The Socioeconomic Effects Of COVID-19 On Women 

woman in mask

By Maria Demertzis and Mia Hoffmann

The pandemic has disproportionately affected women both professionally and at home. Although the gender gap in labour force participation since the onset of the pandemic hasn’t worsened, the policy still needs to tackle existing gender gaps, which for some EU countries are very substantive. 

Following widespread vaccination campaigns, European economies are beginning to emerge from the depths of the recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. And as billions are spent to accelerate the recovery and stabilize economic growth, it is important to understand that not all members of society emerge from this crisis in the same way. The COVID-19 pandemic affected women significantly differently from men along many dimensions. Long-time existing gender inequalities have been exacerbated, so much so, that it has been called a backward step for gender equality.  

The COVID-19 pandemic was different insofar as it affected another part of the workforce than regular recessions. In cyclical economic downturns, male workers tend to be more strongly affected, because men work predominantly in sectors that are more dependent on the business cycle, such as manufacturing and construction. The pandemic crisis, in contrast, affected a different set of industries than usual, and in particular those in which women represent a larger share of the workforce. Women represent the majority of workers in frontline services such as health, long-term care or education, which exposed them to high infection risks with the virus. Women make up the majority of employees in industries hit hardest by lockdown and containment measures, including retail, food services, accommodation and personal services like hairdressers (Figure 1). This in turn, placed them at an increased risk of job loss and precarious employment situation.   

Figure 1: Employment shares by gender in frontline and close contact sectors, EU28 figure1

Note: Sectors at 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 level, data for 2019Q4. Source: Eurostat LFSQ_EGAN22D 

Figure 2 plots the correlation between female employment shares in occupations and an occupational social interaction score. Women in the EU are disproportionately employed in occupations that require a lot of social interaction. They represent 82% of health professionals, and 80% of teaching professionals. Over two thirds of personal services workers are women, as are almost three in four sales workers.  

Figure 2: Female employment share and the social intensity of occupations figure2

Note: Occupations at 3-digit ISCO level. Source: Bruegel based on social interaction score for occupations from Sostero et al. (2020) and employment data for 2019Q4 from the Labor Force Survey, Eurostat.  

At the EU level, the female unemployment rate increased slightly more heavily than men’s unemployment during the first wave of the pandemic, rising from 6.9% to 7.9% from the first to the third quarter of 2020, while men’s unemployment increased from 6.4% to 7% during the same period1. Following another peak in the first quarter of 2021, female and male unemployment rates recovered to 7.3% and 6.6%, respectively. The loss of jobs was particularly pronounced among women with low levels of education, who even before the onset of the crisis faced higher levels of unemployment than men with the same level of educational attainment. The same pattern, albeit smaller in magnitude, applies for women with upper secondary education (Figure 3). 

Figure 3: Unemployment rate by gender and educational attainment figure3

Note: Educational attainment levels based on ISCED2011. Low educated means primary or lower secondary education, intermediate education means upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education, highly educated means tertiary education and higher. Source: Eurostat lfsq_urgaed.  

Women, who on average earn less than men and have accumulated less wealth than men are more likely to face financial difficulties following a sudden loss of income. The financial resilience of European households was already worrisome before the onset of the pandemic, with one in three EU households unable to face an unexpected financial shock. That number rises to 57% when considering single parent households, the majority of which are women. Levels of financial fragility, defined as the inability to finance an unexpected expense such as a funeral or the replacement of a washing machine, among single parent-households remained high during the pandemic but changes at the country level relative to pre-pandemic levels are mixed (Figure 4). While the rate grew significantly in Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovakia, Greece and Malta, it also declined strongly in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Finland, and even more so in Estonia, Portugal and Croatia. Changes in other countries were moderate.  

It is highly unusual for such significant improvements to materialize from one year to another. We believe, instead, that these improvements in the financial situation of single parents are likely due to the outstanding policy response to the pandemic, in which many countries provided financial support to particularly affected groups. While this is an encouraging development, in this context it will be crucial to monitor how financial fragility levels develop when this support is withdrawn.  

Figure 4: Financial fragility among single parent households  figure4

Note: Financially fragile households are defined as those that answer No to the question “Can your household afford an unexpected required expense (amount to be filled) and pay through its own resources?”. The amount is calculated as 1/12 of the at-risk-of-poverty-threshold, which is set as 60% of the national median disposable income after social transfers. Based on this, in 2019 the amount to be filled ranged from 367€ in Romania to 1447€ in Luxembourg, with an EU average of 871€. Source: Eurostat SILC.  

Demertzis et al. (2020) document a significantly higher level of financial fragility among single women than among single men in all EU member states except for Finland before the pandemic. Figure 5 shows the different financial fragility rates for single female and male households during the pandemic in 2020 for all member states for which data is available. The data confirms that women are still disproportionally affected by financial risks in the EU. Women remain more financially fragile than men in all but two countries, Denmark and the Netherlands. Sweden, Belgium and France also appear to offer an almost equal playing field. In contrast a worryingly sizable gender gap is present in eight EU member states: financial fragility affects over 10 percentage points more women than men in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and the Czech Republic.  

Figure 6 depicts how the pandemic affected this gender gap, by comparing the gender gap from 2020 with that of 2019. Inequality deteriorated during the pandemic in 11 out of the 21 reporting countries, in particular in Croatia, Bulgaria and Portugal, where the financial fragility gender gap widened by 6%, 4.9% and 3.8% respectively. Conversely, the gender gap diminished in 10 countries, in particular in France and Slovenia.  

Figure 5: Financial fragility rate of households, 2020 figure5

Source: EU SILC 

Figure 6: Financial fragility gender gap, 2020 vs. 2019 figure6

Note: the gender gap is derived by subtracting the financial fragility rate of single male households from financial fragility rate of single female households. A positive (negative) change therefore indicates a widening (narrowing) of the gender gap between 2019 and 2020. Source: Bruegel based on EU SILC.  

Job leavers statistics indicate that women left their jobs at higher rates than men during the pandemic. Job leavers are all people who left their jobs in the previous three months, be it due to dismissals, retirement or voluntary quitting. In the two years before the pandemic, women and men left their jobs at the same rate of around 2% of total employment at EU level. This rate increased more strongly and persistently for women than for men in 2020, peaking in 2020Q2, with significant variation across member states.  

Figure 7: Recent job leavers by sex in 2020Q2 figure7

Source: Eurostat lfsi_lea_q. 

High female employment shares in close contact sectors and the ensuing rise in female unemployment are certainly drivers of this development. At the same time, owing to the closing of schools and childcare centres working parents had to balance (remote) work with caretaking responsibilities. Emerging evidence suggests that women bore the brunt of this additional load which led to a reduction of female labour supply at the extensive and intensive margin.  

A US survey by McKinsey found that a quarter of surveyed women considered leaving the workforce or downshifting their careers during the pandemic, compared to one fifth of men. When considering only parents of young children (<10 years), 23% of surveyed women considered leaving the workforce, 10 percentage points more than men.  

A number of studies has investigated the time-use patterns of heterosexual couples with children during the first wave of the pandemic in the US, the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain. While both fathers and mothers increased their engagement in unpaid work at home, all studies found a manifestation of traditional gender roles, with women taking over the majority of additional housework and caretaking responsibilities. Importantly, these results could not simply be explained by gender differences in work status or remote work opportunities. Mothers were found to reduce their paid work hours more strongly than fathers to accommodate increased childcare demands and spent more time simultaneously working and looking after their children. Women also interrupted their paid work more frequently to handle housework demands, as a result of which fathers had around twice as many uninterrupted work hours than mothers in the UK. Finally, studies show that the additional burden of caretaking and housework, and the unequal allocation of those tasks led to a deterioration of the subjective well-being of women.  

It is not unlikely that these situations affected the quality of work time and caused a reduction in productivity for workers, and much more so for women than for men. Task juggling and work interruptions have been found to lower productivity and potentially even negatively affect earnings. First evidence from gender shares of authorship of academic publications during the pandemic suggests this may indeed have occurred. In biomedicine, women’s share in academic research output fell significantly since the onset of the pandemic. This effect was particularly pronounced in emerging research relating to the pandemic. The same was found in economics, where female publication shares remained constant for non-Covid related output, but dropped significantly for research on pandemic-related topics. This effect was particularly pronounced among early- and mid-career economists. Such productivity slumps may have implications for women’s future career prospects, by reducing their chances of promotion or pay raises, contributing to a growing gender wage gap and general worsening of work outcomes for women.  

The implications of additional care and household burdens had on women’s productivity, work hours and wellbeing as a result of the pandemic need to be addressed in order to prevent an exacerbation of gender inequalities in the labour market. Even though caretaking responsibilities have returned to near-normal levels, as schools and childcare facilities reopened, the long-term consequences of the pandemic on labour markets are only beginning to materialize. One example is the growing importance of remote work or hybrid work models.  

A recent Eurofound survey found that women would prefer to work remotely more frequently than men, and this gap increased over the course of the pandemic. While in the summer of 2020, 43.6% of men said they would prefer to telework daily or several times a week, compared to 45.1% of women, the results from early in 2021 (Figure 8) show that this share increased for women to 49.1%, while it decreased slightly among men to 42.8%.  

Figure 8: Remote work preferences by gender figure8

Note: Data from survey round 3 (Feb/Mar 2021). Respondents were asked:” If you had the choice, how often would you like to work from home if there were no restrictions due to COVID-19?”. Source: Eurofound (2020), Living, working and COVID-19 dataset 

Evidence from before the pandemic suggests that teleworking can deteriorate career advancement opportunities, which may be a result of one’s performance being less visible compared to that of colleagues that are working in the location. Working from home can also exclude employees from informal networking opportunities with colleagues and supervisors, and eliminate the potential for spontaneous involvement in decision-making and project assignments. When these disadvantages disproportionately affect women, they could perpetuate existing difficulties of female workers to build relationships with their often-male superiors. As argued in Grzegorczyk et al. (2021), unless the disadvantages created by selective teleworking are addressed, we will see gender inequalities deteriorate.  

Policy recommendations 

There is a significant risk of increasing divergences and persistence in the effects that we identify. Policymakers should monitor socioeconomic gender effects carefully as we recover from the crisis. This includes looking out for adverse consequences of the conclusion of pandemic support programs such as inequal increases in financial fragility or poverty rates. Policymakers should invest in financial literacy programs to improve people’s ability to manage their budgets before and during economic recessions. Financial literacy has been found to be an important element in reducing financial fragility, and financial literacy is lower among women then among men.  

In addition, policymakers should shift their attention to unpaid care work. Investments in long-term and elderly care and expanding childcare availability for parents of young children will support especially women and allow them to allocate more time to effective, paid work. Reforming current parental leave legislation to establish paid paternity leave beyond two weeks throughout the EU would furthermore contribute to a more equitable sharing of care responsibilities between mothers and fathers. 

More women lost their jobs during the pandemic. In particular women with low levels of education have not yet recovered fully from the unemployment shock of the crisis, and there is a risk that this larger gender unemployment gap will persist. At the same time, the crisis does not seem to have driven women out of the labor force at higher rates than men (Figure 9). According to the latest data, the gender gap in labor force participation has not worsened since the onset of the pandemic and even improved in a number of countries, which is good news for the economic recovery. Nonetheless, the gap remains substantial in many countries, and low female labor force participation is a structural problem worth addressing.  

Figure 9: The gender gap in labor force participation, 2021Q2 figure9

Bruegel based on Eurostat (lfsi_emp_q). Note: We calculate the gap by subtracting the share of women in the labor force from the share of men in the labor force. A positive bar therefore indicates lower female labor force participation. The change over time is calculated so that a positive (negative) value indicates a widening (narrowing) of the gap.  

In the future, there will be a permanent shift towards more remote working, which will be taken up at higher rates by women than men. Knowing that remote work can have adverse consequences for career opportunities and wages, policymakers should address the potential risks of deepening disadvantages for women in the workforce. This includes raising awareness for biased assessments of teleworking employees and carefully monitoring emerging trends and gender dimensions in labor market outcomes.  

The policy response so far to address the gendered impact of the pandemic has been limited. For example, only three countries dedicate any funds from their allotment of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) to initiatives specifically addressing gender inequalities. Austria, Belgium and Italy together will invest 878€ million on women’s issues in the areas of health, social infrastructure and labour markets. Extending the filter to include funding dedicated to the support of working parents, such as on childcare and nurseries, the amount climbs to 6.8€ billion which still only amounts to less than 1% of the RRF2.  

Next generation EU is not purely a tool to stimulate economic recovery, but has the explicit purpose to set the EU economies on a more sustainable, digital, future-proof growth trajectory. This structural orientation makes it the right tool to use to prevent a perpetuation of existing obstacles to female labor market participation, advancement and outcomes. Although the explicit spending on gender equality measures is small, the impact of the remaining 99% of investment on women is yet unknown, and we encourage the EU and its member states to conduct gender impact assessments of all initiatives to ensure investments contribute to a more equitable future for women and men.  
This article was originally published in Bruegel on 3 November 2021. It can be accessed here: 

About the Authors

Maria DemertzisMaria Demertzis is Deputy Director at Bruegel. She has previously worked at the European Commission and the research department of the Dutch Central Bank. She has also held academic positions at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government in the USA and the University of Strathclyde in the UK, from where she holds a PhD in economics. She has published extensively in international academic journals and contributed regular policy inputs to both the European Commission’s and the Dutch Central Bank’s policy outlets. 
Mia HoffmannMia Hoffmann works at Bruegel as a Research Assistant. She studied International Economics (BSc) at the University of Tuebingen, including one semester at the Università di Torino, and holds a Master’s degree in Economics from Lund University. Her previous research focused on the impact of migration on economic growth and analyzed the effects of childcare policy on household bargaining. Her current research interests involve issues related to trade, labor markets and inequality. 

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of The World Financial Review.