By Dr Kalim Siddiqui

Introduction 

Globalisation today refers to the increasing economic integration beyond national borders, driven by the processes of trade liberalisation and financial deregulation. Large corporations have long sought to dominate global markets, viewing access to international markets as a means to exert control over resources and expand their influence. In theory, global governance aims to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of delivering public goods. Additionally, it calls for greater transparency, accountability, and representation to strengthen democratic processes (Siddiqui, 2020a). 

Globalisation entails a growing proportion of economic, social, and cultural transactions occurring across countries, which is often equated with ‘internationalisation.’ Hirst and Thompson (1996) define it as a shift away from self-sufficient national economies, which may lead to inefficiency and stifle competition, toward a single, integrated global economy. However, Wade (1996) contends that the extent of globalisation has been overstated. (Stiglitz, 2002) 

In the aftermath of the Second World War, international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were established as the United States emerged as the world’s dominant power. The GATT, which was later replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, was originally designed to facilitate trade agreements among sovereign nations. Initially focused on free trade in manufactured goods, the WTO now also prioritises trade liberalisation in services, agricultural commodities, and financial sectors. While the inclusion of these additional areas is strongly supported by the US, the European Union, and large corporations, it faces strong opposition from developing countries. Meanwhile, the IMF was created to provide short-term financial assistance to nations experiencing balance-of-payments crises (Siddiqui, 2020a). 

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the push for globalisation and market integration became a key policy goal for the US, sparking extensive debate among scholars. Proponents of globalisation argue that it fosters competition, efficiency, and trade, while critics contend that it represents a new guise for the historical Western policies of expansion and domination (Siddiqui, 2015). 

A new phase of internationalisation emerged in the aftermath of the crisis that struck the post-war order in the mid-1970s, contributing to the expansion of the global economy while gradually undermining US hegemony. The intensification of international production, particularly after the 1970s crisis under Pax Americana, was coupled with domestic inflationary pressures, trade union militancy, rising unemployment, and declining profits – factors that propelled the evolution of capitalism. 

The radical critique of capitalism has a long history, rooted in the works of Marx, Lenin, Luxemburg, and other early 20th-century theorists of imperialism. Marxist scholars have argued that capitalism, as it spreads, develops the forces of production globally. In contrast, other theorists emphasized that the underdevelopment of former colonies would persist, with global inequalities widening rather than narrowing. According to this view, capitalism has entrenched global inequalities, fostering the development of a select few countries while perpetuating the underdevelopment of others (Siddiqui, 2023). 

Capitalism, Accumulation Crisis, and Global Markets 

For capitalism to endure, there is a relentless pursuit of higher profits, greater market access, and rapid advancements in industrial and commercial production. These forces profoundly impact class relations, capital accumulation, and national economies. This fierce process of expansion and transformation is essential to capitalism’s survival. As Karl Marx (1974) observed, the “bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society.” This insight is crucial not only for understanding the dynamics of the 19th century but also for interpreting the developments of the 20th century and the ongoing transformations of the 21st century (Siddiqui, 2023). 

Globalisation also involves the deregulation of markets and the financial sector. Advances in financial technology, reductions in transaction costs, and the removal of restrictions on cross-border capital flows have led to significant capital movements between countries. Over recent decades, these large capital flows have often triggered currency crises and recessions in many nations. While currency crises are not new, the liberalisation of financial markets has made financial and banking crises more frequent. (Siddiqui, 2017) 

Globalisation encourages the free flow of goods and capital across borders. However, the unrestricted mobility of capital means that if a country’s macroeconomic policies are deemed unsuitable by global financial markets, foreign capital can rapidly leave the country. Such an exodus of capital can trigger financial crises, highlighting the critical importance of maintaining foreign investor confidence to implement policies acceptable to international finance. 

Democracy is founded on the principle that citizens have the freedom to elect a government that will pursue policies reflecting their preferences. However, in developing countries, if the policies of elected governments do not align with the expectations of global finance, this can lead to capital flight, with severe consequences such as reduced investments and slower economic growth. In such situations, the sovereignty of the people becomes secondary to the interests of foreign investors and financial markets. 

For example, a government may seek to improve the socio-economic conditions of its citizens by increasing spending on health and education, funded either by taxing the wealthy or through a larger fiscal deficit. However, both of these policies are typically opposed by global finance. This is why global financial markets and international institutions like the IMF generally discourage fiscal deficits that exceed 3% of a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Additionally, under financial liberalisation, raising taxes on the wealthy can prompt investors to relocate to low-tax jurisdictions. 

Historically, global empires extracted tributes (or surplus) from the territories they occupied. These empires fostered a world economy through a complex division of labour and extensive commercial exchange. Early modern empires, led by emerging merchants and traders from Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and Britain, expanded outward in search of new economic opportunities. This expansion was supported by the development of strong states in the ‘core’ of the burgeoning capitalist world economy. 

In the latter half of the 15th century, monarchies in Western Europe, benefiting from the decline of feudalism, identified trade and territorial conquest as new avenues for wealth. These states defended the interests of their merchants and traders with military force, playing a key role in building the structures of modern capitalism. Initially, they colonised the Americas, economically incorporated other European nations, and eventually extended their influence across the globe during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 

European control over foreign territories resulted in a global division of labour, with the ‘core’ representing economically and militarily dominant centres, and the ‘periphery’ comprising regions forcibly subordinated through colonisation and occupation, such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In this international division of labour, the core and periphery engaged in unequal exchanges—high-wage commodities like manufactured goods flowed from the core, while low-wage commodities, such as raw materials, were extracted from the periphery. 

Economic surpluses appropriated from colonies and semi-colonies were transferred from the periphery to core countries, enriching the latter while leaving the former underdeveloped. This accumulation resulted in wealth for the core and widespread poverty, famines, and mass starvation in the periphery (Siddiqui, 2020b). The international division of labour was designed to benefit the core, sharply increasing global inequalities. The expansion of capitalism has always been characterised by uneven accumulation. Through the processes of capitalist globalisation, accumulation has become increasingly transnational, as global circuits of finance and production extend across borders. Samir Amin (1997) criticised the rise of giant corporations, describing it as an alliance between corporations and the state, leading to greater control over resources in the Global South. 

Similarly, Britain unilaterally adopted ‘free trade’ by repealing the protectionist ‘Corn Laws’ in 1846 and later signing the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty with France in 1860. In contrast, the US never fully embraced the free trade system and instead increased protectionism from the 1870s onward. Adam Smith and David Ricardo argued that it was in a country’s best interest to adopt free trade, regardless of whether other nations followed suit (Siddiqui, 2018). 

Britain had adhered to the ‘Gold Standard’ since 1819, but other countries joined much later—Germany in 1871, France in 1875, and the US in 1879. However, the gold standard was not the result of any international negotiation or agreement, nor was it managed by any international organisation. 

At the end of the Second World War, the US emerged as the world’s most dominant economy, producing more than 50% of global output and 35% of global manufacturing. In contrast, European economies were devastated by the war and needed to import commodities, technology, and capital to rebuild their industries. However, over the past forty years, the global economy has shifted, with European, Japanese, and more recently Chinese economies experiencing significant growth, leading to dramatic changes in global trade patterns. For instance, ASEAN countries are now larger trading partners than the US, and China has surpassed the US as Africa’s largest trading partner. 

Since the 1950s, the US dollar has served as the backbone of US global power, functioning as the world’s reserve currency. Without a strong dollar, the US would struggle to maintain its global hegemony. “De-dollarisation” refers to the declining role of the US dollar in international financial transactions and its status as a reserve currency. This would involve a shift toward using multiple currencies in international trade. For example, US sanctions forced Russia to seek alternative currencies for its transactions. 

Exports and foreign capital have been central to the neoliberal globalisation model, with developing countries encouraged by institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and mainstream economists to focus on export promotion and attracting foreign investment as pathways to economic development (Siddiqui, 2019). This approach, known as “export-led growth,” is often exemplified by the successful transformation of East Asian economies over the last fifty years. Once impoverished, these economies are now seen as prosperous, a phenomenon frequently referred to as the East Asian “miracle.” In contrast, countries like India and Brazil, which, according to the World Bank, pursued an “inward-looking” development strategy and did not prioritise exports, have experienced slower growth, persistent unemployment, and widespread poverty (Siddiqui, 2016). 

Current globalisation is heavily reliant on neoliberal economic policies, which emphasize pro-market reforms (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008). These reforms focus on policies that increase reliance on private capital for resource mobilisation and involve major economic shifts such as privatisation, deregulation of trade and finance, financialisation, and globalisation. In the US and Britain, these changes began in the late 1970s and early 1980s under President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher. Privatisation involves selling off public assets, including essential utilities like water, gas, electricity, railways, and public housing, while outsourcing services within public sectors such as the NHS, education, and public administration. Deregulation meant removing legal restrictions on markets, particularly in areas such as finance, labour, and capital flows. Financialisation transferred power to private enterprises in sectors such as finance and insurance, with the rise of complex financial instruments like derivatives. Globalisation facilitated further economic integration through increased trade and the free flow of capital (Siddiqui, 2019). 

These changes represented a shift in power from the state to the private sector, particularly to large corporations. Historically, this trend can be traced back to attempts in the 1930s to revive liberal capitalism in Europe, the UK, and the US, which had come under pressure from increased state intervention. However, the crisis of the 1930s, followed by global conflict, resulted in a shift toward social democratic policies. These policies included expanding welfare and labour rights, implementing active fiscal and monetary measures, and constructing a global capitalist order under US hegemony. This system allowed individual nation-states to develop institutions and practices suited to their own economic and historical contexts. 

When examining countries that have pursued export-led growth strategies, there are two distinct cases. The first includes nations with large current account surpluses and substantial foreign exchange reserves, such as China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Germany. The second group consists of countries with significant trade deficits, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Mexico. These countries often rely on private financial inflows to reduce current account deficits and balance payments. Even when they accumulate foreign exchange reserves, these are typically financed through borrowing, a reality for many nations in the Global South. 

The idea of export-led growth was discredited by Western governments during the interwar period and the Great Depression. However, global capitalism, after a period of large-scale import substitution in much of the Global South following independence, has seen these policies reemerge through neoliberal globalisation. 

Capitalism first took shape during the Industrial Revolution, which began in Britain’s cotton textile industry. However, Britain did not produce raw cotton, necessitating access to primary commodities grown in tropical and semi-tropical regions. To sustain its industrial growth, Britain, along with other Western European nations, required a steady and affordable supply of raw materials. The success of these industries hinged on securing cheap access to these resources. Furthermore, to achieve economies of scale and expand production, new markets were needed to absorb the surplus of finished goods. Consequently, these challenges were addressed through the control of tropical and semi-tropical regions, which were essential for the expansion of European industries. 

Capitalism, at some stage, must address rising inequalities both within and between countries (Siddiqui, 2018). It also needs to strike a balance between production and consumption, particularly given the rapid automation of industries and the increasing use of new technologies, including artificial intelligence, which significantly reduces the need for human labour. Despite GDP growth, job creation and employment opportunities have lagged, a reality particularly unsustainable for developing countries with large unemployed populations. Therefore, state intervention may be required to redistribute surplus in the form of income protection, boosting domestic demand so consumers can afford domestically produced goods and services. Unlike in the 18th and 19th centuries when Britain exported a large portion of its population to colonies, there is no longer the possibility of large-scale migration to the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa. 

Recent advances in information technology have allowed companies to relocate production to areas where labour and raw materials are cheaper, generating greater profits. Additionally, the rise of broadband internet enables “trade in offices”-  if an employee can work from home, the same tasks can be outsourced to workers in developing countries at lower costs. Since 2008-2009, world trade in goods has stagnated and has yet to recover to its pre-global financial crisis peak in 2015, as seen in Figure 1 (Wolf, 2022). 

Figure 1: World Trade in Goods Relative to Output (trade in goods as a % of GDP).  

The economies of developed countries have not always been as open as proponents of globalisation and market integration often suggest (See Figure 2). Historically, these nations maintained protective measures before embracing the current era of free trade. The push for greater openness and market integration has primarily been driven by large corporations, which seek the benefits of expanded markets for the production and sale of their goods, as well as the opportunity to further monopolise global resources. 

Figure 2: Peak in Openness to Trade across the Big Economies. 

The trade ratio of China, the world’s second-largest trader of goods, peaked in 2006 (as shown in Figure 3). Similarly, the trade ratios for the third and fourth largest goods traders, the US and Japan, peaked in 2011 and 2014, respectively. While the European Union (EU) remains the largest trader, its trade ratio has stagnated rather than peaked. Notably, China has experienced the most significant decline in its trade ratio, which is not primarily attributed to increased protectionism but rather to a shift in its economic policy towards diversification. The primary factor behind the declining trade ratio has been the fall in commodity prices, rather than a decrease in trade volume. This price decline accounted for 5.7 percentage points of the 9.1 percentage points drop in the ratio of goods trade to world output between 2008 and 2020 (Wolf, 2022). 

Figure 3: Trade Openness in the World’s Largest Economies (exports and imports as a % of GDP). 

Foreign capital investments are often viewed as beneficial for enhancing production capacities, acquiring and assimilating new technologies, creating jobs, and most importantly, imparting skills and knowledge that collectively trigger a higher learning process. However, foreign investment may not always lead to the creation of new production capacities; instead, it can focus on acquiring existing capacities and exploiting the growing markets in developing countries. In cases of mergers and acquisitions, the production capacities may remain largely unchanged, while existing production organizations and labour relations often shift in favour of capital. Furthermore, many foreign direct investment (FDI) flows can be modes of round-tripping, designed to take advantage of tax havens. 

Recent trends in FDI flows, as highlighted in the World Investment Report 2024, indicate that larger amounts of foreign investment are directed towards the Global North, or developed countries. Additionally, total foreign investment flows have declined over the past two years since the end of the Covid-19 pandemic. India’s aspirations to become the second-largest destination for FDI have faced significant setbacks. China’s share of global FDI inflows has decreased from 15.2% in 2020 to 12.3% in 2023, while India’s share fell from 6.5% to 2.1% during the same period (World Investment Report 2024). 

In India, following the pro-market reforms of 1991, FDI inflows surged, averaging a growth rate of about 50.1% over the decade. However, this rate dropped to 30.7% in the 2000s and fell sharply in the 2010s, recording an average growth rate of only 4.6%. The IMF had previously stated that capital inflows would be directed towards capital-scarce economies, where returns would be relatively high, potentially increasing manufacturing in developing countries. Nevertheless, the automobile industry has shifted from the US and Canada to Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea, primarily driven by the pursuit of higher profits—either due to lower input costs or expanding markets. Despite expectations of rising FDI in India because of its growing middle-class market, workers’ wages have been kept low to make investments more attractive for FDI in the Global South (World Investment Report 2024). 

Conclusion 

While access to international markets can increase aggregate global wealth for developing countries, it often exacerbates inequality. This dynamic not only undermines the ability of international organizations to create institutions that could mitigate global inequality but also fuels resentment in the Global South. 

The study reveals that globalization has curtailed the freedom of developing nations to choose economic policies tailored to their local contexts. Previously, during dirigiste regimes, petty producers and farmers enjoyed such autonomy. The withdrawal of state support has disproportionately affected poor households, leading to sharp increases in inequalities within many developing countries. These challenges are largely attributed to the neoliberal policies that define contemporary globalization. As a result, the capacity of governments to enact political interventions and introduce necessary changes has been significantly diminished. 

Furthermore, institutions of international economic governance, such as the WTO, primarily reflect the interests of powerful, wealthy nations rather than those of poorer countries. Efforts to reform international trade, investment, labour, and environmental standards are still heavily influenced by the priorities of the Global North, perpetuating a system that disadvantages the Global South. 

About the Author

Dr Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK. 

References

1. Girdner, E. and Siddiqui. K. (2008). “Neoliberal Globalization, Poverty Creation and Environmental Degradation in Developing Countries”, International Journal of Environment and Development 5(1): 1 – 27.  
2. Marx, K. (1974) Manifesto of the Communist Party, The Revolutions of 1848: Political Writings, Vol. 1, p.70, London. 
3. Siddiqui, K. (2023) “Marxian Analysis of Capitalism and Crises”, International Critical Thought, 13(4): 525-545. 
4. Siddiqui, K. (2020) “Globalisation, International Trade and the Developing Countries” European Financial Review, August-Sept. p.60 – 71.  
5. Siddiqui, K. (2020) “The Political Economy of Famines under Colonial India: A Critical Analysis” World Financial Review, July-August, p.56 – 70.  
6. Siddiqui, K. (2019). “Agriculture, WTO, Trade Liberalisation, and Food Security Challenges in the Developing Countries” World Financial Review, March-April, pp.31 – 40.  
7. Siddiqui, K. (2018). “Capitalism, Globalisation and Inequality” World Financial Review, Nov-Dec. p.72 – 77. 
8. Siddiqui, K. (2018). “David Ricardo’s Comparative Advantage and Developing Countries: Myth and Reality” International Critical Thought, 8(3): 1-28, Sept.  
9. Siddiqui, K. (2017). “Financialization and Economic Policy: The Issues of Capital Control in the Developing Countries” World Review of Political Economy 8 (4): 564 – 589. 
10. Siddiqui, K. (2016). “International Trade, WTO and Economic Development” World Review of Political Economy, 7(4): 424 – 450. 
11. Siddiqui, K. (2015). “Trade Liberalisation and Economic Development: A Critical Review” International Journal of Political Economy 44(3): 228 – 247. 
12. Siddiqui, K. (2015). “Foreign Capital Investment into Developing Countries: Some Economic Policy Issues” Research in World Economy 6(2): 14 – 29.  
13. Stiglitz, J. (2002) Globalization and its Discontent, New York: WW Norton & Company. 
14. Wolf, M. (2022) “Globalisation is not Dying”, Financial Times, 14 September, London.  

By Dr Kalim Siddiqui

Introduction 

The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) government, formed in 2014 with the support of Hindutva forces, enjoys backing from significant sections of the big bourgeoisie and the blessings of international finance capital (Siddiqui, 2017).  As a result, the government aggressively pursues neo-liberal policies in line with the demands of global financial interests. The ruling elites have found religion to be a powerful tool for diverting attention from pressing socio-economic demands. In this context, fascist tendencies have emerged, aligning well with the objectives of international finance capital. “Semi-fascism,” as described by Yechury (2021), represents a modern political phenomenon rooted in irrational, medieval ideologies. 

The Hindu nationalist BJP government has been particularly oppressive, primarily targeting minority communities through mob lynchings, hate speech, and instilling fear in the public sphere. These attacks, especially against Muslims, take the form of mob violence, wrongful arrests, and the unjust imprisonment of Muslim youth on flimsy charges. 

Seven decades ago, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, leader of the Dalit community, highlighted the attitude of majoritarian groups towards minorities, particularly when these groups seek their rightful share of political power. He observed that when minorities make such demands, they are often viewed with suspicion. Conversely, when the majority monopolizes power, this is considered “nationalism” rather than communalism. As Ambedkar stated: “Any claim for sharing the power by the minority is called communalism while monopolizing the whole power by the majority is called nationalism. Guided by such a philosophy, the majority is not prepared to allow minorities to share political power” (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2018, p. 172). 

The root cause of communal violence in India stems from social polarization and religious chauvinism, exacerbated by political mobilization from groups like the RSS and BJP, as well as underlying poverty and inequality. Paul Brass (2003) argues that the construction and reinforcement of communal identities within India’s socio-cultural fabric have played a critical role in perpetuating inter-community hatred and violence. While identity politics can be beneficial when it empowers marginalized groups, it can also have adverse effects if it leads to divisiveness. When identity politics fosters competitive communalism, it disproportionately harms minority communities (Yechury, 2021). 

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is driven by the promotion of Hindu supremacy, rooted in the belief of Hindu nationalism. The BJP serves as the political front of the RSS, as the latter does not directly participate in elections, positioning itself as a cultural organization. Historically, the RSS has drawn inspiration from Nazi and Italian fascist ideologies and their emphasis on discipline (Noorani, 2019; Siddiqui, 2020). 

According to the RSS, Hindus are viewed as more loyal to the nation and, therefore, deserving of superior rights and privileges, while religious minorities should have inferior rights. The organization contends that granting equal rights to all citizens contradicts historical and religious truths and weakens national strength (Siddiqui, 2018a). Vinayak Savarkar (1883–1966), a key figure in Hindu nationalism, argued nearly a century ago about who could be considered truly loyal to India. According to Savarkar, loyal Indian citizens are those connected to the geography of India, born within its borders, and whose religion has indigenous roots. He defined these individuals as Hindus (Siddiqui, 2018b), thereby excluding Muslims from being considered faithful Indians. Today, Muslims make up around 200 million people, spread across various regions of India (Noorani, 2019). 

Amartya Sen, a renowned economist, argues that a democratic government should be based on scientific reasoning and logical explanations rather than faith. He emphasizes the importance of fostering discussions and debates to reach a consensus. In a true democracy, the government should act impartially, avoiding favouritism towards any particular community and allowing space for dissenting voices. Sen believes that a democratic regime must address issues like inequality and poverty without regard to caste, race, religion, or ethnicity. It should not promote the “tyranny of the majority” (Siddiqui, 2017). 

Incidence of Communal Violence in India 

Following India’s independence, the country saw a sharp rise in communal violence, largely due to the Partition. However, between 1950 and 2000, rural India—where the majority of the population resides—accounted for only 3.6% of deaths related to Hindu-Muslim violence (Siddiqui, 2016a). 

Hindu-Muslim riots in India are predominantly an urban phenomenon, with the violence concentrated in a few large cities. Notably, a small number of cities in northern and western Indian states account for a disproportionately high share of communal violence (Noorani, 2019). 

Since the BJP came to power at the centre, communal polarization has intensified, with its leaders frequently delivering hate speeches targeting Muslims (See Figure 1). These speeches often portray Muslims as anti-national, raising questions about their loyalty to the Indian state. According to official statistics, over 2,900 cases of communal or religious violence were reported between 2017 and 2021. However, yearly figures reveal significant variation. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau shows that 378 cases of communal or religious rioting were registered in 2021, 857 in 2020, 438 in 2019, 512 in 2018, and 723 in 2017. Figure 1 illustrates that since 2014, 190 people have been killed due to religious riots in India. The distribution of communal/religious violence across different states in 2023 is presented in Figure 2a. 

Figure 1: Number of People Killed in Communal Violence in Different States in India Since 2014.  

Figure 2a: Number of Communal Violence in India in 2023.   

Figure 2b: State Governments, Poltical Parties and Communal Riots in Inida, 2023.   

The communal riots of 2023 follow a pattern similar to that of the past decade. Unlike in previous years, when there was elaborate planning involving the identification of targets, organization of personnel, and coordination of materials to carry out deadly attacks and cause significant damage to the minority community’s property, recent communal violence has taken on a more institutionalized nature. 

Since the BJP came to power in 2014, communal violence has often been incited through religious processions and festivals, where Hindu extremists provoke unrest by chanting anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim slogans. This strategy frequently escalates into riots. The state apparatus, rather than acting impartially, has often targeted the minority community, subjecting them to disproportionate action, including the destruction of property and widespread arrests. This response, in many cases, fulfils the objectives of the rioters from the majority community, making the state appear complicit in the violence. Meanwhile, the Hindu nationalists who incite these riots largely enjoy impunity. 

In 2023, of the 32 communal riots that occurred, 22 took place in states governed by the BJP, either independently or as part of ruling coalitions. Three riots occurred in West Bengal, ruled by the Trinamool Congress, and another three in states governed by the Indian National Congress. (As shown in Figure 2b) The BJP-led state governments not only failed to prevent communal violence but have often been complicit in stoking tensions and supporting the violence. 

In 2002, under the leadership of then-Chief Minister Narendra Modi, Gujarat witnessed a horrific outbreak of communal violence in which over 2,000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed. This event is widely regarded as a pogrom, a form of communal violence where the state and government officials not only fail to prevent the violence but are actively complicit in the attacks against minority communities (Siddiqui, 2016b). 

Since the BJP, led by Modi, took power at the national level, a new form of violence has emerged that had little precedent in India’s history – mob lynchings. These incidents involve Hindu mobs attacking individuals, often from minority communities, typically under the pretext of protecting cows (See Figure 3). Unlike large-scale communal riots, lynchings target one or a few individuals at a time, making them distinct from broader mob violence. 

In BJP-ruled states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, Hindu mobs frequently assault Muslims while police stand by without intervening. In these same states, the police have also been involved in demolishing Muslim homes and businesses, often cheered on by mobs. These demolitions typically occur without any judicial rulings, as BJP-led state governments act on their own authority, bypassing court decisions. 

Figure 3: Number of Mob Lynchings in India in 2023.  

One of the major drivers of communal violence in India is political opportunism. Political parties, particularly Hindu extremist groups, frequently exploit religion and regional identity as tools to mobilize support and secure electoral victories. This approach exacerbates misunderstandings between communities and fosters hatred towards specific minority groups. Hindu nationalists believe that by delivering hate speeches, they can create a sense of insecurity among Hindus, who may then prioritize religious issues—such as the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya—over other concerns when casting their votes. In support of their agenda, they often distort historical facts to justify claims of so-called excesses committed during Muslim rule in India (see Figure 4). 

Figure 4: Number of Hate Speeches Delivered by Hindu Nationalists Across Indian States in 2023.  

Causes of Communal Riots 

Communal riots in India often stem from a complex mix of social, economic, and political tensions. Even a minor incident can escalate into large-scale violence, especially in societies marred by social discrimination and existing violent conflicts. India’s population is diverse, with Hindus constituting about 79.4%, Muslims 14.8%, Christians 2.3%, Sikhs 1.6%, and others making up 2%. While Hindu extremists have expressed some reservations about Christians, their animosity toward Muslims is far more pronounced and visible. 

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as the political arm of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), is a Hindu nationalist party whose ideology is especially hostile towards minorities, particularly Muslims, the largest minority group in India (Golwalkar, 1939). Since the 1970s, India has witnessed numerous outbreaks of Hindu-Muslim conflict, especially in northern states. One of the most horrific instances of such violence occurred in 2002, during the Gujarat riots, under the BJP government led by Narendra Modi. 

Hindu extremist organizations like the RSS were established nearly a century ago. Although their ideology has evolved, the core principles remain unchanged. The primary objective of Hindutva is to establish a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu Nation). V.D. Savarkar, a key figure in Hindu nationalism, wrote in 1925: “A Hindu means a person who regards this land… from the Indus to the seas as his fatherland (pitribhumi) as well as his holy land (punyabhumi).” He argued that Hindus have their holy land in India, whereas Muslims and Christians have their religious Holy sites outside of India. 

Later, in 1939, RSS leader M.S. Golwalkar asserted: “The foreign races in Hindustan [India] must… adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence the Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture… [and] may [only] stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing… Not even citizen’s rights.” 

The RSS has actively sought to reshape the interpretation of Indian history, aiming to glorify Hindu culture and diminish the contributions of Muslims to India’s development. They argue that Hindu society and culture declined following the arrival of Islam in India 1,200 years ago. However, historians have provided ample evidence of Muslim contributions to India’s socio-economic development. For instance, during the reign of Mughal ruler Aurangzeb in 1705, India accounted for 28% of the global GDP, produced 30% of the world’s manufactured goods, and was one of the most prosperous and largest trading nations globally. 

Muslim rulers in India integrated themselves with local culture by marrying locally, financing the construction of temples, and promoting the arts and everyday conduct through their governance. Many religious conversions to Islam were influenced by Sufi saints rather than coercion. This interaction between Islam and India’s indigenous culture resulted in a unique, syncretic blend, forming what we now recognize as a composite Indian culture. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), a Muslim leader in the Indian independence movement, expressed this fusion eloquently: “I am Muslim and proud of that fact… In addition, I am proud of being an Indian. I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality… India’s historic destiny was that many human races and cultures and religious faiths should flow to her, and that many caravans should find rest here… One of the last of these caravans was that of the followers of Islam… Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our arts, our dress, our manners and customs… everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavour” (cited in Hay, 1991). 

During the independence struggle, the Congress Party championed secularism and equal respect for all religions in India. Although Mahatma Gandhi was a devout Hindu, his interpretation of Hinduism was inclusive and tolerant. He believed that Muslims were an integral part of India and, even during the partition, insisted that India’s identity would be incomplete without them. This stance brought Gandhi into direct conflict with Hindu nationalists, particularly groups like the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. These organizations worked closely together, with overlapping membership and a shared goal of establishing a “Hindu Rashtra,” though they differed tactically on how to achieve it. In 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, a Hindu nationalist associated with the Hindu Mahasabha. This tragic event dealt a significant blow to Hindu nationalism, which lost support for decades. 

Following Gandhi’s assassination, both the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS faced public backlash and were marginalized. However, by the early 1990s, the BJP gained substantial political strength. This rise coincided with an economic crisis and the Congress Party’s inability to offer a compelling socio-economic alternative. Hindu extremist groups campaigned vigorously for the demolition of the Babri Mosque and the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya, positioning themselves against concessions to backward Hindu castes. 

During this period, the Indian bourgeoisie was also searching for an alternative to the Congress Party. The global political landscape was rapidly changing after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the end of the Cold War, with the US emerging as the sole superpower. Indian elites, eager to establish closer ties with the US, found ideological alignment with the RSS and BJP, who had long supported stronger relations with US imperialism (Siddiqui, 2009a). 

Under these circumstances, the Indian elite began to see the BJP as a more suitable political vehicle. This shift marked a departure from the politics that had emerged in the 1920s during India’s independence struggle, led by Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi’s leadership emphasized two key objectives: achieving independence from British colonial rule and fostering social transformation within India. He famously stated that independence would be meaningless without Hindu-Muslim unity and the eradication of social evils such as untouchability (Siddiqui, 2022). 

Jawaharlal Nehru, another key leader of the Congress Party, articulated his vision of secularism and nationalism in his book The Discovery of India (1946). For Nehru, India symbolized syncretism, pluralism, and tolerance—values that had shaped Indian history. He wrote, “Ancient India, like ancient China, was a world in itself, a culture and a civilization which gave shape to all things. Foreign influences poured in and often influenced that culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization… of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety was acknowledged and even encouraged.” Nehru believed that modernity, education, and economic development were key to bridging the communal divide, famously referring to industries and dams as the “temples of the modern age” (Nehru, 1989). 

Religion has always played a significant role in shaping morality for the majority of Indians, and this remains true today. It’s important to note that communal riots were rare in the pre-British period, as traditional religiosity fostered religious tolerance and coexistence. Saints like Kabir and Guru Nanak promoted syncretic beliefs, preaching interfaith understanding, tolerance, and love between different religious communities (Nehru, 1989). 

During the period of Muslim rule in India, both mosques and tombs were influenced by and adapted to the local environment. Mujeeb (1967) argues that these structures should be described not merely as “Muslim” but as “Indian Muslim.” The architectural styles of North Indian cities in precolonial India shared significant similarities with Persian and Turkish urban buildings, as well as with those of the contemporary Rajasthani Hindu kingdoms. This blending of styles illustrates the cultural syncretism that characterized the era (Mujeeb, 1967). 

At the height of the Mughal Empire (1526-1767), the empire commanded unprecedented resources in Indian history and encompassed nearly the entire subcontinent. Between 1556 and 1707, India flourished as one of the world’s wealthiest nations, contributing more than 26 percent of global output and ranking among the top exporters of commodities such as cotton textiles, spices, silk, and pearls, all of which were in high demand worldwide, particularly in Europe. In contrast, India’s imports from Europe were minimal, as European goods found little appeal among Indian consumers. Consequently, India received gold in exchange for its exports, as the Industrial Revolution had not yet occurred, leaving European nations with little to offer to Indian markets 

During this period, the Mughal Empire experienced remarkable wealth and glory, functioning as a highly efficient and centralized organization. It boasted a vast network of personnel, resources, and information dedicated to serving the emperor and his nobility (Habib, 1963). The relationship between Hindus and Muslims was predominantly peaceful, with integration between the communities taking place and little evidence of communal violence or animosity. However, during British colonial rule, the administration adopted a policy of divide and rule, encouraging the use of religious symbols within the British army. In response to the Congress Party’s push for ‘swaraj’ (independence) in the early 20th century, the colonial authorities fostered the growth of religious parties among both Hindus and Muslims, such as the Hindu Mahasabha/RSS and the Muslim League (Siddiqui, 2022). 

Mughal culture and values represented a unique blend of Persian-Islamic and regional Indian elements, resulting in a distinctive Indian culture. Although regional identities began to assert themselves by the early 18th century, Mughal manners and ideals continued to influence society long after the decline of imperial central authority. The trajectory of the Mughal Empire during its first two centuries (1526–1748) illustrates the complexities of premodern state-building in the Indian subcontinent (Habib, 1963). 

Emperor Akbar was a significant patron of architecture and the arts, establishing the Mughal style in both painting and architecture. He constructed notable buildings in Agra, Ajmer, Allahabad, and Lahore, but his greatest achievement is considered to be the planned city of Fatehpur Sikri, a magnificent complex built primarily between 1569 and 1572. This city features forts, palaces, and mosques in a distinctive style that largely draws from Persian architecture while incorporating numerous Indian elements. Akbar also had a keen interest in religion and literature; he commissioned translations of the great epics, the Mahābhārata and the Ramāyaṇa, as well as the Vedas, into Persian to make them accessible to Muslims seeking to understand the majority community’s religion and culture. 

In his famous discussions at the ʿEbādatḵāna, Akbar expanded participation to a diverse group of articulate religious leaders, including Sufis, Hindus, Jains, Parsis, and Christians. This engagement reinforced his commitment to tolerance as a core personal and political principle. In 1564, primarily for reasons of state, he abolished the poll tax on non-Muslims (ǰezya) and adopted the slogan “peace with all” (Solḥ-e-Kull) as a guiding tenet of his rule (Mujeeb, 1967). 

Conclusion 

In recent times, social media has emerged as a catalyst for spreading misinformation and propaganda, which can exacerbate communal tensions and lead to violence. Additionally, competition in business and economic disparities within urban settings significantly contribute to communal strife. During periods of economic distress, it is common for individuals to scapegoat other communities for their challenges, which in turn fuels communal hatred and violence (Siddiqui, 2009b). 

The state must take proactive measures to mitigate, rather than exacerbate, communal violence. This requires political and administrative reforms aimed at addressing the underlying socio-economic issues. To effectively tackle communal violence, comprehensive structural changes are essential, along with a commitment to fostering a more inclusive and pluralistic society. 

The study concludes that the primary drivers of communal and religious violence between Hindus and Muslims in India are rooted in political agendas and deteriorating economic conditions, particularly rising inequalities and unemployment. Communal organizations, particularly Hindu extremist parties, exploit religion and regional identity as tools for garnering support and winning elections. This approach cultivates misunderstandings between communities and incites hatred toward specific groups. 

To address the issue of communal violence in India, there is an urgent need for greater societal inclusion and inter-communal dialogue. Civil society, political parties, and legal reforms must work together to enhance the protection of minorities and promote communal harmony and tolerance. Education and awareness initiatives aimed at eradicating illiteracy and promoting secularism are vital. Such efforts can dispel misunderstandings about different religions and foster better relations between communities, paving the way for a more harmonious coexistence in India. 

About the Author

Dr Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK. 

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