Introduction
The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) government, formed in 2014 with the support of Hindutva forces, enjoys backing from significant sections of the big bourgeoisie and the blessings of international finance capital (Siddiqui, 2017). As a result, the government aggressively pursues neo-liberal policies in line with the demands of global financial interests. The ruling elites have found religion to be a powerful tool for diverting attention from pressing socio-economic demands. In this context, fascist tendencies have emerged, aligning well with the objectives of international finance capital. “Semi-fascism,” as described by Yechury (2021), represents a modern political phenomenon rooted in irrational, medieval ideologies.
The Hindu nationalist BJP government has been particularly oppressive, primarily targeting minority communities through mob lynchings, hate speech, and instilling fear in the public sphere. These attacks, especially against Muslims, take the form of mob violence, wrongful arrests, and the unjust imprisonment of Muslim youth on flimsy charges.
Seven decades ago, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, leader of the Dalit community, highlighted the attitude of majoritarian groups towards minorities, particularly when these groups seek their rightful share of political power. He observed that when minorities make such demands, they are often viewed with suspicion. Conversely, when the majority monopolizes power, this is considered “nationalism” rather than communalism. As Ambedkar stated: “Any claim for sharing the power by the minority is called communalism while monopolizing the whole power by the majority is called nationalism. Guided by such a philosophy, the majority is not prepared to allow minorities to share political power” (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2018, p. 172).
The root cause of communal violence in India stems from social polarization and religious chauvinism, exacerbated by political mobilization from groups like the RSS and BJP, as well as underlying poverty and inequality. Paul Brass (2003) argues that the construction and reinforcement of communal identities within India’s socio-cultural fabric have played a critical role in perpetuating inter-community hatred and violence. While identity politics can be beneficial when it empowers marginalized groups, it can also have adverse effects if it leads to divisiveness. When identity politics fosters competitive communalism, it disproportionately harms minority communities (Yechury, 2021).
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is driven by the promotion of Hindu supremacy, rooted in the belief of Hindu nationalism. The BJP serves as the political front of the RSS, as the latter does not directly participate in elections, positioning itself as a cultural organization. Historically, the RSS has drawn inspiration from Nazi and Italian fascist ideologies and their emphasis on discipline (Noorani, 2019; Siddiqui, 2020).
According to the RSS, Hindus are viewed as more loyal to the nation and, therefore, deserving of superior rights and privileges, while religious minorities should have inferior rights. The organization contends that granting equal rights to all citizens contradicts historical and religious truths and weakens national strength (Siddiqui, 2018a). Vinayak Savarkar (1883–1966), a key figure in Hindu nationalism, argued nearly a century ago about who could be considered truly loyal to India. According to Savarkar, loyal Indian citizens are those connected to the geography of India, born within its borders, and whose religion has indigenous roots. He defined these individuals as Hindus (Siddiqui, 2018b), thereby excluding Muslims from being considered faithful Indians. Today, Muslims make up around 200 million people, spread across various regions of India (Noorani, 2019).
Amartya Sen, a renowned economist, argues that a democratic government should be based on scientific reasoning and logical explanations rather than faith. He emphasizes the importance of fostering discussions and debates to reach a consensus. In a true democracy, the government should act impartially, avoiding favouritism towards any particular community and allowing space for dissenting voices. Sen believes that a democratic regime must address issues like inequality and poverty without regard to caste, race, religion, or ethnicity. It should not promote the “tyranny of the majority” (Siddiqui, 2017).
Incidence of Communal Violence in India
Following India’s independence, the country saw a sharp rise in communal violence, largely due to the Partition. However, between 1950 and 2000, rural India—where the majority of the population resides—accounted for only 3.6% of deaths related to Hindu-Muslim violence (Siddiqui, 2016a).
Hindu-Muslim riots in India are predominantly an urban phenomenon, with the violence concentrated in a few large cities. Notably, a small number of cities in northern and western Indian states account for a disproportionately high share of communal violence (Noorani, 2019).
Since the BJP came to power at the centre, communal polarization has intensified, with its leaders frequently delivering hate speeches targeting Muslims (See Figure 1). These speeches often portray Muslims as anti-national, raising questions about their loyalty to the Indian state. According to official statistics, over 2,900 cases of communal or religious violence were reported between 2017 and 2021. However, yearly figures reveal significant variation. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau shows that 378 cases of communal or religious rioting were registered in 2021, 857 in 2020, 438 in 2019, 512 in 2018, and 723 in 2017. Figure 1 illustrates that since 2014, 190 people have been killed due to religious riots in India. The distribution of communal/religious violence across different states in 2023 is presented in Figure 2a.
Figure 1: Number of People Killed in Communal Violence in Different States in India Since 2014.
Figure 2a: Number of Communal Violence in India in 2023.
Figure 2b: State Governments, Poltical Parties and Communal Riots in Inida, 2023.
The communal riots of 2023 follow a pattern similar to that of the past decade. Unlike in previous years, when there was elaborate planning involving the identification of targets, organization of personnel, and coordination of materials to carry out deadly attacks and cause significant damage to the minority community’s property, recent communal violence has taken on a more institutionalized nature.
Since the BJP came to power in 2014, communal violence has often been incited through religious processions and festivals, where Hindu extremists provoke unrest by chanting anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim slogans. This strategy frequently escalates into riots. The state apparatus, rather than acting impartially, has often targeted the minority community, subjecting them to disproportionate action, including the destruction of property and widespread arrests. This response, in many cases, fulfils the objectives of the rioters from the majority community, making the state appear complicit in the violence. Meanwhile, the Hindu nationalists who incite these riots largely enjoy impunity.
In 2023, of the 32 communal riots that occurred, 22 took place in states governed by the BJP, either independently or as part of ruling coalitions. Three riots occurred in West Bengal, ruled by the Trinamool Congress, and another three in states governed by the Indian National Congress. (As shown in Figure 2b) The BJP-led state governments not only failed to prevent communal violence but have often been complicit in stoking tensions and supporting the violence.
In 2002, under the leadership of then-Chief Minister Narendra Modi, Gujarat witnessed a horrific outbreak of communal violence in which over 2,000 people, mostly Muslims, were killed. This event is widely regarded as a pogrom, a form of communal violence where the state and government officials not only fail to prevent the violence but are actively complicit in the attacks against minority communities (Siddiqui, 2016b).
Since the BJP, led by Modi, took power at the national level, a new form of violence has emerged that had little precedent in India’s history – mob lynchings. These incidents involve Hindu mobs attacking individuals, often from minority communities, typically under the pretext of protecting cows (See Figure 3). Unlike large-scale communal riots, lynchings target one or a few individuals at a time, making them distinct from broader mob violence.
In BJP-ruled states, such as Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, Hindu mobs frequently assault Muslims while police stand by without intervening. In these same states, the police have also been involved in demolishing Muslim homes and businesses, often cheered on by mobs. These demolitions typically occur without any judicial rulings, as BJP-led state governments act on their own authority, bypassing court decisions.
Figure 3: Number of Mob Lynchings in India in 2023.
One of the major drivers of communal violence in India is political opportunism. Political parties, particularly Hindu extremist groups, frequently exploit religion and regional identity as tools to mobilize support and secure electoral victories. This approach exacerbates misunderstandings between communities and fosters hatred towards specific minority groups. Hindu nationalists believe that by delivering hate speeches, they can create a sense of insecurity among Hindus, who may then prioritize religious issues—such as the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya—over other concerns when casting their votes. In support of their agenda, they often distort historical facts to justify claims of so-called excesses committed during Muslim rule in India (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Number of Hate Speeches Delivered by Hindu Nationalists Across Indian States in 2023.
Causes of Communal Riots
Communal riots in India often stem from a complex mix of social, economic, and political tensions. Even a minor incident can escalate into large-scale violence, especially in societies marred by social discrimination and existing violent conflicts. India’s population is diverse, with Hindus constituting about 79.4%, Muslims 14.8%, Christians 2.3%, Sikhs 1.6%, and others making up 2%. While Hindu extremists have expressed some reservations about Christians, their animosity toward Muslims is far more pronounced and visible.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as the political arm of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), is a Hindu nationalist party whose ideology is especially hostile towards minorities, particularly Muslims, the largest minority group in India (Golwalkar, 1939). Since the 1970s, India has witnessed numerous outbreaks of Hindu-Muslim conflict, especially in northern states. One of the most horrific instances of such violence occurred in 2002, during the Gujarat riots, under the BJP government led by Narendra Modi.
Hindu extremist organizations like the RSS were established nearly a century ago. Although their ideology has evolved, the core principles remain unchanged. The primary objective of Hindutva is to establish a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu Nation). V.D. Savarkar, a key figure in Hindu nationalism, wrote in 1925: “A Hindu means a person who regards this land… from the Indus to the seas as his fatherland (pitribhumi) as well as his holy land (punyabhumi).” He argued that Hindus have their holy land in India, whereas Muslims and Christians have their religious Holy sites outside of India.
Later, in 1939, RSS leader M.S. Golwalkar asserted: “The foreign races in Hindustan [India] must… adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence the Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of the glorification of the Hindu race and culture… [and] may [only] stay in the country wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing… Not even citizen’s rights.”
The RSS has actively sought to reshape the interpretation of Indian history, aiming to glorify Hindu culture and diminish the contributions of Muslims to India’s development. They argue that Hindu society and culture declined following the arrival of Islam in India 1,200 years ago. However, historians have provided ample evidence of Muslim contributions to India’s socio-economic development. For instance, during the reign of Mughal ruler Aurangzeb in 1705, India accounted for 28% of the global GDP, produced 30% of the world’s manufactured goods, and was one of the most prosperous and largest trading nations globally.
Muslim rulers in India integrated themselves with local culture by marrying locally, financing the construction of temples, and promoting the arts and everyday conduct through their governance. Many religious conversions to Islam were influenced by Sufi saints rather than coercion. This interaction between Islam and India’s indigenous culture resulted in a unique, syncretic blend, forming what we now recognize as a composite Indian culture. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), a Muslim leader in the Indian independence movement, expressed this fusion eloquently: “I am Muslim and proud of that fact… In addition, I am proud of being an Indian. I am part of the indivisible unity that is Indian nationality… India’s historic destiny was that many human races and cultures and religious faiths should flow to her, and that many caravans should find rest here… One of the last of these caravans was that of the followers of Islam… Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements. Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our arts, our dress, our manners and customs… everything bears the stamp of our joint endeavour” (cited in Hay, 1991).
During the independence struggle, the Congress Party championed secularism and equal respect for all religions in India. Although Mahatma Gandhi was a devout Hindu, his interpretation of Hinduism was inclusive and tolerant. He believed that Muslims were an integral part of India and, even during the partition, insisted that India’s identity would be incomplete without them. This stance brought Gandhi into direct conflict with Hindu nationalists, particularly groups like the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. These organizations worked closely together, with overlapping membership and a shared goal of establishing a “Hindu Rashtra,” though they differed tactically on how to achieve it. In 1948, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by Nathuram Godse, a Hindu nationalist associated with the Hindu Mahasabha. This tragic event dealt a significant blow to Hindu nationalism, which lost support for decades.
Following Gandhi’s assassination, both the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS faced public backlash and were marginalized. However, by the early 1990s, the BJP gained substantial political strength. This rise coincided with an economic crisis and the Congress Party’s inability to offer a compelling socio-economic alternative. Hindu extremist groups campaigned vigorously for the demolition of the Babri Mosque and the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya, positioning themselves against concessions to backward Hindu castes.
During this period, the Indian bourgeoisie was also searching for an alternative to the Congress Party. The global political landscape was rapidly changing after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the end of the Cold War, with the US emerging as the sole superpower. Indian elites, eager to establish closer ties with the US, found ideological alignment with the RSS and BJP, who had long supported stronger relations with US imperialism (Siddiqui, 2009a).
Under these circumstances, the Indian elite began to see the BJP as a more suitable political vehicle. This shift marked a departure from the politics that had emerged in the 1920s during India’s independence struggle, led by Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi’s leadership emphasized two key objectives: achieving independence from British colonial rule and fostering social transformation within India. He famously stated that independence would be meaningless without Hindu-Muslim unity and the eradication of social evils such as untouchability (Siddiqui, 2022).
Jawaharlal Nehru, another key leader of the Congress Party, articulated his vision of secularism and nationalism in his book The Discovery of India (1946). For Nehru, India symbolized syncretism, pluralism, and tolerance—values that had shaped Indian history. He wrote, “Ancient India, like ancient China, was a world in itself, a culture and a civilization which gave shape to all things. Foreign influences poured in and often influenced that culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization… of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety was acknowledged and even encouraged.” Nehru believed that modernity, education, and economic development were key to bridging the communal divide, famously referring to industries and dams as the “temples of the modern age” (Nehru, 1989).
Religion has always played a significant role in shaping morality for the majority of Indians, and this remains true today. It’s important to note that communal riots were rare in the pre-British period, as traditional religiosity fostered religious tolerance and coexistence. Saints like Kabir and Guru Nanak promoted syncretic beliefs, preaching interfaith understanding, tolerance, and love between different religious communities (Nehru, 1989).
During the period of Muslim rule in India, both mosques and tombs were influenced by and adapted to the local environment. Mujeeb (1967) argues that these structures should be described not merely as “Muslim” but as “Indian Muslim.” The architectural styles of North Indian cities in precolonial India shared significant similarities with Persian and Turkish urban buildings, as well as with those of the contemporary Rajasthani Hindu kingdoms. This blending of styles illustrates the cultural syncretism that characterized the era (Mujeeb, 1967).
At the height of the Mughal Empire (1526-1767), the empire commanded unprecedented resources in Indian history and encompassed nearly the entire subcontinent. Between 1556 and 1707, India flourished as one of the world’s wealthiest nations, contributing more than 26 percent of global output and ranking among the top exporters of commodities such as cotton textiles, spices, silk, and pearls, all of which were in high demand worldwide, particularly in Europe. In contrast, India’s imports from Europe were minimal, as European goods found little appeal among Indian consumers. Consequently, India received gold in exchange for its exports, as the Industrial Revolution had not yet occurred, leaving European nations with little to offer to Indian markets
During this period, the Mughal Empire experienced remarkable wealth and glory, functioning as a highly efficient and centralized organization. It boasted a vast network of personnel, resources, and information dedicated to serving the emperor and his nobility (Habib, 1963). The relationship between Hindus and Muslims was predominantly peaceful, with integration between the communities taking place and little evidence of communal violence or animosity. However, during British colonial rule, the administration adopted a policy of divide and rule, encouraging the use of religious symbols within the British army. In response to the Congress Party’s push for ‘swaraj’ (independence) in the early 20th century, the colonial authorities fostered the growth of religious parties among both Hindus and Muslims, such as the Hindu Mahasabha/RSS and the Muslim League (Siddiqui, 2022).
Mughal culture and values represented a unique blend of Persian-Islamic and regional Indian elements, resulting in a distinctive Indian culture. Although regional identities began to assert themselves by the early 18th century, Mughal manners and ideals continued to influence society long after the decline of imperial central authority. The trajectory of the Mughal Empire during its first two centuries (1526–1748) illustrates the complexities of premodern state-building in the Indian subcontinent (Habib, 1963).
Emperor Akbar was a significant patron of architecture and the arts, establishing the Mughal style in both painting and architecture. He constructed notable buildings in Agra, Ajmer, Allahabad, and Lahore, but his greatest achievement is considered to be the planned city of Fatehpur Sikri, a magnificent complex built primarily between 1569 and 1572. This city features forts, palaces, and mosques in a distinctive style that largely draws from Persian architecture while incorporating numerous Indian elements. Akbar also had a keen interest in religion and literature; he commissioned translations of the great epics, the Mahābhārata and the Ramāyaṇa, as well as the Vedas, into Persian to make them accessible to Muslims seeking to understand the majority community’s religion and culture.
In his famous discussions at the ʿEbādatḵāna, Akbar expanded participation to a diverse group of articulate religious leaders, including Sufis, Hindus, Jains, Parsis, and Christians. This engagement reinforced his commitment to tolerance as a core personal and political principle. In 1564, primarily for reasons of state, he abolished the poll tax on non-Muslims (ǰezya) and adopted the slogan “peace with all” (Solḥ-e-Kull) as a guiding tenet of his rule (Mujeeb, 1967).
Conclusion
In recent times, social media has emerged as a catalyst for spreading misinformation and propaganda, which can exacerbate communal tensions and lead to violence. Additionally, competition in business and economic disparities within urban settings significantly contribute to communal strife. During periods of economic distress, it is common for individuals to scapegoat other communities for their challenges, which in turn fuels communal hatred and violence (Siddiqui, 2009b).
The state must take proactive measures to mitigate, rather than exacerbate, communal violence. This requires political and administrative reforms aimed at addressing the underlying socio-economic issues. To effectively tackle communal violence, comprehensive structural changes are essential, along with a commitment to fostering a more inclusive and pluralistic society.
The study concludes that the primary drivers of communal and religious violence between Hindus and Muslims in India are rooted in political agendas and deteriorating economic conditions, particularly rising inequalities and unemployment. Communal organizations, particularly Hindu extremist parties, exploit religion and regional identity as tools for garnering support and winning elections. This approach cultivates misunderstandings between communities and incites hatred toward specific groups.
To address the issue of communal violence in India, there is an urgent need for greater societal inclusion and inter-communal dialogue. Civil society, political parties, and legal reforms must work together to enhance the protection of minorities and promote communal harmony and tolerance. Education and awareness initiatives aimed at eradicating illiteracy and promoting secularism are vital. Such efforts can dispel misunderstandings about different religions and foster better relations between communities, paving the way for a more harmonious coexistence in India.
About the Author
Dr Kalim Siddiqui is an economist specialising in International Political Economy, Development Economics, International Trade, and International Economics. His work, which combines elements of international political economy and development economics, economic policy, economic history and international trade, often challenges prevailing orthodoxy about which policies promote overall development in less-developed countries. Kalim teaches international economics at the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield, UK. He has taught economics since 1989 at various universities in Norway and the UK.
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