Impact of Population Changes and Economic Growth in China and India

November 6, 2024

Introduction

China’s population peaked in 2022, earlier than expected. According to UN projections from 1999, China’s population was expected to reach 1.5 billion by the end of 2022. However, the actual population was 100 million less than predicted. This shortfall suggests that China’s working-age population may decline by 10% by 2035 and by nearly 30% by 2050. The country is experiencing both slower economic growth and a declining population, which could significantly affect its overall economic development.

This study will explore the demographic transitions in both China and India and examine the implications of slower population growth by using a global economic model that incorporates full demographic behaviour, including measures of dependency – accounting for both the working-age population and those who are of working age but not employed. In this context, India’s dependency ratio is projected to decline more sharply than China’s. India’s higher initial fertility rate positively impacts GDP growth but weakens real per capita income growth. Additionally, the study will critically evaluate the ongoing debates surrounding the population and economic challenges facing both countries.

The presentation will focus on key aspects of the theoretical relationship between population dynamics and economic growth. Over the past four decades, China has witnessed exceptional economic growth, coupled with significant demographic shifts. The country has experienced dramatic reductions in mortality and fertility rates, leading to one of the most rapid demographic transitions in world history. This transition has been largely shaped by China’s family planning policies, particularly the one-child policy, which has played a critical role in curbing population growth.

India, on the other hand, recently surpassed China as the world’s most populous country, as reported by the United Nations in 2022. India’s population reached 1.4 billion in 2023, and its continued growth presents the potential for a “demographic dividend.” While China and other industrialized countries are facing declining numbers of young workers and increasing elderly populations due to rising life expectancy, India’s workforce remains young and expanding. (Siddiqui, 2021a)

Population Trends in China and India

China and India are the two most populous countries in the world, with India home to approximately 1.45 billion people and China to about 1.42 billion in 2024. Figure 1 illustrates the population growth trends of both countries since 1950 (also see Table 1a, along with projections for 2021. As the data indicates, before 2022, India’s population was lower than China’s. However, in 2022, India surpassed China to become the most populous country in the world. Projections suggest that the gap between their total populations will continue to widen in the coming years.

Together, China and India account for about 35.17% of the global population and 60% of the population of Asia. While Asia’s population is projected to grow over the next decade, it will do so at a slower rate, as shown in Table 1b. Moreover, India’s population density is over three times higher than China’s, with 488 people per square km compared to 148 people per square km in China.

India officially became the world’s most populous country in 2022, overtaking China. By 2023, China’s population began to decline. China’s fertility rate, at 1.2 births per woman in 2022, is among the lowest in the world. In contrast, India’s fertility rate is 2.0 births per woman, which is just below the replacement threshold of 2.1 births per woman. Currently, China accounts for 17.7% of the global population, while India holds a slightly larger share at 17.8%. Meanwhile, Africa is the fastest-growing region in the world, with an annual population growth rate of about 2.4%, while Europe is the only region experiencing population decline, shrinking at a rate of -0.17% per year.

Table 1A: Population Estimates of China and India, 1950-2023

Demographics China vs India 2 — *Source: World Population Prospects, UN, 2024. https://statisticstimes.com/demographics/china-vs-india-population.php*

Table 1B: Population Projections of China and India, 2024-2100

Demographics China vs India — *Source: World Population Prospects, UN, 2024. https://statisticstimes.com/demographics/china-vs-india-population.php*

Demographic Transition in China and India

China and India adopted different strategies for navigating their demographic transitions toward longer life expectancy and smaller, nuclear families. The timing and intensity of these demographic changes have varied significantly between the two countries and even within their regions, depending on factors such as income, literacy rates, and broader socio-economic development. Key factors driving this transition include public investment in the health sector, improved nutrition (especially for reducing child mortality), increased education levels—particularly for girls and women, which often lead to declines in both mortality and fertility rates—urbanization, employment opportunities for women, and access to family planning.

By 2022, China’s fertility rate had fallen to 1.2 births per woman, one of the lowest in the world. India’s fertility rate, at 2.0 births per woman, was just below the “replacement” threshold of 2.1 births per woman, the level required for long-term population stabilization. According to United Nations projections, India’s population is expected to peak around 2064 before gradually declining thereafter (UN, 2022).

While many factors contributed to the decline in birth rates in both China and India, the relative impact of each remains debated (Bongaarts and Hodgson, 2022). In the second half of the 20th century, both governments sought to curb population growth by focusing on reducing fertility rates. For instance, China implemented specific policies, such as the “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign of the 1970s, which promoted later marriages, longer intervals between births, and fewer children overall. The most notable of these policies was the “one-child” policy, enforced from 1980 to 2015, which imposed strict limits on family size, with very few exceptions.

Interestingly, it was not until the 1950s that the populations of both China and India began to rise exponentially. China reached the 1-billion mark in 1980, while India hit the same milestone in 1997.

In 1971, both countries had similar fertility levels, with an average of around six births per woman. However, China’s fertility rate dropped sharply to fewer than three births per woman by 1979, thanks to aggressive family planning policies. In contrast, India’s fertility decline was much more gradual, taking nearly two generations (about 35 years) to achieve the same reduction that China accomplished in just seven years, by 1979.

Moreover, the Chinese government significantly increased investment in human capital and promoted a greater role for women in politics and social change. These efforts contributed to the sharp drop in China’s fertility rate during the 1970s, followed by more gradual declines over the next two decades. In contrast, the Indian government introduced a policy in the early 1950s aimed at discouraging large families and reducing population growth through its national family welfare programme.

India’s demography is not uniform across the country. One third of predicted population growth over the next decade will come from just three states, namely Bihar, MP and UP, in the north of the country, which are some of India’s poorest and most agricultural states. Uttar Pradesh alone already has a population of about 235 million, bigger than Nigeria or Brazil.

Meanwhile in states of India’s south, which has higher average incomes and better economic performance and also has far higher rates of literacy, population rates have already stabilised and have begun to fall. In the next decade, states in the southern states such as Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu are likely to face huge challenges of rising an ageing population, and by 2025, one in five people in Kerala will be over 60.

Under India’s federal structure, state governments had the flexibility to set their own policy priorities, leading to varied impacts across different regions. For example, states like Kerala, Goa, and Tamil Nadu, where governments focused on socio-economic development and women’s empowerment, saw sharp declines in fertility rates—falling below the replacement level two decades before the national average. On the other hand, states that invested less in education, particularly for girls and women, experienced slower fertility reductions.

During the Emergency period (1974–77), the central government implemented mass sterilization campaigns, especially in North India, using coercive methods. India’s slower fertility decline, compared to China’s, can be attributed to several factors, including low spending on education, slower economic growth, and low per capita income between 1970 and 1985.

Figure 1: Population of India and China between 1950 and 2100

India vs China by population — *Source: https://statisticstimes.com/demographics/china-vs-india-population.php*

Currently, the average Indian woman is expected to have 2.0 children over her lifetime, a fertility rate higher than China’s (1.2) or the United States’ (1.6), but significantly lower than India’s fertility rate in 1992 (3.4) or 1950 (5.9).

In rural areas of India, women have an average of 2.1 children, while women in urban areas have 1.6 children. Both figures are lower than they were 20 years ago, when rural women had 3.7 children on average, and urban women had 2.7 children. Furthermore, fertility rates vary significantly by state, ranging from a high of 2.98 in Bihar and 2.91 in Meghalaya to a low of 1.05 in Sikkim and 1.3 in Goa (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Population Growth Across Indian States Between 2002 and 2011

Figure 3: China and India Population Pyramids

China and India Pyramid — *Source: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/population-race-china-india/*

It is often said that higher population growth could bring the prospect of a “demographic dividend.” However, to fully capitalize on a rising youth population, a country must invest in human capital, raise labour productivity, diversify its economy, and prioritize employment creation while protecting the environment. India has a young and growing workforce, while China and other industrialized countries are experiencing a decline in their young populations. With rising life expectancy, the number of elderly citizens is expanding. It is argued that China, with its shrinking youth and aging population, may struggle to sustain higher economic growth and surpass the GDP of the United States.

China’s demographic situation was heavily shaped by the government’s strict “one-child” policy, implemented in the 1970s. Even after the policy was relaxed to allow two children per family in 2016, the long-term demographic impact remains irreversible. China is now facing a rapidly aging population, with over one-third of its citizens expected to be 65 years old or older by 2050. (See Figure 3) This aging population, combined with slowing economic growth, poses significant challenges.

India, on the other hand, is projected to have nearly 100 million people aged 60-64 by 2100 (see Figure 3). India’s young population is growing, while China’s is declining. However, India’s large and expanding workforce also highlights significant challenges. While young people have great potential to drive economic growth, they must first gain access to quality education and employment. Currently, 65% of India’s population is under 35, and the country is experiencing high rates of digital adoption, especially in the IT sector, which is further accelerating economic growth. Despite this, employment creation has lagged behind, leading some economists to describe India’s growth as “jobless growth.”

Several studies define the “demographic dividend” by focusing on declining dependency ratios, typically defined as the proportion of the population that is of working age (Bloom et al., 2003). However, in many countries, substantial numbers of “working-age” individuals are not employed, while some older individuals continue to work. A more accurate measure of the dependency ratio would compare the non-working population to the working population, which may differ significantly from the standard measure.

Considering this, China’s demographic dividend has remained positive since the turn of the century, although it is projected that after 2030, total dependency will begin to rise. China’s aging population has become a major policy concern in recent years. According to UN projections (2008), the proportion of China’s population aged 60 and above is expected to nearly double, from 12% in 2010 to 23% in 2030. During this period, the increase in elderly dependency will outpace the decline in youth dependency, further complicating China’s demographic challenges.

While India’s elderly population will rise from 7% to 12% between 2010 and 2030, overall dependency in the country will continue to be dominated by declines in youth dependency, signalling a more substantial demographic dividend. Not surprisingly, both India and China are following different population policy responses. China is now actively transitioning from its “one-child policy” to a “two-child policy,” while India continues to promote fertility decline through family planning and social initiatives.

However, rising unemployment, especially among India’s youth, has become a critical issue. When Narendra Modi became Prime Minister in 2014, he promised to create 20 million jobs annually, but the government has fallen far short of this target. As a result, the competition for job openings is intense, with hundreds of thousands of applications for even a handful of positions. In addition, the public sector is cutting back on hiring, and many government positions remain unfilled. High unemployment rates, especially among young people, have led to increasing rates of suicide as job seekers struggle to find employment.

India’s unemployment crisis is compounded by the lack of a social safety net, meaning that many face severe economic hardship and even starvation. Some argue that focusing on manufacturing is not a viable solution to India’s unemployment problem. This is not because manufacturing itself is ineffective, but because the nature of modern manufacturing has become highly capital-intensive. Even with significant capital investments, manufacturing may only generate modest employment growth. However, critics of this view argue that sustainable growth in other sectors, particularly services, depends on a strong manufacturing base to provide the necessary infrastructure.

According to the United Nations, adults aged 65 and older made up only 7% of India’s population in 2023, compared to 14% in China and 18% in the United States. The proportion of elderly Indians is expected to remain below 20% until 2063, after which it will rise sharply, reaching nearly 30% by 2100.

Women with more education and higher incomes tend to have fewer children and give birth later in life. For example, the median age at first birth is 24.9 among Indian women with 12 or more years of schooling, compared to 19.9 among women with no schooling. Similarly, Indian women in the highest wealth quintile have their first child at a median age of 23.2, while women in the lowest quintile do so at 20.3.

When examining the historical trends of population growth in China and India during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the impact of European invasion, occupation, and wars becomes evident. These events significantly affected the economies of the two most populous countries, with incomes dramatically falling, leading to widespread famines and deaths (see Figure 4). (Siddiqui, 2020a)

In the 19th century, British economic policies in India, particularly the push for free trade, contributed to skyrocketing food prices during poor harvests. (Siddiqui, 2019) Despite the presence of railways and roads for transportation, the colonial government failed to effectively distribute food to famine-stricken areas. (Siddiqui, 2022) The often-idealized portrayal of colonialism by its apologist’s conflicts with historical records, which reveal that colonial policies made famines more frequent and deadly. Economic historian Robert C. Allen (2009) emphasized that living conditions deteriorated during the 19th century, as British rule ‘drained’ India of its wealth and resources. This led to millions of deaths from famine. According to Allen, extreme poverty in India worsened under British rule, increasing from 23% in 1810 to more than 50% by the mid-20th century. Real wages also declined during the colonial period, reaching their lowest levels in the 19th century, while famines became more frequent and severe. (Allen, 2009)

In 1800, India’s population was around 169 million, while China’s population was nearly double at 322 million. Researchers agree that the period from 1880 to 1920, the height of Britain’s colonial power, was particularly devastating for India. Comprehensive population censuses from 1882 indicate that the death rate rose sharply, from 37.2 deaths per 1,000 people in the 1880s to 44.2 in the 1910s. Life expectancy also declined, falling from 26.7 years to 21.9 years. Data on real wages show that by 1880, living standards in colonial India had significantly declined from earlier levels.

Figure 4: Population of India and China, 1800 to 2100

Population 1800 to 2100 — *Source: World Economic Forum*

The question arises: how did British colonial rule in India, which lasted for two centuries, cause millions of deaths? The answer seems to lie in the systematic destruction of India’s manufacturing sector and exploitation of its resources. Before colonization, India was one of the world’s largest industrial producers, exporting high-quality textiles globally. (Siddiqui, 2023a) Historian Madhusree Mukerjee notes that the British colonial regime removed tariffs, allowing British goods to flood the Indian market. At the same time, the British imposed higher taxes and internal duties, preventing Indian producers from selling their textiles both domestically and internationally.

Population censuses conducted during the colonial period reveal that India’s population remained nearly stagnant. (Siddiqui, 1995) One of the primary reasons for this was widespread famine. Famines, caused by war, inflation, crop failure, population imbalance, or misguided government policies, led to regional malnutrition, starvation, epidemics, and significantly increased mortality rates. (Siddiqui, 2023b)

Economic historians have documented those tens of millions of Indians starved to death during several policy-induced famines in the late 19th century, as resources were siphoned off to Britain and its white settler colonies. Britain’s colonial policies are associated with the deaths of over 120 million Indians between 1770 and 1945. These famines, often considered genocidal, were caused by British exploitation rather than natural disasters. The Great Bengal Famine of 1770, one of the most devastating, claimed around 10 million lives and affected Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, with around 30 million people impacted overall. (Siddiqui, 2020a)

China, too, experienced European military aggression in the 19th century, which weakened the central government and plunged the country into prolonged civil strife, known as the “century of humiliation.” This period saw little population growth due to large-scale conflict and death. Britain, seeking to expand its commercial dominance, waged two Opium Wars against China. The First Opium War (1839–42) and the Second Opium War (1856–60), also known as the Anglo-French War in China, resulted in British and French victories that forced China into unfavourable treaties. (Siddiqui, 2020b)

As a result, China ceded Hong Kong to Britain and opened several treaty ports to foreign trade. (Siddiqui, 2021b) The Chinese government also had to allow the increased sale of British-imported opium within China, an act that devastated the country’s population and economy, all under the guise of promoting free trade, with little regard for the catastrophic consequences for the Chinese people. (Siddiqui, 2018a)

Conclusion

India recently surpassed China to become the most populous country, according to data released by the United Nations (UN, 2022). This demographic shift is accompanied by significant changes in both countries, as improvements in income, consumption, and healthcare lead to an increasing elderly population. In 2023, adults aged 65 and older make up only 7% of India’s population, compared to 14% in China and 18% in the United States. The proportion of elderly Indians is expected to remain below 20% until 2063, after which it may sharply rise to nearly 30% by 2100.

The potential for a “demographic dividend” arises from this higher population growth. (Siddiqui, 2021c) However, to capitalize on the increasing youth population, India must prioritize public investments in education and healthcare, enhance labour productivity, and diversify its economy. Employment creation, coupled with environmental protection, should be central goals for the Indian government as it navigates this demographic transition.

While India boasts a growing young population, China faces a declining youth demographic amid an aging workforce. This presents unique challenges for both countries. Young people in India have tremendous potential to contribute to economic growth, but they require adequate education and job opportunities to do so. Despite recent economic advancements, employment generation remains low, a phenomenon some economists refer to as “jobless growth.” (Siddiqui, 2018b)

Moreover, India’s infrastructure, although improved in recent years, still lags behind that of China. A significant portion of the Indian workforce is engaged in the informal sector, and only one in five Indian women participates in the formal labour force—one of the lowest rates in the world. Addressing these issues will be critical for India to harness its demographic potential and foster sustainable economic development.

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About the Author

Dr Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK.

References

Allen, Robert C. (2009) The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cambridge.
Bloom, D., Canning, D., and Sevilla, J. (2003) The demographic dividend: A new perspective on the economic consequences of population change, Rand Publishers.
Bongaarts, J. and Hodgson, D. (2022) Fertility Transition in the Developing World, London: Springer Nature.
Siddiqui, K. (2023a). “Developmental Challenges: Export vs Import-Substitution in Industrialisation in Developing Countries” World Financial Review, October-November, pp.1 – 15. ISSN:1756-3763.
Siddiqui, K. (2023b). “The New Cold War: Struggle for Global Domination” (Part I and Part 2) World Financial Review, June, p.6 – 17 & August, pp.1 – 12.
Siddiqui, K. (2022) “Capitalism, Imperialism, and Crisis”, European Financial Review, June-July, p.16 – 32.
Siddiqui, K. (2021a) “The Importance of Industrialisation in Developing Countries” World Financial Review, January February, pp.60-73.
Siddiqui, K. (2021b) “The Import Substitution Policy in the Post-Colonial Countries” World Financial Review, November-December, p.76 – 86.
Siddiqui, K. (2021c). “Can the 21st Century be an Asian Century?” Asian Profile, 49(1): 1 – 19, March.
Siddiqui, K. (2020a) “The Political Economy of Famines under Colonial India: A Critical Analysis” World Financial Review, July-August, p.56 – 70.
Siddiqui, K. (2020b) “Britain’s Trade with China in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century: A Review of the Opium Wars” Asian Profile, 48(3): 206 – 221, September.
Siddiqui, K. (2019). “A Century of India’s Economic Transformation: A Critical Review” Journal of Perspectives on Financing and Regional Development, 7(1): 1 – 22, Jan.-Feb.
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Siddiqui, K. (2018b). “The Political Economy of India’s Economic Changes since the last Century” Argumenta Oeconomica Cracoviensia, 19:103 – 132. https://doi.org/10.15678/AOC.2018.1906
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Siddiqui, K. (1995) “Population and Environment”, The Nation, Part 1 and Part 2, January 27 and 28.
United Nations (2022) World Population Prospects 2022: Summary of Results. UN DESA/POP/2022/TR/NO. 3. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York.

The Truth About Return-to-Office Headlines: Why the Data Tells a Different Story

November 6, 2024

By Dr. Gleb Tsipursky

In recent months, headlines have frequently proclaimed that companies like Amazon are demanding employees return to the office in droves, signaling the end of the flexible work era. However, contrary to these attention-grabbing headlines, reliable and objective data from sources like the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows a steady increase in workplace flexibility, with more employees enjoying hybrid and remote work arrangements in 2024 than in the previous year.

Cherry-Picked Stories vs. Objective Data

The sensationalism around a supposedly ever-growing return to the office is largely driven by cherry-picked stories. Headlines often focus on the loud proclamations of a few high-profile CEOs or companies cracking down on flexible work. These narratives grab attention but are not necessarily representative of broader trends. In reality, many organizations are quietly adapting to employee preferences for flexibility, finding that the rigid mandates announced in the early post-pandemic phase are difficult to enforce and often counterproductive.

Contrary to the narrative of a massive return to office, the data reveals a year-over-year increase in the number of employees who work from home, either some of the time or all the time.

A clear example of this disconnect is found in the August 2024 jobs report from the BLS. Contrary to the narrative of a massive return to office, the data reveals a year-over-year increase in the number of employees who work from home, either some of the time or all the time. Specifically, 22.8% of workers reported teleworking for some or all of their job in August 2024, up from 19.5% in the same month the previous year. Among hybrid workers – those who work remotely only some of the time – the share climbed from 9.2% to 11.7% over the same period; those who worked remotely all the time increased to 11.1%, up from 10.3%

This government data is backed up by similar findings from highly credible private sources. For example, the eighth annual Owl Labs state of work report finds that the number of fully in-office workers fell from 66% in 2023 to 62% in 2024, while the number of hybrid workers rose from 26 to 27% and fully remote from 7 to 11%. Overall, the BLS data is more trustworthy on actual proportions of each, since they have a broader and deeper data set, but the similarity in trends is telling.

The uptick in remote and hybrid work is a strong indicator that many employers are becoming more accommodating, even as some continue to trumpet a return to office rhetoric. This shift is driven by practical considerations. For example, several CEOs at companies I work with on helping determine their flexible work arrangements have increasingly chosen to – quietly – cease enforcing in-office attendance rules when they realized that the effort to monitor and manage these requirements was becoming more trouble than it was worth. The initial worker backlash to strict return-to-office policies did not subside as expected, but rather continued to escalate, diverting managerial attention away from more strategic concerns.

A variant of this pattern is the “hushed hybrid” trend, where workers collaborate secretly with their managers to come to the office less frequently than the C-suite wants. Essentially, the managers undermine company policies because they recognize it would be a lot of hassle to enforce them, and not worth the resentment this enforcement would cause. Thus, many workers come in once or twice a week, even if the requirements might be three days a week.

On a related note, witness the rise of “coffee badging,” where employees might follow the letter of the law but undermine its spirit. Namely, they come into the office the required three – or even four or five – days a week, long enough to grab a coffee and meet with a colleague, and then go home.

No wonder that the 2023 Global Traffic Scorecard by traffic analysis firm INRIX Inc. observed significant changes in commuting patterns, with a decrease in peak morning and evening traffic congestion and an increase around midday. This shift suggests that many employees are taking advantage of more flexible work hours, leading to a new kind of workday that departs from the traditional 9-to-5 model. Moreover, the global nature of this survey shows the trend of flexibility is not limited to American companies.

The Myth of the “Great Return” to the Office

The persistent narrative of a “great return” to the office is not only misleading but also fails to account for the growing body of evidence that suggests a preference for flexibility is reshaping the modern workplace. For instance, a June 2024 survey from the Conference Board found that nearly half (45%) of HR professionals in companies with strict in-office mandates reported difficulties retaining employees. In contrast, only 15% of HR professionals in companies offering flexibility faced similar retention challenges. This stark contrast highlights how rigid office attendance policies can be detrimental to talent retention.

Similarly, a recent report from the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School in partnership with Great Place to Work identified strong positive links between flexible work models and employee well-being. The study analyzed the percentage of a company’s workforce permitted to work remotely for part of the week. Companies where at least 75% of employees had the option to work remotely part-time reported the highest levels of well-being. In contrast, firms where fewer than 25% of employees had this flexibility scored the lowest. A similar trend was observed with flexible work schedules. Organizations that allowed a larger share of their workforce to choose their in-office hours experienced a more positive and healthy work environment.

This data underscores a significant shift in worker priorities, where flexibility, work-life balance, and mental health support are becoming more valued than traditional benefits or even salary increases.

It’s clear that for many professionals, the option to work remotely or in a hybrid model is non-negotiable. Recent findings from an Owl Labs survey support this view, revealing that 66% of employees would consider looking for a new job if the ability to work from home were removed, and 39% would quit immediately. This data underscores a significant shift in worker priorities, where flexibility, work-life balance, and mental health support are becoming more valued than traditional benefits or even salary increases.

Data from Robert Half, a staffing firm, provides further evidence that the job market is tilting decisively towards flexible work arrangements. According to their reports, the number of fully on-site roles has steadily decreased over the past year. In Q1 2023, 83% of job postings were for fully on-site roles. By Q2 2024, that figure had dropped to 67%, down from 69% in Q1 2024. Meanwhile, job postings for hybrid and remote roles have been steadily increasing. For example, hybrid job postings have risen from 9% in Q1 2023 to 22% in Q2 2024, while remote job postings have grown from 7% to 11% over the same period.

The Way Forward: Embracing a Hybrid Future

In the face of these trends, it is becoming increasingly clear that employers who cling to the idea of a full-scale return to the office may be fighting a losing battle. Workers have demonstrated that they are willing to push back against rigid attendance rules, and the data shows that they are succeeding in securing more flexibility. The year-over-year increase in remote and hybrid work signals that flexible work is here to stay. Companies that recognize this reality and adapt their policies accordingly will likely find themselves in a stronger position to attract and retain top talent.

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About the Author

Dr. Gleb Tsipursky was named “Office Whisperer” by The New York Times for helping leaders overcome frustrations with hybrid work and Generative AI. He serves as the CEO of the future-of-work consultancy Disaster Avoidance Experts. Dr. Gleb wrote seven best-selling books, and his two most recent ones are Returning to the Office and Leading Hybrid and Remote Teams and ChatGPT for Thought Leaders and Content Creators: Unlocking the Potential of Generative AI for Innovative and Effective Content Creation. His cutting-edge thought leadership was featured in over 650 articles and 550 interviews in Harvard Business Review, Inc. Magazine, USA Today, CBS News, Fox News, Time, Business Insider, Fortune, The New York Times, and elsewhere. His writing was translated into Chinese, Spanish, Russian, Polish, Korean, French, Vietnamese, German, and other languages. His expertise comes from over 20 years of consulting, coaching, and speaking and training for Fortune 500 companies from Aflac to Xerox. It also comes from over 15 years in academia as a behavioral scientist, with 8 years as a lecturer at UNC-Chapel Hill and 7 years as a professor at Ohio State. A proud Ukrainian American, Dr. Gleb lives in Columbus, Ohio.

Will Remote Work Determine the Election?

November 6, 2024

By Dr. Gleb Tsipursky

The 2024 U.S. presidential election is shaping up to be one of the closest in recent history, with both Kamala Harris and Donald Trump locked in a dead heat in many polls. This razor-thin margin amplifies the impact of even small demographic changes, such as those driven by the recent surge in remote work. Research by the nonpartisan Centre for Economic Policy Research shows that the flexibility offered by remote jobs has allowed people from traditionally Democratic urban centers to relocate to more affordable suburban or even rural areas, many of which lean Republican or fall in swing states. These shifts inevitably affect voter profiles in battleground states, potentially influencing who wins in these high-stakes regions.

The remote work revolution has brought a level of geographic mobility not seen in decades. Census data shows that the percentage of Americans working primarily from home has quadrupled in three years, while the rate of state-to-state moves has increased by over 12 percent since 2019. Freed from the requirement of daily commuting, many workers are choosing to leave high-cost, left-leaning states and cities such as California, New York, and Chicago, and instead settle in states where housing prices are generally lower and taxes more favorable.

Politically, these migration patterns are significant. Many of those moving out of left-leaning urban centers to suburban or rural areas—often in politically red or purple states—are bringing their voting preferences with them. If even a small percentage of new residents vote along the lines of their previous state’s tendencies, it could shift the political dynamics, especially in close races where margins are often razor-thin.

Many workers are choosing to leave high-cost, left-leaning states and cities such as California, New York, and Chicago, and instead settle in states where housing prices are generally lower and taxes more favorable.

Remote work opportunities are disproportionately clustered in left-leaning cities and metropolitan hubs. Counties that offer the highest number of remote jobs tend to be areas that leaned Democratic in the last election. But while remote roles may have originally drawn workers to these urban hubs, many now find themselves opting to live in more affordable suburban or rural areas, a choice that’s increasingly feasible with flexible work. Since the start of the pandemic, Americans who moved across state lines were 45 percent more likely to be working from home than those who remained in their states. As a result, workers with political preferences shaped in blue states or cities are now relocating to regions that are more ideologically diverse or conservative.

This migration has already begun to make an impact in key swing states. Florida and Georgia, both red-leaning states, are experiencing demographic shifts that could shift their political leaning. In Texas, another historically red state, an influx of new residents from more progressive areas has made its political future less certain. In states like Arizona, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, which were pivotal in determining the last election, these shifts add yet another layer of unpredictability. Migration trends could have an immediate impact in these states, where even slight changes in voter turnout or preferences can have outsize consequences.

However, it is important to recognize that demographic shifts don’t always translate to predictable voting behavior. Some newcomers may gravitate toward communities that already align with their political leanings, while others may gradually adapt to the political environment of their new location. Nevertheless, the current migration trends, accelerated by the widespread adoption of remote work, suggest that the electorate in these battleground states will be significantly different from what it was in 2020. This creates a challenge for political campaigns that now need to account for an increasingly mobile electorate with motivations and preferences that aren’t as easily defined by geography.

The 2024 election is shaping up to be a referendum on many issues, but the influence of remote work is an often overlooked factor that may nonetheless determine the outcome.

The influence of remote work on the political landscape extends beyond presidential elections. As more Americans leave city centers for nearby suburbs, local and congressional races are also feeling the impact. The so-called “donut effect”—the tendency of people to move out of dense city centers to suburban or even rural areas—is causing shifts within metropolitan regions that could affect the makeup of congressional districts and local elections. In traditionally Democratic strongholds like New York City and San Francisco, there is a notable exodus from the urban core to suburban or exurban areas. Such a reshaping of the voter base could turn suburban areas from purple to blue, while in other regions it may consolidate right-leaning voters. These movements could ultimately alter the political balance in local races, congressional districts, and perhaps even in future state-level elections.

As remote work-driven mobility continues, it is giving rise to a new kind of voter demographic. These are Americans who can now prioritize quality of life, affordability, and personal values over workplace proximity, and this mobility is increasingly leading them to areas with different political landscapes. Younger workers are especially prominent among this group, as they are more likely to work in industries that support remote or hybrid arrangements and have shown a greater willingness to prioritize lifestyle over job location. Political parties will likely need to tailor their strategies to appeal to these geographically diverse, often ideologically mixed voters, who could play an outsized role in shaping both state and national elections in the years to come.

The 2024 election is shaping up to be a referendum on many issues, but the influence of remote work is an often overlooked factor that may nonetheless determine the outcome. As both parties vie for an advantage in battleground states, tracking these shifting voter patterns will be crucial. From Florida’s changing suburbs to Texas’s diversifying population, remote work-driven migration will likely remain a key factor in America’s political landscape. Politics in the U.S. is entering a new era, one where voters are more mobile, less predictable, and where the influence of traditional party strongholds may be slowly giving way to a more fluid and dynamic political environment. The 2024 election may be the first to reveal just how much remote work has transformed the political landscape in America, but it is unlikely to be the last.

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About the Author

Dr. Gleb Tsipursky

Impact of U.S. Presidential Race on Chinese Tech: A Tale of Two Candidates

November 6, 2024

As the U.S. presidential election nears, the potential victory of Donald Trump poses mixed implications for Chinese technology firms. Executives fear that Trump’s unpredictable style could lead to intensified sanctions, echoing his previous trade war actions that banned high-tech exports to China. His combative approach might also unsettle U.S. allies, complicating coordinated efforts against China.

Conversely, Kamala Harris is viewed as a more predictable choice, likely to continue incremental changes in export controls and maintain international cooperation. Regardless of who wins, analysts anticipate new restrictions aimed at curbing China’s technological advances amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

While half of the industry analyses see a Trump win as detrimental, the other half suggests his unilateral policies may face opposition from U.S. allies, potentially undermining their effectiveness. Nevertheless, China’s tech sector has become increasingly self-sufficient since the trade war, focusing on domestic alternatives.

As uncertainty looms, many executives have adopted a “new normal” mindset, prioritizing rapid growth and innovation. “We are blind to know what might come next, so we just keep going, as fast as we can,” said one industry executive, reflecting the resolve to adapt to an unpredictable landscape.

Related Readings:

New EU Tariffs on Chinese EVs: Towards a Trade War with China?

US Tech War Against China Is Unwarranted and Self-Destructive

November 2024: A Swing States Déjà Vu Election?

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How the U.S. Elections Could Impact Canadian Businesses

November 6, 2024

By Roberts Obradovic

As the United States approaches a significant election, Canadian businesses are closely watching to understand how the outcomes could directly affect their operations, strategies, and bottom lines. The policies enacted by the next U.S. administration will have profound implications for trade, labor mobility, regulatory environments, and more. This article explores how the potential election results could impact Canadian companies and what they can do to prepare.

Understanding the Potential Scenarios

The upcoming U.S. election presents two primary scenarios that could differently impact Canadian businesses:

A Trump Administration with a Republican Majority: A return of Donald Trump to the presidency, coupled with a Republican-controlled Congress, could lead to a resurgence of protectionist policies and a focus on “America First” initiatives.
A Harris Administration with a Democratic Majority: If Kamala Harris becomes president with Democrats controlling Congress, policies may lean towards strengthening worker protections and enhancing corporate social responsibility standards.

The Current U.S.-Canada Economic Relationship

The United States and Canada share one of the world’s largest trading relationships, with billions of dollars worth of goods and services crossing the border annually. This deep economic integration means that policy changes in the U.S. can have immediate and significant effects on Canadian businesses across various sectors, from manufacturing and agriculture to technology and services.

How Each Scenario Could Impact Canadian Businesses

1. Trade and Tariffs

Under a Trump Administration:

Increased Tariffs: The reinstatement of higher tariffs on imports could make Canadian goods more expensive in the U.S. market, reducing competitiveness.
Trade Barriers: New trade barriers could disrupt the flow of goods and services, affecting supply chains and profitability.
Sector-Specific Impacts: Industries like automotive, manufacturing, and technology could face heightened scrutiny and restrictions, potentially leading to decreased exports and revenue losses.

Under a Harris Administration:

Stability in Trade Relations: A Democratic leadership might favor more stable trade relations, reducing the likelihood of sudden tariff increases.
Focus on Fair Trade: Emphasis on fair trade practices could benefit Canadian companies that adhere to high labor and environmental standards.
Opportunities for Collaboration: Potential initiatives on climate change and green technology could open new markets for Canadian businesses specializing in these areas.

2. Labor and Immigration Policies

Under a Trump Administration:

Stricter Immigration Laws: Tighter immigration policies could limit the ability of Canadian professionals to work in the U.S., affecting industries that rely on cross-border talent, such as tech and engineering.
Impact on CUSMA: Potential renegotiations or stricter interpretations of the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) could hinder labor mobility and complicate cross-border projects.
Challenges for Multinational Teams: Companies with integrated North American teams might face logistical hurdles, increasing operational complexities.

Under a Harris Administration:

Support for Labor Mobility: Policies may favor easier movement of professionals across borders, benefiting companies with cross-border operations and collaborative projects.
Enhanced Worker Protections: Stronger labor laws could increase operational costs but also create a more stable workforce environment.
Emphasis on Diversity and Inclusion: Initiatives promoting workplace diversity could align with Canadian corporate values, facilitating smoother integration of teams.

3. Regulatory Shifts and Corporate Standards

Under a Trump Administration:

Deregulation: A push for deregulation could reduce compliance costs but also lead to a less predictable business environment, with rapid policy changes affecting long-term planning.
Competitive Pressures: U.S. companies might gain cost advantages due to lower regulatory burdens, increasing competition for Canadian businesses both in the U.S. market and globally.
Environmental Concerns: Relaxed environmental regulations could create challenges for Canadian companies committed to sustainability, potentially affecting their competitiveness.

Under a Harris Administration:

Alignment with Canadian Standards: Emphasis on corporate social responsibility and environmental regulations could align U.S. standards more closely with Canadian practices, simplifying compliance for cross-border operations.
Increased Compliance Requirements: Higher regulatory standards may increase operational costs but also foster a fairer competitive landscape.
Opportunities in Sustainability: Companies specializing in renewable energy, clean technology, and sustainable practices might find new opportunities for growth.

Preparing for the Future

Canadian businesses can take proactive steps to mitigate risks and capitalize on opportunities, regardless of the election outcome:

Reassess Trade and Export Strategies: Companies reliant on exports to the U.S. should explore diversifying their market reach to reduce exposure to potential tariffs or trade restrictions. Building connections with other international markets, such as the European Union or Asia-Pacific region, could provide a cushion if U.S. trade relations become challenging.

Evaluate Labor and Workforce Strategies: For Canadian businesses with U.S. operations, reviewing workforce management, labor costs, and operational expenses will be essential to navigate potential changes in wage and labor regulations. Investing in remote work technologies and cross-training employees can enhance flexibility and reduce dependency on cross-border movement.

Consult Legal Experts: Given potential shifts in regulations and trade policies, consulting a business lawyer can help Canadian companies adopt adaptive strategies to respond to changing market conditions and regulatory landscapes. Legal guidance can support efforts to increase supply chain resilience, develop contingency plans, and incorporate flexible budgeting strategies to absorb potential regulatory changes.

Stay Updated on Regulatory Changes: Executives and boards should keep a close watch on U.S. policy developments to prepare for shifts in regulations and expectations. Subscribing to policy updates, engaging with industry associations, and participating in cross-border business forums can provide valuable insights.

Embrace Innovation and Sustainability: Regardless of political changes, global trends are moving towards sustainability and digital innovation. Canadian businesses that invest in green technologies, sustainable practices, and digital transformation may find new opportunities and remain competitive in a changing landscape.

Conclusion

The outcome of the U.S. elections holds significant implications for Canadian businesses. By understanding how different scenarios could impact trade, labor, and regulatory environments, companies can better prepare and adapt. Proactive planning, market diversification, workforce development, and legal consultation are key strategies to navigate the uncertainties ahead. Embracing innovation and staying informed will position Canadian businesses to thrive, no matter the election results.

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About the Author

Roberts Obradovic is a Toronto-based law firm specializing in corporate, privacy, employment, and litigation matters. With extensive experience in cross-border legal issues, our team provides comprehensive legal guidance to Canadian businesses navigating the complexities of U.S. regulations and policies. We help clients understand the implications of international trade agreements, labor laws, and regulatory changes, assisting them in adapting to evolving political landscapes and maintaining compliance in their operations.

Nigel Green Bitcoin Prediction Proves True: Surges Amid Trump Election Momentum, Expected to Hit $80,000

November 6, 2024

Bitcoin surged to a record high of $75,060 on Tuesday night as growing confidence in Donald Trump’s return to the White House fueled investor excitement in the cryptocurrency space.

The world’s most valuable digital asset has seen a remarkable rally, up over 7% on Tuesday alone, as markets bet on Trump’s victory.

This latest surge was no surprise to Nigel Green, CEO of deVere Group, one of the world’s largest independent financial advisory and asset management organizations, who had accurately forecast that election night volatility would lead to Bitcoin breaking its previous high.

Nigel Green had long stated that the intersection of politics and cryptocurrency would play a defining role in shaping market trends as the US election draws near.

With the Trump campaign positioning itself as the most pro-cryptocurrency in history, he foresaw that the mere possibility of his return to office would cause significant upward pressure on Bitcoin.

“We’ve said for months that Trump’s stance on cryptocurrency, combined with the uncertainty surrounding the election, would push Bitcoin to new heights,” says Nigel Green.

“This rally isn’t just about the election; it’s about the fundamental shifts happening in the digital financial system, of which Bitcoin is the leader. People are waking up to the fact that traditional systems are changing.”

Trump’s pro-cryptocurrency position has been a game changer. On the campaign trail, he has vowed to end what he calls the ‘persecution’ of the cryptocurrency industry and to position the United States as the ‘Bitcoin superpower of the world.’

The deVere CEO continues: “His pledge to cut red tape, promote innovation, and attract major investments in the digital asset space has galvanized investors. Trump’s odds of winning, which have been steadily improving according to prediction markets, are seen as a key reason for the latest surge in Bitcoin’s value.”

“Trump’s open support of cryptocurrency has triggered this surge, as many investors anticipate that a Trump victory would clear the path for mainstream adoption and regulation that is both favorable and necessary for Bitcoin’s continued growth,” explained Green.

“Also, public backing from influential figures in the crypto world has given Trump’s campaign substantial credibility among tech investors. This pro-crypto narrative could pave the way for regulatory clarity, bolstering institutional investments that could send Bitcoin to unprecedented heights.”

While Bitcoin has already soared past its previous high, deVere Group believes this is only the beginning.

Nigel Green and his analysts predict that if Trump were to win, Bitcoin could climb as high as $80,000 in the near future, driven by a combination of heightened demand, market sentiment, and policy expectations under a Trump administration.

“Bitcoin at $80,000 is not far-fetched. We are seeing a perfect storm of market dynamics,” Green stated.

“Crypto investors, traditional investors, and institutions are all looking at Bitcoin not just as an asset, but as a hedge against political instability, inflation, and other macroeconomic factors. Trump’s victory would be a major confidence boost for the sector, potentially pushing Bitcoin beyond $80,000.”

Investors are encouraged to consult with deVere’s team of expert financial advisors to discuss strategies for taking advantage of the ongoing Bitcoin bull run and mitigating risks in an increasingly volatile political landscape.

“As the election results continue to unfold, one thing is certain: Bitcoin has already made history, and with a Trump victory seemingly on the horizon, it could soar even higher, potentially reaching the $80,000 mark.

“This is an exciting time for crypto, and the momentum is undeniable.”

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With Inflation Dropping and Interest Rates Rising, How is the Canadian Economy Adjusting?

November 5, 2024

Three Canadian flags in front of a business building in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

With such big fluctuations in the economy over the past few years, Canadians have had a hard time adjusting to new costs and high interest rates. The rapid change left many people frustrated as they tried to keep afloat even with everyday purchases. Recently the Bank of Canada lowered rates to 4.5% after holding them at 5% since 2023, and it is predicted that this rate-cutting pattern will continue into 2025. But what does this mean for the market and Canadian households?

Inflation dropped to 2.5% in July, marking the lowest increase of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) since 2021. While the lower interest rate and inflation rate are positive signs of the economy stabilizing, we still have a long way to go until consumers will feel the true effects.

“Although rates are starting to come down, they are still fairly high, which means we really won’t see big effects in the market until another drop”, says Moncton, New Brunswick Financial Advisor Serge Robichaud. “Even with the lower rates, it is going to take time for the economy and people to adjust. There is always a lag that can be unpredictable, and we need to keep a sharp eye on the ripple effects so our clients can be aware.”

Rates Still Pose Challenges

In order for the economy to have a ‘neutral level’ when it comes to interest rates, the Bank of Canada estimates that rates would need to stabilize at 2.25-3.25%. Currently, we are nowhere near those numbers. This means that while the interest rates have dropped, consumer spending will not strengthen enough in 2024 to see significant growth in business investment.

Mortgage Rates

This is where we will see both positive immediate changes as well as some challenges. For new buyers, the drop in interest rates will help housing affordability. “This is one of the pushes that the real estate market needs. With the predicted drops in rates that will continue into 2025, we will see more buyers who can invest in property,” Moncton’s Robichaud explains. While this is great news for new buyers, those who have mortgages that are coming up for renewal this year might not reap the benefits. New rates are likely to still be higher than what they were 4 to 5 years ago when they first purchased. “Even with higher mortgage renewal rates, it is a manageable issue because incomes have increased since the start of the pandemic to help balance.”

Saving Accounts and GICs

As the Bank of Canada continues to lower interest rates, the returns from traditional savings accounts and GICs will be affected. Robichaud shares that, “The relationship between loans and mortgages isn’t directly linear with savings rates. That being said, in order to compensate for lower lending rates, the BoC will usually also drop the interest you can collect on your savings”.

Consumer Spending

With inflation rates starting to drop it is predicted we will see a rebound in consumer spending. During the summer of 2024, there has already been an increase on travel spending among Canadians. Not only does inflation play a factor when it comes to consumer spending, but interest rates will help individuals determine how much disposable income they have to spend on material items.

Before the year’s end, additional cuts are expected to bring Canada’s interest rate to 4%. The Canadian economy will see significant changes as the rate continues to drop. What is important to note is that these changes won’t occur overnight. It will be well into 2025 before we settle into a new economy.

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Coursepivot: Best Do my Research Paper for me Site in the USA

November 5, 2024

CoursePivot.com — *Image from Coursepivot.com*

You have been asking, can I pay someone to do my research paper for me? The best and correct answer is YES, you can hire people experienced and qualified enough on Coursepivot.com to “write my research paper” for you. If you are a college student, you can hire someone to do your research paper on Coursepivot.com. Most importantly, Coursepivot.com will deliver your term paper right to your email, with free AI and similarity report.

Knowing very well how serious it has become to proof you did not use AI in your research paper, the most reasonable approach is buy custom research papers from a website that does not use one after all. So, in this article, let us talk about Coursepivot and why this company has become the go-to for best research paper writing services in United States.

Whether you need someone help you outlining research paper so you can write your custom paper yourself; you are asking someone to write same day papers and deliver your custom paper within hours, Coursepivot.com is the best for all such requests.

It is not easy to find a legitimate research paper help site in America that gives a guarantee for your money back if you indeed get a poor-quality paper. We’re saying this knowing well how rare it is to find complaints of poor quality papers or custom essays done on Coursepivot.com. In fact, Coursepivot.com college paper writing website is now rated 98/100 and 4.9/5 on major review platforms, making it the most reliable when it comes to asking someone to “do my research paper for me.”

Introduction to Coursepivot.com Service

Coursepivot.com is a “do my research paper” and assignment writing service launched over 10 years in USA. The company has offices in Arizona, U.S. and other workstations in Ontario, Ca. Coursepivot started as a online tutoring website before getting into custom essay and research paper writing services a few years ago. Overall, it has been considered the best homework writing website because it employs only US-based experts in its locations. In fact, Coursepivot.com does not hire virtual or remote assignment helpers. All homework writers and research paper writers work from physical workstations in USA (Arizona) and Canada (Ontario).

Types of Services on Coursepivot

Pay someone to do my research paper for me service

The most popular sought-after service on the internet today is “do my research paper for me services.” In the USA, the best website that offers cheap and quality research paper writing services is Coursepivot.com without a doubt based on reviews. The US-based company has helped thousands of students looking for a legit website to buy custom research papers. Without Coursepivot.com, you are assured of A-quality research papers: Dissertations, theses, term papers, and custom essays.

Coursepivot.com website is known for completing and doing best research papers, whether you need with specific parts or the entire paper done from scratch. For example, you can pay someone online to help you write an abstract for research paper for you, draft the methods section of research paper, write a perfect conclusion for your paper or even find the best and fit topic for your custom research paper.

You can still ask Coursepivot.com whether you can “buy custom research papers” in Master’s and PhD levels and they will craft a perfect paper for you.

Pay someone to help with assignment writing

Undoubtedly, Coursepivot.com remains the top and most trusted website in United States when it comes to AI-free and cheap assignment writing services. So, Coursepivot is your best option if you are also looking for help with case study, doing discussion board posts, or complete other homework help categories in subjects like Nursing and management. Coursepivot has still been reviewed as the number one assignment helper site in USA.

If you need your homework done by an expert in the USA, visit Coursepivot.com and surely you won’t be frustrated. After all, if the paper you receive is not satisfactorily done, you can ask for limitless revisions or even a refund. So, trust what we say here that our thorough research has found that Coursepivot.com is the most legit and popularly searched by US college students when it comes to help do my research paper for me requests.

AI humanizing to Bypass Turnitin

Coursepivot.com is still the best site where you can pay someone to remove AI content in your paper and bypass Turnitin AI detection. There are many tools you can use to humanize AI and convert AI text to human text. However, it has been confirmed time and time again that the best option when your paper is flagged as AI generated is to manually rewrite and not using paraphrasing tools. So, before you ask them to “do my research paper online”, you can also hire the writers on Coursepivot to rewrite and edit that AI-flagged paper to make sure it passes AI checkers.

So, the most accurate answer to how can I bypass Turnitin AI detection by humanizing my paper is manually rewriting and editing the flagged content one sentence at a time while constantly checking until the paper passes as Human. Alternatively, the second option is to hire an expert on Coursepivot.com to rewrite and edit the content until you get 0% AI on Turnitin without any change in your arguments or paper structure.

Our Genuine Coursepivot Review

Pros

Expert Writers: Coursepivot boasts a team of skilled writers specializing in various fields, ensuring high-quality work when you request to write my research paper for me.
Custom Research Papers: Every paper is tailored to meet specific needs. When students purchase a research paper online, they receive a document crafted just for them.
100% Plagiarism-Free Guarantee: Coursepivot guarantees that all papers are original, allowing students to confidently pay someone to write my research paper without fear of duplicate content.
Timely Delivery: The service is committed to delivering papers on time, providing students with enough time to review their work before submission. Those needing to write my term paper quickly can rely on this efficiency.
Secure and Confidential: Coursepivot prioritizes privacy, ensuring that personal information remains confidential when students buy research papers.

Cons

Pricing: Some students may find Coursepivot’s prices higher than average. However, the emphasis is on quality, which justifies the cost.
Limited Free Revisions: While revisions are offered, there may be limits based on the project. Clear communication is essential when students order research paper online.
No Live Chat Support: Currently, Coursepivot does not provide live chat support, relying instead on email or phone communication, which may be less immediate.

How It Works

Step 1: Place Your Order
First, students need to sign up for free or log in to their existing account on Coursepivot. Next, they can navigate to the order form page by clicking the “Order Now” link. They should specify their requirements for the assignment and upload any relevant files, then click the submit button.
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After clicking “submit,” students will be directed to a safe and secure payment window. They can choose to pay for their order using PayPal or a credit card. Coursepivot will hold the payment until the solution is delivered.
Step 3: Get Your Solution by Email
Once payment is made, the support team will assign the best-suited expert for the task. The writer will begin working on the order, and when it’s ready, Coursepivot will double-check to ensure it’s entirely original. The completed paper will then be sent to the student’s email. The payment will be released once the student is satisfied with the solution.

Top 4 Best Research Paper Writing Sites Compared

Site 1. Coursepivot.com

Overview: Coursepivot.com is a premier research paper writing service designed to meet the unique needs of students across the USA. It offers a range of customizable options, ensuring that every paper is original and tailored to specific guidelines.

Pros:

Master’s level expertise
100% plagiarism-free guarantee
Timely delivery
Secure and confidential
Excellent customer support

Cons:

Slightly higher prices compared to some competitors, reflecting the quality.

Site 2. Papersowl.com

Overview: Papersowl.com positions itself as a user-friendly platform where students can find writers for their research papers.

Why Coursepivot.com is Better: Unlike Papersowl, Coursepivot maintains a consistent quality standard with expert writers, ensuring high-quality work every time. Coursepivot’s commitment to timely delivery and originality sets it apart from the inconsistent experiences reported by Papersowl users.

Site 3. Essaypro.com

Overview: Essaypro.com claims to connect students with professional writers for various academic needs, including research papers.

Why Coursepivot.com is Better: Coursepivot ensures that all writers are qualified and native English speakers, providing students with the assurance of high-quality, well-researched papers. This level of quality control and expertise is often lacking at Essaypro, making Coursepivot the preferred choice.

Site 4. Studybay.com

Overview: Studybay.com offers a marketplace for students to hire freelance writers for various projects, including research papers.

Why Coursepivot.com is Better: Coursepivot provides a straightforward and transparent ordering process, ensuring students know what to expect. The focus on producing original, human-written content without relying on AI makes Coursepivot a far more reliable option than Studybay.

Our Final Review and Recommendation

After comparing Coursepivot.com with other leading research paper writing services, it is clear that Coursepivot stands out as the most legitimate and reliable option for college students in the USA looking to hire someone to do my research paper for you. With its commitment to quality, expert writers, a 100% plagiarism-free guarantee, and a user-friendly experience, Coursepivot provides unmatched value.

Students can trust that when they choose Coursepivot to get my research paper done online, they are making an investment in their academic success, ensuring that their papers are not only high-quality but also tailored to their specific needs. For those who are serious about achieving excellent results, Coursepivot.com is undoubtedly the best place to pay someone to write my research paper for me with a guarantee of no AI or plagiarism.

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Canadian Dimension: What the US Presidential Candidates Are Saying and Aren’t – Key Trends and Issues for the Election

November 5, 2024

Banner of Trump and Harris — *Election signs in Lancaster, Ohio. Photo by Dan Keck on Flickr*

By Dr. Jack Rasmus

National opinion polls show that with just one week to go in the US presidential election, Trump and Harris are virtually tied at 47 percent each. But national opinion polls are irrelevant as they predict little in terms of the actual outcome. This is because, in America’s archaic election system, it is not the people but the Electoral College (EC) delegates, appointed by their respective states, who decide who wins.

Technically, these delegates cast their votes for president based on whichever candidate receives the majority of the votes in their respective states. However, as the world witnessed in the 2020 US election, some EC delegates were prepared to vote contrary to the voters in their state; and some governors and legislatures were prepared to send competing delegations to the EC.

The election is still not over when the EC delegates meet in December to cast their states’ votes. The delegates’ votes are recorded and the results are sent to Congress on January 6. Technically, Congress could choose not to accept the delegates’ votes—as nearly occurred on January 6, 2021. Since 2021, Congress has passed new rules to seek to clarify the process—but those rules are still untested and remain unclear, in some respects, as to how Congress will confirm the EC tally this December to determine the final outcome of the Harris versus Trump contest. The Congress has the final say in regard to accepting the EC delegates’ votes.

Further uncertainties may arise after November 5, should either party challenge the state vote outcomes in court, delay sending delegates to the EC counting in December, or otherwise tie up the new procedure in the courts before the January 6 final confirmation by Congress. It is well known that both parties have been preparing to spend millions to legally challenge the results in several states, in particular the “swing states,” either to delay or even overturn the vote results or EC delegate appointments. In other words, post-November 5, events may prove even more dramatic than those that followed the November 2020 election.

Decision by swing states, not popular vote

However the process unfolds, it is in the seven swing states that this year’s outcome will be decided—just as it was in 2020 and 2016. And if current trends continue through the final week before the election, the result may turn out a close repeat of the 2016 one. In that election, the outcome was determined, essentially, in the swing states.

The seven swing states are: Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Some analysts say that Virginia—once solidly Republican but lately shifted to the Democrats in slim margins—should be included in the swing state column this time as well.

To reiterate a key point: what happens in those seven (or eight) swing states will determine the election, not the popular vote as predicted by the polls. And perhaps not simply by the voters in those key states, but by the two parties’ legal teams and other behind-the-scenes political machinations by the political elites.

So, the likelihood is great that the American public will not know on November 6 who their president will be in 2025. That may take weeks. Or months.

Such is the legacy of the limited electoral democracy in the United States, where “one person, one vote” is not, nor ever was, the rule for electing presidents. At one point in the past, senators were selected in backroom wheeling and dealing by state legislatures and governors. Changing that “system,” and bringing in “one person, one vote,” took longer than a century. That this has not been done for the presidential election testifies to the fact that neither of the two main parties has any serious interest in abolishing the Electoral College and switching to direct election of the president. The parties like it this way. Direct election would eliminate the many possibilities to manipulate the election that the EC system enables (possibilities we saw play out in 2020 and may see again this year).

Several other important trends may also influence the election outcome. One of these, not surprisingly, is money.

Political party realignments

In 2010, the US Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision opened the floodgates to allow virtually unlimited campaign contributions by wealthy donors and corporations, a trend that has continued to escalate ever since. Billions of dollars are now spent on the elections. In recent weeks, for example, Kamala Harris and the Democrats reportedly raised $1 billion in just three months (July–September). And, in the past week, another $97 million. In contrast, Trump spent $417 million during the summer and just $16 million in recent weeks. This represents a historic shift: traditionally, it was the Republican Party that received the big-money contributions. With 2024, that mantle has been passed. Today, the Democrats are the party of big money.

At the same time, money flows from or on behalf of foreign nations have also accelerated. For example, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has admitted to spending more than $100 million on 2024 election candidates—and that is only what’s admitted publicly. Of the organizations that make election contributions on behalf of foreign powers, AIPAC is the only one exempt under US law from registering as a foreign agent.

There may also be, since 2016, another party realignment underway—not simply in regard to support from wealthy donors but also from other constituencies. Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance, are clearly making a bid for working class support, with proposals to cut taxes on tip income, overtime pay, Social Security benefit payments, childcare tax credits, state and local tax deductions, and other measures. To a limited extent, Harris has mimicked some of these proposals. Perhaps most interesting is Trump’s proposal to eliminate the tax on Social Security benefits (not to be confused with the payroll tax). Although this tax is still a relatively recent one, introduced under Reagan in the 1980s, Trump now proposes to repeal it. Meanwhile, Harris and the Dems—once the champions of Social Security—are conspicuously silent. Can it be that the Trump Republicans are now shifting toward working class constituencies, while Harris and the Democrats focus on identity issues and Trump’s personality? Further evidence that such a realignment is underway, if still in the early stages, comes from key neocons and anti-democracy political characters such as Dick Cheney and John Bolton, who now support Harris and campaign with her. Are today’s Democrats now the party of war and empire?

Another important trend is the recent emergence of social media channels and personalities as key outlets of communication to voters. It is well known by now that voters under 35 don’t watch mainstream outlets like CNN, MSNBC, and the like; nor do they read the New York Times or the Washington Post—or any print media, for that matter. Instead, candidates are seeking out interviews with social media celebrities as never before.

Defining issues for 2024

The current election is notable not only for the issues being raised by Trump and Harris, but for the issues the candidates decline to address. Since the start of this year, national polls have indicated that the economy—and specifically inflation—is the number-one issue. A recent Gallup poll showed the economy to be the most important issue by far, with a huge majority of respondents calling it either “very important” or “extremely important.”

The issue of second-highest concern is democracy. This is a more complex issue, one that means different things to different voters. For Democrats, this means concerns about Supreme Court decisions and the future of abortion and women’s rights, but also points to support for the Democratic Party’s incessant focus on Trump and the January 6, 2021 Capitol riots. For Republicans, it means concerns about the Democrats in relation to censorship, widespread “ballot denialism” against challengers (whether former Democratic Party members or third-party challengers), Democrat manipulation of their own party’s primaries, the Dems’ use of “lawfare” (in particular legal attacks on Trump), and general concerns regarding manipulation of election vote counts.

The number-three concern, according to the Gallup poll, is immigration, often linked by Trump to issues, real or imagined, such as crime, loss of jobs to “illegals,” privileging of immigrants over US citizens for welfare assistance, housing availability, and other social conditions.

All other issues—from education and health care to taxes and abortion, climate change, race, transgender rights, and foreign policy—rate lower in terms of voter interest. Foreign policy issues, it seems, are not much on US voters’ minds this cycle.

Notably, among the Gallup respondents, Democrats did not list the economy among their top-five concerns—or immigration, crime, taxes, or war. For Democrat voters, this election is mostly about Trump, January 6, the Supreme Court, and women’s and transgender rights. In other words, the Democrats’ messaging centres mostly around what Republicans call “woke” issues and a personal focus on Trump. In contrast, Trump supporters focus on more traditional “pocketbook” concerns: inflation, wages, taxes, crime, and national security issues like war and terrorism.

A deeper inspection of these issues suggests the Democrats may again be “fighting the last war,” as the saying goes. Polls show undecided voters in swing states—in contrast to hardcore party loyalists—just don’t care that much about January 6. Neither are charges regarding Trump’s behaviour among their greatest concerns. Yet the Democrats, nonetheless, continue to hammer away at the personality issue: Trump instigated the January 6 Capitol riot, or Trump is a felon, a womanizer, a Putin pawn, and a Hitler lover. Or, more lately (and with some irony given recent events), Trump suffers from early dementia. Not be outdone, Trumps calls Harris a “fake Black,” unintelligent, and a Biden puppet. For undecided voters in the swing states, however, all this personality bashing, on both sides, is likely just so much political “noise.” And, at this point in the campaign, they are the voters who matter.

Yet the candidates address economic issues like inflation with political platitudes, focus on their distorted interpretations of “democracy,” and continue to engage in personality bashing. Perhaps even more important, there’s been no discussion of the existential issues that will impact voters—and the country’s very stability—even more dramatically in the months immediately following the election.

Such existential issues include the growing fiscal crisis, as US deficits approach $2 trillion per year and the national debt spirals toward $40 trillion and beyond; the near certainty of severe austerity measures including program spending cuts in 2025, regardless of who wins the election; an escalating series of proxy wars leading to region-wide conflicts, perhaps even nuclear ones, in Europe and the Middle East; and the expansion of the BRICS economic block, which threatens to replace US/G7 dominance over the global economy and would bring a deep contraction of living standards in the US and the G7 countries.

It is notable that issues so critical as these are barely ever mentioned by either candidate. Nor were they raised by moderators in the presidential debates. Nor are they addressed in the mainstream media, even at this late date.

What follows is an analysis of such key, often existential issues, which have either received scant mention by the candidates or simply not been addressed at all.

Inflation and the economy

Since the beginning of 2024, polls have shown that the economy, chiefly inflation, is the number-one voter issue for voters. The Democrats tout a slowdown in the rate of price increases to approximately 2.5 percent in the past year. But is it this recent slowdown, or the cumulative rise in the general price level, that is giving voters the impression that inflation is the biggest issue?

Harris and the Democrats focus on the levelling-off of gasoline prices over the last year and the official government inflation index showing food prices have risen only one percent in the last twelve months. Harris has proposed a $25,000 credit toward down payments for new home buyers to partially offset increasingly unaffordable house prices, and touts the Biden program for reducing expensive drug prices for ten new itemized prescription drugs to take effect in 2026.

Trump and the Republicans charge these are just economic band aids and argue the general price-level rise since 2020 is the key inflation indicator, despite the recent slowdown. Households face prices that have levelled off some, yet remain 30–35 percent higher than in 2020.

The reality appears closer to the Republican view. Prices of the most frequently purchased grocery items are up 21 percent since 2020, according to the Wall Street Journal. A few of these increases include: gasoline at the pump (+38 percent), eggs (+113 percent), milk (+24 percent), loaf of bread (54 percent), chicken breast (+37 percent). Even the price of fast food meals at McDonald’s is up 40 percent since 2019. Premiums have risen for home, health, and automobile insurance—the latter by more than 20 percent in just the past year. And housing prices are up 47 percent, according to the national Case–Shiller index. And that doesn’t count what working class voters actually pay for their homes each month in mortgage payments, which have risen 114 percent since 2020 due to interest rates and other fees.

The Democrats conveniently ignore the fact that the government’s official 2.5 percent consumer price index rise over the past year doesn’t include mortgage rates or fees. Nor do official inflation indexes include any other interest rate hikes, for that matter. Average credit card rates have risen from 16 percent in 2020 to 23 percent today, as US households carry over bigger-than-ever unpaid balances on their cards from month to month. The same can be said for student loan rates, auto loan interest, and installment loans—all of which have risen sharply since 2022.

This surge in price levels has devastated real disposable income for US households. And that’s what they’ll remember when they vote.

The inflation level might not be an issue if real wages increased at a similar rate. But they haven’t for four years. Real median weekly earnings (i.e., hourly wage x hours worked) have contracted slightly. They decline even faster if you count the more than 50 million part-time, temporary and gig workers in the US economy, per federal government figures. And real weekly earnings would decline further yet if interest rates and tax increases were included in the government’s inflation adjustment, which they aren’t.

Even official government data for full-time workers’ median weekly earnings, when adjusted for inflation in 1983–84 prices (the base year the government uses to measure long-term real wages), show that real wages declined by 2.8 percent in 2021–23, levelling off at 0.4 percent the past year; whereas during Trump’s first three years (2017–19), they rose a modest one to two percent.

Not surprisingly, Trump and Vance talk about the reduction in real take-home pay impacting all workers, not the average hourly full-time wage, unadjusted for inflation, touted in the Harris-Walz campaign messaging.

Decline of democracy

The second-most important issue to voters is the very real impression that the norms and practices of democracy in America have been subtly but steadily dismantled over recent decades. This problem surfaced in the public consciousness during the 2000 election when the Supreme Court, in its Bush v. Gore decision, in effect “selected” George W. Bush as president by halting the Florida vote recount. The threat to democracy intensified the following year in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which US neocons leveraged to impose the Patriot Act, reversing long-standing civil liberties, and launched a program of intensified surveillance of US citizens that continues to this day. A decade later, in 2010, the Supreme Court issued its Citizens United ruling and gutted the 1965 Voting Rights Act, effectively endorsing widespread gerrymandering of House of Representatives districts by both parties. Then came the court’s decision that the two main parties need not abide by any democratic principles in running their respective organizations. The parties, it would seem, are essentially private clubs.

Neither party nor their candidates offer any concrete proposals to rescind the Patriot Act and its attack on civil liberties. Or to pass legislation to override the Supreme Court’s disastrous green-lighting of unlimited campaign contributions. Or to abolish the Electoral College. Or to reverse the Congressional gerrymandering, which has ensured that no more than 50 House seats are ever competitive contests. Or to restore the Voting Rights Act. Or to undo voter suppression. Or to reform their own organizations democratically, to ensure the party members actually choose the candidates.

The Democrats, in 2024, have reduced the issue of the decline in democracy to the events of January 6, 2021, in order to tag Trump as a “demon of democracy” who, if elected, will open the floodgates to authoritarian and even dictatorial rule. The Republicans remain silent about their voter suppression initiatives, seek to reverse mail-in ballots, and complain about Democrats’ ballot denialism, plans for social media censorship, and politically weaponized “lawfare,” but propose no action.

Illegal immigration

The third issue of greatest interest to voters is, according to Gallup and other polls, the issue of illegal immigration along the country’s southern border. Government data shows that an average of two million people per year crossed into the US in 2022 and 2023. Data for 2024 are not available yet. Immigration slowed in 2020–21, due largely to a weak US economy during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Democrats focus on Trump’s demand to deport the “illegals,” specifically the cost and likely impossibility of physically enforcing such measures. Trump focuses on the consequences of the Biden-Harris policies of the past four years, impacting jobs, housing, and crime. Both accuse the other for the thousands of children of immigrants that have gone unaccounted for during both administrations. Trump takes a page from the old “welfare reform abuses” playbook, accusing the Democrats of giving each “illegal” a $2,000 cash debit card and setting them up with free housing, while millions of Americans languish with little to no housing and without cash resources. Democrats accuse Trump of sabotaging a recent bipartisan congressional bill to regulate immigration simply to boost his campaign.

While Trump and Harris push their respective positions at rallies and appearances across the northern swing states over the election’s closing weeks, neither says anything about the existential issues noted previously: the deficit and debt, the coming austerity program cuts, the escalating proxy wars and slide toward potential nuclear confrontations with Russia or Iran, and the BRICS challenge to US global economic hegemony.

Deficits and debt

Neither candidate admits how much each party has contributed to the deficits and debt during their recent administrations. In 2000, the US national debt was $5.674 trillion when George W. Bush entered office; when he left, it was $10.024 trillion—nearly double. Starting with Bush’s $10.024 trillion as a base, when Obama left office at the end of 2016 the national debt had risen to $19.573 trillion, nearly doubling again. By the time Trump left office at the end of 2020, it had risen to $26.945 trillion in just four years. As of October 2, 2024, under Biden—just another four years—the national debt rose to $35.680 trillion. By year’s end, it is expected to be $36.260 trillion.

So, if we compare who performed worse, Trump or Biden, in their four years in office: Trump added $7.372 trillion to the national debt and Biden added $9.315 trillion.

For both presidents—and, indeed, since 2000 generally—the rise in deficits and debt is attributable to four factors:

$16 trillion in tax cuts, at least three quarters of which have accrued to corporations, businesses, and wealthy investors (as well as slow growth of the US economy, and therefore also tax revenues, after 2008).
$8.5 trillion for US wars, the Pentagon, and US defense spending in general, which now costs more than $1.2 trillion per year.
Price gouging by health insurance and Big Pharma companies, which have driven up the cost of government-subsidized health care programs.
Crisis-related government spending programs in 2008–10 ($1 trillion) and again in 2021–22 ($3 trillion).

None of the $36 trillion national debt, by the way, includes spending by the Federal Reserve, America’s central bank, whose total balance sheet debt rose from $0.8 trillion in 2007 to $5 trillion by 2016 and then to $9 trillion by 2021. Nor does the $36 trillion figure include state and local debt, which averages around another $2–3 trillion. (Shortfalls in the Social Security and Medicare programs do not form part of the annual budget deficit or national debt figures above.)

The growing fiscal crisis will likely erupt at some point during the next president’s term in office. On average, deficits have exceeded $1 trillion and been rising every year under both Republicans and Democrats since 2016. In 2024 alone, the official US deficit figure was $1.8 trillion. This has meant that annual interest payments to wealthy bondholders, domestic and foreign, this year cost $950 billion—more than the Pentagon budget. The deficit acceleration will continue. The Congressional Budget Office, the research arm of Congress, estimated this year that another $20 trillion will be added to deficits, rising to $56 trillion in 2034. That’s a continuing average of $2 trillion per year and means that, by 2034, interest payments on the debt will rise to $1.7 trillion.

That’s $0.95 trillion today, and $1.7 trillion in a decade, rushing out of the annual budget and into the pockets of wealthy bondholders! That’s more than Social Security and more than even the Pentagon. A fiscal train wreck is around the corner in America.

In short, deficits and debt are issues of immense importance to the stability of the economy and standard of living for millions of Americans over the next decade. But neither candidate, Harris or Trump, has spoken a word about it. And neither candidate will, because they would in effect be pointing the finger at themselves.

Austerity and program cuts

In terms of solutions to the fiscal crisis, neither party will raise taxes for the wealthy and their corporations to reduce the deficit. Democrats have shown over the last four years that, despite promises to the contrary, their actions have been fully in accord with Trump’s $4.5 trillion in tax cuts in 2018, which contributed greatly to the rising deficit. Trump favours the permanent extension of these cuts (80 percent of which accrue to investors and businesses) when they come up for renewal in 2025. The Congressional Budget Office estimates this will represent an additional $5 trillion hit to the deficit and debt. The Democrats’ big-money donors will not permit them to reverse the tax cuts either.

Neither Harris nor Trump will address the root causes of the annual trillion-dollar-plus deficits and escalating national debt. Whoever wins in November will continue to raise Pentagon spending to support America’s imperial proxy wars. They will ensure that the Treasury continues to pay bondholders $1–1.7 trillion each year to prevent a collapse of the US dollar. And they will enact even more tax cuts for businesses and investors.

Instead of reversing tax cuts, they will implement social spending cuts—and these will include Social Security—even as they have said nothing about the coming austerity cuts and tell lies about how they won’t cut Social Security.

The BRICS challenge and the decline of empire

While Trump and Harris campaign, the economic foundations of their very system are fracturing. Formed in 2009 by five countries— Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—the BRICS was initially created to bring together the leading economies of the Global South to address the consequences of the global financial crash and recession of 2008–09. By that time, the world had moved on from the 1980s, when the leading global financial and economic powers, the US and the UK, introduced what has been called the neoliberal policy revolution in response to the economic and political crises of the 1970s.

US capitalism was not only rescued in the 1980s but set out upon a massive worldwide economic expansion. America’s global hegemony was restored and its empire grew. That growth accelerated in the 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the opening of China to Western investment, and the further deepening of neoliberal policies. In 2008, however, the expansion and its associated policies hit a wall from which the US global economic empire has still to recover fully. Trump tried to restore it, but failed. History will show the same for Biden.

In the 21st century, the US has sustained itself on the strength of its foreign investments, financialization of the economic system, and new technologies. However, the Global South has expanded economically. It is no longer the Global South of the 1980s, which was largely dependent on the West economically, and much weaker politically and militarily than the US and its G7 allies.

With the advent of neocon control over US foreign policy beginning in the late 1990s, US elites have resorted to wars and violence to maintain their empire. In the face of crises in 2008 and 2020, they have struggled with the rise of the BRICS—particularly the competitive challenge from China, Russia’s recovery from its post-USSR depression of the 1990s, and growing assertiveness by Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia as well as India, Brazil, and others. The Global South wants a bigger voice in the institutions of empire. So far, however, the US and its G7 allies have allowed them only token participation in those institutions.

In the midst of the 2024 election, therefore, the rise of the BRICS is moving to a new stage, as its current and prospective members met in Kazan, Russia, this past October. Twelve new member countries are in the process of joining the current nine. Notable among the new additions are several important nations and economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, in Southeast Asia; Algeria and Nigeria, in Africa; several Central Asian countries and Turkey; and Bolivia and Cuba, in Latin America. And it is reported that as many as 80 countries are interested at least to some degree.

The eventual outcome of the BRICS challenge will be the displacement of the key institutions underlying the US global empire: the SWIFT payments system, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and, eventually, the US dollar as the dominant global reserve and transactions currency. The recent BRICS Kazan Declaration is a 108-clause blueprint that outlines where the organization is headed and describes a set of global economic institutions parallel to the Bretton Woods system created in 1944, upon which the US post-war economic empire has been based ever since.

The BRICS represents an existential challenge to the United States. However, neither Trump nor Harris, nor their respective Republican and Democrat leaderships, are saying anything about it during this election. Perhaps to do so would be too dangerous for their political aspirations, the consequences too great? Or perhaps they simply haven’t formed a consensus on a strategy yet, beyond “strong-arming” the Global South into submitting once again to their “rules-based international order”?

It is likely, however, that once the election is over the BRICS will become the key topic of debate among the US elites and their G7 allies concerning “what is to be done.” By then, the November 2024 election will be history. And voters will have had no say on what actions the US imperial elites and their allies will take in response to the existential challenges currently on the horizon.

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About the Author

Dr. Jack Rasmus is the author of several books on the United States and the global economy, including The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy from Reagan to Trump (2020), Systemic Fragility in the Global Economy (2016), and The Twilight of American Imperialism (forthcoming later this year form Clarity Press). He is a host for the radio show Alternative Visions on the Progressive Radio Network, a journalist, a playwright, and a former professor of economics at St. Mary’s College (retired). He worked for 20 years for various tech start-ups and global companies, prior to which he served for 15 years as an organizer and local union president with several American unions.

Kamala Harris and Donald Trump Make Final Pitches in Tight Presidential Race

November 4, 2024

As Election Day looms, Democratic candidate Kamala Harris made her closing pitch for the presidency in Michigan, addressing a historically Black church in Detroit and meeting with Arab Americans in East Lansing. Harris emphasized the power voters hold to determine the nation’s future and addressed the challenges faced by civilians in Gaza and Lebanon, pledging to end the Gaza war if elected.

Meanwhile, former President Donald Trump rallied in Pennsylvania, using fiery language to criticize Democrats and warn of a “nation in decline.” He addressed supporters with dark predictions for the economy and took jabs at the media, suggesting they shield him from threats. Trump’s recent rhetoric has prompted concern, as he called out critics and implied that election results should be decided by Tuesday night, though election officials warn that counting may take days.

With more than 78 million Americans already casting ballots, polls show a tight race, with Harris enjoying strong support among women and Trump gaining ground with Hispanic men. Control of Congress is also up for grabs, potentially shaping the legislative landscape for the next president.

Related Readings:

Bombshells in the 2024 Election: Past & Future

The First Vice-Presidential Debate

The Second 1st Presidential Debate

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