By Ahmad Dahlan
The issue of political Islam and the state in Indonesia apparently continues to roll ahead of the 2019 presidential election as President Joko Widodo from the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDIP) took Professor Ma’ruf Amin as a vice presidential candidate. Ma’ruf Amin is an ulema, scholar, and an expert in Islamic economics.
The declaration of cleric Ma’ruf Amin as President Jokowi’s running mate in next year’s presidential election has surprised many as the announcement occurred just hours after former Consitutional Court chief justice Professor Mahfud MD appeared to confirm he was the vice presidential choice of Widodo.
What also made the decision astonishing is the fact that Jokowi was nominated as a presidential candidate by the Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDIP), the ruling party which had been perceived as a nationalist-red party and not too open to Islamic policies, although in the past presidential election, PDIP was supported by a mass Islamic-based party, particularly the United Development Party (PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), and several NU cadres.
Is the election of Amin as Jokowi’s Vice President candidate aimed at alleviating tensions over political Islam within the country or Jokowi is purely seeking victory?
Issues Exacerbating Political Islam in Indonesia
There are three recent major issues related to the exacerbation of political Islam in Indonesia. First, the left-wing issue relating to the rise of communism. Of course, prejudice about the rise of communism is inseparable from the parties involved in the September 30 movement. “According to historians, in 1965 – 1966 Islamic youth and paramilitary groups with military backing massacred between 500,000 and one million suspected communists across the country.”¹
Second, the right-Islam issue is terrorism and Daulah Islamiyah. Indonesia is panicked by the extreme ideology of right Islam which had given birth to many militant-jihad attacks. Unfortunately, many Muslims are trapped in a circle of terrorism which is allegedly affiliated with the IS (Islamic State) movement in Iraq and Syria, and are willing to commit suicide terrorism. Even the latest Indonesia church attacks in Surabaya is very ironic, because the attacks were committed by a family of suicide bombers.2
Third, bilateral trade and development relations between Indonesia and China continue to be passionate. Xiao Qian (Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia) said in 2017 that the value of Indonesian exports to China reached U.S. $ 28.5 billion (up 35%), and Indonesian imports from China reached U.S. $ 34.8 billion (up 8.3%).3 This bilateral trade relationship is often politicised and linked to communism.
These three issues directly or indirectly create tension against the socio-political-economic conditions of Muslims in Indonesia. Can Amin address these problems? Also, what is the role of Islamic economics in neutralising Indonesia’s economic development going forward?
Ma’ruf Amin As Expert in Islamic Economics
In the socio-political aspect, the appointment of Amin could be correct to alleviate the issue of SARA (ethnicity, religion, race and between groups) or identity politics.
According to the Chairman of the Central Leadership Board of PDIP, Andreas Pareira, the Ma’ruf Amin election could reduce the identity politics attacks aimed at Jokowi. To recall, in the 2014 presidential election, there were groups who spread the issue about Jokowi being a non-Muslim and his affiliation with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).4
In my opinion, PDIP seemed to be more interested in Ma’ruf’s position as an expert in the field of economics (Islam) and Chair of the National Sharia Council, which oversees and gives fatwas on the Islamic economic system in Indonesia – roles that are rarely known by the Indonesian people. With his breadth of knowledge and expertise in economics, his victory in the upcoming 2019 presidential election and tenure could help advance macroeconomic policies (national economic development) based on Islamic economics, and encourage the growth of sharia financial and banking institutions in Indonesia.
Relation of Political Islam and Islamic Economics in Indonesia
If you look at the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, it was considerably late compared to other Muslim-majority countries. Some findings suggest that this can be attributed to President Soeharto’s regime (New Order) and his policies towards Islam.
Interestingly, it was Soeharto who provided political-economic support for the establishment of the first Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat) at the time when the Islamic trend is giving a stronger sociological effect.
In an interview with Perwaatmadja (founder of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia and had served in the Islamic Development Bank), he explained one thing that Moerdiono (at that time the minister of state secretary) emphasised is the idea of Islamic bank establishment is not in line with the Indonesian Islamic State (NII).5 In fact, the idea of establishing an Islamic bank is far from the mission of establishing an Islamic state.
Soeharto immediately carried out political and regulatory policies by issuing a Government Regulation (PP) concerning banks with the profit sharing principle,6 and he drive to pool the core capital so the Islamic bank could be realised in Indonesia. It is rare that President Soeharto quickly agrees with the Islamic policies/issues, especially if driven by political parties (pure politics).
This reflects that the use of Islamic economic system and banking as a way to change authorities’ views on political Islam is very effective and does not cause much Islamic tension with the state or Islamic phobia.
Meanwhile, it was suspected that Suharto’s support for the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (ICMI) was an opportunist strategy, because of his political stance that saw positive changes about “Islamisation” especially among the middle class.7
Also, Effendy’s research found that the relationship of the Islam and state was not easy. It had an impact on the political role of Islam to participate fully in Indonesian political development, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Then the deadlock found common ground in 1992 when both accommodated interests.8
That conflict can be seen today in Jokowi-Ma’ruf tandem (a Nationalist-Religious tandem). Perhaps, PDIP wants to have a memorable victory in the upcoming 2019 presidential election the same way as the victory of Ganjar-Taj Yajin, in the Central Java Governor election (2018). If you look at the surveys, Jokowi has better electability than Prabowo.
Again, in the context of Islamic political economy, basically the Islamic economic system or the personification of Islamic economics like the election of Ma’ruf – which is perceived to be a synthesis and a way to reduce the political Islam tensions in Indonesia did not come suddenly, but has been in a very long process.
Referring to Hefner in the late 1980s, new modernists (young Muslim thinkers) began to emerge. They campaign not to conquer the country, but to renew education and culture with new (global) discourse on democratisation and human rights. They stated, the ultimate goal of Muslim politics is not to create a centralised state with monopoly rights to politics and culture, but the building of Muslim civil society that is able to balance the state power, and promote public culture about pluralism, public participation and social justice.9 Political structure which is the focus of Islamic economic thought and movement has been in motion since the 1980s and were discussed in various books and literatures. Again, at that time, the political Islam relationship and state was known as antagonistic (not mutually agreed).10 Hefner explained that between 1983 and 1985, the Indonesian government required all mass organisations to be founded on the Pancasila ideology. The New Order regime often interfered in Muslim organisations.11
Today, Islamisation is already in the public space, which was pioneered by the rise of the Islamic economy in Indonesia since 1990s. The political space before that barely allowed the formalisation of Islam/sharia now acknowledges many regulations such as sharia banking laws and sukuk.
Also, there has been various civil Islamic political economic organisations such as the Islamic Economic Community (MES), the Association of Islamic Economics Experts (IAEI), Indonesian Islamic Bank Association (Asbisindo) among others which carry out activities and encouragement for the government to support policies on development of Islamic economics system and Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia.
The positive impact that the Islamic economic system/sharia has is that it can ease tensions in political Islam, and the integration of the word “Islam/sharia” in the financial and business economic systems in Indonesia has created internal inclusiveness (among Muslims) because Islamic economics does not contain sensitive differences (khilafiyah).
The Islamic economics also creates external inclusiveness where Islamic financial institutions do not only belong to Muslims but can be owned and accessed by all people regardless of religion, race, ethnicity and class, even from the Chinese group. To note, some Islamic banks are only business units of conventional banks whose majority shares are owned by Chinese people. This model is difficult to be realised in other Islamic institutions.
These are the best conditions and moments about Islamic economics and its personification
Featured Image: The battle lines for Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election were drawn when Mr Widodo (left) chose Mr Amin (right) as his running mate. (AP: Tatan Syuflana)
About the Author
Ahmad Dahlan is a doctor in Islamic Economics and Finance, and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics and Islamic Business, IAIN Purwokerto, Indonesia. He wrote many books, articles, competitive researchers; was active in the Sharia Economic Community Expert Council (MES); and served as a Deputy Chair of the Indonesian Economists Association (IAEI), Banyumas Regency. His article, “Political Economy of Islamic Banking in Indonesia,” was recently published in the American International Journal of Social Science (June 2018).
1. Lamb, Kate., “Beware the red peril: Indonesia still fighting ghosts of communism.” The Guardian. October 1, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/01/beware-the-red-peril-indonesia-still-fighting-ghosts-of-communism.
2. Horten, Alex. “Family of suicide bombers kills at least 7 in Indonesia church attacks.” The Washington Post. May 13, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/05/13/family-of-suicide-bombers-kills-at-least-7-in-indonesia-church-attacks/?utm_term=.3ea39b4b9fb9.
3.“Dubes: Nilai perdagangan Indonesia-China meningkat.” Antaranews.com. January 30, 2018. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/681839/dubes-nilai-perdagangan-china-indonesia-meningkat.
4. “Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin: Politik Identitas VS Isu Ekonomi,” Tempo.co. August 20, 2018. https://fokus.tempo.co/read/1118744/jokowi-maruf-amin-politik-identitas-vs-isu-ekonomi.
5. Karnanen Anwar Perwaatmadja, interview, Tuesday, July 12, 2016 at Jakarta. The sentence were processed by the author.
6. At that time invited PP No. 70, 71 and 72 concerning banking based on profit sharing principle.
7. Hefner, Robert W. “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesia Middle Class.” paper. Mujani Saiful. “Kultur Kelas Menengah Muslim dan Kelahiran ICMI: Tanggapan Terhadap Robert W. Hefner dan Mitsuo Nakamura.” on the Nasrullah Ali Fauzi (ed.), ICMI Antara Status Quo dan Demokratisasi, (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), p. 76-77.
8. Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the state: the transformation of Islamic political ideas and practices in Indonesia, thesis (doctoral), (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1994), p. 214.
9. Hefner, Robert W. “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization”, Sociology of Religion, Oxfort Journal, Published by: Oxford University Press, Vol 62, No 4, 2001, p. 504.
10. Hadiz Vedi R., “Indonesian Political Islam: Capitalist Development and the Legacies of the Cold War.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. 30, 1, 3-38.
11. Hefner. Public Islam, p. 505.
