Europeans are finally coming to grips with the reality that high-intensity warfare between developed, symmetrical countries was not simply eradicated with the end of WWII. Leaders have also woken up to the fact that the continent’s deep precision strike capabilities are inadequate if an aggressor knocks down their door.
Russian and Ukrainian forces have been battling it out for almost four years, marking the return of high-intensity warfare: meaning significant losses, occurring over a sustained period of time and with constant skirmishes over superiority on land, in the air and at sea. One study from The French Institute of International Relations observes: “since the winter of 2023, the stalemate on the Ukrainian front has prompted the belligerents to make greater use of deep precision strikes, in search of a military effect that has become impossible to achieve on the front line”.
Ukraine’s manpower, military budget and arms stockpiles were vastly inferior to Russia’s at the beginning of the conflict, but impressive determination and resourcefulness have helped develop deep precision strike (DPS) capabilities that might turn the tide. And Russian citizens felt the repercussions recently as they faced drastic fuel shortages and record-level gasoline prices – a result of Ukraine’s campaign to bomb Russia’s oil infrastructure and hurt Putin’s war economy. Reuters reports that Ukraine’s long-range strikes have neutralised 17% of Russia’s oil refining capacity in August. This intensive use of deep strikes has raised awareness among European leaders: not only are their countries vulnerable to such threats, but they also have very limited capabilities in this area.
The conflict, amongst others, has demonstrated Europe’s need to have robust air defence systems (IAMD/A2AD) and an array of DPS armaments capable of neutralising high value targets (HVTs) including key people, infrastructure and command centres located far beyond front lines. Beyond their immediate, potential or observed military effect, DPS weapons are an essential tool for STRATCOM due to the fact that by simply having them in one’s arsenal, they serve as a deterrence – of dissuading potential aggressors from crossing the red line.
DPS in Action
While Ukraine has mostly relied on long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for hitting HVTs, they have also been developing long-range cruise missiles that are faster, capable of inflicting greater damage and more difficult to shoot down than UAVs. Ukraine upgraded its Neptune anti-ship missile into a new long-range cruise missile and used it last March to hit an oil refinery in Tuapse, causing a fire that took three days to extinguish. As Ukrainian MP Roman Lozinskyi remarked, “In essence, Putin has quietly confirmed to Trump how much our deep strikes are hurting the Russian energy sector. This is our trump card.” And Ukraine now has a big, new trump card to play.
Ukraine’s Fire Point defence company recently unveiled its Flamingo FP-5, a long-range cruise missile that can carry a one-ton warhead over 3,000 kilometres. Iryna Terekh, Fire Point’s CEO, says the company aims to produce 200 per month and, “We watched Russian reaction to our first missions, and I can tell you the more successful the mission was, the more Russians tried to choke all publicity around it.”
Terekh also highlights another fundamental role of DPS capabilities – to deter. David Kirichenko from the Atlantic Council argues that the sheer size of Russia means its air defence systems cannot defend the whole country from DPS so, “Kyiv policymakers are hoping that if Putin is confronted with a bloody stalemate in Ukraine and the prospect of mounting attacks inside Russia, he may be forced to rethink his current uncompromising stance and seek a settlement to end the invasion.”
Regardless of Ukraine’s future ability to produce these missiles and use them effectively, the Flamingo epitomises the various strengths in owning deep strike capabilities: the ability to physically hit where it hurts, to leverage this as an effective communications tool, using it as a bargaining chip and deterrent from future aggression.
In the Middle East, Iran’s significant arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles could not deter Israel’s hawkish government from attacking in June because they claimed adding a nuclear weapon to Iran’s arsenal was too imminent. After twelve days of precision strikes, Israel neutralised HVTs in Iran including nuclear scientists, top military brass, missile production facilities and nuclear sites.
The last time Europe truly used its limited DPS abilities was in 2018 during the Hamilton Operation to punish Syria’s then-president Bashar al-Assad for crossing the red line of using chemical weapons against civilians. On April 14th, British, French and American forces successfully destroyed Syrian facilities storing chemical weapons by firing European-made, long-range Storm Shadow (SCALP in French) cruise missiles from the air and five MdCN naval cruise missiles (with a range greater than 1000 km) by sea. Storm Shadow missiles have since been provided to Ukraine by France and the UK.
Changing Geopolitical Realities, Changing Needs
As if the Russian threat were not enough, Europe has had to face the new reality that America is no longer interested in defending freedom and democracy on the continent at today’s cost.
Some leaders lament or try to circumvent transatlantic abandonment. Germany is debating purchasing an American-made Typhon system and Tomahawk missiles (also recently purchased by the Netherlands). EU countries buying American argue it’s faster than developing European-made solutions, but Fabian Hoffmann from the University of Oslo observes, “Only a sustained, long-term missile industrial effort can get Europe back on track in the missile domain. This requires acknowledging that modern war demands thousands of conventional long- and deep-strike capabilities, backed by a robust and continuous order intake.”
Other EU leaders are embracing the opportunity to build European security. France’s President Macron has been promoting European industrial and technological sovereignty and Poland’s Prime Minister Tusk bluntly said last spring, “I will repeat once again what seems incredible but is true: 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans to protect us from 180 million Russians who have not been able to cope with 40 million Ukrainians for three years.”
Luckily, it appears all leaders have woken up to the fact that EU member states must build the DPS capabilities required to deter and defend a Russian, or other, aggression. France and the UK recently signed the Lancaster House 2.0 agreement to order “new Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles following their successful use by Ukraine, upgrading UK and French production lines to bolster national stockpiles to deter adversaries.” They also agreed to begin the development phase (with Italy) of the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) programme, led by European MBDA, to “develop a low observable cruise missile and a highly manoeuvrable supersonic munition.”
The Dutch Ministry of Defence recently announced it is joining the Spanish-led ‘Joint Strike Missile – Submarine Launched’ programme. The new submarine-launched missile is based on the Joint Strike Missile (JSM) from Norwegian Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace. JSM was an evolution from the proven ship- and land-based anti-ship missile Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
Meanwhile, a report from IISS observes that “European countries possess air- and sea-launched cruise missiles; however, no European NATO member has a ground-launched cruise missile having a range of more than 300km except Turkey.” The European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative aims to fill that European capability gap (amongst others) by uniting France, Germany, Poland, Italy, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands. MBDA’s Land Cruise Missile (LCM), based on its battle-proven naval cruise missile (MdCN), is seen as a prime candidate for a pan-European solution. Regarding ELSA, Sweden’s Defence Minister Pål Jonson maintains, “The lesson learned from the war in Ukraine is that long-range strike capabilities are becoming increasingly important on the battlefield, and of course, also with stronger air defence capabilities.”
These efforts will take a lot of time, and money, to develop. When unveiling her €800 billion “ReArm Europe” plan in May, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, claimed that, “This is Europe’s moment and we must live up to it.“ If Ukraine can use ingenuity and determination to build its own deep strike capabilities, shouldn’t Europe be able to do the same?
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