud environment, pinpointing over-provisioned resources, unused assets, and other inefficiencies. The remediation orchestration feature guides teams through the resolution process, ensuring sustainable improvements rather than short-term fixes.
The platform’s engineering-first approach resonates deeply with technical teams, allowing them to optimize cloud performance while driving cost savings. Backed by Index Ventures and Salesforce Ventures, PointFive is rapidly gaining traction as a leader in cloud cost efficiency, setting new standards for how businesses approach cloud economics.
A Vision for Smarter Cloud Management
PointFive’s innovation reflects a broader shift in the cloud industry. As businesses increasingly adopt multi-cloud strategies, the need for intelligent, proactive tools will only grow. The future of cloud management lies in empowering engineers with the resources and insights they need to build efficient, scalable, and resilient architectures.
PointFive envisions a world where cloud cost management is no longer a burden but a strategic advantage. The platform is empowering businesses to realize the full potential of their cloud investments by eliminating guesswork and offering actionable solutions. The result is a smarter, leaner cloud ecosystem—one where efficiency and innovation thrive together.
For companies looking to control their cloud expenses, PointFive offers more than just a tool. It provides a comprehensive roadmap to success, bridging the gap between engineering excellence and financial accountability. In doing so, PointFive is not only redefining cloud cost management but also shaping the future of cloud computing.
The plight of global biodiversity and the climate system has received increased attention in the past two months, courtesy of two international summits. Bruce Howard, Director of the UK’s Ecosystems Knowledge Network, argues that while governments are behind the curve in addressing the systemic risks posed by nature and climate, this opens the way for substantial opportunities for the investment sector.
At the COP16 biodiversity summit in Colombia last month, investors and corporates made some of the biggest noises in favour of action on nature. From food to fashion, businesses are working hard to manage supply chains and infrastructure with specific dependencies on healthy habitat. Government signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity, meanwhile, were not on the front foot in Colombia. Only a minority have fulfilled a straightforward commitment to publish National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans.
Nearly 13,000 km away in Azerbaijan, the COP29 climate gathering closed. Over 60,000 delegates were part of it. Some progress has been made, including early agreement over standards for a global voluntary carbon market. The UK delegation presented a UK Government set of principles for voluntary carbon and nature markets. Negotiations on money to aid developing countries in their climate transition have, however, been sluggish. Much of this rests on the blending of public and private finance. The multilateral development banks have stepped up their contribution on climate finance to US$120 billion for developing countries by 2030, with one third going to adaptation.
As the recent nature and climate COPs now find their place in the chequered history of global environmental summits, investors and insurers are left with a bitter-sweet mix of challenge and opportunity relating to nature and climate.
Thanks to the recent COPs, it is clearer than ever that governments cannot be relied upon to work together to manage the state of the natural environment on behalf of business, investors and society. They find it particularly hard to pool the financial resources to support those nations and people groups that are disproportionately disadvantaged by environmental limits being crossed. This should be no surprise. Environment-related targets set by global government consensus are usually too little, too late. And they are rarely fulfilled.
This is a bleak situation. But it is one in which responsible investors can find opportunity. In particular, land, water and nature can be managed in ways that deliver greater climate resilience (or at least reduce the impact of extreme weather). In June this year, the Green Finance Institute, working with leading research establishments, identified a potential 12% hit on UK GDP in the coming few decades due to the combined effect of climate change and nature degradation.1 In response, investors, including those managing assets owned by the insurance industry, now have a clearer line of sight into the ‘natural capital’ investment arena. Natural capital is essentially the ‘machine’ – made of components like groundwater, soils, water courses and vegetation – that delivers value for businesses and the economy. Climate resilience is a major part of that value.
Natural capital for climate resilience is now being eyed at the regional level. Look for example at the investable proposition that Rebalance Earth – boutique asset manager – is forming around Plymouth City Region in the UK, with support from the pensions industry.2 The Nature Finance UK Conference in London earlier this month gathered over 400 professionals to explore investment opportunities of this type, including the nature markets that underpin them.
The role of natural capital investment for climate and biodiversity outcomes is particularly heightened for asset management in the insurance industry. After all, insurance plays a pivotal role in enabling investment in land, water and nature. Howden’s latest ‘Great Enabler’ White Paper – published at COP29 – sets out the vision for this.3 Insurers need to work with investors to ensure that private capital can be deployed expediently to address the inter-woven nature and climate vulnerabilities of so many businesses, financial institutions and economies.
All investments carry risks, and this is no different for nature-based projects such as the restoration of degraded natural habitat on the basis of its contribution towards net zero and flood risk reduction. The expertise available among insurance investment is so key to this.
The convening of separate climate and nature COPs is now out of step with the realisation that these aspects of the natural world are intrinsically connected. The insurance investment sector does not need to wait for governments and inter-governmental bodies to see this. Insurers – and those that manage their assets – can find commercial advantage in delivering the urgent collective action of governments is unable to do achieve.
Nature and climate are intrinsically linked. The same can now apply to insurance and responsible investment.
Bruce Howard directs the annual Nature Finance UK Conference in London, as well as the Ecosystems Knowledge Network; a UK wide non-profit harnessing the expertise of 4,000 professionals in the environment, planning, health, corporate and finance sectors.
Inge Wetzer, Social Psychologist in Cybersecurity & Compliance at Secura, and Nadine Hoogerwerf, Chief Information Security Officer at Zivver recently discussed the impact of compliance fatigue and shared actionable strategies for fostering a positive, security-conscious culture
Security Overload. That is what many employees (and some employers) are feeling as organisational data becomes more nuanced and complex in an increasingly data-driven workplace. According to Zivver’s Freedom to Focus report, 41% of employees identified excessive bureaucracy and process overload as major barriers to concentrating on their core responsibilities, with an additional 27% citing time-consuming security processes as a key hindrance. This information overload not only affects productivity but also undermines employees’ ability to effectively manage and respond to security threats, leaving organisations vulnerable in a fast-paced digital environment.
It’s understandable. Compliance obligations and security responsibilities have grown dramatically in recent years, but in many cases, the tools and technologies designed to help employees cope with the information tsunami has failed to keep up. Today, even the most diligent workforce can experience “security fatigue,” where the sheer volume of policies, rules, regulations and reminders becomes too much to bear. This isn’t just a policy problem, a technology problem, or a compliance problem – it’s also a cultural problem.
Understanding Security Fatigue
Security fatigue has become a pressing concern as organisations seek to maintain compliance while managing an increasingly complex array of cybersecurity threats. As Inge explains, security fatigue occurs when employees feel overwhelmed by the constant demand to follow numerous security protocols, especially when these demands feel disconnected from their core roles. This sense of fatigue often stems from well-meaning but excessive training and policy requirements, which can lead to disengagement or even non-compliance. Wetzer emphasised that many organisations unknowingly push employees toward fatigue by prioritising quantity over quality in security education.
Nadine added that, in some cases, security fatigue can create a false sense of complacency, where employees no longer view protocols as essential and may underestimate their importance. This disengagement makes organisations more vulnerable, as employees are less likely to fully engage with cybersecurity measures. Both speakers agreed that a more thoughtful, risk-based approach is needed—one that considers employees’ actual day-to-day responsibilities and avoids overwhelming them with non-essential compliance tasks. By focusing on clear, relevant guidance, organisations can help reduce fatigue and foster a more active commitment to secure practices.
Compliance Overload – A Precursor to Fatigue?
To combat security fatigue effectively, organisations must find a balance between essential security protocols and manageable compliance practices. Nadine noted that many organisations adopt a blanket approach, adding layers of rules and training to cover every potential threat. However, this can lead to an overload of requirements that employees struggle to follow, particularly when the rules feel unrelated to their specific roles. She suggested that a risk-based approach—prioritising measures based on relevance and impact—can make compliance efforts more effective and reduce unnecessary demands on employees.
Inge supported this perspective, pointing out that aligning security measures with real, identifiable risks helps employees see the value in following protocols. She explained that when organisations focus only on high-impact areas and eliminate redundant requirements, employees are more likely to feel that security practices genuinely support their work. This approach not only reduces compliance fatigue but also strengthens adherence, as employees understand that the measures are practical and purposeful.
Motivation Meets Practicality
Engaging employees in cybersecurity requires more than just instructing them to follow protocols; it requires a focus on motivation and relevance. Inge highlighted that people are more likely to adopt secure behaviours if they understand how these practices connect to their own roles and responsibilities. She pointed out that many organisations overlook this motivational element, defaulting to repetitive training that focuses on rules rather than purpose. Instead, Inge suggested using relatable scenarios and real-life examples to help employees see how cybersecurity affects their daily work and the organisation’s overall safety.
Nadine added that simplifying security measures is equally important. Overly complex policies can lead to confusion or unintentional non-compliance, as employees may struggle to understand what’s expected of them. She recommended making instructions as clear and direct as possible, ideally delivering guidance just-in-time, so that employees receive relevant training when they actually need it. This approach not only reduces the cognitive load on employees but also reinforces secure practices as a natural part of their work, rather than a disruptive add-on.
A Behavioural Psychology Perspective
From a psychological perspective, Inge explained that secure behaviour really relies on three key factors: knowledge, motivation, and opportunity. While training can address knowledge gaps, it doesn’t always translate into action if employees lack the motivation to apply what they’ve learned. Inge suggested that organisations should assess employees’ existing knowledge levels and, where appropriate, shift focus from mere instruction to motivational techniques that help individuals see the importance of security in their specific roles. Opportunity, the final point, means ensuring that employees have the resources and support to comply, from user-friendly tools to a supportive security culture. Without the right opportunities, even motivated employees may find secure practices hard to maintain. By addressing all three components, Inge argued, organisations can create a stronger foundation for lasting behaviour change and resilience against cyber threats.
Supporting Technologies
While behaviours around security are very much a human issue, technology can play a powerful role in helping to shape and nurture those behaviours. Nadine discussed how tools like phishing detectors, password managers, and automated encryption systems can help prevent human errors by adding a protective layer that doesn’t require constant vigilance from employees. She emphasised that while these tools are critical, they must be user-friendly. Complex or intrusive software can frustrate users and lead to workarounds, undermining security goals. Nadine advised that any security tool introduced to support compliance should integrate smoothly with employees’ regular workflows, ensuring that security is embedded seamlessly into daily tasks.
Inge added that when technology is designed with the user experience in mind, it not only improves compliance but can also foster a more positive attitude towards cybersecurity. She suggested that interactive demos and training sessions could be provided to boost employees’ confidence in using new security tools, especially for those who may feel intimidated by technology. By giving employees practical, hands-on experience, organisations can alleviate concerns, reinforce good habits, and make secure practices feel like an accessible, integral part of their work environment rather than an added burden.
Inge Wetzeris a social psychologist specialising in cybersecurity and compliance at Secura. With a PhD in social psychology, she focuses on human behaviour in cybersecurity, designing programmes to enhance security awareness and foster positive organisational change.
Nadine Hoogerwerfis the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at Zivver. With extensive experience in tech scale-ups and companies like Capgemini, she leads the company’s security and compliance efforts, ensuring the protection of sensitive information and regulatory adherence.
If one would take reading international affairs as a pleasurable endeavor, the emphasis would understandably be on the armed conflicts being “main headliners” such as the Russia-Ukraine War1 or the conflict occurring between Israel and the Iran’s proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.2 Observing keenly, the patterns of these armed conflicts are merely the manifestations of states pursuing their strategic interests but at the expense of other states and non-state actors, as well as individuals. They can be indirectly implicated, as these events have their geopolitical implications not only for the region in which they are occurring but also for other states involved and other actors connected through various multilateral relations and trade. More undesirable would be if their conditions lead to the suffering, horrible experiences, and lack of security for civilians caught up in the middle. Unfortunately, they are often considered as an afterthought to the high politics discussion of war. Furthermore, on the sidelines, media and think tanks would invite subject experts, analysts and political pundits to relay their various interpretations on the causes of such occurrences and what lies ahead. The discussions may turn toward policy making that represent biases for a certain cause or ideology. This would likely result in an optimistic and well-crafted framework only to be translated differently or distorted as facts on the ground. There would still be a struggle to be the dominant power amongst though who would aim to do so. Wars would continue as if we were all condemned to experience all of it.
Looking then at the big picture, there lies this pattern in international relations that is silently disturbing. It is quiet in a sense that no one would bat an eye for it: the act of neglect. How does this neglect manifest? Despite the opening of institutions and regimes that made way for other logics in explaining the contemporary world, it seems that there is a triumph of realism in the atmosphere. The material world it claims to render its presumptions for, seemingly proves it right as powerful states with all their military might can easily pursue their strategic interests compared to other states. Wars and conflicts of varying degrees persists, providing no significant room for human security and sustainable development to be the prevailing international norm and policy.
This is an anarchic system detrimental for the relevance of what I call “the others”. These “others” are the ones who are essentially neglected and must rely to the powerful states upon the rise of conflicts, or any action related to its preparations. Their circumstances would logically call for more fixation with their economy and development over their armed forces and defense. In the study and discussion of international events, they can unfortunately be casted as footnotes or sideshows away from the main event. It may be suggested that this is simply the nature of international relations. For now, this belief has a solid case to stand by. But given these circumstances, what’s in it, therefore, for “the others”? How can this reality affect and reflect the whole world in the long run? How will they achieve their strategic interests or even just a basic assurance of security? The answers for these questions are complicated but needs to be done.
One of the collectives that belong to “the others” are the small-island states in the Pacific. They fit in this category, as not all would have an idea who are the people in these countries let alone their history and cultural identity. Development issues are more pressing here compared to military matters. Media, particularly in the West that dominates the discussion on foreign affairs, do not prioritize them that much except probably in the context of them being involved with international organizations like the UN3 or being a part of treaties involving a great power.45 Their experiences exhibit how “the others” were before and are right now. They can also reflect how “the others” can render implications for the international system in the future. These island nations, taken for granted as undiscernible dots in maps across a vast ocean, can show us in its microcosmic means, what is in it for a world where they are neglected.
A Passing Fancy
History would suggest that the ancestors of the people from these small-island states are masters of explorations by way of the ocean.6 As the western empires and states later explored and extended their colonies and territories, the same ocean the Pacific islanders mastered became the open canvas in which they drew their preferred images of power and influence.7 Currently, the islanders have co-existed with the standing bastions of the foreign seen through their territories and military bases. Some of these are France’s New Caledonia8 and Guam in which the US houses a naval base.9 In terms of the economy on the other hand, these small-island states are also vulnerable to economic hardships due to being prone to natural disasters.10
Furthermore, certain specific events about these island nations exhibit their standing in international relations. One would be the case of Nauru with their sudden rise and fall involving guano.11 The country became one of the richest in the world at some point but was not able to sustain it due to a significant diminishing of supply of the said natural resource. Another would be Castle Bravo in which the US conducted nuclear testing in Bikini Atoll.12 This resulted in dire social and environmental consequences for the locals. Meanwhile just a few days ago, an election in Palau highlighted the presence of a US military base and its implications for the security of the former. As the US’s geopolitical rival, China is also involved in an allegation of undercutting Palau due to its diplomatic ties with Taiwan.13
These points at hand provide the grounds for a pessimistic inference. From here, it can be reasoned out from their history and contemporary examples of their global involvement that these small-island states in the Pacific are a passing fancy for the other powers and developed states dominating the international system. Having an insignificant human and natural resource to show or utilize, the root of its tangible value is ironically taken from this insignificance. Insignificance translates to open ventures for bigger powers to use them for geopolitical purposes. Consequently, insignificance can also mean an ease in neglecting these states if they have no longer utility. Worse, if these powers entered a conflict with one another catching these small-island states in the middle, the latter may have no choice but to commit to equibalancing approaches if not asking one of them to be a security ally. Their security, having no capability to pursue it unilaterally, hangs by the thread every time they rely for assistance. This is the fate of the small-island states in the Pacific being a part of “the others”. But this is not the only plight that these undergo. Unfortunately, their micro illustration of the others’ experiences presents a situation unique to them: they are sinking fast literally.
Crushing Under the Blue Elephant’s Steps
It turns out that these small-island states must deal with another big occurrence aside from their relations with powerful states and economically well-off ones. The environment, unlike states, knows no politics. It only becomes political upon its entry to policy discussions by various actors. Even so, its manifestations are felt on the planet as its whole domain is more than any political delineations we may construct within. Climate change affects every state especially those with coastal areas through rising water levels. But its devastation is more evident in these Pacific small-island states of the Pacific. They are sinking with no realistic optimism that their entire countries, their literal sands and soils, would still be above water and habitable in the future. The issue is so desperate that the rising waters became the background, literally and figuratively, for the speech of Tuvalu’s foreign minister during COP26.14
Pointing out the science behind, NASA’s Sea Level Change Science Team that the sea level rise will affect countries such as Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Fiji.15 Because of this, various international discussions and agreements facilitated by the likes of the UN16 and Australia do exist. One of these agreements was the Falepili Union Treaty between Australia and Tuvalu.17 Being the nearest developed country aside from New Zealand, the agreement essentially planned for Australia to accept relocated people from Tuvalu incase environmental existential threats continues to manifest for the latter. The effectivity of its enactment is still to be observed as it only came to force months ago.
One may then argue that these small island-states are receiving help through nearby developed states and are not in total shambles. However, the whole world does not only consist of all the states across the Pacific Ocean. This is an important fact to emphasize especially on environmental concerns like climate change. The international community should be involved even those that are far from these small-island states. Whether there would be an aggregate significant approach is questionable owing to the agenda we are focusing right now, especially the powerful ones.
The plight of these small-island nations, however small and one of a kind it may be, simply exhibits what lies ahead for the rest. The problem is we tend to ignore these Pacific nations as we disregard their environmental problems while being oblivious to the fact that the uniqueness of their situation is just a specific indicator of a larger problem that directly involves us. In a world that looks like a place where states only care for relative gains and all other approaches for cooperation remains only in black and white, the dots across the Pacific will depressingly be nothing but a stain in a broad canvass.
To some extent, this phenomenon raises questions about the future of these states. What would a state be without a physical existing territory? How about the people that have recognized these islands as home? What would happen to their culture, heritage, and ancestry? If they would seek refuge, how would they be treated in their host’s country? Like a true “other”, a historic shift for these people may not matter in the grand scheme of things. But if one would analyze, their worsening situation is also the reality for the rest of the world. Climate change that exacerbates forced migration continues to be observed in various continents and regions like in Africa.18 This may continue as there are no indicators that global warming is generally easing. Moreover, states like Bangladesh, having vulnerable coastal areas, may lose some of it due to rising sea levels.19 The people in these locations are at risk to be like the Pacific islanders one way or another by the need to move or the need of an aid.
But what exactly do these occurrences have to do with the powerful states and even the states considered as economic powerhouses? They are essentially those residences at the top of the hill in which “the others” would try to reach and ask for help. As of now in general, the doors are not fully open. The EU, with all the well-off Western European states it has, have fortified their borders as a response to irregular migration coming from places like Western Africa.20 In addition, the US have also a heavily secured border with Mexico to ward off undesirable migrants.21 In a sense, they have steered away from directly heeding the calls for help. Even as they may throw aid and ratify treaties here and there, climate change continues as there is no effective and long-term solution provided. Most, if not all powerful and developed states, are heavily focused on pursuing their own intentions in the international arena with no substantial regard for sustainability.
A Friendly Reminder: Deal Not with Magnitude
Probably by now, you may think that this article could have just focused on any of “the others”. You may be right by reasoning that another case could lead to almost the same inferences or conclusions. However, the case of the Pacific small-island states amongst “the others” perfectly captures the international community’s sick habit of focusing on numbers, wealth, and size as an indicator of magnitude or significance. If a state would at least have one of these, it is a significant part of international affairs and policy making for better or worse. Sadly, all of these are not present to the Pacific small-island states, especially the first one pertaining to their population. They are the most legitimate pawns in the political game of chess used as a sacrifice or a puppet, can easily be used and discarded, not that much significant value to be assisted upon, and no chance to reach the end of the board for a promotion. The world tends to react only if an issue becomes a large-scale crisis especially if it comes knocking on their borders. But even in these circumstances, a favorable response for “the others” is unsure as shown in the case of the EU and US. These small-island nations are far away from other countries, current events, and armed conflicts to be given significant attention. If these states hypothetically sink right now, I bet the international community would not even quickly notice it happened.
Yet, here the Pacific islanders remain illustrating what is happening, what is to come, and what is wrong with all of us. Only if a significant number of collectives, especially powerful actors, would bat an eye. If we are to consider the international system as a machinery, the small and insignificant gears are still part of its functioning. An abnormality in its rotation may show symptoms or signs that may spread and be seen inside the whole machine and destroy it. The case of the Pacific small-island states perfectly showcases this “small but terrible” metaphor. Indeed, a perfect ambassador representing “the others” and possibly a perfect hermit coming from an isolated place far away warning us of our follies and impending doom.
How do we deal then with “the others” that includes these Pacific small-island states, if not through magnitude? Such question, I believe, is something for the powerful states and developed countries to ponder on. The question is also a moral one, something that a realist would disregard for its intangibility and something that a pragmatist would not necessarily put in a pedestal. We must proceed to being inclusive for these “others”. We must ensure that all actors in all sectors, may it be economic, financial, socio-cultural, or political, are involved. A framework that not only focuses on climate relocations22 but on giving them a chance to thrive where they belong and where they want to be.
Actions can still be provided. I believe the next step no longer relies only on the theoretical but heavily on the practical as well. Political will amongst state actors, especially the powerful ones, is needed. A will that explicitly emphasize sustainable development as well as human security. If we are to dissect further the insignificance that ironically provides their value, it just focuses on their territory with its use for their strategic purposes and not on the people directly. But this goes with another pressing reality that most of the problems experienced by these small-island states are directly affecting their population. An emphasis towards sustainability and human security would call for the reversal of the effects of global warming and climate change. If it would come into fruition, it would alleviate the negative situation of the people living in those states, specifically the sinking of their land.
We should also be aware of current international trends that will be factors towards this endeavor. The return of Donald Trump as the leader of the most powerful country in the world,23 the continuous challenge to the hegemony of the US by other powerful states, the rise of right-wing politics and their social influence, as well as the conditions of international organizations as the standard bearer of liberalism are some of the things we need to ponder on in terms of their implications on dealing with “the others” appropriately. Furthermore, we should also be observant with the domestic and foreign affairs of powerful and developed states. Whatever occurs in their formulation and pursuit of foreign policy would have an effect for the small, developing, and least developed ones. Call me a daydreamer, but they hopefully disprove the logic of the realists about our world if we are to stand for “the others” and the Pacific small-island states.
This overall, is the explanation and lesson the small-island states in the Pacific provide to us. They exhibit a disaster that not only them and their fellow “others” are bound to suffer under but the whole world as well. At the same time, it also shows how the international community deals with the downtrodden and its habit of focusing on magnitudes. In the end, the small things are essentially the big things. And how we treat these far-flung neighbors of ours across the Pacific Ocean would spell our future together.
John Louis B. Benito, LPT, MA is a lecturer at the Department of International Studies of De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines. He earned his MA degree in International Studies, major in European Studies from the same university. His research interests and publications include International Migration, Critical Security, and Sustainable Development. He aims to contribute knowledge and directions in the academe and policy making circles about international relations and international affairs well into the future.
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By Terence Tse
CFOs are evolving into AI-driven transformation orchestrators, balancing finance, technology, and strategy while upskilling teams, managing risks, and driving measurable business value.
A key insight from this year’s AI for CFOs event, organized...
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Dr. Gleb Tsipursky was named “Office Whisperer” by The New York Times for helping leaders overcome frustrations with hybrid work and Generative AI. He serves as the CEO of the future-of-work consultancy Disaster Avoidance Experts. Dr. Gleb wrote seven best-selling books, and his two most recent ones are Returning to the Office and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams and ChatGPT for Thought Leaders and Content Creators: Unlocking the Potential of Generative AI for Innovative and Effective Content Creation. His cutting-edge thought leadership was featured in over 650 articles and 550 interviews in Harvard Business Review, Inc. Magazine, USA Today, CBS News, Fox News, Time, Business Insider, Fortune, The New York Times, and elsewhere. His writing was translated into Chinese, Spanish, Russian, P olish, Korean, French, Vietnamese, German, and other languages. His expertise comes from over 20 years of consulting, coaching, and speaking and training for Fortune 500 companies from Aflac to Xerox. It also comes from over 15 years in academia as a behavioral scientist, with 8 years as a lecturer at UNC-Chapel Hill and 7 years as a professor at Ohio State. A proud Ukrainian American, Dr. Gleb lives in Columbus, Ohio.
