By Gregory P. Shea, Paul Brown and Andre Kotze
Organisations often can benefit from collaboration with others inside or outside of the organisation. However, potentially useful collaboration too often proves suboptimal or an outright fail. Few organisations stood to benefit more from emergency disaster relief expertise than did the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) after the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers on 11 September 2001. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initially sent two teams to connect and help the FDNY. One succeeded. The story offers specific lessons for leaders trying to precipitate intra- or inter-organisational collaboration.
The Fire Department of New York (FDNY) did not have to do it. They had secured an identity as one of, if not THE premier fire department in the world. The department had, as former fire commissioner Sal Cassano said in our interview with him, “150 years of service uninterrupted by progress”.
Yet, surrounded by the destruction and carnage of 9/11, they chose not to rebuild but to recreate the FDNY: 343 FDNY firefighters dead, including three of five ranking chiefs and 93 others in leadership positions. The FDNY had lost firefighters, much of its leadership, and thousands of years of firefighting experience.
In addition, the FDNY had lost 91 vehicles and countless thousands of pieces of equipment, destroyed. The fires that burned around and under WTC plaza would take 99 days to extinguish. Recovery of human remains would continue for more than 8 months. Meanwhile, the city that never sleeps still had emergencies for the FDNY to handle, including fires, which totalled about 1.8 million a year, emergencies that the remaining approximately 11,000 members of the FDNY needed to continue to address promptly and effectively.
Fundamental characteristics of the FDNY would fuel and shape its clawing out from under the post-9/11 debris, in the global, national, and local, world. Deeply traumatised individually and collectively, the FDNY nonetheless assumed lead ownership for the site and dug in – literally.
Deep historical currents had contributed to the toppling of the Twin Towers. Deep global and national currents would determine years of responses to the terror perpetrated. Fundamental characteristics of the FDNY would fuel and shape its clawing out from under the post-9/11 debris, in the global, national, and local, world. Deeply traumatised individually and collectively, the FDNY nonetheless assumed lead ownership for the site and dug in – literally. “Within an hour, the department was back up to normal response capabilities” (Chief Hayden).
Physical, cognitive, and emotional residue from massive, complexly formed rogue waves notwithstanding, individual actions still mattered, as they did on 9/11 itself. People still shaped what happened next. This article offers a brief account of how a few people led by doing just that. Implications for leaders conclude the article.
Scouting the Terrain
“Tension in the command post was palpable.” So reported Paul Summerfeld of the Southwest Incident Management Team (SW-IMT), recollecting initial visits to the FDNY nerve or command centre. The SW-IMT was the second IMT in less than a week to take a run at “finding work” helping a traumatised and beleaguered department, the first being effectively rebuffed. Other agencies asked for assistance and IMTs from around the country worked at the site of the collapsed towers. IMTs secured and distributed supplies, both physical and personnel. They worked with various agencies, including the Port Authority of New York and USAR (Urban Search and Rescue), but NOT with the FDNY.
Dan Oltrogge, of the SW-IMT, and his task force had arrived on 12 September. They supported USAR effort until being tasked to connect with and support the FDNY. Oltrogge surmised that this assignment differed from most: the people charged with managing the post-9/11 world with its carnage, destruction, and chaos were also victims of 9/11, traumatised survivors themselves. Like “almost all operators will do, they will put their heads down and they will be tactically driven…. They’ll do that until they drop…. They’ll try and outwork the incident because that’s the way they were raised.” How long could the FDNY keep this up? “Fire departments are very good at what they do for around 3-4 days” (Paul Summerfeld).
Usually, the SW-IMT, like most IMTs, comes in, relieves initial responders, and runs ongoing disaster operations, overseeing, guiding, as well as providing and organising resources and logistics. They have everything from food and water to replacement communication hardware to incident management operations skills and protocols well honed for large-scale disasters.
“In the usual sequence of events, initial responders take a step back.” But this was not usual and this was New York – and the FDNY “In this case, there was WAY too much ownership … by the FDNY [343 personnel lost], NYPD [23 personnel lost].” Clearly, this time was different. “The culture was different walking in. Not just the culture of NYC, the culture of the FDNY” (Paul Summerfeld). Perhaps needless to say, “We were not invited by the FDNY.” Furthermore, “Acceptance of IMT personnel at the actual site [of the collapsed towers] was not easy.” FDNY regarded the ground with reverence, even as a site hallowed by the magnitude of loss.
The clock ticked on. A relentless pace and volume of labour continued. The towers had gone down 7 days before. All that gear, all those supplies, and all that know-how regarding incident management – worthless unless the IMT could connect with a battered and defiant FDNY. “They [the FDNY] had a gaping hole in their capability …. This was no quick fix …. We were unsure how to help” (Paul Summerfeld). The SW-IMT worked its way into observing the FDNY inter-agency briefing of 18 September from a stairwell through an open door.
Getting the Chance to Help
The IMT did know that “It’s the whole relationship thing …. Just start a conversation and then try to find out what the network was and who may have a little bit of decision authority and see if there’s anything we can do” (Dan Oltrogge). Or, as Paul Summerfeld said, “If we didn’t develop relationships, the door was going to get slammed in our faces.”
And focus, then adapt, but focus. “Don’t try to fix the bigger problem that you can see swirling all around you, just grossly apparent inefficiencies and redundancy and disconnects and confusion and angst. Don’t mess with that. Get with the local jurisdiction, lend them a hand, do what you can and then go home” (Oltrogge).
But how? How to make this officially tasked run at connecting with the FDNY a success, despite the failure of the initial, more informal effort by a peer group.
The SW-IMT waited on the steps overlooking the crammed morning briefing room. They knew enough to be there. They were not at the table, not even in the room, not even in the corridor outside the room. They were on the stairs above the corridor outside the room – but they were watching and listening. They were in position.
They listened, aware that this was NYC. This was the FDNY. “If you can make it here, you can make it anywhere.” That place. Lesson learned: no forestry department patches or National Park Service uniforms, no name badges with titles.
“A lot of times, what’s really important in those instances is it’s about patience and persistence” (Oltrogge).
Discerning How to Help
The meeting broke up and personnel from forestry approached Chief Peter Hayden, head of the just-formed FDNY incident task force and asked, “Chief, can I have five minutes of your time and talk to you?” They had, knowingly, approached the right person. A sceptical Pete Hayden replied, “Sure, OK.” Hayden knew he needed all the help he could get, hence the meeting room stuffed with a myriad of agencies and departments (perhaps 60), but “I remember saying to myself, ’Here’s a guy from the Grand Canyon [literally]. I’m in the canyons of New York City. How is this guy going to help me?’”
Pete Hayden’s recognition of need and commitment to politeness meant that he listened, despite an endless set of pressing demands calling for his time, demands that no doubt contributed to a colleague pronouncing the conversation “b*** s***” and walking out. The conversation quickly turned to immediate needs, such as portable radios and a system for charging them. They talked incident management teams. “I had never heard of these teams.”
Chief Hayden said, “’Come with me.’ We went up to the third floor of the firehouse, … a big open room, some desks and chairs …. ’Will this do?’ and [Dan Oltrogge] says, ’this will be perfect.’”
As for communication devices, the SW-IMT Communications Unit Leader, Mike Hanneman, said, “I can have 400 portables [portable radios] up and running with a couple of repeater sites by tomorrow afternoon.” As Dan Oltrogge recounted, “Now it’s tomorrow afternoon.” Hayden has his 400 portables (and a few extra). Also, “He [Hayden] has a repeater site set up on the Empire State Building [and] he’s got a repeater site on the mast of the Intrepid aircraft carrier [a museum ship in the Hudson River].” Not surprisingly, “That was the moment …that was the first real thing that got our foot in the door.” The SW-IMT had made themselves useful.
As for utilising SW-IMT incident management expertise, the SW-IMT needed to loosen selectively the FDNY’s grip on the approach to operations without diminishing its control. “This was not the place to teach ICS [Incident Command System]. This was the environment to help” (Summerfeld). “So, you were not doing command and control [this time], you moved into advise and consult?” “Yes” (Shea / Summerfeld). “We became staff for Pete Hayden [FDNY Deputy Chief and Incident Commander].”
The day following “the meeting”, the SW-IMT moved into that large open room on the third floor at the firehouse serving as the FDNY ICP. On 20 September, they created a “sample” Incident Action Plan (IAP), a road map of ongoing operations and agencies. On 21 September, they produced 35 copies of the IAP. Eventually, demand for the report led to daily production of over 500 copies. Daily usage spread, including to an expectant mayor’s office.
A Long Shadow
As noted, the FDNY did not just rebuild itself after 9/11. It recreated itself, including opening up to dramatic increases in training inside (building a large and sophisticated addition to its training academy) and outside the department (including building relationships with places such as West Point and Wharton). One key component in the reconstruction? A deep commitment to incident management.
The FDNY came to embrace the domain of incident management with the passion of a convert, which, of course, it was. As Dan Oltrogge said, “what I was really impressed with when we started that training program with the FDNY (at their request) [was] that they didn’t try and shortcut …. They really drank the Kool-Aid that our system is performance-based. It’s not based on day job or rank structure.”
“Best thing we ever did. That’s the success story … it has longevity. It has been a key contributor to the public safety of this country, using one disaster management system”.
Soon, the students became partners. Partners in training around the country. Together they encountered lots of cynicism about the system until, “when [participants] had an FDNY instructor up there at the front of the room telling their story, you could’ve heard a pin drop, instant credibility of that system. It was huge. Those guys have been very aggressive in that. Very aggressive.”
Partners also in doing – nationally. Over the years, FDNY personnel answered calls issued after Hurricane Katrina, Super Storm Sandy, and numerous wildfires.
“Best thing we ever did. That’s the success story … it has longevity. It has been a key contributor to the public safety of this country, using one disaster management system” (Dan Oltrogge).
Conclusion
“Man cannot control the current of events. He [sic] can only float with them and steer” (Otto von Bismark). Or, applied to hard times and battered people: Spot the currents. Respect their force. Remain afloat (i.e., don’t drown). Identify the moments when one can steer. Stay on the river.
FEMA sent two IMTs to the FDNY to connect and to help. One succeeded. The success offers specific lessons for leaders trying to collaborate in the service of helping:
- Pause and observe: Situation and people. Where did you land? Where are you? Who are these people? What’s the local and personal reality? What needs addressing? How do they view you? Look for how to address the situation with the right people duly and rightly respected.
- Get concrete – fast. Traumatised people need a sense of efficacy, a sense denied to, or often outright stripped from them by an overwhelming disaster. Help them mend by helping them mend their world.
- Act in context, but act. Add value by doing the needed. Words may get you five minutes with the chief, but valuable contribution secures a working relationship.
- Respect and honour the implementers, the doers. Your resources (physical or cognitive) matter to the extent that they get employed to good effect. Others will, in the end, determine the usage (or not) and the effectiveness of what you have to offer.
- Adapt as required. Protocols exist for guidance, for reference. They do not necessarily fit a given challenge neatly and snugly. It’s about effective help, not protocol adherence.
- Immediate impact makes enduring impact possible. Keep your eyes open for opportunities. Build relationships. Be willing to recognise mastery in your “students”, their growing into peers. True partnerships develop.
A Closing Note
So, the next time you hear or find yourself about to say, “I’m from the government, corporate, IT, HR [or similar] … and I’m here to help,” stop and consider again those two very different sets of dwellers of two very different sets of canyons. Consider again their path to immediate and to transcending invaluable post-9/11 collaboration.
About the Authors
Gregory P. Shea, PhD, a Senior Fellow at the Wharton School’s Center for Leadership and Change Management, Adjunct Professor of Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics at the Wharton School. www.gregoryshea.com and https://www.linkedin.com/in/gregory-shea-ph-d-1108871/
Paul Brown is a retired New York City Fire captain and third-generation firefighter. He currently works as a leadership coach and educator, sharing his experiences involving high-stakes decision-making, and resilience with clients. Currently he is collaborating on a project to draw lessons in leadership, decision-making, and resilience from FDNY leaders following 9/11. A father of three, he enjoys time with his family and is the leader of his son’s boy scout troop.
Andre Kotze, a process consultant and performance coach with over 25 years of experience on the applied side of people and organisation development, Chief Executive of AirtimeBA, using behaviour science to help professionals develop key communication, collaboration, and decision-making skills. www.airtimeba.com and https://www.linkedin.com/in/andre-kotze-b38a3617b/
