By Denisa Avram
The recent election results in Romania have shocked the political scene. Călin Georgescu, a political outsider until recently but a name sporadically mentioned in Romanian politics, managed to secure victory through an unexpected and largely overlooked campaign predominantly conducted on TikTok. However, his success raises alarming questions about mass influence, electoral interference, and insufficient regulation of digital platforms.
Is this the new formula for becoming Head of State? Can one become President overnight through TikTok? Is there a legal framework to investigate what happened and identify who financed the online campaign? Could the European Commission and Romania Digital Services Coordinator, namely the National Authority for Management and Regulation in Communications (ANCOM), pursue a deeper investigation?
TikTok can help you become President overnight
Călin Georgescu leveraged TikTok in an unprecedented way for presidential elections, turning the platform into a highly effective electoral propaganda tool in a remarkably short time. His content, launched primarily in October, consisted of short, emotional videos with nationalist messages that quickly captivated audiences. TikTok’s algorithms are designed to maximize user engagement by prioritizing content that evokes strong emotions such as anger, pride, or fear—emotions easily exploited in political contexts. Georgescu’s campaign capitalized on these vulnerabilities, generating a near-hypnotic wave of support that garnered over two million voters.
Unlike other candidates, Georgescu had little public presence outside TikTok, yet he managed to overtake the content on the platform. His campaign was bolstered by networks of micro-influencers, many of them paid, and anonymous accounts that aggressively shared pro-Georgescu messages while attacking his political opponents with disinformation. For instance, videos falsely claimed that other candidates were puppets of foreign interests.
Even more concerning, subsequent investigations revealed potential involvement by external actors amplifying this propaganda. Bots and accounts coordinated from outside Romania contributed to the promotion of his messages, suggesting electoral interference. The question remains: do we have the tools to trace these activities?
Additionally, many videos featured misleading or outright false information, presented in accessible and oversimplified formats. For example, Georgescu was portrayed as the “savior leader” of Romania, while his opponents were vilified through conspiracy theories. The cumulative effect was extreme polarization and massive mobilization among his electorate.
Let’s see if the Digital Services Act can provide some answers?
The European Union recently adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA), legislation aimed at combating disinformation, regulating online content, and ensuring algorithmic transparency on digital platforms. In theory, the DSA provides robust tools to prevent such abuses:
- Algorithmic transparency: Platforms like TikTok are required to disclose how their algorithms function and allow external audits.
- Reporting of illegal Content: Governments can request the rapid removal of disinformation or content that violates electoral laws.
- Platform accountability: TikTok could face financial penalties for failing to prevent the spread of false or manipulative content.
- Systemic risk prevention: TikTok is obligated to conduct periodic evaluations of systemic risks associated with the platform, such as the spread of disinformation or electoral interference. In the Romanian context, the platform could be investigated for negligence in identifying risks linked to the dissemination of manipulative content.
- Cooperation with national authorities: The DSA mandates platforms to cooperate with member state authorities regarding the removal of illegal content. Electoral authorities in Romania could invoke the DSA to request the removal of disinformation videos and explanations regarding their origins.
- Transparency in political advertising: Platforms must provide clear information about political ads, including their funding sources and purposes. If videos widely distributed on TikTok were funded by external actors or opaque networks, TikTok could face sanctions. TikTok maintains an ad library, for instance, where all sponsored content can be accessed.
- Illegal content dissemination: Electoral disinformation may qualify as illegal content under Romanian law. TikTok should have taken prompt action to remove such materials.
Challenges in Implementation
Although the DSA offers a robust framework, its implementation is still in its early stages, and Romania has proven vulnerable to such campaigns before the regulations became fully operational. TikTok, for example, maintains an ad library where all sponsored content should be accessible. Yet, in this case, the clarity and transparency of sponsorships remain questionable (example).
The DSA also allows the European Commission to impose sanctions on platforms failing to meet their obligations, with fines of up to 6% of their global revenue. Romanian authorities can refer cases to the Commission for formal investigation in collaboration with Digital Services Coordinators (DSC), such as ANCOM in Romania. ANCOM could request details about the financial backers and accounts used to fund political ads, leveraging TikTok’s ad library as a starting point.
While the DSA does not directly address foreign electoral interference, it provides a basis for investigating bot networks or coordinated fake accounts operating from outside the EU. Romania can also collaborate with the EU Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) to identify and counter such threats.
Additionally, TikTok is a signatory of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation, which sets voluntary measures to combat disinformation. EU authorities could examine whether TikTok adhered to its commitments under this code.
What’s Next for Romania and the EU?
Călin Georgescu’s victory demonstrates the susceptibility of European democracies to digital manipulation. Romania must urgently modernize its electoral legislation to address technological threats, while the EU must rigorously enforce the DSA and work closely with member states to safeguard election integrity.
Public education on digital literacy is equally crucial. Voters must understand how digital platforms operate and how they can be manipulated. Only through a combination of regulation, education, and vigilance can Europe mitigate the devastating effects of disinformation on platforms like TikTok.
Romania’s case should serve as a wake-up call for the entire European Union. While technology offers immense opportunities, without adequate regulation, it can become a dangerous weapon against democracy.
About the Author
Denisa Avram is an affiliate expert for Europuls – Center of European Expertise, public policy analyst and political communication expert, specialized in technological regulation, digital security and combating disinformation. With a career in European public affairs, Denisa previously worked for various technology companies such as Glovo or eBay. Her articles, published in leading European publications, address topics such as the influence of digital platforms, algorithmic transparency and the role of the European Union in technology regulation. Denisa frequently collaborates with experts in cyber security and European legislation, providing detailed analysis on contemporary challenges in the digital space.
She graduated with a BA in European Studies as well as a MA in Public Affairs at Maastricht University. He then continued his academic career with an Advanced Master’s in International Relations and Diplomacy at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.
Denisa is passionate about digital education and supports initiatives that promote media literacy and responsible online platforms. Through her work, Denisa aims to raise public awareness and help strengthen democracy in the technological age.
